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A STUDENTS' HISTORY OF GREECE



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
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
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THE ACROPOLIS



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# A STUDENTS' HISTORY OF GREECE

BY

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## PREFACE

WITH the consent of Professor J. B. Bury, I have prepared an edition of his "History of Greece for Beginners" which may serve as a text-book for Secondary Schools in this country. In preparing this edition, I have confined myself chiefly to excision, although in places a somewhat different arrangement of material has been adopted. No statement of fact has been changed, and as far as possible the author's exact language has been retained. This is especially true in the chapters dealing with Alexander, where, to keep the spirited account of the original, the proportion of this revision may have been sacrificed. I have ventured to add brief paragraphs dealing with some of the more important Greek authors, and to expand the paragraphs on the adornment of Athens; and have supplied a large number of new maps. To make the book more serviceable in Secondary Schools, a very few of the more important references to supplementary reading which I have found useful have been appended to each chapter; for those who wish more detailed topical reading, references have been given to "A History Syllabus for Secondary Schools, prepared by a Special Committee of the New England Teachers' Association."

I am under deepest obligations to Professor Edward Channing of Harvard University, who has read my manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. Acknowledgment is also due to my friend, Mr. H. B. Hinckley, who has assisted in reading the proof.

E. K.

NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS,

August 15, 1907.

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
A STUDENTS' HISTORY OF GREECE















# HISTORY OF GREECE

## CHAPTER I

### THE BEGINNINGS OF GREEK CIVILIZATION

**1. Greece and the Ægean.** — The most striking feature of continental Greece is the deep gulf which has cleft it asunder into two parts. The southern half ought to have been an island, — as its Greek name, “the island of Pelops,” suggests, — but it holds on to the continent by a narrow bridge of land at the eastern extremity of the great cleft. Now this physical feature has the utmost significance for the history of Greece; and its significance may be viewed in three ways, if we consider the existence of the dividing gulf, the existence of the isthmus, and the fact that the isthmus was at the eastern and not at the western end. (1) The double effect of the gulf itself is clear at once. It let the sea in upon a number of folk who would otherwise have been inland mountaineers, and increased enormously the length of the seaboard of Greece. Further, the gulf constituted southern Greece a world by itself; so that it could be regarded as a separate land from northern Greece. (2) But if the island of Pelops had been in very truth an island, — if there had been no isthmus, — there would have been from the earliest ages direct and constant intercourse between the coasts which are washed by the Ægean and those which are washed by the Ionian Sea. The eastern and western lands of Greece would have been brought nearer to one another, when the ships of trader or warrior, instead of tediously circumnavigating the Peloponnesus, could sail from the eastern to the western sea through the middle of Greece. The disappearance

of the isthmus would have revolutionized the roads of traffic and changed the centers of commerce; and the wars of Grecian history would have been fought out on other lines. (3) Again, if the bridge which attached the Peloponnesus to the mainland had been at the western end of the gulf, the lands along either shore of the inlet would have been more accessible to the commerce of the Ægean and the Orient; the civilization of northwestern Greece might have been more rapid and intense; and the history of Bœotia and Attica, unhooked from the Peloponnesus, would have run a different course.

The character of the Ægean basin was another determining condition of the history of the Greeks. Strewn with countless islands it seems meant to promote the intercourse of folk with folk. The Cyclades pass imperceptibly into the isles which the Asiatic coast throws out, and there is formed a sort of island bridge, inviting ships to pass from Greece to Asia. The western coast of Asia Minor belongs, in truth, more naturally to Europe than to its own continent; it soon became part of the Greek world; and the Ægean might be considered then as the true center of Greece.

The west side of Greece, too, was well furnished with good harbors. It was no long voyage from Corcyra to the heel of Italy, and the inhabitants of western Greece had a whole world open to their enterprise. But that world was barbarous in early times and had no civilizing gifts to offer; whereas the peoples of the eastern seaboard looked toward Asia and were drawn into contact with the immemorial civilizations of the Orient. The backward condition of western as contrasted with eastern Greece in early ages did not depend on the conformation of the coast, but on the fact that it faced away from Asia; and in later days we find the Ionian Sea a busy scene of commerce and lined with prosperous communities which are fully abreast of Greek civilization.

**2. The Divisions of Greece.**—The important geographical features and noted places in the peninsula of Greece may be conveniently considered in three main divisions: (1) Northern

Greece; (2) Central Greece; (3) Southern Greece, "the island of Pelops," or the Peloponnesus.

(1) *Northern Greece* contains the two large districts of Epirus and Thessaly which are separated from Macedonia by the Cambunian Mountains. Epirus, on the west coast, is a mountainous district, its people are rude and backward, and it has contributed little to influence Greek history. Almost in the center is Dodona, one of the oldest and most revered shrines in Greece. Across the Pindus range lies Thessaly, a great fertile plain, drained by the river Peneus which forces its way through the Vale of Tempe. To the north are the Cambunian Mountains from which rises Olympus, the loftiest peak in Greece on whose snow-capped heights the gods were supposed to dwell. On the east the Magnesian range, with the peaks of Ossa and Pelion, runs along the coast.

(2) *Central Greece* contains many small states. To the west are the rude mountainous districts of Acarnania and Ætolia. Nearly in the center, lies Phocis, famous for Mount Parnassus, the home of the Muses, and for Delphi, the most important oracle in Greece. To the east is Bœotia, a fertile plain, with the long river Cephissus flowing into Copais, the one large lake in Greece. In Bœotia are situated Orchomenus, one of the seats of the most ancient civilization, and Thebes, its great rival. Still farther to the east and separated from Bœotia by the Cithæron range, the peninsula of Attica projects into the Ægean. The chief city, Athens, situated on the Acropolis, at an early date asserted its supremacy over the entire district. On the Isthmus of Corinth, which connects central with southern Greece, are the two small states of Megaris and Corinthia.

(3) *The Peloponnesus* contains six divisions of varying size and importance. On the northeast, joined with Corinthia, is Argolis, in whose plain lie the ruins of the ancient cities of Mycenæ and Tiryns; and where is situated the city of Argos, the early rival of Sparta. To the south is the district of Laconia whose fertile valley between the Parnon and Taygetus mountains, is drained by the



river Eurotus, on whose banks is situated the city of Sparta. West of Laconia is Messenia, which was subjected to Sparta at an early date. To the north lies the great inland state of Arcadia, whose lofty valleys are surrounded by still loftier mountains. To the extreme northwest is Elis, a harborless stretch of coast through which flows the Alpheus, one of the longest rivers of Greece. Here is situated Olympia, where every four years were celebrated games in honor of Zeus. Along the northern coast of the Peloponnesus fronting on the Corinthian Gulf lies Achæa.



3. **Influence of Geography on History.** — Greece is thus a land of mountains and small valleys; it has few plains of even moderate

size and no considerable rivers. It is therefore well adapted to be a country of separate communities, each protected against its neighbors by hilly barriers; and the history of the Greeks is a story of small independent states. The political history of all countries is in some measure under the influence of geography; but in Greece geography made itself preëminently felt, and fought along with other forces against the accomplishment of national unity. The islands formed states by themselves; but as seas, while like mountains they sever, may also, unlike mountains, unite, it was less difficult to form a sea than a land empire. In the same way, the hills prevented the development of a brisk land traffic, while, as we have seen, the broken character of the coast and the multitude of islands facilitated intercourse by water.

There is no barrier to break the winds which sweep over the Euxine toward the Greek shores. Hence the Greek climate has a certain severity and bracing quality, which promoted the vigor and energy of the people. Again, Greece is by no means a rich and fruitful country. It has few well-watered plains of large size; the cultivated valleys do not yield the due crop to be expected from the area; the soil is good for barley, but not rich enough for wheat to grow freely. Thus though the tillers of the earth had hard work, the nature of the land tended to promote maritime enterprise. On one hand, richer lands beyond the seas attracted the adventurous, especially when the growth of the population began to press on the means of support. On the other hand, it ultimately became necessary to supplement home-grown corn by wheat imported from abroad. But if Demeter denied her highest favors, the vine and the olive grew abundantly in most parts of the country, and their cultivation was one of the chief features of ancient Greece.

**4. Remains of Ægean Civilization.** — It is in the lands of Thessaly and Epirus that we first dimly descry the Greeks busy at their destined task of creating and shaping the thought and civilization of Europe. The oldest known sanctuary of Zeus, their



supreme god, is the oakwood of Dodona in Epirus. But it was specially in Thessaly, where the first Greek settlers were the Achæans, that this race, living on the plains of Argos and the mountains round about it, fashioned legends which were to sink deep into the imagination of Europe. Here they peopled Olympus, in whose shadow they dwelled, with divine inhabitants, so that it has become forever the heavenly hill in the tongues of men. And here, also, they composed lays in the hexameter verse, that marvellous meter which is probably of their invention. But the Achæans were immigrants in Thessaly, having come from another home in the mountains of Illyria, and their descendants migrated again, before the art of the hexameter was perfected in those lays sung at the banquets of their nobles, which give us in the Homeric literature our earliest picture of those ancient Aryan institutions which are common to ourselves and to the Greeks.

Moreover, when the Greek migrants came to the shores of the Ægean, they found there a white race more advanced in civilization than themselves. This Ægean race, as it may be called, which, like the Ligurians in Italy or the Iberians in Spain, preceded the Aryan conqueror, was a race of traders, having intercourse with many lands. We have lately come to know a good deal of its life, from the remains of its civilization, discovered at Troy and in the islands of Amorgos and Melos, and in Crete.

(1) *Crete*. — At the time when the kings of the Twelfth Dynasty were reigning in Egypt, Crete was a land of flourishing communities, and was about to become, if it had not already become, a considerable sea power. It is probable that Cnossus was one of the strongest and richest settlements in Crete at the beginning of the second millennium. The remains of the palace, which in subsequent ages was transformed into a grander and more luxurious abode, have recently been dug out of the earth; and its stones, on




COIN OF CNOSSUS,  
EARLY (OBVERSE).  
MINOTAUR [LE-  
GEND: ΚΝΟΣ]

which the emblem of a double axe is inscribed, declare that the kings who dwelled therein were devoted to the worship of a great deity whose symbol was the double axe or *labrys*. It was from this god of the *labrys* that the Labyrinth of Cretan legend derived its name; and it seems probable that this palace on the hill of Cnossus was the original Labyrinth, afterward converted by myth into the Dædalean maze which sheltered the Minotaur.

The palace is unprotected by the massive walls, which characterize the ruins of this age, thus showing that its lords were seakings, depending for their strength upon their ships. The royal wealth was secured in a series of storerooms built side by side; stone chests for treasure and large jars for storage have been found in abundance. And the kings kept accurate record and account of their possessions, for the art of writing was perfectly familiar in Crete in the days when she played the greatest part she was ever destined to play in the history of the world. Hundreds of written documents have been found in the Cnossian palace. The writing material was small tablets of clay, which were preserved in wooden boxes secured by seals. The writing, which is of linear character, cannot be read; but it has been made out that about seventy signs were in common use.

(2) *Tiryns and Mycenæ*. — Tiryns stands on a long, low rock about a mile and a half from the sea, and the land around it was once a marsh. From north to south the hill rises in height; it was shaped by man's hand into three platforms, of which the southern and highest was occupied by the palace of the king. But the whole acropolis was strongly walled round by a structure of massive stones, laid in regular layers but rudely dressed, the crevices being filled with a mortar of clay. This fashion of building has been called Cyclopean from the legend that masons called Cyclôpes were invited from Lycia to build the walls of Tiryns.

The stronghold of Mycenæ, about twelve miles inland, at the northeastern end of the Argive plain, was built on a hill which rises to nine hundred feet above the sea-level. The shape of




LION GATE, MYCENÆ

the citadel is a triangle, and the greater part of the wall is built in the same "Cyclopean" style as the wall of Tiryns, but of smaller stones. Another fashion of architecture, however, also occurs, and points to a later date than Tiryns. The gates and some of the towers are built of even layers of stones carefully hewn into rectangular shape. On the northeast side, a vaulted stone passage in the wall led by a subterranean path to the foot of the hill, where a cistern was supplied from a perennial spring outside the walls. Thus the garrison was furnished with water in case of a siege. Mycenæ had two gates. The lintel of the chief doorway is formed by one huge square block of stone, and the weight of the wall resting on it is lightened by the device of leaving a triangular space. This opening is filled by a sculptured stone relief representing two lionesses standing opposite each other on either side of a pillar, on whose pedestal their forepaws rest. They are, as it were, watchers who ward the castle, and from them the gate is known as the Lion gate.

The ruins on the hill of Tiryns enable us to trace the plan of the palace of its kings. One chief principle of the construction of the palaces of this age seems to have been the separation of the dwelling-house of the women from that of the men, — a principle which continued to prevail in Greek domestic architecture in historical times. The halls of king and queen alike are built on the same general plan as the palace in the old brick city on the hill of Troy and the palaces which are described in the poems of Homer. An altar stood in the men's courtyard (*αὐλή*), which was enclosed by pillared porticoes; the portico (*αἶθουσα*) which faced the gate being the vestibule of the house. Double-leafed doors opened from the vestibule into a preliminary hall (*πρόδομος*), from which one passed through a curtained doorway over a great stone threshold (*λαῖνος οὐδός*) into the men's hall (*μέγαρον*). In the midst of it was the round hearth — the center of the house — encircled by four wooden pillars which supported the flat roof. The palace of Mycenæ crowned the highest part of the hill, and its plan was, in general





AREA OF MYCENAEAN CIVILIZATION

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conception and in many details, like that of Tiryns. It was customary to embellish the walls by inset sculptured friezes and by paintings. A brilliant alabaster frieze, inset with *cyanus* or paste of blue glass, decorated the vestibule of the hall at Tiryns, and the men's halls in both palaces were adorned with mural pictures.

Besides their castle and palace, the burying-places of the kings of Mycenæ are their most striking memorials. Close to the western wall, south of the Lion gate, the royal burial circle has been discovered, within which six tombs cut vertically into the rock had remained untouched by the hand of man since the last corpses were placed in them. Weapons were buried with the men, some of whose faces were covered with gold masks. The heads of the women were decked with gold diadems; rich ornaments and things of household use were placed beside them. But a day came when this simple kind of grave was no longer royal enough for the rich princes of Mycenæ, and they sought more imposing resting-places; or else, as some believe, they were overthrown by lords of another race, who brought with them a new fashion of sepulcher. Nine sepulchral domes, hewn in the opposite hillside, have been found not far from the acropolis. The largest of them is generally known as the "Treasury of Atreus," a name which rose from a false idea as to its purpose.

But besides the stately burying-places of the kings, the humbler tombs of the people have been discovered — square chambers cut into the rock. The town of Mycenæ below the citadel consisted of a group of villages, each of which preserved its separate identity; each had its own burying-ground. Thus Mycenæ, and probably other towns of the age, represented an intermediate stage between the village and the city — a number of little communities gathered together in one place, and dominated by a fortress.

We have seen how in the royal graves on the castle hill treasures of gold, long hidden from the light of day, revealed the wealth of the Mycenæan kingdom. Treasures would perhaps have been found also in some of the great vaulted tombs if they had not been



rified by plunderers in subsequent ages. But for us the works of the potter, and the implements of war and peace fashioned by the bronze-smith, are of more value than the golden ornaments for studying this early civilization; and things of daily use have been found in the lowlier rock-tombs as well as in the royal sepulchers of hill or plain. From the implements which the people used, and also from the representations which artists wrought, we can win a rough picture of their dress, armor, and ornaments, and form an idea of their capacity in art.

(3) *Attica and Bœotia*. — In Attica there are many relics. On the Athenian Acropolis there are a few stones supposed to belong to a palace of great antiquity, but we can look with more certainty on some of the ancient foundations of the fortress wall. This wall was called Pelargic or Pelasgic by the Athenians; and it seems likely that the word preserves the name of the ancient inhabitants of the place, the Pelasgoi.

In Bœotia there are striking memorials. On the western shores of the great Copaic marsh a people dwelled, whose wealth was proverbial; and their city Orchomenus shared with Mycenæ the attribute of "golden" in the Homeric poems. One of their kings built a great sepulchral vault under the hill of the citadel, and later generations took it for a treasury. It approached, though it did not quite attain to the size of the Treasure-house of Atreus itself.

(4) *Troy*. — Modern research on the hill of Hissarlik, in the northwest corner of Asia Minor, shows that in an earlier period a great city flourished on the hill of Troy. It was built of sun-baked brick, and stood on the ruins of an older city built of stone. The brick city had three gates, and towers protected the angles of its walls. Its inhabitants belonged to the stone and copper age; bronze was still a rarity with them. But the palace, which can be traced, shows the same general ground-plan of a house as that which is described perhaps fifteen hundred years later in the poems of Homer. From an outer gate we pass through a courtyard, in

which an altar stood, into a square preliminary chamber; and from it we enter the great hall, in the center of which was the hearth. Long before the Greeks came, the Ægean race were building such houses as Homer tells of.

The great brick city was destroyed by fire, probably about 2000 B.C.; and three other cities were reared and perished on that same site. Civilization progressed; bronze superseded stone



TROY, SIXTH CITY (VIEW FROM EAST TOWER). PREHISTORIC WALL ON THE LEFT (ROMAN FOUNDATIONS ON RIGHT)

tools, as tin was brought in more abundance from the west. The new Troy, through whose glory the name of the spot was to become a household word forever throughout all European lands, was built on the levelled ruins of the older towns. The circuit of the new city was far wider, and within a great wall of well-wrought stone, the citadel rose, terrace upon terrace, to a highest point. On that commanding summit, as at Mycenæ, we must presume that

The six  
(Homer  
city of  
1600-11  
B.C.

the king's palace stood. The houses of which the foundations have been disclosed within the walls have the same simple plan that we saw in the older brick city and in the palaces of Mycenæ and Tiryns. The wall was pierced by three or four gates, the chief gate being on the southeast side, guarded by a flanking tower. The builders were more skilful than the masons of the ruder walls of the fortresses of Argolis; and it is a question whether we are to infer that the foundation of Troy belongs to a later age, or that from the beginning the art of building was more advanced among the Trojans. But if Troy shows superior excellence in military masonry, its civilization in other ways seems to have been simpler than that of the Argive plain. It imported, indeed, the glazed Mycenæan wares, and was in contact with Ægean civilization. But Troy stands, in a measure, apart from the "Mycenæan" world — beside it, in contact with it, yet not quite of it. This was natural; for in speech and race the Trojans stood apart. We know with full certainty who the people of Troy were; we know that they were a Phrygian folk and spoke a tongue akin to our own.

(5) *Ægean Civilization.* — The civilization of the men whose monuments we have been considering belonged to the age of bronze and copper. Even in its later period, iron was still so rare and costly that it was used only for ornaments — rings, for instance, and possibly for money. The arms with which the men of Mycenæ attacked their foes were sword, spear, and bow. Their defensive armor consisted of huge helmets, probably made of leather; shields of ox-hide reaching from the neck almost to the feet — complete towers of defence, but so clumsy that it was the chief part of a military education to manage them. The princes went forth to war in two-horsed war-chariots, which consisted of a board to stand on and a breastwork of wicker. The fragment of a silver vessel (found in one of the rock-tombs of Mycenæ) shows us a scene of battle in front of the walls of a mountain city, from whose battlements women, watching the fight, are waving their hands.

Men wore long hair, not, however, flowing freely, but tied or

plaited in tresses. In old times they let the beard grow both on lip and chin; but the fashion changed, and in the later period, as we see from their pictures, they shaved the upper lip. Razors have been found in the tombs. Their garments were simple, a loin apron and a cloak fastened by a clasp-pin; in later times, a close-fitting tunic. High-born dames wore tight bodices and wide gown-skirts. Frontlets or bands round the brow were



SIEGE SCENE ON A SILVER VESSEL; 8-SHAPED SHIELD ABOVE IN LEFT CORNER (MYCENÆ)

a distinction of their attire, and they wore their hair elaborately curled, or coiled high in rings, letting the ends fall behind. The ornaments which have been found in the royal tombs of Mycenæ show that its queens appeared in glittering gold array.

The remains at Mycenæ, Tiryns, and Cnossus are, taken in their

entirety, the most impressive of the memorials of a widespread Ægean civilization. In the Peloponnesus, nowhere except at Tiryns and Mycenæ have great fortresses or palaces been found; but



GEM SHOWING FEMALE  
DRESS (MYCENÆAN)

some large vaulted hill-tombs, on the same plan as those of the Argive plain, mark the existence of ancient principalities. The lords of Amyclæ, which was the queen of the Laconian vale before the rise of Greek Sparta, hollowed out for themselves a lordly tomb, which, unlike the Treasury of Atreus, was never invaded by robbers.

In this vault, among other costly treasures, were found the most precious of all the works of Mycenæan art that have yet been drawn forth from the earth: two golden cups on which a metal-worker of matchless skill has wrought vivid scenes of the snaring and capturing of wild bulls.

**5. Inferences from the Relics of Ægean Civilization.** — Having taken a brief survey of the character and range of the “Mycenæan civilization,” we come to inquire whether any evidence exists, amid these chronicles of stone and clay, of gold and bronze, for determining the periods of its rise, bloom, and fall. In the first place, it belongs to the age of bronze; the iron age had not begun. Iron was still a rare and precious metal in the later part of the period; it was used for rings, but not yet for weapons. The iron age can hardly have commenced in Greece long before the tenth century; and if we set the beginning of the bronze age at about 2000 B.C., we get roughly the second millennium as a delimitation of the period within which “Mycenæan” culture flourished and declined.

The art of writing was known to the Cretans, but we can interpret neither their signs nor their language. But in Egypt, evidence has been discovered which teaches us in what centuries the potters of the Ægean made their wares and shipped them to distant shores.



In the sixteenth century, men of Ægean type bearing Mycenæan vases were represented on a wall-painting at Egyptian Thebes. At Gurob, a city which was built in the fifteenth century and destroyed two or three hundred years later, a number of "false-necked" jars imported from the Ægean have been found; and they belong not to the earlier, but to the later, period of Mycenæan pottery.

But Egyptian evidence is found not only on Egyptian soil, but on both sides of the Ægean. Three pieces of porcelain, one inscribed with the name, the two others with the "cartouche," of Amenhotep III. of Egypt (before 1400 B.C.), and a scarab with the name of his wife, have been found in the chamber-tombs of Mycenæ; and a scarab of the same Amenhotep was discovered in the burying-place of Ialysus in Rhodes. It would follow that in the fifteenth century, at latest, the period of the chamber-tombs and the vaulted tombs began.

The joint witness of these and other independent pieces of evidence proves that the civilization of which Mycenæ and Cnossus were principal centers was flourishing from the sixteenth to the thirteenth century.

Such was the world which the Greeks had come to share, and soon to transform, on the borders of the Ægean Sea. It was a world created by folk who belonged to the European race which had been from of old in possession of this corner of the earth. Greek civilization, it is well to repeat, was simply a continuation and supreme development of that more primitive civilization of which we caught glimpses before the bronze age began. There is no reason to suppose that these peoples were designated by any common name; there were, doubtless, many different peoples with different names which are unknown to us. We know that there were Pelasgians in Thessaly and in Attica; tradition suggests that the Arcadians were Pelasgians, too. But it is probable that all these peoples, both on the mainland of Greece and in the Ægean islands, belonged to the same non-Aryan race, — a dark-

haired stock,— which also included the Mysians, the Lydians, the Carians, perhaps the Leleges, on the coast of Asia Minor.

There seems little doubt that this prehistoric Ægean world was composed of many small states. Of the relation of these states

to one another, of the political events of the period, we know almost nothing; but the eminent position of "golden" Mycenæ herself seems to be established. Her comparative wealth is indicated by the treasures of her tombs, which exceed all treasures found elsewhere in the Ægean. But her lords were not only rich; their power stretched beyond their immediate territory. This fact may be inferred from the road system which connected Mycenæ with Corinth, and must have been constructed by one of her kings. Three narrow but stoutly built highways have been traced, the two western joining at Cleonæ, the eastern going by Teneæ.



THE ARGIVE PLAIN

They rest on substructions of "Cyclopean" masonry; streams are bridged and rocks are hewn through; and as they were not wide enough for wagons, the wares of Mycenæ were probably carried to the Isthmus on the backs of mules.

There was an active sea-trade in the Ægean — a sea-trade



which reached to the Troad and to Egypt ; but there is no proof that Mycenæ was a naval power. Everything points to Crete as the queen of the seas in this age, and to Cretan merchants as the carriers of the Ægean world. The predominance of Crete survived in the memories of Minos, whom tradition exalted as a mighty sea-king who cleared the Ægean of pirates and founded a maritime power.



PAINTED TOMBSTONE WITH WARRIORS (MYCENÆ, LOWER TOWN)

The discoveries made by excavation on the hill of Cnossus show that this tradition embodied historical fact. The remains of the great palace testify, as we have seen, to a dynasty, lasting for two hundred years, of rich sea-kings. That period of Cnossian power had begun by the commencement of the fifteenth, and endured into the thirteenth century, though perhaps hardly beyond. It seems at least probable that the destruction of Cnossus occurred before the destruction of Mycenæ.

Of the power and resources of the Ægean states, the monuments hardly enable us to form an absolute idea. They were small, as we saw; it was an age

When men might cross a kingdom in a day.

The kings had slaves to toil for them; the fortresses and the large tombs were assuredly built by the hands of thralls. One fact shows in a striking way how small were these kingdoms, and how slender their means, compared with the powerful realms of Egypt and the Orient. If Babylonian or Egyptian monarchs, with their command of slave-labor, had ruled in Greece, they would assuredly have cut a canal across the Isthmus and promoted facilities for commerce by joining the eastern with the western sea.

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<sup>1</sup> A History Syllabus for Secondary Schools prepared by a Special Committee of the New England History Teachers' Association. D. C. Heath & Co. Boston, 1904. This syllabus contains a good analysis and a list of topics.



## CHAPTER II


### THE GREEK CONQUEST AND THE HOMERIC AGE

1. **The Greek Conquest.** — It must not be supposed that the non-Aryan Ægean population was either exterminated or wholly enthralled by the Aryan Greek invaders. In the first place, the invaders were not wholly Aryan, though they had men of Aryan blood among them, from whom they had taken their institutions, some of their gods, and their tongue. They were all men of Aryan speech, not all of Aryan stock. Secondly, though the older tongues disappeared entirely, that is due to the character of the Greek language, which, as later history shows, was vigorous and masterful. Wherever the Greeks settled, it became the language of the land. And so, in Greece itself, sometimes the Greeks came in as conquerors, predominant both in numbers and power, sometimes merely as settlers; but everywhere the country was Græcized. In Attica and Arcadia, for example, there was little disturbance of the original inhabitants, and tradition preserved the fact in various myths pointing to the antiquity of the two races (*αὐτόχθονες*).

Thus what took place was not a single irruption, but a gradual infiltration of a new stock into an older one, carrying the introduction of a new language. By some cause the Greeks were being pressed southward from their home in the northwest of the Balkan peninsula; while at the same time — perhaps from a kindred reason — the Phrygians and Trojans, who dwelt in western Macedonia and southern Thrace, were moving eastward and across the straits into Asia Minor. And this process, so far as the Greeks were concerned, extended on over centuries. The northwestern lands of Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia were certainly lands of

Greek speech many years before the conquest of the Peloponnesus. But it need not be supposed that northern Greece was completely overspread by the Greeks before they began to pass into the southern peninsula. The first Greek settlers of the Peloponnesus must have crossed by boat from the northwest shore of the Corinthian Gulf; and the countries afterward called Achæa, Elis, and Messenia, together with the Arcadian highlands, had at least begun to be hellenized sooner than Laconia and Argolis. The Greeks reached Argolis from the eastern side. From Thessaly the new people spread southward along the eastern coast to Eubœa, and the shores of Attica, to the Cyclad islands, and lastly to Argolis. Other settlers penetrated into the fertile mountain-girt country afterward to be called Bœotia. Some of these were perhaps the Minyæ, who inhabited Orchomenus in the heroic age, though again this may have been the name of the natives whom the Greeks hellenized. In Attica some of the settlements seem to have been made by a tribe called *Iāvōnes* or Ionians, and these settled in Argolis also.

All this was a long and gradual process. It needed many years for the Greeks to blend with the older inhabitants and hellenize the countries in which they settled. In eastern Greece, where the Ægean civilization flourished, the influence was reciprocal. While the Greeks gradually imposed their language on the native races, they learned from a civilization which was more advanced than their own. Things shaped themselves differently in different places according to the number of the Greek settlers and the power and culture of the native people. In some countries, as seemingly in Attica, a small number of Greek strangers leavened the whole population and spread the Greek tongue; thus Attica became Greek, but the greater part of its inhabitants were sprung, not from Greeks, but from the old people who lived there before the Greeks came. In other countries the invaders came in larger numbers and the inhabitants were forced to make way for them. We may say, at all events, that there was a time for most lands in Greece





when the Greek strangers and the native people lived side by side, speaking each their own tongue and exercising a mutual influence which was to end in the fusion of blood, out of which the Greeks of history sprang.

No reasonable system of chronology can avoid the conclusion that Greeks had already begun to settle in the area of Ægean civilization, when the Ægean civilization of the bronze age was at its height. Coming by dribblets, they fell under its influence in a way which could not have been the case if they had swept down in mighty hordes, conquered the land by a few swoops, and destroyed or enslaved its peoples. It is another question how far the process of assimilation had already advanced when the lords of Mycenæ and Orchomenus and the other royal strongholds built their hill-tombs; and it is yet another whether any of these lords belonged to the race of the Greek strangers. To these questions we can give no positive answers; but this much we know: in the twelfth century, if not sooner, the Greeks began to expand in a new direction, eastward beyond the sea; and they bore with them to the coast of Asia the Ægean civilization. That civilization is what we find described in pictures of the heroic age of Greece.

1500-1000  
B.C.

2. **Expansion of the Greeks to the Eastern Ægean.** — (1) *Æolians.* — The first Greeks who sailed across the Ægean were the Achæans and their fellows from the hills and plains of Thessaly and the plain of the Spercheus. Along with the Achæans there sailed as comrades and allies the Æolians. It was to the northern part of Asia Minor, the island of Lesbos and the opposite shores, that the Achæan and Æolian adventurers steered their ships, and here they planted the first Hellenic settlements on Asiatic soil. The coast-lands of western Asia Minor are, like Greece itself, suitable for the habitations of a seafaring people. A series of river-valleys are divided by mountain chains which run out into promontories so as to form deep bays; and the promontories are continued in islands. The Greek invaders won the coast-lands



from the Mysian natives, and seized a number of strong places which they could defend, — such as Cyme, Ægæ, Old Smyrna. They pressed up the rivers, and on the Hermus they founded Magnesia under Mount Sipylus.

The Greeks made no settlement in the Troad. But in occupying the country south of the Troad, they came into collision with the great Phrygian town of Troy, or Ilios, as it was called from King Ilos, who perhaps was its founder. There were weary wars. Then the mighty fortress fell; and we need not doubt the truth of the legend which records that it fell through Grecian craft or valor. The Phrygian power and the lofty stronghold of “sacred Ilios” made a deep impression on the souls of the Greek invaders; and the strife, on whatever scale it really was, blended by their imagination with the old legends of their gods, inspired the Achæan minstrels with new songs. Through their minstrelsy the struggle between the Phrygians and the Greek settlers assumed the proportion of a common expedition of all the peoples of Greece against the town of Troy; and the Trojan war established itself in the belief of the Greeks as the first great episode in the everlasting debate between east and west.

It is to be observed that the Greeks and Phrygians in that age do not seem to have felt that they were severed by any great contrast of race or manners. They were conscious, perhaps, of an affinity in language; and they had the same kind of civilization. This fact comes out in the Homeric poems, where, though some specially Phrygian features are recognized, the Trojans might be a Greek folk and their heroes have Greek names;<sup>1</sup> and it bears witness to the constant intercourse between the Achæan colonists and their Phrygian neighbors.

(2) *Ionians*. — The Achæan wave of emigration was succeeded by an Ionian wave, flowing mainly from the coasts of Attica and Argolis, and new settlements were planted, south of the elder Achæan settlements. The two-pronged peninsula between the

<sup>1</sup> Paris (Phrygian) = Alexander (Greek) is an instance of a double name.

Hermus and Cayster rivers, with the off-lying isle of Chios, the valleys of the Cayster and Mæander, with Samos and the peninsula south of Mount Latmos, were studded with communities which came to form a group distinct from the older group in the north. Of the foundation of the famous colonies of Ionia, of the order in which they were founded, and of the relations of the settlers with the Lydian natives, we know little. Clazomenæ and Teos arose on the north and south sides of the neck of the peninsula which runs out to meet Chios; and Chios, on the east coast of her island, faces Erythræ on the mainland — Erythræ, “the crimson,” so called from its purple fisheries, the resort of Tyrian traders. Lebedus and Colophon lie on the coast as it retires eastward from Teos to reach the mouth of the Cayster; and there was founded Ephesus, the city of Artemis. South of Ephesus and on the northern slope of Mount Mycale was the religious gathering-place of the Ionians, the temple of the Heliconian Poseidon, which, when once the Ionians became conscious of themselves as a sort of nation and learned to glory in their common name, served to foster a sense of unity among all their cities, from Phocæa in the north to Miletus in the south. There was one great inland city, Magnesia on the Mæander, which must not be confused with the inland Æolian city, Magnesia on the Hermus.

The Greek settlers brought with them their poetry and their civilization to the shores of Asia. Their civilization is revealed to us in their poetry, and we find that it resembles in its main features the civilization which has been laid bare in the ruins of Mycenæ and other places in elder Greece. The Homeric poems show us, in fact, a later stage of the civilization of the heroic age. The Homeric palace is built on the same general plan as the palaces that have been found at Mycenæ and Tiryns, at Troy, and in the Copaic Lake. The blue inlaid frieze in the vestibule of the hall of Tiryns proves that the poet’s frieze of cyanus in the hall of Alcinous was not a fancy; and he describes as the cup of Nestor a gold cup with doves perched on the handles, such as one which was found

in a royal tomb at Mycenæ. There is, indeed, one striking difference in custom. The Mycenæan tombs reveal no trace of the habit of burning the dead, which the Homeric Greeks invariably practiced; while the poems ignore the practice of burial. In later times both customs existed in Greece side by side.



GOLD CUP, WITH DOVES (MYCENÆ)

It follows, first, that by the twelfth century the Greeks had assimilated the civilization of the Ægean. Secondly, that whatever fate befell the Mycenæan civilization in the mother-country, it continued without a break in the new Greece beyond the seas, and developed into that luxurious Ionian civilization which meets

us some centuries later. New elements were added in the meantime; intercourse with Phrygia and Syria, for example, brought new influences to bear; but the permanent framework was the heritage from the ancient folk of the Ægean.

**3. The Later Wave of Greek Invasion.** — The colonization of the Asiatic coasts and islands extended over some hundreds of years, and it was doubtless accelerated and promoted at certain stages of its progress by the changes which were happening in the mother-country. The ultimate cause of these movements, which affected almost the whole of Greece from north to south, was probably the pressure of the Illyrians.

(1) *Ætolia*. — This downward pressure was fatal to Ætolia. In the Homeric poems we see that "Pleuron by the sea and rocky Calydon" and the other strong cities of that region were abreast of the civilization of the heroic age. But in the later ages of Greek history, we find Ætolia regarded as a half-barbarous country, the abode of men who spoke, indeed, a Greek tongue, but had lagged ages and ages behind the rest of Greece in science and civilization. We find the neighboring countries in the same case. Epirus suddenly lapsed into comparative barbarism, and the sanctuary of Dodona remained a lonely outpost. The explanation of this falling away is the irruption and conquest by Illyrian invaders, who swamped Greek civilization instead of assimilating it.

This invasion naturally drove some of the Greek inhabitants across the gulf, and Ætolian emigrants made their way to the river Peneus, where they settled, took to themselves the name of Æleans or "Dalesmen," and gradually extended their power to the Alpheus. Their land was a tract of downs with a harborless coast, and they never became a maritime power.

(2) *Thessaly*. — In Epirus the pressure of the Illyrians led to two movements of great consequence, the Thessalian and the Boëtian migration. There is nothing to show decisively that these two movements happened at the same time or were connected with each other. A folk, called Thessaloi, crossed the hills and

settled in the western corner of the land which is bounded by Pelion and Pindus. They gained the upper hand and spread their sway over northern Argos. They drove the Achæans southward into the mountains of Phthia, and henceforward these Achæans play no part of any note in the history of Greece. The Thessalian name soon spread over the whole country, which is called Thessaly to the present day. Crannon, Pagasæ, Larisa, and Pheræ became the seats of lords who reared horses and governed the surrounding districts. The conquered people were reduced to serfdom and were known as the Laborers (*Penestai*); they cultivated the soil, at their own risk, paying a fixed amount to their lords; and they had certain privileges; they could not be sold abroad or arbitrarily put to death. We know almost nothing of the history of the Thessalian kingdoms; but in later times we find them combined in a very loose political organization, which lay dormant in times of peace; but through which, to meet any emergency of war, they could elect a common captain, with the title of *tāgos*.

(3) *Achæa*. — But all the folk did not remain to fall under the thralldom imposed by the new lords. A portion of the Achæans migrated southward to the Peloponnesus, probably accompanied by their neighbors the Hellenes, who lived on the upper waters of the river Spercheus. The Achæans and Hellenes together founded settlements along the strip of coast which forms the southern side of the Corinthian Gulf; and the whole country was called Achæa. Thus there were two Achæan lands, the old Achæa in the north, now shrunk into the mountains of Phthia, and the new Achæa in the south; while in the land which ought to have been the greatest Achæa of all, — the Asiatic land in which the poetry of Europe took shape, — the Achæan name was merged in the less significant title of *Æolis*.

(4) *Bœotia*. — The lands of Helicon and Cithæron experienced a similar shock to that which unsettled and changed the lands of Olympus and Othrys; they were occupied by the Bœotians. Ac-

According to the Greek account, the Bœotians lived in Thessaly and moved southward in consequence of the Thessalian conquest. They first occupied places in the west of the land which they were to make their own. From Chæronea and Coronea they won Thebes, which was held by an old folk called the Cadmeans. Thence they sought to spread their power over the whole land. They spread their name over it, for it was called Bœotia, but they did not succeed in winning full domination as rapidly as the Thessalians succeeded in Thessaly. The rich lords of Orchomenus preserved their independence for hundreds of years, and it was not till the sixth century that anything like a Bœotian unity was established. The policy of the Bœotian conquerors, who were perhaps comparatively few in number, was unlike that of the Thessalians; the conquered communities were not reduced to serfdom.

(5) *Phocis and Doris*. — West of Bœotia, in the land of the Phocians amid the regions of Mount Parnassus, there were changes of a less simple kind. Hither came the Dorians, who probably belonged to the same "northwestern" group of the Greek race as the Thessalians and Bœotians. But the greater part of them soon went forth to seek fairer abodes in distant places. Yet a few remained behind in the small basin-like district between Mount Oeta and Mount Parnassus, where they preserved the illustrious Dorian name throughout the course of Grecian history, in which they never played a part. It would seem that the Dorians also took possession of Delphi, the "rocky threshold" of Apollo, and planted some families there who devoted themselves to the service of the god.

4. **The Dorian Migration.** — The departure of the Dorians from the regions of Parnassus was probably gradual, and it was accomplished by sea. They built ships — perhaps the name of Naupactus, "the place of the ship-building," is a record of their ventures; and they sailed round the Peloponnesus to the south-eastern parts of Greece. Some sailed to Crete, others to the south-



ern coast of Asia Minor, where, though taking little part in the history of Hellas, they preserved their Hellenic speech.

(1) *Laconia*. — The next conquests of the Dorians were in the Peloponnesus. There were three distinct conquests — the conquest of Laconia, the conquest of Argolis, the conquest of Corinth. The Dorians took possession of the rich vale of the Eurotas, overthrew the lords of Amyclæ, and, keeping their own Dorian stock pure from the mixture of alien blood, reduced all the inhabitants to the condition of subjects. It seems probable that the Dorian invaders who subdued Laconia were more numerous than the Dorian invaders elsewhere. The eminent quality which distinguished the Dorian from other branches of the Greek race was that which we call “character”; and it was in Laconia that this quality most fully displayed and developed itself, for here the Dorian seems to have remained more purely Dorian.

(2) *Argolis*. — In Argolis the course of things ran otherwise. The invaders, who landed under a king named Temenos, had doubtless a hard fight; but their conquest took the shape, not of subjection, but of amalgamation. It is to the time of this conquest that the overthrow of Mycenæ may best be referred; and here, as in the case of Amyclæ, it seems probable that the old native dynasty had already given place to Greek lords. Certain is it that both Mycenæ and Tiryns were destroyed suddenly and set on fire. Henceforward Argos under her lofty citadel was to be queen of the Argive plain.

(3) *Corinth*. — Dorian ships were also rowed up the Saronic Gulf. It was the adventure of a prince whom the legend calls Errant, the son of Rider (Ἀλήτης, son of Ἰππότης). He landed in the Isthmus and seized the high hill of Acrocorinth, the key of the peninsula. This was the making of Corinth. Here, as in Argolis, there was no subjection, no distinction between the conquerors and the conquered. The geographical position of Corinth between her seas determined for her people a career of commerce, and her history shows that the Dorians had the qualities

of bold and skilful traders. For a time Corinth seems to have been dependent on Argos, whose power was predominant in the eastern Peloponnesus for more than three hundred years.

From Argos the Dorians made two important settlements in the north, on the river Asopus — Sicyon on its lower, and Phlius on its upper, banks. And beyond Mount Geraneia, another Dorian city arose, called Megara, "the Palace," on the commanding hill which looks down upon the western shore of Salamis.

The conquest of the eastern Peloponnesus was followed by a second Dorian colonization of the Asiatic coast. The bold promontories below Miletus, the islands of Cos and Rhodes, were occupied by colonists from Argolis, Laconia, Corinth, and Crete. On the mainland Halicarnassus was the most important Dorian settlement, but it was formed in concert with the Carian natives, and was half Carian.

As for the chronology of all these movements which went to the making of historical Greece, we must be content with approximate limits:—

Achæan colonization	}	13th-10th centuries.
Fall of Cnossus		
Fall of Troy		
Beginnings of Ionian colonization		
Thessalian conquest		
Bœotian conquest		
Dorian conquest of Crete and islands	}	
Dorian conquest of eastern Peloponnesus		
Colonization of Cyprus . . . . .		11th century.
Continuation of Ionian colonization . . . . .		10th century.
Dorian colonization of Asia Minor . . . . .		10th century.

5. **Homer.**—No Greek folk has laid Europe under a greater debt of gratitude than the Achæans, for the Achæans originated epic poetry, and the beginning of European literature goes back to them. But their European epic was created on Asiatic soil. They brought with them to Asia old poetic tales which figured the strife of night and day, of winter and summer, and all nature's

great processes. And, stimulated by the toils and adventures of settling in a new land, they began to retell these old tales, changing them into historical myths. Achilles may be a sea-god, Agamemnon (who was worshipped as Zeus Agamemnon at Sparta) a god of the sky. Achilles is his foe, as he is also of Memnon, the sun-god, whom he slays. But an event of actual history is introduced as the motive of the wrath of Achilles. He is wroth for the sake of Briseis, a Lesbian captive, and the taking of Bresa was an actual event.

When legend and history began to be blended, the element of history triumphed, and the nature-myth dropped out of sight. In the early days the Trojan story seems to have ended with the death of Hector. The original conception was not the tale of a siege which found its consummation in the fall of the fortress; the siege was rather the setting for the strife between Agamemnon and Achilles, between Achilles and Hector. The story of Troy's fall and the wooden horse is a later invention.

It was, perhaps, in the eleventh century, at Smyrna or some other Æolian town, that the nucleus of the *Iliad* was composed, on the basis of those older lays, by a poet whom we may call the first Homer, though it is not probable that he was the poet who truly bore that name. He sang in the Achæan, or as it came to be called the Æolian, tongue. His poem was the wrath of Achilles and the death of Hector, and it forms only the smaller part of the *Iliad*. It was not till the ninth century that the *Iliad* really came into being. Then a poet of supreme genius arose, and it may be that he was the singer whose name was actually Homer. He composed his poetry in rugged Chios, and he gives us a local touch when he describes the sun as rising over the sea. He took in hand the older poem of the wrath of Achilles and expanded it into the shape and compass of the greater part of the *Iliad*. He is the poet who created one of the noblest episodes in the whole epic, Priam's ransoming of Hector. Tradition made Homer the author of both the great epics, the *Odyssey* as well as the *Iliad*.

This is not probable. It can hardly have been before the eighth century that the old lays of the wandering of Odysseus and the slaying of the suitors were taken in hand and wrought into a large poem.

We may suppose, then, that Homer lived at Chios in the ninth century, and was the true author of the *Iliad*. He did not give it the exact shape in which it was ultimately transmitted; for it received from his successors in the art additions and extensions which were not entirely to its advantage. But it was he, to all seeming, who first conceived and wrought out the idea of a mighty epic. He was no mere stringer together of ancient lays. He took the motives, he caught the spirit, of the older poems; he wove them into the fabric of his own composition; but he was himself as divinely inspired as any of the older minstrels. He was the father of epic poetry, in the sense in which we distinguish an epic poem with a large argument from a short song. He and his successors sang in Ionia, and rewrote the poems in Ionian dialect, though sometimes for the sake of meter they were obliged to keep the Æolian form. But in rewriting they sought to reproduce, not the atmosphere of their own age, but that which was familiar to the original writers of the songs. For example, the weapons and gear described are those of the bronze age; but now and then a slip betrays the later hand. Unwittingly, the poet of the *Odyssey* allows it to escape that he lived in the iron age, for such a proverb as "the mere gleam of iron lures a man to strife" could not have arisen until iron weapons had been long in use.

In the course of time the Trojan War began to assume the shape of a great national enterprise. All the Greeks looked back to it with pride; all desired to have some share in its glory. Consequently, a great many stories were invented in various communities for the purpose of bringing their ancestors into connection with the Trojan expedition. And the *Iliad* was regarded as something of far greater significance than an Ionian poem; it was accepted as a national epic, and was, from the first, a powerful influence in

promoting among the Greeks community of feeling and tendencies toward national unity. For two hundred years after its birth the *Iliad* went on gathering additions; and the bards were not unready to make insertions in order to satisfy the pride of the princely and noble families at whose courts they sang. Finally, in the seventh century, the Catalogue of the Greek host was composed, formulating explicitly the Panhellenic character of the expedition against Troy.

The *Odyssey*, affiliated as it was to the Trojan legend, became a national epic, too. And the interest awakened in Greece by the idea of the Trojan War was displayed by the composition of a series of epic poems, dealing with those events of the siege which happened both before and after the events described in the *Iliad*, and with the subsequent history of some of the Greek heroes. These poems were anonymous for the most part, and passed under the name of Homer. Along with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, they formed a chronological series which came to be known as the Epic Cycle.

**6. Political and Social Organization of the Early Greeks.** — The Homeric poems give us our earliest glimpse of the working of those political institutions which lie at the base of all the constitutions of Europe. They show us the King at the head. But he does not govern wholly of his own will; he is guided by a Council of the chief men of the community whom he consults; and the decisions of the council and king deliberating together are brought before the Assembly of the whole people. Out of these three elements — King, Council, and Assembly — the constitutions of Europe have grown; here are the germs of all the various forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

But in the most ancient times this political organization was weak and loose. The true power in primitive society was the family. When we first meet the Greeks, they live together in family communities. Their villages are habitations of a *genos*; that is, of a clan, or family in a wide sense, — all the members being descended from a common ancestor and bound together by the

tie of blood. Originally, the chief of the family had the power of life and death over those who belonged to the family; and it was only as the authority of the state grew and asserted itself against the comparative independence of the family, that this power gradually passed away. But the village communities were not isolated and independent; they were part of a larger community which is called the *phylē* or tribe. The tribe was the whole people of the kingdom, in the kingdom's simplest form; and the territory which the tribe inhabited was called its deme (*δῆμος*). When a king became powerful and won sway over the demes of neighboring kings, a community consisting of more than one tribe would arise.

It was usual for several families to group themselves together into a society called a *phratra* or brotherhood, which had certain common religious usages. The significance of the brotherhood is illustrated by Homer's description of an outcast, as one who has no "brothers" and no hearth.

The importance of the family is most vividly shown in the manner in which the Greeks possessed the lands which they conquered. The soil did not become the private property of individual freemen, nor yet the public property of the whole community. The king of the tribe or tribes marked out the whole territory into parcels, according to the number of families in the community; and the families cast lots for the estates. Each family then possessed its own estate; the land belonged to the whole kin, but not to any particular member. The right of property in land seems to have been based, not on the right of conquest, but on a religious sentiment. Each family buried their dead within their own domain; and it was held that the dead possessed forever and ever the soil where they lay, and that the land round about a sepulcher belonged rightfully to their living kinsfolk, one of whose highest duties was to protect and tend the tombs of their fathers.

The king was at once the chief priest, the chief judge, and the supreme leader of the tribe. He belonged to a family which



claimed descent from the gods themselves. His relation to his people was conceived as that of a protecting deity; "he was revered as a god in the deme." The kingship passed from sire to son, but it is probable that the people might refuse to accept a degenerate son who was unequal to the tasks that his father had fulfilled. The sceptered king had various privileges—the seat of honor at feasts, a large and choice share of booty taken in war and of food offered at sacrifices. A special area of land was marked out and set apart for him as a royal domain, distinct from that which his family owned.

A king had no power to enforce his will, if it did not meet the approval of the heads of the people. He must always look for the consent and seek the opinion of the deliberative Council of the Elders. Certain families had come to hold a privileged position above the others — had, in fact, been marked out as noble, and claimed descent from Zeus; and the Council was composed of this nobility. In the puissant authority of this Council of Elders lay the germ of future aristocracy.

More important than either king or council for the future growth of Greece was the gathering of the people, out of which democracy was to spring. All the freemen of the tribe — all the freemen of the nation, when more tribes had been united — met together, not at stated times, but whenever the king summoned them, to hear and acclaim what he and his councillors proposed, — to hear and acclaim, but not to debate or propose, themselves. As yet, the gathering of the folk for purposes of policy had not been differentiated from the gathering for the purpose of war. The Assembly was not yet distinguished as an institution from the army; and if Agamemnon summons his host to declare his resolutions in the plain of Troy, such a gathering is the Agora in no figurative sense: it is in the fullest sense the Assembly of the people.

Though the monarchy of this primitive form, as we find it reflected in the Homeric lays, generally passed away, and was

already passing away when the latest lays were written, it survived in a few outlying regions which lagged behind the rest of the Hellenic world in political development. Thus the Macedonian Greeks in the lower valley of the Axios retained a constitution of the old Homeric type till the latest times — the royal power continually growing.

The constitutional fabric of the Greek states was thus simple and loose in the days of Homer. In the later part of the royal period a new movement was setting in, which was to decide the future of Greek history. The city began to emerge and take form and shape out of the loose aggregate of villages. The inhabitants of a plain or valley were induced to leave their scattered villages and make their dwellings side by side in one place, which would generally be under the shadow of the king's fortress. Sometimes the group of villages would be girt by a wall; sometimes the protection of the castle above would be deemed enough. The movement was promoted by the kings; and it is probable that strong kings often brought it about by compulsion. But in promoting it they were unwittingly undermining the monarchical constitution, and paving the way for their own abolition. A city-state naturally tends to be a republic.

In the heroic age, then, and even in the later days when the Homeric poems were composed, the state had not fully emerged from the society. No laws were enacted and maintained by the state. Those ordinances and usages (*θέμις*) which guided the individual man in his conduct, and which are necessary for the preservation of any society, were maintained by the sanction of religion. There were certain crimes which the gods punished. But it was for the family, not for the whole community, to deal with the shedder of blood. The justice which the king administered was really arbitration. A stranger had no right of protection, and might be slain in a foreign community, unless he was bound by the bond of guest friendship with a member of that community, and then he came under the protection of Zeus, the

Hospitable (*Xenios*). Wealth in these ages consisted of herds and flocks; the value of a suit of armor, for instance, or a slave was expressed in oxen. Piracy was a common trade, as was inevitable in a period when there was no organized maritime power strong enough to put it down. So many practiced this means of livelihood that it bore no reproach; and when seamen landed on a strange strand, the natural question to ask them was: "Outlanders, whence come ye? are ye robbers that rove the seas?"

**7. Fall of Greek Monarchies and Rise of the Republics.** — Under their kings the Greeks had conquered the coasts and islands of the Ægean, and had created the city-state. These were the two great contributions of monarchy to Grecian history. Throughout the greater part of Greece in the eighth century, the monarchies were declining and disappearing, and republics were taking their place. It is a transformation of which we can only guess at probable causes; but we may be sure that the deepest cause of all was the change to city life. In some cases, gross misrule may have led to the violent deposition of a king; in other cases, if the succession to the scepter devolved upon an infant or a paltry man, the nobles may have taken it upon themselves to abolish the monarchy. In some cases, the rights of the king might be strictly limited, in consequence of his seeking to usurp undue authority; and the imposition of limitations might go on until the office of king, although maintained in name, became in fact a mere magistracy in a state wherein the real power had passed elsewhere. Of the survival of monarchy in a limited form, we have an example at Sparta; of its survival as a mere magistracy, in the *Archon Basileus* at Athens.

Where the monarchy was abolished, the government passed into the hands of those who had done away with it — the noble families of the state. When the nobles assume the government and become the rulers, an aristocratic republic arises. Sometimes the power was won, not by the whole body of the noble clans, but by the clan to which the king belonged. This was the case at

Corinth, where the royal family of the Bacchiads became an oligarchy of the narrowest form.

At this stage of society, birth was the best general test of excellence that could be found, and the rule of the nobles was a true aristocracy, the government of the most excellent. They practiced the craft of ruling; they were trained in it, they handed it down from father to son; and though no great men arose, — great men are dangerous in an aristocracy, — the government was conducted with knowledge and skill. Close aristocracies, like the Corinthian, were apt to become oppressive. But on the whole the Greek republics flourished in the aristocratic stage, and were guided with eminent ability.

The two great achievements of the aristocratic age were the planting of Greek cities in lands far beyond the limits of the Ægean Sea, and the elaboration of political machinery. The first of these was simply the continuation of the expansion of the Greeks around the Ægean itself; it was systematically promoted by the aristocracies, and it took a systematic shape. The creation of political machinery carried on the work of consolidation which the kings had begun when they gathered together into cities the loose elements of their states. When royalty was abolished or given, as it were, to a commission, the ruling families of the republic had to substitute magistracies tenable for limited periods, and had to determine how the magistrates were to be appointed, how their functions were to be circumscribed, how the provinces of authority were to be assigned. New machinery had to be created, to replace that one of the three parts of the constitution which had disappeared.

**8. Phœnician Intercourse with Greece.** — The Greeks were destined to become a great seafaring people; but sea-trade was a business which it took them many ages to learn. Their occupation of the islands was accompanied by a decline of the maritime supremacy which the Ægean islanders and especially the Cretans enjoyed; and there was a long interval during which the

trade of the Ægean with the east was partly carried on by strangers. The men who took advantage of this opening were the Phœnicians of the city-states of Sidon and Tyre on the Syrian coast, men of that Semitic stock to which Jew, Arab, and Assyrian alike belonged. The Phœnicians, doubtless, had marts here and there on coast or island; they certainly had a station at Abdera in Thrace. Their ships were ever winding in and out of the Ægean isles from south to north, bearing fair naperies from Syria, fine-wrought bowls and cups from the workshops of Sidonian and Cypriot silversmiths, and all manner of luxuries and ornaments; and this constant commercial intercourse, lasting for two centuries, is amply sufficient to account for all the influence that Phœnicia exerted upon Greece.

One inestimable service the Phœnicians are said to have rendered to Hellas, and thereby to Europe. It is generally supposed that they gave the Greeks the most useful instrument of civilization, the art of writing. If this theory is true, it was perhaps at the beginning of the ninth century, hardly later, that the Phœnician alphabet was moulded to the needs of the Greek language. In this adaptation the Greeks showed their genius. The alphabet of the Phœnicians and their Semitic brethren is an alphabet of consonants; the Greeks added the vowels. They took some of the consonantal symbols for which their own language had no corresponding sounds, and used these superfluous signs to represent the vowels. We may suppose that the original idea was worked out in Ionia. In Ionia, at all events, writing was introduced at an early period and was perhaps used by poets of the ninth century. Certain it is that the earliest reference to writing is in the *Iliad*, in the story of Bellerophon, who carries from Argos to Lycia "deadly symbols (σῆματα λυγρά) in a folded tablet." It seems simpler to suppose that the poet had in his mind a letter written in the Greek alphabet, than that he was thinking of the old pictorial forms of writing which were employed in ancient times.

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**Sources.** Homer, Iliad and Odyssey.

For an excellent list of topics based on the Homeric poems, see West, Ancient History, 96.



## CHAPTER III

### THE EXPANSION OF GREECE

1. **Causes and Character of Greek Colonization.** — The expansion of the Greeks beyond Greece proper and the coasts of the *Ægean*, the planting of Greek colonies on the shores of Thrace and the Black Sea, in Italy and Sicily, even in Spain and Gaul, began in the eighth, and reached its completion in the sixth, century. It was the continuation of the earlier expansion over the *Ægean* islands and the coast of Asia Minor, the details of which are unknown to us. The great difference between Greek and Phœnician colonization is that, while the Phœnicians aimed solely at promoting their commerce, and only a few of their settlements, notably Carthage, became more than mere trading-stations or factories, Greek colonization satisfied other needs than desire of commercial profit. It was the expression of the adventurous spirit which has been poetically reflected in the legends of the “Sailing of the *Argo*” and the “Home-coming of *Odysseus*” — the same spirit, not to be expressed in any commercial formula, which prompted English colonization.

Trade, of course, sometimes paved the way. The merchants of Miletus, who risked themselves in the dangerous waters of the *Euxine*, observed natural harbors and inviting sites for cities, and when they returned home, organized parties of settlers. The adventurous, the discontented, and the needy were always to be found. But in the case of the early colonies at least, it was not overpopulation of the land, so much as the nature of the land system, that drove men to emigrate. In various ways, under the family system, which was ill-suited to independent and adventurous spirits, it

would come about that individual members were excluded from a share in the common estate, and separated from their kin. Again, the political circumstances of most Greek states in the eighth and seventh centuries favored emigration. We have seen that at this time the aristocratic form of government generally prevailed. There were strong inducements for men to leave their native city, where they were of little account, and to join in the foundation of a new *polis* where they might themselves rule. In fact, political discontent was an immediate cause of Greek colonization.

Wherever the Greek went, he retained his customs and language, and made a Greek "polis." It was as if a bit of Greece were set down on the remote shores of the Euxine or in the far west on the wild coasts of Gaul or Iberia. The colony was a private enterprise, but the bond of kinship with the "mother-city" was carefully fostered. Intercourse between colonies and the mother-country was specially kept up at the great religious festivals of the year, and various marks of filial respect were shown by the daughter to the mother. When, as frequently befell, the colony determined herself in turn to throw off a new shoot, it was the recognized custom that she should seek the *æcist* or leader of the colonists from the mother-city. Thus the Megarian colony, Byzantium, when it founded its own colony, Mesembria, must have sought an *æcist* from Megara. The political importance of colonization was sanctified by religion, and it was a necessary formality, whenever a settlement was to be made, to ask the approbation of the Delphic god. The most ancient oracular god of Greece was Zeus of Dodona. But the oak-shrine in the highlands of Epirus was too remote to become the chief oracle of Greece, and the central position of Delphi enabled the astute priests of the Pythian Apollo to exalt the authority of their god as a true prophet to the supreme place in the Greek world.

Colonization tended in two ways to promote a feeling of unity among the Greek peoples. By the wide diffusion of their race on the fringe of barbarous lands, it brought home to them more fully

the contrast between Greek and barbarian, and, by consequence, the community of the Greeks. The Greek dwellers in Asia Minor were naturally impressed with their own unity in a way which was strange to dwellers in Bœotia or Attica, who were surrounded on all sides by Greeks, and were therefore alive chiefly to local differences. In the second place, colonization led to the association of Greeks of different cities. An œcist who decided to organize a party of colonists could not always find in his own city a sufficient number of men willing to take part in the enterprise. He therefore enlisted comrades from other cities; and thus many colonies were joint undertakings and contained a mixture of citizens of various nationalities.

2. Colonies on the Coasts of the Euxine, Propontis, and North Ægean. — A mist of obscurity hangs about the beginnings of the



COLONIES IN THE PONTUS AND PROPONTIS

first Greek cities which arose on the Pontic shores. Here Miletus was the pioneer. Merchants carrying the stuffs which were manufactured from the wool of Milesian sheep may have established

trading-stations along the southern coast. But the work of colonization beyond the gate of the Bosphorus can hardly have fully begun until the gate itself was secured by the enterprise of Megara, which sent out men, in the first part of the seventh century, to found the towns of Chalcedon and Byzantium. This is the first appearance of the little state of Megara in Greek history; and none of her contemporaries took a step that was destined to lead to greater things than the settlement on the Bosphorus. Westward from Byzantium they also founded Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis; eastward they established "Heraclea in Pontus," on the coast of Bithynia.

677 B.C.

553 B.C.



GREEK COLONIES IN THE NORTHERN ÆGEAN

The enterprise of the Megarians stimulated Miletus. At the most northerly point of the southern coast a strait-necked cape forms two natural harbors, an attractive site for settlers, and here the Milesians planted the city Sinope. Farther east arose another Milesian colony, Trapezus. At the Bosphorus the Milesians had been anticipated by Megara, but they partly made up for this by planting Abydus on the Hellespont opposite Sestos, and they also

645 B.C.

seized a jutting promontory on the south coast of the Propontis, where a narrow neck, as at Sinope, forms two harbors. The town was named Cyzicus; the tunny-fish on her coins shows what was one of the chief articles of her trade. Lampsacus, at the northern end of the Hellespont, once a Phœnician factory, was colonized by another Ionian city, Phocæa, about the same time.


If Miletus and Megara took the most prominent part in extending the borders of the Greek world eastward of the Hellespont, the northwestern corner of the Ægean was the special domain of Eubœa.



EARLY COIN OF POTIDÆA (OBVERSE).  
POSEIDON RIDING;  
STAR

The coast of Macedonia, between the rivers Axios and Strymon, runs out into a huge three-pronged promontory. Here Chalcis planted so many towns that the whole promontory was named Chalcidice. Some of the chief cities, however, were founded by other states, notably Corinthian Potidæa on the most westerly of the three prongs, which was called Pallene. Sithonia was the central prong, and Acte, ending in Mount Athos, the eastern. Some of the colonies on Pallene were founded by Eretria, and those along the coast north of Acte by Andros, which was dependent on Eretria. Hence we may regard this group of cities as Eubœan, though we cannot regard it as Chalcidian. On the west side of the Thermaic Bay, two Eubœan colonies were planted — Pydna and Methone — on Macedonian soil.

**3. Colonies in the Western Mediterranean.**—The earliest mention of Sicilian and Italian regions in literature is to be found in some later passages of the *Odyssey*, which should perhaps be referred to the eighth century. By the end of the seventh century, Greek states stood thick on the east coast of Sicily and round the sweep of the Tarentine Gulf. These colonies naturally fall into four groups: (1) the Eubœan settlements in Italy; (2) the Eubœan settlements in Sicily; (3) the Dorian settlements in Sicily and Italy; (4) the Achæan settlements in Italy.





(1) *The Eubæan Settlements in Italy.* — The earliest navigation of the western seas was ascribed to Heracles, who reached the limits of the land of the setting sun, and stood on the ledge of the world looking out upon the stream of Oceanus. From him the opposite cliffs which form the gate of the Mediterranean were called the Pillars of Heracles. The earliest colony founded by Greek sailors in the western seas was said to have been Cyme on the coast of Campania. Tradition assigned to it an origin before 1000 B.C. But though we place its origin in the eighth century, the tradition that it was the earliest Greek city founded in Italy may possibly be true. Chalcis, Eretria, and Cyme, a town on the eastern coast of Eubœa, coöperated and succeeded in establishing their colony, Cyme, on a rocky height which rises above the sea where the Italian coast is about to turn sharply eastward to encircle the bay of Naples. Subsequently they occupied the harbor, which was inside the promontory and established there the town of Dicæarchia, which afterward became Puteoli; farther east they founded Naples, "the new city."

The solitary position of Cyme in these regions — for no Greek settlement could be made northward on account of the great Etruscan power, and there was no rival southward until the later foundation of Posidonia — made her influence both wide and noiseless. There are no striking wars or struggles to record; but the work she did holds an important and definite place in the history of European civilization. To the Eubœans of Cyme, we may say that we owe the alphabet which we use to-day, for it was from them that the Latins learned to write. Again, the Cymæans introduced the neighboring Italian peoples to a knowledge of the Greek gods and Greek religion. Heracles, Apollo, Castor, and Polydeuces became such familiar names in Italy that they came to be regarded as original Italian deities. The oracles of the Cymæan Sibyl, prophetess of Apollo, were believed to contain the destinies of Rome.

(2) *Sicily and the Eubæan Settlements in Sicily.* — The next

settlement of the Eubœan Greeks was on Sicilian, not Italian, ground. The island of Sicily is the center of the Mediterranean; it parts the eastern from the western waters. It has been thus marked out by nature as a meeting-place of nations; and the struggle between European and Asiatic peoples, which has been called the "Eternal Question," has been partly fought out on Sicilian soil. There has been in historical times no native Sicilian power. The greatness of the island was due to colonization — not migration — from other lands. Lying as a connecting link between Europe and Africa, it attracted settlers from both sides.

The earliest inhabitants of the island were the Sicans. From them the island was called Sicania. The next comers were the Sicels, and as we find Sicels in the toe of Italy, we know that tradition correctly described the Sicilian Sicels as settlers from the Italian peninsula. The Sicels wrested from the Sicans the eastern half of the island, which was thus cut up into two countries — Sicania in the west, Sicelia in the east. At a very early time Sicania was invaded by a mysterious people named Elymians, probably of Iberian race. They occupied a small territory in the northwest of the island. Of these three peoples who inhabited this miniature continent, soon about to become the battlefield of Greek and Phœnician, the Sicels were the most numerous and most important.

At an early age merchants from Phœnicia planted factories on the coasts of the island. At first they did not make any settlements of a permanent kind — any that could be called cities. For Sicily was to them only a house to call at, lying directly on their way to the land of the farthest west, when they went forth to win the golden treasures of Tarshish and planted their earliest colony, Gades, outside the straits which divide Europe from Africa. Their next colonies were on the coast of Africa over against Sicily, and this settlement had a decisive influence on the destinies of the island. The settlements of Hippo and Utica, older than Carthage, were probably the parents of the more abiding Phœnician settle-

ments in Sicily. In the east of the island the Phœnicians had no secure foothold; they appeared purely in the guise of traders. Hence when the Greeks came and seriously set to work to plant true cities, the Phœnicians disappeared.

Sicilian, like Italian, history really opens with the coming of the Greeks. They came under the guidance of Chalcis and the auspices of Apollo. It was naturally on the east coast, which faces Greece, that the first Greek settlement was made, and it is to be noticed that of the coasts of Sicily the east is that which most resembles in character the coast-line of Greece. The site, which was chosen by the Chalcidians, and the Ionians of Naxos who accompanied them, was not a striking one. A little tongue of land, north of Mount Ætna, was selected for the foundation of Naxos. Here, as in the case of Cyme, the Chalcidians who led the enterprise surrendered the honor of naming the new city to their less prominent fellow-founders. A sort of consecration was

always attached to Naxos as the first homestead of the Hellenes in the island. An altar to Apollo was erected on the spot where the Greeks first landed, at which it was the habit of ambassadors from old Greece to offer sacrifice as soon as they arrived in



COIN OF ZANCLE, EARLY (OBVERSE).  
HARBOR OF ZANCLE, WITH A DOL-  
PHIN [LEGEND: ΔΑΝΚ (λαζων)]



COIN OF HIME-  
RA, EARLY (OB-  
VERSE). COCK

Sicily. In the fertile plain south of Ætna the Chalcidians soon afterward founded Catane, close to the sea, and inland Leontini. These cities were wrested from the Sicels. The Chalcidians also won possession of the northeast corner, and thus obtained command of the straits between the island and the mainland. Here Cymæans and Chalcidians planted Zancle on a low rim of land, which resembles a reaping-hook (ζάγκλον), and gave the place its name. The haven is

735 B.C.

728 B.C.

715 B.C.

648 B.C.

formed by the curving blade; and when Zancle came in after-days to mint money, she engraved on her coins a sickle representing her harbor and a dolphin floating within it. A hundred years later the city was transformed by the immigration of a company of Messenians, and ultimately the old local name was ousted in favor of Messana. From Zancle the Eubœans founded Himera, the only Greek city on the northern coast. It was important for Zancle that the land over against her, the extreme point of the Italian peninsula, should be in friendly hands, and therefore the men of Zancle incited their mother-city to found Rhegium; and in this foundation Messenians took part.

(3) *Dorian Settlements in Sicily.*—While this group of Chalcidian colonies was being formed in northeastern Sicily, Dorian Greeks began to obtain a footing in south-eastern Sicily. The earliest of the Dorian cities was also the greatest. Syracuse, destined to be the head of Greek Sicily, was founded by Corinthian emigrants under the leadership of Archias before the end of the eighth century. Somewhere about the same time Corinth also colonized Corcyra; the Ionian islands were halfway stations to the west. Tradition placed both foundations in the same year. But in both cases Corinth had to dispossess previous Greek settlers, and in both cases the previous settlers were Eubœans. Her colonists had to drive Eretrians from Corcyra and Chalcidians from Syracuse.

At an early date Megarians also sailed into the west to find a new home. After various unsuccessful attempts to establish themselves, they finally built their city on the coast north of Syracuse, beside the hills of Hybla, and perhaps Sicel natives joined in founding the Sicilian Megara. But, like her mother, the new Megara was destined to found a colony more famous than herself.



734 B.C.

COIN OF SYRACUSE,  
EARLY (OBSERVE).  
HEAD OF ARETHU-  
SA; DOLPHINS [LE-  
GEND: ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ]

628 B.C.

688 B.C.

595 B.C.

This settlement, which was to be the westernmost outpost of Greek Sicily, was Selinus, a town named of wild celery (*σέλινον*), situated on a low hill on the coast. In the meantime, the southeastern corner was being studded gradually with Dorian cities. At the beginning of the seventh century, Gela was planted by Rhodian colonists with Cretans in their train. At a later time, Camarina was planted from Syracuse.

581 B.C.

The latest Dorian colony of Sicily was only less conspicuous than the first. The Geloans sought an œcist from their Rhodian metropolis, and founded, halfway between their own city and Selinus, the lofty town of Acragas, which soon took the second place in Greek Sicily and became the rival of Syracuse. It was perched on a high hill near the sea-shore. The small, poor haven was at some distance from the town; "flock-feeding Acragas" never became a maritime power.

In planting their colonies and founding their dominion in Sicily the Greeks had mainly to reckon with the Sicels. In their few foundations in the farther west they had to deal with the Sicans. These older inhabitants were forced to retire from the coasts, but they lived on their fortresses on the inland hills. The island was too large and its character too continental to invite the newcomers to attempt to conquer the whole of it. With the Phœnicians the Greeks had no trouble. Their factories and temples had not taken root in the soil, and on the landing of a stranger who was resolved to take root, they vanished. But they did not abandon the western corner of the island, where the Greeks made no attempt to settle. There they maintained three places which now assumed the character of cities. These were Panormus, Solus, and Motya. The Elymian country lay between Motya and Panormus. The chief town of the Elymians, Segesta (which in Greek mouths became Egesta), was essentially a city, while Eryx, farther west, high above the sea but not actually on it, was their outpost of defence. At Eryx they worshipped some goddess of nature, soon to be identified with

the Greek Aphrodite. The Elymians were on good terms with the Phœnicians, and western Sicily became a Phœnician corner. While the inland country was left to Sicel and Sican, the coasts were to be the scene of struggles between Phœnician and Greek.

Italy, the name by which we know the central of the three great peninsulas of the Mediterranean, did not extend as far north as the Po in the time of Julius Cæsar, and originally it covered a very small area indeed. In the fifth century Thucydides applied the name Italy to the western of the two extremities into which the peninsula is divided. This extremity was inhabited, when the Greeks first visited it, by Sicels and Ænotrians, on whose seaboard the Achæans of the Peloponnesus, probably toward the close of the eighth century, found a field for colonization. The first colonies which they planted in Italy were perhaps Sybaris and Croton, famous for their wealth and their rivalry. Sybaris, on the river Crathis, in an unhealthy but most fruitful plain, soon extended her dominion across the narrow peninsula, and, founding the settlements of Laos and Scidros on the western coast, commanded two seas. Thus, having in her hands an overland route to the western Mediterranean, she could forward to her ports on the Tyrrhenian Sea the valuable merchandise of the Milesians, whom Chalcidian jealousy excluded from the straits between Italy and Sicily. Thus both agriculture and traffic formed the basis of the remarkable wealth of Sybaris, and the result was an elaboration of luxury which caused the Sybarite name to pass into a proverb. Posidonia, famous for its temples and its roses, was another colony on the western sea, founded from Sybaris. 721 B.C.

To the south of Sybaris is Croton. Like Sybaris, Croton widened its territory and planted colonies of its own. Caulonia, perhaps also a settlement of Croton, was the most southerly Achæan colony and was the neighbor of the western Locri. 703 B.C.

(4) *Achæan and Dorian Settlements in Italy.*—The Achæans and Locrians had more in common with each other than either had with the Dorians, and we may conveniently include Locri



in the Achæan group. Thus the southern coast of Italy would have been almost a homogeneous circle if a Dorian colony had not been established in a small sheltered bay at the extreme north point of the gulf, to which it gave the name it still bears —

Taras or Tarentum. Taras was remarkable as the only foreign settlement ever made by the greatest of all the Dorian peoples. Laconian settlers occupied the place at some unknown date and made of it a Dorian city. The prosperity of the Tarentines depended partly on the cultivation of a fruitful territory, but mainly on their manufacturing industry. Their fabrics and dyed wools became renowned, and their pottery was widely diffused. Taras, in fact, must be regarded as an industrial rather than as an agricultural state.



COIN OF TARAS,  
FIFTH CENTURY  
(REVERSE). TA-  
RAS ON A DOL-  
PHIN; SHELL  
[LEGEND: TA-  
PAS]

Thus the western coast of the Tarentine Gulf was beset with a line of Achæan cities, flanked at one extremity by western Locri, on the other by Dorian Taras. The common feature, which distinguished them from the cities settled by the men of Chalcis and Corinth, was that their wealth depended on the mainland, not on the sea. Their rich men were landowners, not merchants; it was not traffic, but rich soil, that had originally lured them to the far west. These cities, with their dependencies beyond the hills, on the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea, came to be regarded as a group, and the country came to be called Great Hellas (Magna Græcia).

**4. Growth of Trade and Maritime Enterprise.**— While the colonies were politically independent of their mother-states, they reacted in many ways on the mother-country. We have seen how the system of family property was favorable to colonial enterprise. But the colonists, who had suffered under that system, were not likely to introduce it in their new settlements, and thus the institution of personal landownership was probably first es-

tablished and regulated in the colonies. Their example reacted on the mother-country, where other natural causes were also gradually undermining the family system. In the first place, as the power of the state grew greater, the power of the family grew less; and the prestige of the head of the family, overshadowed by the power of the state, became insensibly weaker. In the second place, it was common to assign a portion of an estate to one member of the family, to manage and enjoy the undivided use of it; and the natural tendency must have been to allow it on his death to pass to his son on the same conditions. It is clear that such a practice tended to the ultimate establishment of personal proprietorship of the soil. Again, side by side of the undivided family estate, personal properties were actually acquired. At this period there was much wild, unallotted land, "which wild beasts haunt," especially on the hill-slopes, and when a man of energy reclaimed a portion of this land for tillage, the new fields became his own, for they had belonged to no man. We can thus see generally how inevitable it was that the old system should disappear and the large family estates break up into private domains.

The Bœotian poet Hesiod has given us a picture of rural life in Greece at this period. He was a husbandman himself near c. 700 B.C. Ascra, where his father, who had come as a stranger from Cyme in Æolis, had put under cultivation a strip of waste land on the slopes of Helicon. The farm was divided between his two sons, Perses and Hesiod, but in unequal shares; and Hesiod accuses Perses of winning the larger portion by bribing the lords of the district. But Perses managed his farm badly, and did not prosper. Hesiod wrote his poem the *Works* to teach such unthrifty farmers as his brother true principles of agriculture and economy. His view of life is profoundly gloomy, and suggests a condition of grave social distress in Bœotia. This must have been mainly due to the oppression of the nobles, "gift-devouring" princes, as he calls them. The poet looks back to the past with regret. The golden age, the silver, and the bronze have all gone by, and the


age of the heroes who fought at Troy; and mankind is now in the iron age, and "will never cease by day or night from weariness and woe." The poem gives minute directions for the routine of the husbandman's work, the times and seasons of sowing and reaping, and the other labors of the field, the fashion of the implements of tillage; and all this is accompanied by maxims of proverbial wisdom. Hesiod has a great significance as the first spokesman of the common folk. In the history of Europe, his is the first voice raised from among the toiling classes and claiming the interest of mankind in their lot. It is a voice indeed of acquiescence, counselling fellow-toilers to make the best of an evil case; the stage of revolt has not yet been reached. But the grievances are aired, and the lords who wield the power are exhorted to deal just judgments, that the land may prosper.

Boeotia was always an unenterprising country of husbandmen, and Hesiod had no sympathy with trade or foreign venture. But the growth of trade was the most important fact of the time, and here, too, the colonies reacted on the mother-country. By enlarging the borders of the Greek world they invited and facilitated the extension of Greek trade and promoted the growth of industries. Hitherto the Greeks had been mainly an agricultural and pastoral people; many of them were now becoming industrial. They had to supply their western colonies with oil and wool, with metal and pottery, and they began to enter into serious competition with the Phœnician trader.

Greek trade moved chiefly along water-ways, and this is illustrated by the neglect of road-making in Greece. There were no paved roads, even in later times, except the Sacred Ways to frequented sanctuaries, like that from Athens to Eleusis and Delphi, or that from the sea-coast to Olympia. Yet the Greeks were still timorous navigators, and it was deemed hazardous to sail even in the most familiar waters, except in the late summer. Hesiod expresses the general fear of the sea: "For fifty days after the solstice, till the end of the harvest, is the tide for sailing; then

you will not wreck your ship, nor will the sea wash down your crew, unless Poseidon or Zeus wills their destruction."

Seafaring states found it needful to build warships for protection against pirates. The usual type of the early Greek warship was the penteconter or "fifty-oar," a long, narrow galley with twenty-five benches, on each of which two oarsmen sat. The penteconter hardly came into use in Greece before the eighth century. The Homeric Greeks had only smaller vessels of twenty oars. But



DIPYLON VASE, WITH SHIP (BRITISH MUSEUM)

before the end of the eighth century a new idea revolutionized ship building in Phœnicia. Vessels were built with two rows of benches, one above the other, so that the number of oarsmen and the speed were increased without adding to the length of the ship. The "bireme," however, never became common in Greece, for the Phœnicians had soon improved it into the "trireme," by the superposition of another bank of oars.<sup>1</sup> The trireme, propelled

<sup>1</sup> The secret of building this kind of galley has been lost. Modern shipwrights cannot reproduce a trireme. In later times the Greeks built ships of many banks—five, ten, even forty.

by one hundred and seventy rowers, was ultimately to come into universal use as the regular Greek warship, though for a long time after its first introduction by the Corinthians the old penteconters were still generally used. But penteconters and triremes alike were affected by the new invention of the bronze ram on the prow — a weapon of attack which determined the future character of Greek naval warfare.

The Greeks believed that the first regular sea-fight between two Greek powers was fought before the middle of the seventh century between Corinth and her daughter-city Corcyra. If the tradition is true, we may be sure that the event was an incident in the struggle for the trade with Italy and Sicily and along the Adriatic coasts. The chief competitors, however, with Corinth in the west, were the Eubœan cities, Chalcis and Eretria. In the traffic in eastern seas the island city of Ægina, though she had no colonies of her own, took an active part, and became one of the richest mercantile states of Greece.

**5. Influence of Lydia on Greece.** — The Greeks of the Asiatic coast were largely dependent, for good or evil, on the adjacent inland countries. The inland trade added to their prosperity, but at any moment if a strong barbarian power arose, their independence might be gravely menaced. At the beginning of the seventh century, active intercourse was maintained between the Greeks and the kingdoms of Phrygia and Lydia. The Phrygian king Midas was said in later times to have dedicated a throne to the god of Delphi.



ELECTRON COIN OF LYDIA  
(BEGINNING OF SEVENTH  
CENTURY). OBVERSE:  
STRIATED SURFACE. RE-  
VERSE: OBLONG AND TWO  
SQUARE SINKINGS

A considerable Phrygian element had won its way into Lydia, and had gained the upper hand. But the Phrygian rulers had become degenerate, and Gyges, a native Lydian, succeeded in slaying the king Candaules and seizing the crown. This revolution



ushered in a new period for the Lydian kingdom. Gyges was ambitious to control the Greek cities to the north and west of his kingdom and led expeditions against Miletus and the Ionian cities. Possibly Colophon and Magnesia were captured, but the other cities were able to hold their own and repel Gyges. His plans, however, were interrupted by an invasion of the Cimmerians, barbarians who lived in what is now known as the Crimea, who overran Lydia, captured its capital Sardis, and slew Gyges in battle; and in their turn threatened the Greek cities. But the danger was averted, for Gyges was succeeded by Ardys, who finally drove back the Cimmerians and abandoned for the time the conquest of the Greek cities.



COIN OF HALICARNASSUS, SIXTH CENTURY. OBTVERSE: STAG [LEGEND: ΦΑΝΟΣ ΕΜΙ ΣΕΜΑ]. REVERSE: INCUSE

In the meantime, Lydia had made an invention which revolutionized commerce. It is to Lydia that Europe owes the invention of coinage. The Babylonians, Phœnicians, and Egyptians made use of weighed gold and silver as a medium of exchange, a certain ratio being fixed between the two metals. A piece of weighed metal becomes a coin when it is stamped by the state, and is thereby warranted to have its professed weight and purity. This step was first taken in Lydia, where the earliest money was coined somewhere about the beginning of the seventh century, probably by Gyges. Miletus and Samos soon adopted the new invention, which then spread to other Asiatic towns. Then Ægina and the two great cities of Eubœa instituted monetary systems. By degrees all the states of Greece followed their example and gave up the primitive custom of estimating value in heads of cattle, and established mints of their own. As gold was very rare in Greece, not being found except in the islands of Siphnos and Thasos, the Greeks coined in silver. This invention, coming at the very moment when the Greeks were entering upon a period of great



commercial activity, was of immense importance, not only in facilitating trade, but in rendering possible the accumulation of capital.

**6. The Opening of Egypt and Foundation of Cyrene.** — Thus the merchants of Miletus and her fellows grew rich. They were the intermediaries between Lydia and the Mediterranean; while the

Lydians carried Greek wares to the interior parts of Asia Minor and the far east. Their argosies sailed to the far west, as well as to the coasts of the Euxine. But a new field for winning wealth was opened to them, much about the same time as the invention of coinage revealed a new prospect to the world of commerce.



COIN OF CYRENE,  
EARLY (OB-  
VERSE). SIL-  
PHION; SIL-  
PHION SEED;  
LION'S HEAD



COIN OF CYRENE,  
FIFTH CENTURY  
(OBVERSE) HEAD  
OF ZEUS AMMON  
[LEGEND: KYPA]

c. 645 B.C.

The jealously guarded gates of Egypt were unbarred to Greek trade.

c. 630 B.C.

Egypt had been conquered by Assyria and the land split up into endless small dependent kingdoms. But Psammetichus, one of the kings of Lower Egypt, revolted, and with the help of Ionian and Carian mercenaries, brought the whole of Egypt under his sway. Psammetichus and his successors departed from the old policy of the Pharaohs and opened Egypt to the trade of the world and allowed the Greeks to settle permanently in the country. The Milesians founded a trading station on the Nile, around which the city of Naucratis grew up, which became the haven of all Greek traders. Farther to the west, bands of exiles and adventurers from the islands of Thera and Crete founded the city of Cyrene. This was the only Greek colony in Africa to attain eminence and wealth, and, though its civilization was influenced by the Libyans, it occupied a high place in the Greek world.

7. **Popular Discontent in Greece.** — The advance of the Greeks in trade and industry produced many consequences of moment for their political and social development. The manufactures required labor, and a sufficient number of free laborers was not to be had. Slaves were therefore indispensable, and they were imported in large numbers from Asia Minor and Thrace and the coasts of the Euxine. The slave-trade became a profitable enterprise, and the men of Chios made it their chief pursuit. The existence of household slaves, generally war-captives, such as we meet in Homer, was an innocent institution which would never have had serious results; but the new organized slave system which began in the seventh century was destined to prove one of the most fatal causes of disease and decay to the states of Greece.

At first the privileged classes of the aristocratic republics benefited by the increase of commerce; for the nobles were themselves the chief speculators. But the wealth which they acquired by trade undermined their political position. For, in the first place, their influence depended largely on their domains of land; and when industries arose to compete with agriculture, the importance of land necessarily declined. In the second place, wealth introduced a new political standard; and aristocracies resting on birth tended to transform themselves into aristocracies resting on wealth. As nobility by birth cannot be acquired, whereas wealth can, such a change is always a step in the direction of democracy.

The poorer freemen at first suffered. Their distress and discontent drove them into striving for full political equality, and in many cases they strove with success. The second half of the seventh century is marked in many parts of Greece by struggles between the classes; and the wiser and better of the nobles began themselves to see the necessity of extending political privileges to their fellow-citizens. The centralization in towns, owing to the growth of industries and the declining importance of agriculture, created a new town population, and doubtless helped on the democratic movement.

In this agitated period lived a poet of great genius, Archilochus of Paros. It has been truly said that Archilochus is the first Greek "of flesh and blood" whom we can grasp through the mists of antiquity. Son of a noble by a slave mother, he tried his luck among the adventurers who went forth to colonize Siris in Italy, but he returned having won an experience of seafaring which taught him to sing of the "bitter gifts of Poseidon" and the mariner's prayers for "sweet home." Then he took part in a Parian colonization of Thasos, and was involved in party struggles which rent the island. It must have been at Thasos that he witnessed an eclipse of the sun at noontide, which he describes; and this gives us, as a date in the Thasian period of his life, the 6th of April, 648 B.C. — the first exact date we have bearing on the history of Greece. He announces that he is "the servant of the lord of battle, and skilled in the delicious gift of the Muses." But when he fought in a war which the islanders waged with the Thracians of the opposite coast, he ran for his life and dropped his shield. "Never mind," he said, "I will get me another as good." Poor, with a stain on his birth, tossed about the world, soured by adversity, Archilochus in his poetry gave full expression to his feelings, and used it to utter his passionate hatred against his enemies, such as the Parian Lycambes, for instance, who refused him his daughter Neobule.



EARLY COIN OF CAULONIA. OBTVERSE: APOLLO WITH BOUGH, SMALL FIGURE ON HIS ARM; STAG [LEGEND: KAYAO]. REVERSE: INCUSE BACK OF THESE FIGURES

## A TABULAR VIEW OF THE EXPANSION OF GREECE

(This list contains the important colonies mentioned in the text, together with the traditional dates of their foundation and the mother-city.)

COLONIES IN THE EAST	COLONIES IN THE WEST
<p><b>1. Colonies on the North Ægean.</b>  Potidæa. Corinth.  Pydna. Eubœan.  Methone. Eubœan.  Olynthus. Eubœan (Chalcis).</p> <p><b>2. Colonies on the Propontis.</b>  Byzantium. Megara, 660 B.C.  Chalcedon. Megara, 667 B.C.  Selymbria. Megara.  Abydos. Miletus.  Cyzicus. Miletus.  Lampsacus. Phocæa.</p> <p><b>3. Colonies in the Euxine.</b>  Heraclea in Pontus. Megara.  Sinope. Miletus.  Trapezus. Miletus.  Dioscurias. Miletus.  Panticapæum.  Heraclea Chersonesus. Miletus.</p>	<p><b>1. Colonies in Italy.</b>  Cyme. Eubœan. 8th century.  Dicæadchia. Cyme.  (Neapolis.)  Rhegion. Eubœan.  Sybaris. Achæan, 721 B.C.  Laos. Sybaris.  Posidonia. Sybaris.  Croton. Achæan, 703 B.C.  Terina. Croton.  Caulonia. Croton.  Locri. Achæan.  Tarentum. Dorian.</p> <p><b>2. Colonies in Sicily.</b>  Syracuse. Dorian, 734 B.C.  Megara. Megara, 728 B.C.  Selinus. Megara.  Gela. Rhodes, 688 B.C.  Acragas. Gela.  Naxos. Eubœan, 735 B.C.  Catane. Eubœan, 728 B.C.  Leontini. Eubœan, 728 B.C.  Zancle. Eubœan, 715 B.C.  Himera. Eubœan.</p>

Morey, *Ancient History*, 112, contains a somewhat longer list with the dates given by Grote.

## REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 77)

(NOTE. References to the general histories and special works are generally too long and detailed to be assigned. It is suggested that this chapter be treated by means of map exercises rather than by supplementary references.)

## CHAPTER IV

### GROWTH OF SPARTA. FALL OF THE ARISTOCRACIES

**1. Sparta and her Constitution.**—The Dorian settlers from the north, who took possession of the valley of the Eurotas, established themselves in a number of village communities throughout the land, and bore the name of Lacedæmonians. In the course of time, a city-state grew up in their midst and won dominion over the rest. The city was called Sparta; and took the dominant place in Laconia which had been formerly held by Amyclæ. The other Lacedæmonian communities were called the *periæci*, or “dwellers round about” the ruling city, and, though they were free and managed their local affairs, they had no political rights in the Spartan state. The chief burdens which fell on them were military service and the farming of the royal domains.

The Spartans were always noted for their conservative spirit. Hence we find in their constitution survivals of an old order of things which existed in the days of Homeric poetry. The most striking of these survivals was royalty; Sparta was nominally ruled by kings.

This conservative spirit of the Spartans rendered them anxious to believe that their constitution had existed from very ancient times in just the same shape and feature which it displayed in the days of recorded history. There can be little doubt, however, that the Spartan state, like most other states, passed through the stages of royalty and aristocracy; and that the final form of the constitution was the result of a struggle between the nobles and the people. The remarkable thing was that throughout these changes hereditary kingship survived.

The machine of the Spartan constitution had four parts: the Kings, the Council, the Assembly, and the Ephors. The first three are the original institutions, common to the whole Greek race; the Ephors were a later institution, and were peculiar to Sparta.

(1) *Kings*. — We saw that toward the end of the Homeric period the powers of the king were limited, and that this limited monarchy then died out, sometimes leaving a trace behind it, perhaps in the name of a magistracy — like the king-archon at Athens. In a few places it survived, and Sparta was one of them. But, if it survived here, its powers were limited in a twofold way. It was limited not only by the other institutions of the state, but by its own dual character. For there were two kings at Sparta, and had been since the memory of men. The kingship passed from father to son in the two royal houses of the Agids and Eurypontids. Of the religious, military, and judicial functions, which belonged to them and to all other Greek kings the Spartan kings lost some and retained others.

They were privileged to hold certain priesthoods; they offered solemn sacrifices for the city every month to Apollo; they prepared the necessary sacrifices before warlike expeditions and battles; they were priests, though not the sole priests, of the community.

They were the supreme commanders of the army. It is recorded that they had originally the right of making war upon whatever country they chose, though in historical times war and peace were decided, not by the kings, but by the Assembly. But in the field they were sovereign; they had unlimited right of life and death; and they had a bodyguard of a hundred men. It is clear that these large powers were always limited by the double nature of the kingship. But at a date shortly before 500 B.C. it was defined by law that only one of the kings, to be chosen on each occasion by the people, should lead the army in time of war, and moreover they were made responsible to the community for their conduct in their campaigns.



But while they enjoyed this supreme position as high-priests and leaders of the host, they could hardly be considered judges any longer. The right of dealing out dooms like the Homeric Agamemnon had passed away from them; only in special cases had they still judicial or legal powers.

There were royal domains in the territory of the *periæci* from which the kings derived their revenue. But they also had perquisites at public sacrifices; on such occasions they were (like Homeric kings) given the first seat at the banquet, were served first, and received a double portion of everything, and the hides of the slaughtered beasts. The king was succeeded by his son; if there were no children, the succession fell to the nearest male kinsman, who was likewise the regent in the case of a minority.

(2) *Council*. — The *gerontes* or elders whom we find in Homer advising the king and also acting as judges have developed at Sparta into the *Gerusia*. This Council consisted of thirty members, including the two kings, who belonged to it by virtue of their kingship. The other twenty-eight must be over sixty years of age, so that the Council was a body of elders in the strict sense of the word. They held their office for life and were chosen by acclamation in the general assembly of citizens, whose choice was supposed to fall on him whose moral merits were greatest; membership of the Council was described as a "prize for virtue." The Council prepared matters which were to come before the Assembly; if exercised, as an advising body, it was a great influence on political affairs; and it formed a court of justice for criminal cases.

But though the Councillors were elected by the people, they were not elected from the people. Only men of the noble families could be chosen members of the Council. And thus the Council formed an oligarchical element in the Lacedæmonian constitution.

(3) *Assembly*. — Every Spartan who had passed his thirtieth year was a member of the *Apella*, or Assembly of Citizens, which met every month. In old days, no doubt, it was summoned by

the kings, but in historical times we find that this right has passed to the ephors. The assembly did not debate, but having heard the proposals of kings or ephors, signified its will by acclamation. If it seemed doubtful to which opinion the majority of the voices inclined, recourse was had to a division. The people elected the members of the Gerusia, the ephors and other magistrates; determined questions of war and peace and foreign politics; and decided disputed successions to the kingly office. Thus, theoretically, the Spartan constitution was a democracy. No Spartan was excluded from the Apella of the people; and the will of the people expressed at their Apella was supreme. "To the people," runs an old statute, "shall belong the decision and the power." But the same statute granted to the executive authorities — "the elders and magistrates" — a power which restricted this apparent supremacy of the people. It allowed them "to be seceders, if the people make a crooked decree." It seems that the will of the people, declared by their acclamations, did not receive the force of law, unless it were then formally proclaimed before the Assembly was formally dissolved. If the elders and magistrates did not approve of the decision of the majority of the Assembly, they could annul the proceedings by refusing to proclaim it — "seceding" and dissolving the meeting, without waiting for the regular dissolution by king or ephor.

(4) *Ephors*. — The five ephors were the most characteristic part of the political constitution of Sparta. The origin of the office is veiled in obscurity; it was supposed to have been instituted in the first half of the eighth century. But it cannot have been till the seventh century that the ephors won their great political power. They must have won that power in a conflict between the nobility, who governed in conjunction with the kings, and the people, who had no share in the government. In that struggle the kings represented the cause of the nobility, while the ephors were the representatives of the people. This is clear from the oaths which were every month exchanged between the kings and the

ephors. The king swore that he would observe the laws of the state in discharging his royal functions; the ephor that he would maintain the royal power undiminished, so long as the king was true to his oath. In this ceremony we have the record of an acute conflict between the government and people. The democratic character of the ephorate appears from the fact that any Spartan might be elected. The mode of election was practically equivalent to an election by lot.

The ephors entered upon their office at the beginning of the Laconian year. As chosen guardians of the rights of the people, they were called upon to watch jealously the conduct of the kings. With this object two ephors always accompanied the king on warlike expeditions. They had the power of indicting the king and summoning him to appear before them. The judicial functions which the kings lost passed partly to the ephors, partly to the Council. The ephors were the supreme civil court; the Council, as we have seen, formed the supreme criminal court. But in the case of the *Periœci*, the ephors were criminal judges also. They were, moreover, responsible for the strict maintenance of the order and discipline of the Spartan state, and, when they entered upon office, they issued a proclamation to the citizens to "shave their upper lips and obey the laws."

**2. Spartan Conquest of Messenia.** — In the growth of Sparta the first and most decisive step was the conquest of Messenia. The southern portion of the Peloponnesus is divided into two parts by Mount Taygetus. Of these, the eastern part is again severed by Mount Parnon into two regions; the vale of the river Eurotas, and the rugged strip of coast between Parnon and the sea. The western country is less mountainous, more fruitful, and blessed by a milder climate. Its natural fortress was the lofty rock of Ithome.

Of the First Messenian War, which must be assigned to the eighth century, all that we know with certainty is that the Spartan king, under whose auspices it was waged, was named Theopompus;

that it was decided by the capture of the great fortress of Ithome; and that the eastern part of the land became Laconian.

As the object of the Spartans was to increase the number of the lots of land for their citizens, many of the conquered Messenians were reduced to the condition of Helots. For some generations they submitted patiently, but at length, when victorious Sparta



SPARTA

felt secure, a rebellion was organized. The rebels were supported by their neighbors in Arcadia and Pisatis, and they are said to have found an able and ardent leader in Aristomenes, sprung from an old Messenian family. The revolt was at first successful. The Spartans fared ill, and their young men experienced the dis-

End of 7th  
century

grace of defeat. The hopes of the serfs arose, and Sparta despaired of recovering the land. But a leader and a poet arose amongst them. The lame Tyrtaeus is recorded to have inspired his countrymen with such martial vigor that the tide of fortune turned, and Sparta began to retrieve her losses and recover her reputation. The warriors advanced to battle singing his "marches" to the sound of flutes, while his elegies are said to have been recited in the tents after the evening meal. But we learn from himself that his strategy was as effective as his poetry, and the Messenians were presently defeated in the battle of the Great Foss. They then retired to the northern stronghold of Eira on the river Nedon, which plays the same part in the second war that Ithome played in the first. But Eira fell; legend says that it was beleaguered for eleven years. Aristomenes was the soul of the defence, and his wonderful escapes became the argument of a stirring tale. On one occasion he was thrown, with fifty fellow-countrymen captured by the Spartans, into a deep pit. His comrades perished, and Aristomenes awaited certain death. But by following the track of a fox he found a passage in the rocky wall of his prison and appeared on the following day at Eira. When the Spartans surprised that fortress, he made his escape wounded to Arcadia.

Those Messenians who were left in the land were mostly reduced again to the condition of Helots, but the maritime communities and even a few in the interior remained free, as Perioeci, in the possession of their estates.

At this time Sparta, like most Greek states, suffered from domestic discontent. The pressing land question was partly solved by the conquest of the whole land of Messenia; and doubtless the foundation of the colony of Taras in southern Italy was undertaken for the purpose of relieving an excessive population.

The Messenian war, as recorded by Tyrtaeus, shows us that the power of the privileged classes had already been undermined by a great change in the method of warfare. The fighting is done, and the victory won, by regiments of mailed foot-lancers, who

march and fight together in close ranks. The secret had been discovered that such *hoplites* (as they were called) were superior to cavalry; but it was in Sparta first that their value was fully appreciated. There they became the main part of the military establishment. The city no longer depended chiefly on her nobles in time of war; she depended on her whole people. The progress of metal-smiths in their trade, which accompanied the general industrial advance of Greece, rendered possible this transformation in the art of war. Every well-to-do citizen could now provide himself with an outfit of armor and go forth to battle in panoply.<sup>1</sup> The transformation was distinctly levelling and democratic; for it placed the noble and the ordinary citizen on an equality in the field.

**3. Internal Development of Sparta and her Institutions.**—When Sparta emerges into the full light of history, we find her under an iron discipline, which invades every part of a man's life and controls all his actions from his cradle to his deathbed. Everything is subordinated to the art of war, and the sole aim of the state is to create invincible warriors.

(1) *The Land System; Helots.*—The whole Spartan people formed a military caste; the life of a Spartan citizen was devoted to the service of the state. In order to carry out this ideal it was necessary that every citizen should be freed from the care of providing for himself and his family. The nobles owned family domains of their own; but the Spartan community also came into possession of common land, which was divided into a number of lots. Each Spartan obtained a lot, which passed from father to son, but could not be either sold or divided; thus a citizen could never be reduced to poverty. The original inhabitants, whom the Lacedæmonians dispossessed and reduced to the state of serfs, known as *Helots*, cultivated the land for their lords. Every year

<sup>1</sup> The metal breastplate had been introduced; metal greaves were worn, and thigh-pieces. The round shield borne on the arm had superseded the clumsy shoulder-swung shield of the heroic period.



the owner of a lot was entitled to receive seventy measures of corn for himself, twelve for his wife, and a stated portion of wine and fruit. All that the land produced beyond this, the Helot was allowed to retain for his own use. Though the Helots were not driven by taskmasters, and had the right of acquiring private property, their condition seems to have been hard; at all events, they were always bitterly dissatisfied and ready to rebel, whenever an occasion presented itself. The system of Helotry was a source of danger from the earliest times, but especially after the conquest of Messenia; and the state of constant military preparation in which the Spartans lived may have been partly due to the consciousness of this peril perpetually at their doors. The *Krypteia* or secret police was instituted — it is uncertain at what date — to deal with this danger. Young Spartans were sent into the country and empowered to kill every Helot whom they had reason to regard with suspicion. By this device, the youths could slay dangerous Helots without any scruple or fear of the guilt of manslaughter. But notwithstanding these precautions, serious revolts broke out again and again.

(2) *The Military Training.* — Thus relieved from the necessity of gaining a livelihood, the Spartans devoted themselves to the good of the state, and the aim of the state was the cultivation of the art of war. Sparta was a large military school. Education, marriage, the details of daily life were all strictly regulated with a view to the maintenance of a perfectly efficient army. Every citizen was to be a soldier, and the discipline began from birth. When a child was born, it was submitted to the inspection of the heads of the tribe, and if they judged it to be unhealthy or weak, it was exposed to die on the wild slopes of Mount Taygetus. At the age of seven years the boy was consigned to the care of a state-officer, and the course of his education was entirely determined by the purpose of inuring him to bear hardships, training him to endure an exacting discipline, and instilling into his heart a sentiment of devotion to the state. The boys, up to the age of

twenty, were marshalled in a huge school formed on the model of an army.

At the age of twenty the Spartan entered upon military service, and was permitted to marry. But he could not yet enjoy home-life; he had to live in "barracks" with his companions, and could only pay stolen and secret visits to his wife. In his thirtieth year, having completed his training, he became a "man," and obtained the full rights of citizenship. The *Homoioi* or peers, as the Spartan citizens were called, dined together in tents in the Hyacinthian Street. Each member of a common tent made a fixed monthly contribution, derived from the produce of his lot, consisting of barley, cheese, wine, and figs, and the members of the same mess-tent shared the same tent in the field in time of war. Three hundred "horsemen," chosen from the Spartan youths, formed the king's bodyguard; but though, as their name shows, they were originally mounted, in later times they fought on foot. The light infantry was supplied by the Periœci and Helots.

(3) *The Results of the Spartan System.*—Thus Sparta was a camp in which the highest object of every man's life was to be ready at any moment to fight with the utmost efficiency for his city. The aim of every law, the end of the whole social order, was to fashion good soldiers. Private luxury was strictly forbidden; Spartan simplicity became proverbial. The individual man, entirely lost in the state, had no life of his own; he had no problems of human existence to solve for himself. Sparta was not a place for thinkers or theorists; the whole duty of man and the highest ideal of life were contained for a Spartan in the laws of his city.

It was inevitable that, as time went on, there should be many fallings away, and that some of the harder laws should, by tacit agreement, be ignored. From an early period it seems to have been a permitted thing for a citizen to acquire land in addition to his original lot. As such lands were not, like the original lot, inalienable, but could be sold or divided, inequalities in wealth

necessarily arose, and the "communism" which we observed in the life of the citizens was only superficial. But it was specially provided by law that no Spartan should possess wealth in the form of gold or silver. This law was at first eluded by the device of depositing money in foreign temples, and it ultimately became a dead letter; Spartans even gained throughout Greece an evil reputation for avarice.

(4) *Origin of the Spartan Institutions.* — There is no doubt that the Spartan system of discipline grew up by degrees; yet the whole fabric shows an artistic unity which might be thought to argue the work of a single mind. And until lately this was generally believed to be the case; some still maintain the belief. A certain Lycurgus was said to have framed the Spartan institutions and enacted the Spartan laws about the beginning of the ninth century.

But the grounds for believing that a Spartan lawgiver named Lycurgus ever existed are of the slenderest kind. Herodotus states that the Spartans declared Lycurgus to have been the guardian of one of their early kings, and to have introduced from Crete their laws and institutions. But the divergent accounts of this historian's contemporaries, who ignore Lycurgus altogether, prove that it was simply one of many guesses, and not a generally accepted tradition.

The guess was natural, for in Crete, which island was by its geographical situation withdrawn from the main course of Greek history, there existed very similar institutions among men of Dorian stock. There was a population divided into warriors and serfs. There was a board of ten annual magistrates (Κόσμοι) corresponding to the ephors; and a council answering to the Gerusia. But for the council and the magistracy only nobles were eligible, and there were no kings. The real likeness lies in the discipline of the youth, which was, like that of Sparta, designed solely for making good warriors, and which enforced on all a similar form of barrack life with common meals, with the same strict state regulation of existence, and a more complete communism.


#### 4. The Supremacy and Decline of Argos. The Olympian Games.

—The rebellion of Messenia had been especially formidable to Sparta, because the rebels had been supported by two foreign powers, Arcadia and Pisa. The king of Pisa on the Alpheus had recently risen to new power with the help of Argos; and Argos herself had been playing a prominent part under the leadership of her king Pheidon. The reign of this king was the last epoch of Argos as active power of first rank. We know little about him, and the only action that stands out clearly is his expedition to the west. He led an Argive army across Arcadia to the banks of the Alpheus, and presided there over the Olympic festival, which now for the first time is heard of in the history of Greece.

The sacred grove of Olympia lay under the wooded mount of Cronus, where the river Cladeus flows into the Alpheus, in the angle between the two streams. The sanctuary was in the territory of Pisa, and there is no doubt that the care of the worship and the conduct of the festivals belonged originally to the Pisan community. But the men of Elis, the northern neighbors of Pisa, set their hearts on having control of the Olympian sanctuary, and as they were the stronger, finally succeeded in usurping the conduct of the festival. The games at first included foot-races, boxing, and wrestling; chariot-races and horse-races were added later. Such contests were an ancient institution in Greece. The funeral games of Patroclus, described in the *Iliad*, permit us to infer that they were a feature of the ninth century.

The mythical institution of the games was ascribed to Pelops or to Heracles; and when the Eleans usurped the presidency, the story gradually took shape that the celebration had been revived by the Spartan Lycurgus and the Elean Iphitus in the year 776 B.C., and this year was reckoned as the first Olympiad. From that year until the visit of Pheidon, the Eleans professed to have presided over the feast and their account of the matter won its way into general belief.

It is possible that King Pheidon reorganized the games and in-



TEMPLE OF HERA AND ZEUS AT OLYMPIA (TRADITIONAL DATE, TENTH CENTURY B.C.)



augurated a new stage in the history of the festival. At all events, at the beginning of the sixth century the festival was no longer an event of merely Peloponnesian interest. It had become famous wherever the Greek tongue was spoken, and, when the feast tide came round in each cycle of four years, there thronged to the banks of the Alpheus, from all quarters of the Greek world, athletes and horses to compete in the contests, and spectators to behold them. During the celebration of the festival a sacred truce was observed, and the men of Elis claimed that in those days their territory was inviolable. The prize for victory in the games was a wreath of wild olive; but rich rewards always awaited the victor when he returned home in triumph and laid the Olympian crown in the chief temple of his city. The Olympian festival furnished a center where Greeks of all parts met and exchanged their ideas and experiences; it was one of the institutions which expressed and quickened the consciousness of fellowship among the scattered folks of the Greek race; and it became a model, as we shall see, for other festivals of the same kind, which aided in promoting a feeling of national unity.

We can see but dimly into the political relations of Pheidon's age; but we can discern at least that Sparta lent her countenance to Elis in this usurpation, and that Argos, jealous of the growing power of Sparta, espoused the cause of Pisa. This was the purpose of King Pheidon's expedition to Olympia. He took the management of the games out of the hands of Elis and restored it to Pisa. And for many years Pisa maintained her rights. She maintained them as long as Sparta, absorbed in the Messenian strife, had no help to spare for Elis; and during that time she did what she could to help the foes of Sparta. But when the revolt was suppressed, it was inevitable that Elis should again, with Spartan help, win control of the games, for Argos, declining under the successors of Pheidon, could give no aid to Pisa.

The final struggle with Messenia marks the period at which the balance of power among the Peloponnesian states begins to shift.



In the seventh century Argos was the leading state. She had reduced Mycenæ; she had made Tiryns an Argive fort; she had defeated Sparta at Hysia; and there can be little doubt that Pheidon's authority extended over all Argos; and possibly his influence was felt in Ægina and on the eastern coast of Laconia. But his reign is the last manifestation of the greatness of southern Argos. Fifty years after the subjugation of Messenia, the Spartans became the strongest state in the Peloponnesus, and the Argives sank into the position of a second-rate power—always able to maintain their independence, always a thorn in the side of Sparta, always to be reckoned with as a foe and welcomed as a friend, but never leading, dominant, or originaive.

**5. Changes in Law. Democratic Movements.**—It is clear that there is no security that equal justice will be meted out to all, so long as the laws by which the judge is supposed to act are not accessible to all. Naturally, therefore, one of the first demands which the people in Greek cities pressed upon their aristocratic governments was for a written law. It must be borne in mind that in old days deeds which injured only the individual, and did not touch the gods of the state, were left to the injured person to deal with as he chose or could. The state did not interfere. Even in the case of bloodshedding, it devolved upon the kinsfolk of the slain man to wreak punishment upon the slayer. Then, as social order developed, the state took justice partly into its own hands; and the injured man, before he could punish the wrong-doer, was obliged to charge him before a judge, who decided the punishment. But no crime could come before a judge, unless the injured person came forward as accuser, except in a case of bloodshedding. It was felt that the shedder of blood was not only impure himself, but had also defiled the gods of the community; so that manslaughter of every form came under the class of crimes against the religion of the state.

The work of writing down the laws, and fixing customs in legal shape, was probably in most cases combined with the work of

reforming; and thus the great codifiers of the seventh century were also lawgivers. Of these the most famous were the Athenians, Dracon, and Solon the Wise.

In many cases the legislation was accompanied by political concessions to the people, and it was part of the lawgiver's task to modify the constitution. But for the most part this was only the beginning of a long political conflict. Social distress was the sharp spur which drove the people on in this effort toward popular government. The struggle was in some cases to end in the establishment of a democracy; in many cases, the oligarchy succeeded in maintaining itself and keeping the people down; in most cases, perhaps, the result was a perpetual oscillation between oligarchy and democracy — an endless series of revolutions, too often stained by violence. But though democracy was not everywhere victorious, — though even the states in which it was most firmly established were exposed to the danger of oligarchical conspiracies, — yet everywhere the people aspired to it; and we may say that the chief feature of the domestic history of most Greek cities, from the end of the seventh century forward, is an endeavor to establish or maintain popular government.

**6. Tyrants.** — As happens usually, or at least frequently, in such circumstances, the popular movement received help from within the camp of the adversary. Discontented nobles came forward to be the leaders of the discontented masses. But when the government was overthrown, the revolution generally resulted in a temporary return to monarchy. The mass of the people were not yet ripe for taking the power into their own hands; and they were generally glad to entrust it to the man who had helped them to overthrow the hated government of the nobles. This new kind of monarchy did not rest on hereditary right, but on physical force.

Such illegitimate monarchs were called tyrants, to distinguish them from the hereditary kings, and this form of monarchy was called a *tyrannis*. The word in itself did not imply that the monarch

was bad or cruel; there was nothing self-contradictory in a good tyrant, and many tyrants were beneficent. But the isolation of these rulers, who, being without the support of legitimacy, depended on armed force, so often urged them to be suspicious and cruel that "tyrant" inclined to the evil sense in which modern languages have adopted it. Yet the Greek dislike of the tyrannis was not mainly due to the fact that many tyrants were oppressors. Arbitrary control was repugnant to the Greek love of freedom.

The period which saw the fall of the aristocracies is often called the age of the tyrants. The tyrannis first came into existence at this period; there was a large crop of tyrants much about the same time in different parts of Greece; they all performed the same function of overthrowing aristocracies, and in many cases they paved the way for democracies. But there is no age in the subsequent history of Greece which did not see the rise of tyrants here and there. Tyranny was always with the Greeks. It, as well as oligarchy, was a danger by which their democracies were threatened at all periods.

Ionia seems to have been the original home of the tyrannis, and this may have been partly due to the seductive example of the rich court of the Lydian "tyrants" at Sardis. The most famous of Ionian tyrants was Thrasybulus of Miletus, under whose rule that city held a more brilliant position than ever. In Lesbian Mytilene we see the tyrannis, and also a method by which it might be avoided. Tyrants rose and fell in rapid succession; the echoes of hatred and jubilation still ring to us from relics of the lyric poems of Alcæus. "Let us drink and reel, for Myrsilus is dead." The poet was a noble and a fighter; but in a war with the Athenians on the coast of the Hellespont he threw away his shield, like Archilochus, and it hung as a trophy at Sigeum. Pittacus, however, who distinguished himself for bravery in the same war with Athens, was to be the savior of the state. He gained the trust of the people, and was elected ruler for a period of ten years in order to heal the sores of the city. Pittacus gained the reputation of a wise lawgiver and a

c. 600 B.C.

c. 600-570  
B.C.

firm, moderate ruler. He banished the nobles who opposed him — among others the two most famous of all Lesbians, the poets Alcæus and Sappho. At the end of ten years he laid down his office, to be enrolled after his death in the number of the Seven Wise Men.

**7. Tyrants at Corinth.** — The ruling clan of the Bacchiads at Corinth was overthrown by Cypselus, who had put himself at the head of the people. The Bacchiads were banished and their property confiscated; dangerous persons were executed, and Cypselus took the reins of government into his own hands. Of the rule of Cypselus himself, we know little; he is variously represented as harsh and mild. His son Periander succeeded, and of him more is recorded. The general features of the Cypselid tyrannis were a vigorous colonial and commercial policy, and the encouragement of art.

One of the earliest triumphs of Cypselus was probably the reduction of Corcyra, which had formed a fleet of its own and had grown to be a rival of its mother in the Ionian Seas. It has already been mentioned that the earliest battle of ships between two Greek states was supposed to have been fought between Corinth and Corcyra. The attempt of Corinth to form a colonial empire was an interesting experiment. The idea of Cypselus corresponded to our modern colonial system, in which the colonies are in a relation of dependence to the mother-country, and not to that of the Greeks, in which the colony was an independent sovereign state. Geographical conditions alone rendered it out of the question to apply the new principle to Syracuse, but the success at Corcyra was followed up by a development of Corinthian influence in the northwest of Greece. Apollonia was planted on the coast of Epirus; and, farther north, Corcyra, under the auspices of her mother-city, colonized Epidamnus. In another quar-



COIN OF CORINTH, SIXTH-FIFTH CENTURY (OBVERSE). HELMETED HEAD OF GODDESS

ter of the Greek world, a son of Periander founded Potidæa in the Chalcidic peninsula.

Cypselus and Periander did their utmost to promote the commercial activity of their city. In the middle of the seventh century the rival Eubœan cities, Chalcis and Eretria, were the most important merchant states of Greece. But fifty years later they had somewhat declined; Corinth and Ægina were taking their place. Their decline was brought about by their rivalry, which led to an exhausting war.

While the most successful of the tyrants, like Periander, furthered material civilization, they often manifested an interest in intellectual pursuits, and did something for the promotion of art. A new form of poetry called the *dithyramb* was developed at Corinth during this period, the rude strains which were sung at vintage-feasts in honor of Dionysus being moulded into an artistic shape. The discovery was attributed to Arion, a mythical minstrel, who was said to have leaped into the sea under the compulsion of mariners who robbed him, and to have been carried to Corinth on the back of a dolphin, the fish of Dionysus.

In architecture, Corinthian skill had made an important contribution to the development of the temple. In the course of the seventh century, men began to translate into stone the old shrine of brick and wood; and stone temples arose in all parts of the Greek world — the lighter "Ionic" form in Ionia, the heavier "Doric" in the elder Greece. By the invention of roof-tiles, Corinthian workmen rendered it practicable to give a considerable inclination to the roof; and thus in each gable of the temple a large triangular space was left, inviting the sculptor to fill it with a story in marble. The pediment, as we name it, was called by the Greeks the "eagle"; and thus it was said that Corinth had discovered the eagle (ἄετός).

c. 586 B.C.

The great tyrant died and was succeeded by his nephew Psammetichus, who, having ruled for a few years, was slain. With him the tyranny of the Cypselids came to an end, and an aristocracy



of merchants was firmly established. At the same time the Cypselid colonial system partly broke down, for Corcyra became independent and hostile, while the Ambraciots set up a democracy. But over her other colonies Corinth retained her influence, and was on friendly terms with all of them.

8. **Tyrants of Megara.** — Some time after the inauguration of the Cypselid tyranny, a similar constitutional change occurred



PILLARS OF AN OLD TEMPLE AT CORINTH

at Megara, and a friendship sprang up between the two cities. The mercantile development of Megara, famous for her weavers, had enriched the nobles, who held the political power and oppressed the peasants with a grinding despotism. Then Theagenes arose as a deliverer, and made himself tyrant. Having obtained a body-guard, he surprised and massacred the aristocrats. His term of tyranny was marked by one solid work, the construction of an

c. 640 B.C



aqueduct. He was overthrown, and then followed a political struggle between the aristocracy, which had regained its power, and the people. Concessions were wrung from the government. The capitalists were forced to pay back the interest which they had extorted, while the political disabilities were relieved by extending citizenship to the country population and admitting the tillers of the soil to the Assembly. These conflicts and social changes are reflected in the poems of Theognis, who meditated on and lamented them. He judges severely the short-sighted, greedy policy of his own caste, and sees that it is likely to lead to another tyranny. On the other hand, his sympathies are with an aristocratic form of government, and he discerns with dismay the growth of democratic tendencies. He cries:—

Unchanged the walls, but, ah, how changed the folk!  
 The base, who knew erstwhile nor law nor right,  
 But dwelled like deer, with goatskin for a cloak,  
 Are now ennobled; and, O sorry plight!  
 The nobles are made base in all men's sight.

**9. Tyrants at Sicyon.**—The rise of a tyranny in agricultural Sicyon seems to have occurred much about the same time as at mercantile Corinth. The first of the house of whom we have any historical record is Cleisthenes, who ruled in the first quarter of the sixth century. He was engaged in a war with Argos, which claimed lordship over Sicyon. He would not permit rhapsodists to recite the Homeric poems at Sicyon, because there was so much in them about Argos and Argives.

Cleisthenes married his daughter Agarista to an Athenian noble, Megacles, of the famous family of the Alcmaeonids. A legend is told of the wooing of Agarista, which illustrates the tyrant's wealth and hospitality and the social ideas of the age. On the occasion of an Olympian festival at which he had himself won in the chariot-race, Cleisthenes made proclamation to the Greeks that all who aspired to the hand of his daughter should assemble at Sicyon,

sixty days hence, and be entertained at his court for a year. At the end of the year he would decide who was most worthy of his daughter. Then there came to Sicyon all the Greeks who had a high opinion of themselves or of their families. Cleisthenes tested their accomplishments for a year. He tried them in gymnastic exercises, but laid most stress on their social qualities. The two Athenians, Hippocleides and Megacles, pleased him best, but to Hippocleides of these two he most inclined. The day appointed for the choice of the husband came, and Cleisthenes sacrificed a hundred oxen and feasted all the suitors and all the folk of Sicyon. After the dinner, the wooers competed in music and general conversation. Hippocleides was the most brilliant, and, as his success seemed assured, he bade the flute-player strike up, and began to dance. Cleisthenes was surprised and disconcerted at this behavior, and his surprise became disgust when Hippocleides, who thought he was making a decisive impression, called for a table and danced Spartan and Athenian figures on it. The host controlled his feelings, but, when Hippocleides proceeded to dance on his head, he could no longer resist, and called out, "O son of Tisander, you have danced away your bride!" But the Athenian only replied, "Hippocleides careth not," and danced on. Megacles was chosen for Agarista, and rich presents were given to the disappointed suitors.

**10. The Sacred War. The Panhellenic Games.** — The most important achievement of Cleisthenes, and that which won him most fame in the Greek world, was his championship of the Delphic oracle.

The temple of Delphi, or Pytho, lay in the territory of the Phocian town of Crisa. The sanctuary of "rocky Pytho" was terraced on a steep slope, hard under the bare sheer cliffs of Parnassus, looking down upon the deep glen of the Pleistus, — an austere and majestic scene, supremely fitted for the utterance of the oracles of God. The men of Crisa claimed control over the Delphians and the oracle, and levied dues on the visitors who came to consult

the deity. The Delphians desired to free themselves from the control of the Crisæans, and they naturally looked for help to the great league of the north, in which the Thessalians, the ancient foes of the Phocians, were now the dominant member. The folks who belonged to this religious union were the "dwellers around" the shrine of Demeter at Anthela, close to the pass of Thermopylæ; and hence they were called the Amphictions of Anthela or Pylæ. The league included the Locrians, Phocians, Bœotians, and Athen-

ians, as well as the Dorians, Malians, Dolopians, Enianes, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, and Magnetes.

The Amphictions espoused warmly the cause of Apollo and his Delphian servants, and declared a holy war against the men of Crisa who had violated



THE SACRED WAR AND DELPHIC AMPHITIONY

the sacred territory. And Delphi found a champion in the south as well as in the north. The tyrant of Sicyon across the gulf went forth against the impious city. As Crisa was situated in such a strong position, commanding the road from the sea to the sanctuary, the utter destruction of the city was the only conclusion of the war which could lead to the assured independence of the oracle. The Amphictions and Sicyonians took the city after a sore struggle, razed it to the ground, and slew the inhabitants. The Crisæan plain was dedicated to the god; solemn and heavy curses were pronounced against whosoever should till it.

One of the consequences of this war was the establishment of a close connection between Delphi and the Amphictiony of Anthela. The Delphic shrine became a second place of meeting, and the league was often called the Delphic Amphictiony. The temple was taken under the protection of the league; the administration of the property of the god was placed in the hands of the sacred councillors, two for each member of the league; who met twice a year in spring and autumn, both at Anthela and at Delphi. The oracle and the priestly nobles of Delphi thus won a position of independence; their great career of prosperity and power began. The Pythian games were now reorganized on a more splendid 582 B.C. scale, and the ordering of them was one of the duties of the Amphictions. The festival became, like the Olympian, a four-yearly celebration, being held in the middle of each Olympiad.

Much about the same time two other Panhellenic festivals were instituted at the Isthmus and at Nemea. Both the Isthmian and the Nemean festivals were two-yearly. Thus from the beginning of the sixth century four Panhellenic festivals are celebrated, two in the Peloponnesus, one on the Isthmus, one in the north; and throughout the course of Grecian history the prestige of these gatherings never wanes.

These four Panhellenic festivals helped to maintain a feeling of fellowship among all the Greeks, and Delphi, the meeting place for pilgrims and envoys from all quarters of the Greek world, helped to keep distant cities in touch with one another. These two forces promoted the conception of a common Hellenic race with common interests. About the middle of the seventh century the name "Panhellenes" was used in a poem by Archilochus, and the Homeric Catalogue of the Ships, a work of the seventh century, gives to almost every state in Greece a share in the great Hellenic enterprise against Troy.

We saw that the Bœotians were a member of the northern Amphictiony. The unity of Bœotia itself had taken the form of a federation, in which Thebes was the dominant power. This

unity had its weak points; its maintenance depended upon the power of Thebes; some of the cities were reluctant members. Orchomenus held out for independence till forced to join about the end of the seventh century. Above all, Plataea chafed; she had



BOEOTIA

kept herself pure from mixture with the Boeotian settlers, and her whole history — of which some remarkable episodes will pass before us — may be regarded as an isolated continuation of the ancient struggle between the elder Greek inhabitants of the land and the Boeotian conquerors.

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## CHAPTER V

### THE UNION OF ATTICA AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE ATHE- NIAN DEMOCRACY

1. **The Union of Attica.** — Attica, like its neighbor Bœotia and other countries of Greece, was once occupied by a number of independent states. But of all the lordships between Mount Cithæron and Cape Sunium the most important was Athens, the stronghold in the midst of the Cephisian plain, five miles from the sea. Even in the bronze age it was one of the strong places of Greece. There still remain pieces of the wall of gray-blue limestone with which the Pelasgian lords of the castle secured the edge of their precipitous hill. This citadel — the Acropolis — is joined to the Areopagus by a high saddle, which forms its natural approach, and on this side walls were so constructed that the main western entrance to the citadel lay through nine successive gates.

The first Greeks who won the Pelasgic Acropolis were probably the Cecropes, and the later Athenians were always ready to describe themselves as the sons of Cecrops. This Cecrops was numbered among the imaginary prehistoric kings of Athens; he was nothing more than the fabulous ancestor of the Cecropes. But the time came when other Greek dwellers in Attica won the upper hand over the Cecropes, and brought with them the worship of Athena. The Acropolis became Athenai; the folk — whether Cecropes or Pelasgians — who dwelled in the villages around it, on the banks of the Ilisus and Eridanus, became Athenians. They became Athenians in the full sense only after another great step in their history — the *συννοικισμός* or union of the small yet separate

Trad. date  
1581 B.C.

communities, which was annually commemorated by the feast of the *συννομία*. Athens was no longer the head of a league like Thebes in Bœotia, nor the mistress of subject communities. The man of Marathon or any village in Attica was precisely on a level with a dweller in Athens herself. We do not know when this step was achieved, nor by whom. In after-times the Athenians thought that the hero Theseus, whom they had enrolled in the list of their early kings,<sup>1</sup> was the author of the union of their country.



ATHENA AND POSEIDON ON A VASE PAINTED BY AMASIS

2. **Foundation of the Athenian Commonwealth.** — At Athens, as in the other Greek states, there existed in early days a royalty, which passed into an aristocracy and then into a republic. The

<sup>1</sup> Old Attic tradition (preserved by Herodotus) counted only four kings before Theseus, viz. Cecrops, Erechtheus, Pandion, Ægeus.

first step in the limitation of kingly power was the institution of a *polemarch* or commander of the army, elected by the nobles. The next was the establishment of an *archon* or regent, who usurped most of the kingly functions. Acastus was the first regent, created by his kinsmen the Medontids; and he held office for life. All archons after him swore that they would be true to their oath even as Acastus. Next came the limitation of the archonship to a period of ten years, though for some time still the archon must be a Me-



ATTICA

683-682 B.C. dontid. This restriction of choice was abolished, but the first certain date which we have is 683-682 B.C., when the archonship or regency became a yearly office.

The kings were not formally abolished, but continued to hold office for ceremonial purposes, and to the last the title was retained in that of the archon basileus.

In the period of these changes took place the union or synœcism

of Attica. The united people of all the separate districts and villages were grouped into four tribes. The brotherhoods or phratries were rearranged under the tribes, three to each, making twelve phratries in all. At the head of each tribe was a "tribe king."

3. **The Aristocracy in the Seventh Century.** — (1) *The Archons.* — Early in the seventh century, then, the Athenian republic was an aristocracy, and the executive was in the hands of three annually elected officers, the archon, the king, and the polemarch. The archon was the supreme judge in all civil suits. He held the chief place among the magistrates, and his name appeared at the head of official lists, whence he was called *eponymus*. The polemarch had judicial duties, besides being commander-in-chief of the army; he judged all cases in which non-citizens were involved. The king's functions were confined to the management of the state-religion, and the conduct of certain judicial cases connected with religion, which came before the Council of which he was president.

(2) *The Council of the Areopagus.* — The Bule or Council of Elders came afterward to be called at Athens the Council of the Areopagus, to distinguish it from other councils of later growth. This name was derived from its place of meeting for a certain purpose. According to early custom, murder and manslaughter were not regarded as crimes against the state, but the family of the slain man might either slay the slayer or accept a compensation. But gradually, the belief gained ground that he who shed blood was impure and needed cleansing. Accordingly, when a murderer satisfied the kinsfolk of the murdered by paying a fine, he had also to submit to a process of purification, and satisfy the gods and the Erinyes or Furies, who were, in the original conception, the souls of the dead clamoring for vengeance. And when a member of a community was impure, the stain drew down the anger of the gods upon the whole community, if the unclean were not driven out. Hence it came about that the state undertook the conduct of criminal justice. The council itself formed the court, and the proceedings were closely associated with the wor-

ship of the *Semnai*. These Chthonian goddesses had a sanctuary, which served as a refuge for him whose hand was stained with bloodshed, on the northeast side of the Areopagus, outside the city wall. On this rugged spot the council held its sittings to deal with cases of murder, violence with murderous intent, poisoning, and incendiarism.

(3) *Classes in Athens*. — Under the rule of the kings and the aristocracies, the free population fell into three classes: the *Eupatridæ* or nobles; the *Georgi* or peasants, who cultivated their own farms; and the *Demiurgi* (public workers) — those who lived by trade or commerce. But besides these classes of citizens, who had the right of attending the Assembly, there was a mass of freemen who were not citizens, such as the agricultural laborers, who, having no land of their own, cultivated the estates of the nobles.

4. **The Timocracy.** — Although Attica seems to have taken no part in the colonizing movements of the eighth and seventh centuries,



COIN OF ATHENS  
(EARLY). OVERSE,  
HEAD OF PALLAS

the Athenians shared in the trading activities of that period. The cultivation of the olive was becoming a feature of Attica, and its oil a profitable article of exportation. At the same time, Attic potters were actively developing their industry on lines of their own. It is easy to see how participation in trade began to undermine the foundations of the aristocracy of birth. The nobles engaged in mercantile ventures with various success, some becoming richer, and others poorer; and the industrial folk increased in wealth and importance. The result would ultimately be that wealth would assert itself as well as birth, both socially and politically. In the second half of the seventh century we find that the aristocracy had changed into a *timocracy*, or constitution, in which political rights depend entirely on wealth. For we find the

people divided into three classes, according to their wealth. The principle of division was the annual yield of landed property, in corn, oil, or wine. The highest class was the *Pentacosiemedimni*, including those whose land produced at least so many measures (medimni) of corn and so many measures (metretæ) of oil or wine as *together* amounted to five hundred measures. The second class included those whose property produced more than three hundred, but less than five hundred, such measures. These were called *Knights*, and so represented roughly those who could maintain a horse and take their part in war as mounted soldiers. The minimum income of the third class was two hundred measures, and their name, *Zeugitai* or *Teamsters*, shows that they were well-to-do peasants who could till their land with a pair of oxen. The chief magistracies of archon, king, and polemarch were confined to the first class, but the principle was admitted that a successful man, although not a Eupatrid (noble) was eligible for the highest offices. It is probable that the institution of the *Thesmothetæ* also marks a step in the self-assertion of the lower classes. The Thesmothetæ were a college of six judges elected annually, who managed the whole judicial system of Athens. They were soon associated with the three chief magistrates—the archon, basileus, and polemarch; and the nine came to form a sort of college and were called the Nine Archons. c. 640 B.C.

Outside these classes were the smaller peasants who had land of their own, of which, however, the produce did not amount to two hundred measures of corn or oil, and the humbler handicraftsmen. These were called *Thetes*, the name being perverted from its proper meaning of “laborers.” The Thetes were citizens, but had no political rights. Yet as the conditions of a growing maritime trade led to the development of a navy, and as the duty of serving as marines in the penteconters mainly devolved upon the Thetes, this gave them a new significance in the state. The democracy of Athens was always closely connected with her sea power. And though the economic changes, caused in the seventh



century by the invention of money, led to much hardship and social discontent, still an event happened about thirty years before the end of the century which shows that the peasants were still loyal to the existing constitution.

c. 632 B.C.

**5. The Conspiracy of Cylon.** — A certain Cylon, of noble family, married the daughter of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara and, with Megarian help, tried to make himself master of the city. Cylon enlisted in his enterprise a number of noble youth, and a band of Megarian soldiers sent by Theagenes; he had no support among the people. He succeeded in seizing the Acropolis, but the sight of foreign soldiers effectually quenched any lurking sympathy that any of the Athenians might have felt for an effort to overthrow the government. Cylon was blockaded in the citadel, and, after a long siege, he escaped with his brother from the fortress. The rest were soon constrained to capitulate. They sought refuge in the temple of Athena Polias, and left it when the archons promised to spare their lives. But Megacles, of the Alcmaeonid family, was archon this year; and at his instigation the conspirators were put to death. Such a violation of a solemn pledge to the suppliants who had trusted in the protection of the gods was an insult to the gods themselves; and the city was under a curse till the pollution should be removed. This view was urged by the secret friends of Cylon and those who hated the Alcmaeonids. And so it came to pass that while Cylon, his brother, and their descendants were condemned to perpetual banishment, the Alcmaeonids and those who had acted with them were also tried on the charge of sacrilege and condemned to a perpetual exile, with confiscation of their property. The banishment of the Alcmaeonids had consequences in the practical politics of Athens two hundred years later.

**6. The Laws of Dracon.** — The outbreak of a war with Megara, in consequence of the plot of Cylon, aggravated the distress of the rural population; for the Attic coasts suffered from the depredations of the enemy, and the Megarian market was closed to the

oil-trade. And, probably to prevent an outbreak, it was decided that a code of law should be drawn up and written down. Dracon was appointed an extraordinary legislator (*thesmothetes*), and empowered to codify and rectify the existing law. We know only the provisions of that part of his criminal law which dealt with the shedding of blood; and his name became proverbial for a severe lawgiver. An Athenian orator won credit for his epigram that Dracon's laws were written, not in ink, but in blood. This idea arose from the fact that certain small offenses, such as stealing cabbage, were punished by death. A broader view, however, of Dracon's code will modify this estimate. He drew careful distinctions between murder and various kinds of accidental or justifiable manslaughter; and though, being appointed by the aristocracy, he was bound to provide for the interests of the rich power-holding class, it was at all events an enormous gain for the poor that those interests should be defined in writing.

7. **The Legislation of Solon.** — Dracon's code was something, but it did not touch the root of the evil. Every year the oppressiveness of the rich few and the impoverishment of the small farmer were increasing. Without capital, and obliged to borrow money, which was still very scarce,<sup>1</sup> the small proprietors mortgaged their lands, which fell into the hands of capitalists, who lent money at ruinous interest. The condition of the free laborers or *hektekori* was even more deplorable. The sixth part of the produce, which was their wage, no longer sufficed, under the new economical conditions, to support life, and they were forced into borrowing from their masters. The interest was high, and the person of the borrower was forfeited to the lender in case of inability to pay. Thus while the wealthy few were becoming wealthier and greedier, the small proprietors were becoming landless, and the landless free-

<sup>1</sup> The value of silver at this time may be judged from the fact that a sheep cost a drachma, a bushel of barley a drachma, an ox five drachmæ. (A drachma = about 20 cents.)

men were becoming slaves. And the evil was aggravated by unjust judgments, and the perversion of law in favor of the rich and powerful. The people were bitter against their remorseless oppressors and only wanted a leader to rebel.

The catastrophe, however, was averted by the mediation of an eminent citizen — Solon, the son of Execestides, a noble connected with the house of the Medontids. He was a merchant, and belonged to the wealthiest class in the state. He had imbued himself with Ionic literature, and had mastered the art of writing verse in the Ionic idiom. We are fortunate enough to possess portions of poems — political pamphlets — which he published for the purpose of guiding public opinion; and thus we have his view of the situation in his own words. The more moderate of the nobles seem to have seen the danger and the urgent need of a new order of things; and thus it came to pass that Solon was solicited to undertake the work of reform. He was elected archon, with extraordinary legislative powers; and instead of making the usual declaration of the chief magistrate, that he would protect the property of all men undiminished, he proclaimed that all mortgages and debts by which the debtor's person or land was pledged were annulled, and that all those who had become slaves for debt were free. By this proclamation the Athenians "shook off their burdens," and this first act of Solon's social reform was called the *Seisachtheia*. The great deliverance was celebrated by a public feast.

The character of the remedial measures of Solon is imperfectly known. After the canceling of old debts, he passed a law which forbade debtors to be enslaved; and he fixed a limit for the measure of land which could be owned by a single person, so as to prevent the growth of dangerously large estates. These measures hit the rich hard, and created discontent with the reformer; while, on the other hand, he was far from satisfying the desires and hopes of the masses. He would not confiscate and redistribute the estates of the wealthy, as many wished. And, though he rescued the

free laborer from bondage, he made no change in the working-on-share system, so that the condition of these landless freemen was improved only in so far as they could not be enslaved.

**8. The Constitutional Reforms of Solon, and the Foundations of Democracy.** — But Solon's title to fame as one of the great statesmen of Europe rests upon his reform of the constitution. The Athenian commonwealth did not actually become a democracy till many years later; but Solon not only laid the foundations — he shaped the framework. At first sight, indeed, the state as he reformed it might seem little more than an aristocracy of wealth — a timocracy — with certain democratic tendencies. He retained the old graduation of the people in classes, according to property. But he added the Thetes as a fourth class, and gave it certain political rights. On the three higher classes devolved the public burdens, and they served as cavalry, or as hoplites. The Thetes were employed as light-armed troops, or as marines. It is probable that Solon made little or no change in regard to the offices which were open to each class. The Thetes were not eligible to any of the offices of state, but they were admitted to take part in the meetings of the Ecclesia, and this gave them a voice in the election of the magistrates.

(1) *The Courts: the Heliæa.* — But the radical measure of Solon was his constitution of the courts of justice. He composed a court out of all the citizens, including the Thetes; and as the panels of judges were enrolled by lot, the poorest citizen might have his turn. Any magistrate on laying down his office could be accused before the people in these courts; and thus the institution of popular courts invested the people with a supreme control over the administration. The people, sitting in sections as sworn judges, were called the *Heliæa*, — as distinguished from the Assembly, in which they gathered to pass laws or choose magistrates, but were required to take no oath. At first the archons were not deprived of their judicial powers, and the *heliæa* acted as a court of appeal; but by degrees only the proceedings prelim-

inary to a trial were left to the archons, and the *heliæa* became both the first and the final court.

The constitution of the judicial courts out of the whole people was the secret of democracy which Solon discovered. We can hardly hesitate to regard Solon as the founder of the Athenian democracy. He deprived the Council of the Areopagus of its deliberative functions, so that it could no longer take any direct part in administration and legislation. But, on the other hand, he gave it wide and undefined powers of control over the magistrates, and a censorial authority over the citizens. Its judicial and religious functions it retained. Henceforward the nine archons at the end of their year of office became life-members of the Council of the Areopagus; and this was the manner in which the Council was recruited. Thus the Areopagites were virtually appointed by the people in the Assembly, which elected the archons.

(2) *The Council*. — Having removed the Council of the Areopagus to this place of dignity, above and almost outside the constitution, Solon was obliged to create a new body to prepare the business for the assembly. This new council which Solon instituted consisted of four hundred members; a hundred being taken from each of the four tribes, either chosen by the tribe itself or, more probably, picked by lot. All citizens of the three higher classes were eligible; the Thetes alone were excluded.

(3) *Election by Lot*. — The use of lot for the purpose of appointing public officers was a feature of Solon's reforms. According to men's ideas in those days, lot committed the decision to the gods. It was doubtless as a security against the undue influence of clans and parties that Solon used it. He applied it to the appointment of the chief magistrates themselves. But, religious though he was, he could not be blind to the danger of taking no human precautions against the falling of the lot upon an incompetent candidate, and he therefore mixed the two methods of lot and election. Forty candidates were elected, ten from each tribe, by the voice of their tribesmen; and out of these the nine archons were picked by lot.

9. **Effects of the Legislation of Solon.** — Solon sought to keep the political balance steady by securing that each of the four tribes should have an equal share in the government. Yet the gravest danger ahead was in truth not the strife of poor and rich, but the deep-rooted and bitter jealousies which existed between many of the clans. While the clan had the tribe behind it and the tribe possessed political weight, such feuds might at any moment cause a civil war or a revolution. But it was reserved for a future lawgiver to grapple with this problem.

One of Solon's first acts was to repeal all the legislation of Dracon, except the laws relating to manslaughter. His own laws were inscribed on wooden tables and kept in the public hall.

Solon had done his work boldly, but he had done it constitutionally. He had not made himself a tyrant, as he might easily have done, and as many expected him to do. On the contrary, one purpose of his reform was to forestall the necessity, and prevent the possibility, of a tyranny. To a superficial observer, caution seemed the note of his reforms, and men were surprised, and many disgusted, by his cautiousness. When he laid down his office, he was assailed by complaints; but he refused to entertain the idea of any modifications in his measures. Thinking that the reforms would work better in the absence of the reformer, he left Athens soon after his archonship and traveled for ten years. Though the remnants of his poems are fragmentary, though the recorded events of his life are meager, and though the details of his legislation are dimly known and variously interpreted, the personality of Solon leaves a distinct impression on our minds. We know enough to see in him an embodiment of the ideal of intellectual and moral excellence of the early Greeks, and the greatest of their wise men.

Solon's social reforms inaugurated a permanent improvement. But his political measures, which he intended as a compromise, displeased many. Party strife broke out again bitterly soon after his archonship, and only to end, after thirty years, in the tyranny



which it had been his dearest object to prevent. The two great parties were those who were in the main satisfied with the new constitution of Solon, and those who disliked its democratic side and desired to return to the aristocratic government which he had subverted. The latter consisted chiefly of Eupatrids and were known as the men of the Plain. The opposite party of the Coast included the bulk of the middle classes, the peasants as well as the Demiurgi, who were bettered by the changes of Solon. They were led by Megacles, son of Alcmaeon, the same Megacles who married Agarista. For one of Solon's measures was an act which permitted the return of the Alcmaeonids.

#### TOPICS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 79)

1. The Athenian Constitution.

Bury, 163-180. Holm, I, 376-384.

2. Solon and his Legislation.

Bury, 180-190. Holm, I, 387-395. Cox, G. W., Greek Statesmen, 1-31.

**Sources.** Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, 1-31. Plutarch, Solon. Herodotus, Book I, 29-33.

## CHAPTER VI

### GROWTH OF ATHENS IN THE SIXTH CENTURY

1. **The Conquest of Salamis.** — Almost equally distant from Athens and Megara, parted by a narrow water from both, Salamis in the hands of either must be a constant menace to the other. The possession of Salamis must decide the future history of both Megara and Athens. At this period Megara, with her growing colonial connections and her expanding trade, was a strong state and a formidable neighbor. The conspiracy of Cylon furnished 629 B.C. an occasion of war. Theagenes sent his ships to harry the Attic coasts. The Athenians sought to occupy Salamis, but all their efforts to gain a permanent footing failed, and they abandoned the attempt in despair. Years passed away. At length Solon saw that the favorable hour had come. He composed a stirring poem which began: "I came myself as a herald from lovely Salamis, but with song on my lips instead of common speech." He blamed the peace policy of the "men who let slip Salamis," as dishonorable; and cried, "Arise, and come to Salamis, to win that fair island and undo our shame." His appeal moved the hearts of his countrymen to a national effort, and an Athenian army went forth to lay the first stone of their country's greatness.

An intimate friend of Solon took part in the enterprise, — Pisistratus, son of Hippocrates. He helped the expedition to a successful issue. Not only was the disputed island wrested from Megara, but he captured the port of Nisæa over against the island. And though Nisæa was subsequently restored when peace was made, Salamis became permanently annexed to Attica as her first c. 570 B.C. transmarine possession. The island was afterward divided in

lots among Athenian citizens, who were called *cleruchs* or "lot-holders."

The conquest of Salamis was a decisive event for Athens. Her territory was now rounded off; she had complete command of the landlocked Eleusinian bay; it was she who now threatened Megara.

**2. Athens under Pisistratus.** — Pisistratus, the conqueror of Nisæa, was the hero of the day. By practicing popular arts, he ingratiated himself with those extreme democrats who were outside both the Plain and the Coast. He thus organized a new party which was called the Hill, as it largely consisted of the poor Hillsmen of the highlands of Attica. With this party at his back, Pisistratus aimed at grasping the supreme power. One day he appeared in the agora, wounded, he said, by a foul attack of his political foes; and he showed wounds which he bore. In the Assembly, packed by the Hillsmen, a bodyguard of fifty clubsmen was voted to him. Having secured his bodyguard, — the first step in a tyrant's progress, — Pisistratus seized the Acropolis, and made himself master of the state.

It was the fate of Solon to live just long enough to see the establishment of the tyranny which he dreaded. He survived but a short time under Pisistratus, who at least treated the old man with respect.

At the end of about five years the other two parties united against Pisistratus and succeeded in driving him out. But new disunion followed, and Megacles, the leader of the Coast, seems to have quarreled not only with the Plain, but with his own party. At all events, he sought a reconciliation with Pisistratus and undertook to help him back to the tyranny on condition that the tyrant wedded his daughter. By a trick Pisistratus deceived the common people and returned to Athens; but the coalition did not last long. For Pisistratus treated his wife with neglect; which so enraged Megacles when he heard of it, that he made common cause with the tyrant's enemies and succeeded in driving Pisistratus out a second time.

561-0 B.C.

556-555 B.C.

550-549 B.C.

549 B.C.

The second exile lasted about ten years, and Pisistratus spent it in forming new connections in Macedonia. He exploited the gold mines of Mount Pangæus near the Strymon, and formed a force of mercenary soldiers, thus providing himself with money and men to recover his position at Athens. When he landed at Marathon, his adherents flocked to his standard. The citizens who were loyal to the constitutional government marched forth, and were defeated in battle at Pallene. Resistance was at an end, and once more Pisistratus had the power in his hands. This time he kept it.

540-539 B.C.



TROOPS AT ATHENS (VASE OF AGE OF PISISTRATUS)

(1) *The Domestic Policy of Pisistratus.*—The rule of Pisistratus may be described as a constitutional tyranny. The constitution of Solon seems to have been preserved in its essential features, but various measures of policy were adopted by him to protect his position, while he preserved the old forms of government. He managed to exert an influence on the appointment of the archons, so as to secure personal adherents, and one of his own family generally held some office. The tyrant kept up a standing force of paid soldiers — among them, perhaps, Scythian archers, whom we see portrayed on Attic vases of the time. He confiscated

the estates of his leading opponents, most of whom, including the Alcmaeonids, had left Attica, and he divided the land among his landless supporters, the laborers on shares, and they had only to pay a land-tax of one-tenth. This tax, together with his possessions on the Strymon, gave Pisistratus a large revenue. Attica was tranquil under him, and the people thrived, while he founded the foreign power of the state and beautified the city.

(2) *The Foreign Power of Pisistratus.*—About forty years before Pisistratus became tyrant, Athens had made her first venture in distant seas, and seized the Lesbian fortress Sigeum, at the entrance to the Hellespont. But the conquest was lost during the party strife which followed. Pisistratus recaptured Sigeum, and made one of his sons governor of the place. At the same period a much greater acquisition was made in the same region, under the auspices of Pisistratus, but by one of his opponents. Miltiades, of the noble family of the Philaids, a leader of the Plain, went out with a band of settlers to found a colony in the Thracian Chersonese.

Pisistratus strongly asserted the claim of Athens to be the mother and leader of the Ionian branch of the Greek race. The temple of Apollo in Delos, the island of his mythical birth, had long been a religious center of the Ionians on both sides of the Ægean. Pisistratus "purified" the sacred spot by digging up all the tombs that were within sight of the sanctuary and removing the bones of the dead to another part of the island.

(3) *The Beginnings of the Drama.*—Pisistratus was indeed scrupulous and zealous in all matters concerned with religion. But no act of his was more fruitful in results than what he did for the worship of Dionysus. He built for the Bacchic god a new house at the foot of the Acropolis, and its ruins have not yet wholly disappeared. In connection with this temple Pisistratus instituted a new festival, called the Great Dionysia of the City, and it completely overshadowed the older feast of the Winepress (Lenæa), which still continued to be held in the first days of spring

at the old sanctuary of the Marshes. The chief feature of Dionysiac feasts was the choir of satyrs, the god's attendants, who danced around the altar clothed in goat-skins, and sang their "goat-song." But it became usual for the leader of the dancers, who was also the composer of the song, to separate himself from his fellows and hold speech with them, assuming the character of some person connected with the events which the song celebrated, and wearing an appropriate dress. Such performances, which at the rural feasts had been arranged by private enterprise, were made an official part of the Great Dionysia, and thus taken under state protection, in the form of a "tragic" contest, two or more choruses competing for a prize. Legends not connected with Dionysus were chosen for representation, and the dancers appeared, not in the Bacchic goat-dress, but in the costume suitable for their part in the story. This performance was divided into three acts; the dancers changed their costumes for each act; and only at the end did they come forward in their true goat-guise and perform a piece which preserved the original satyric character of "tragedy." Then their preponderant importance was by degrees diminished, and a second actor was introduced; and so the goat-song of the days of Pisistratus grew into the tragedy of Æschylus.

The great festival in honor of Athena, known as the *Pan-athenæa*, had been remodeled, if not founded, shortly before Pisistratus seized the tyranny, and was held every fourth year. It was celebrated with athletic and musical contests, but the center and motive of the feast was the great procession which went up to the house of Athena on her hill, to offer her a robe woven by the hands of Athenian maidens. The temple of Athena and Erechtheus was situated near the northern cliff; and to the south of it a new house had been reared for the goddess of the city to inhabit. It had been built before the days of Pisistratus, but it was probably he who encompassed it with a Doric colonnade. From its length this temple was known as the House of the Hun-



dred Feet, and many of the lowest stones of the walls, still lying in their places, show us its site and shape. The triangular gables displayed what Attic sculptors of the day could achieve. Hitherto



ATHENA SLAYING A GIANT (FROM A PEDIMENT OF THE OLD TEMPLE OF ATHENA ON THE ATHENIAN ACROPOLIS)

the favorite material of these sculptors had been the soft marly limestone of the Piræus. But now — in the second half of the sixth century — Greek sculptors have begun to work in a nobler and harder material; and on one of the pediments of the renovated

temple of Athena Polias the battle of the Gods and Giants was wrought in Parian marble. Athena herself in the center of the composition, slaying Enceladus with her spear, may still be seen and admired.

Southeastward from the citadel, on the banks of the Ilissus, Pisistratus began the building of a great Doric temple for the Olympian Zeus. He began, but so immense was the scale of his plan that the work had to wait for Rome and the Emperor Hadrian to complete it.

**3. Growth of Sparta, and the Peloponnesian League.** — While a tyrant was moulding the destinies of Athens, Sparta had become the predominant power in the Peloponnesus.

Eastern Arcadia is marked by a large plain, high above the sea-level; the villages in the north of this plain had coalesced into the town of Mantinea; those in the south had been united in Tegea. Sparta had gradually pressed up to the borders of the Tegean territory, and a long war was the result. This war is associated with an interesting legend. When the Spartans asked the Delphic oracle whether they might hope to achieve the conquest of Arcadia, they received a promise that the god would give them Tegea. Then, on account of this answer, they went forth against Tegea with fetters, but were defeated; and, bound in the fetters which they had brought, they were compelled to till the Tegean plain. War went on, and the Spartans, invariably defeated, at last consulted the oracle again. The god bade them bring back the bones of Orestes, but they could find no trace of the hero's burying-place, and they asked the god once more. This time they received an oracle couched in obscure enigmatic words: —

c. 556-550  
B.C.

Among Arcadian hills a level space

Holds Tegea, where blow two blasts perforce

And woe is laid on woe and face to face

Striker and counter-striker: there the corse

Thou seekest lies, even Agamemnon's son;

Convey him home and victory is won.

This did not help them much. But it befell that, during a truce with the Tegeates, a certain Lichas, a Spartan man, was in Tegea and entering a smith's shop saw the process of beating out iron. The smith in conversation told him that, wishing to dig a well in his courtyard, he had found a coffin seven cubits long and within it a corpse of the same length, which he replaced. Lichas guessed at once that he had solved the oracle, and told the story at Sparta. The courtyard was hired from the smith, the coffin was found, and the bones brought home to Laconia. Then Tegea was conquered, and here we return from fable to fact. The territory of the Arcadian city was not treated like Messenia; it was not incorporated in the territory of Lacedæmon. It became a dependent state, contributing a military contingent to the army of its conqueror.

c. 550 B.C.

Much about the same time, Sparta at length succeeded in rounding off the frontier of Laconia on the northeastern side by wresting the disputed territory of Thyreatis from Argos. The armies of the two states met on the border-land, but the Spartan kings and the Argive chiefs agreed to decide the dispute by a combat between three hundred chosen champions on either side. The story is that all the six hundred were slain except three, one Spartan and two Argives; and that while the Argives hurried home to announce their victory, the Spartan — Othryades was his name — remained on the field and erected a trophy. In any case, both parties claimed the victory, and a battle was fought in which the Argives were utterly defeated.

The defeat of Argos placed Sparta at the head of the peninsula. All the Peloponnesian states, except Argos and Achæa, were enrolled in a loose confederacy, engaging themselves to supply military contingents in the common interest, Lacedæmon being the leader. The meetings of the confederacy were held at Sparta, and each member sent representatives. Corinth readily joined; for Corinth was naturally ranged against Argos, while her commercial rival, the island state of Ægina, was a friend of Argos. The other Isthmian state, Megara, in which the rule of the nobles

had been restored, was also enrolled. Everywhere Sparta exerted her influence to maintain oligarchy — everywhere she discountenanced democracy, except in one notable instance.

4. **Fall of the Pisistratids and Intervention of Sparta.** — When 528-527 B.C.  
 Pisistratus died, his eldest son Hippias took his place and Hipparchus helped him in the government. Hippias and Hipparchus were abreast of the most modern culture. The eminent poets of the day came to their court, such as Simonides of Ceos, and Anacreon of Teos.

The first serious blow aimed at the power of the tyrants was due to a personal grudge. Hipparchus gave offense to two young men named Harmodius and Aristogiton; who formed the plan of slaying the tyrants. They chose the day of the Panathenaic festival because they could then, without raising suspicion, appear publicly with arms. But, as the hour approached, it was observed that one of the conspirators was engaged in speech with Hippias. His fellows leapt hastily to the conclusion that their plot was betrayed, and, giving up the idea of attacking Hippias, rushed to the market-place and slew Hipparchus. Harmodius 514 B.C.  
 was cut down by the mercenaries, and Aristogiton, escaping for the moment, was afterward captured, tortured, and put to death.

At the time no sympathy was manifested for the conspirators, but their act led to a complete change in the government of Hippias. Not knowing what dangers might still lurk about his feet, he became a hard and suspicious despot. Then many Athenians came to hate him, and they began to cherish the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton as tyrant-slayers.

The overthrow of the tyranny was chiefly brought about by the Alcmaeonids, who desired to return to Athens and could not win their desire so long as the Pisistratids were in power. They used their influence with the Delphic oracle to put pressure on Sparta. Accordingly, whenever the Spartans sent to consult the god in any matter, the response always was: "First, free Athens." The diplomacy of the Alcmaeonids, of whose clan Cleisthenes, son of



HARMODIUS AND ARISTOGITON


Megacles, was at this time head, supported as it was by the influence of Delphi, finally prevailed, and the Spartans consented to force freedom upon Athens. They sent an expedition under King Cleomenes, and Hippias was blockaded in the Acropolis. When his children, whom he was sending secretly into safety abroad, fell into the hands of his enemies, he capitulated, and, on condition that they were given back, undertook to leave Attica within five days. He and all his house departed to Sigeum.

510 B.C.

Thus the tyrants had fallen, and with the aid of Sparta Athens was free. It was not surprising that when she came to value her liberty she loved to turn away from the circumstances in which it was actually won, and linger over the romantic attempt of the two friends who slew the tyrant; Harmodius and Aristogiton became household words.

As soon as Hippias had been driven out and the Spartans had departed, the strife of factions broke out; and the Coast and Plain seem to have risen again in the parties of the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes<sup>1</sup> and his rival Isagoras, who was supported by the secret adherents of the tyrant's house. Cleisthenes won the upper hand by enlisting on his side superior numbers. He rallied to his cause a host of poor men who were outside the pale of citizenship,

<sup>1</sup> Tree showing the relationships of eminent Alcmaeonids in the sixth and fifth centuries:—





508 B.C.

by promising to make them citizens; and in the year of his rival's archonship he introduced new democratic measures of law. Isagoras was so far outnumbered that he had no resource but appeal to Sparta. At his instance the Lacedæmonians, who looked with disfavor on democracy, demanded that the Alcmaeonids, as a clan under a curse, should be expelled from Attica; and Cleisthenes, without attempting resistance, left the country. But this was not enough. King Cleomenes entered Attica for the second time, expelled seven hundred families pointed out by Isagoras, and attempted to dissolve the new constitution and to set up an oligarchy. But the whole people rose in arms; Cleomenes, who had only a small band of soldiers with him, was blockaded with Isagoras in the Acropolis, and was forced to capitulate on the third day. Cleisthenes could now return with all the other exiles and complete his work.

**5. Reform of Cleisthenes.**—The machinery of Athenian democracy devised by Solon would not act. Clan interests and local interests occasioned factions. Clans were embodied in their entirety in one or other of the four tribes, and the groups of phratries possessed undue political influence. Thus the tribe was apt to direct its efforts to secure the advantage of a powerful clan, or of the dwellers in one region, such as the Coast. The memorable achievement of Cleisthenes was that he invented a new organization which split up these local or family combinations, and secured that citizens should act in the interest of the whole state, and not of a particular region.

(1) *Tribes and Demes.*—Taking the map of Attica as he found it, consisting of between one and two hundred demes or small districts, Cleisthenes distinguished three regions: the region of the city, the region of the coast, and the inland. In each of these regions he divided the demes into ten groups called *trittyes*, so that there were thirty such trittyes in all. Out of the thirty trittyes he then formed ten groups of three, in such a way that no group contained two trittyes from the same region. Each of these

groups constituted a tribe. Thus Kydathenæon, a trittys of the city region, was combined with Pæania, a trittys of the inland, and Myrrhinus, a trittys of the coast, to form the tribe of Pandionis. The ten new tribes thus obtained were called after eponymous heroes.<sup>1</sup>

Each Athenian citizen was therefore a member of a deme, a trittys, and a tribe. The tribe had another use apart from its political function, for each tribe contributed to the army a regiment of hoplites and a squadron of horse. Every citizen, therefore, not only voted with his tribe, but fought in his tribal regiment under his tribe's officers. The deme again was a corporation, with a demarch or president, who kept the burgess-roll, on which every citizen was inscribed at the age of seventeen. But the trittys had no independent corporate existence; it was only a link between the demes and the tribes. It was the means of bringing together a number of groups or demes of people without any common local interest to act together at Athens. The old parties of Hill, Plain, and Coast were thus done away with. The stability of the new order lay in the fact that the demes on which it ultimately rested were natural and real divisions. In official documents henceforward men were described by their deme, not by their father's name. A man might change his residence and live in another deme, but he belonged always to that in which he was originally enrolled.

(2) *The Council of Five Hundred.* — As the existing Council of Four Hundred had been based on the four Ionic tribes, Cleisthenes devised a Council of Five Hundred based on his ten new tribes. Each tribe contributed fifty members, of which each deme returned a fixed number, according to its size. Councilors were appointed by lot; but the outgoing Council had the right of rejecting the unfit. They took an oath when they entered upon office that they would "advise what is best for the city"; and

<sup>1</sup> Names of the ten tribes: Erechtheis, Ægeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Ceneis, Cecropis, Hippothontis, Æantis, Antiochis.

they were responsible for their acts, when they went out of office.

This Council, in which every part of Attica was represented, was the supreme administrative authority in the state. The archons and other magistrates were obliged to present reports to the Council and receive the Council's orders. All the finances of the state were practically in its hands, and ten new finance officers called *apodektai* (one from each tribe) acted under its direction. Further, the Council acted as a ministry of public works, and even as a ministry of war. It may also be regarded as the ministry of foreign affairs, for it conducted negotiations with foreign states, and received their envoys. It had no powers of declaring war or concluding a treaty; these powers resided solely in the sovereign Assembly. But the Council was not only an administrative body; it was a deliberative assembly, and had the initiative in all law-making. No proposal could come before the Ecclesia unless it had already been proposed and considered in the Council. Again, the Council had some judicial functions. It formed a court before which impeachments could be brought, as well as before the Assembly.

It is obvious that the administrative duties could not conveniently be conducted by a body of five hundred constantly sitting. Accordingly the year of three hundred and sixty days was divided into ten parts, and the councilors of each tribe took it in turn to act as a committee for carrying on public business during a tenth of the year. In this capacity, as members of the acting committee of fifty, the councilors were called *Prytaneis* or presidents, the tribe to which they belonged was said to be the *presiding*, and the divisions of this artificial year were called *prytanies*.

The new tribes led to a change in the military organization. Each was required to supply a regiment of hoplites and a squadron of horsemen; and the hoplites were commanded by ten generals whom the people elected from each tribe. The office of general was destined hereafter to become the most important in the

state; but at first he was merely the commander of the tribal regiment.

The Athenian Council instituted by Cleisthenes shows that Greek statesmen understood the principle of representative government. That Council is an excellent example of representation with a careful distribution of seats according to the size of the electorates; and it was practically the governing body of the state. But though Greek statesmen understood the principle, they always hesitated to intrust to a representative assembly sovereign powers of legislation. Owing to the small size of the city-state, an assembly, which every citizen who chose could attend, was a practicable institution; and the fundamental principle that supreme legislative power is exercised by the people itself could be literally applied.

**6. First Victories of the Democracy.**—Athens, now become a democracy, was at once subjected to a critical ordeal. King Cleomenes, who had pulled down one tyrant, now proposed to set up another, and in support of Isagoras, now an aspirant to the tyrannis, he leagued Sparta with Bœotia and Chalcis. Attica was to be assailed on three sides at once. But when the Peloponnesian host under the two kings, Cleomenes and Demaratus, had crossed the Isthmus and occupied Eleusis, they were deserted by the Corinthians, who condemned the expedition and returned home. Quarrels between Cleomenes and Demaratus further disorganized the army, till finally it broke up. Thus Cleomenes was again thwarted, and Athens a second time saved from Spartan coercion. 506 B.C.

Meanwhile, the Thebans as leaders of Bœotia had gladly joined the enterprise. Plataea, a town on the Bœotian slope of Mount Cithæron, held aloof from the Bœotian league and sought the help and protection of Athens. This was the beginning of a long friendship. When the retreat of Cleomenes left the Athenian army free to check the Bœotians, who had come in over the pass of Cithæron, and the Chalcidians, who had crossed the Euripus, the Bœotians moved to join the Chalcidian force. But they were 510 B.C.

intercepted and thoroughly defeated by the Athenians, who then followed the Chalcidians across the strait, and won another victory so crushing that Chalcis was forced to cede the Lelantine plain. The richest part of this plain was divided into lots among two thousand Athenian citizens who migrated to Eubœa. Thus the democracy had not only defended itself, but won new territory.

506 B.C.

#### TOPICS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 79)

1. The Tyranny of Pisistratus.

Bury, 192-202. Holm, I, 405-419. Abbott, Greece, I, 450-476.

2. The Reforms of Cleisthenes.

Bury, 211-215. Holm, I, 421-431. Cox, Greek Statesmen, 61-71.

**Sources.** The Pisistratids, Herodotus, I, 59-64.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ÆGEAN

#### 1. The Rise of Persia and the Fall of the Lydian Kingdom. —

While the Greeks were sailing their own seas, and working out in their city-states the institutions of law and freedom, great despotic kingdoms were waxing and waning in the east. In the seventh century the mighty empire of Assyria was verging to its end; the power destined to overthrow it had arisen. Those who destroyed the Assyrian empire, the Medes and Persians, folk of Aryan speech like the Greeks, were marked out by destiny to be the adversaries of the Greeks throughout the two chief centuries of Grecian history.

Toward the end of the eighth century the Medes successfully c. 700 B.C.  
revolted from Assyria, conquered and formed a union with the Persians who lived in the hilly country to the south, and, in a league with Babylonia, overwhelmed Assyria itself. The con- 606 B.C.  
querors divided the empire. The southwestern portion up to the borders of Egypt went to Babylonia; Assyria and the lands stretching westward into Asia Minor were annexed to Media. The conquest of Lydia was the next aim in the expansion of the Median power, and a pretext was found for declaring war. In the sixth year of the war, in the midst of a battle, an eclipse of the sun made such an impression on the minds of the combatants that a peace was concluded. Through a fortunate marriage treaty, the kingdom of Lydia was saved for a generation to enjoy the brilliant period of its history.

It was during this period that the kings of Lydia attempted to subdue the Greek cities along the coast, and under Cræsus succeeded



in adding all but Miletus to their empire. The Greek language spread in Lydia; the Greek gods were revered; the Greek oracles were consulted. Hence the Greeks never regarded the Lydians



GOLD COIN OF SARDIS (MIDDLE OF SIXTH CENTURY). OBVERSE: FOREPARTS OF LION AND BULL. REVERSE: TWO INCUSE SQUARES

as utter barbarians; and they always cherished a curious indulgence and sympathy for Cræsus, though he had enslaved and ruled as despot the cities of Asiatic Hellas. The Ionians had marveled at the treasures of golden

Gyges, but the untold wealth of Cræsus became proverbial. There is no more striking proof of the political importance of the oracle of Delphi at this period than the golden offerings dedicated by Cræsus — offerings richer than even the priestly avarice of the Delphians could have dared to hope for.

Having extended his sway to the coast, Cræsus conceived the idea of making Lydia a sea-power and conquering the islands. But he was diverted from his design by an event of great moment. His brother-in-law Astyages was hurled from the throne of Media by a hero, who was to become one of the world's mightiest conquerors. The usurper was Cyrus the Great, of the Persian family of the Achæmenids.

The fall of Astyages was an opportunity for the ambitious Lydian to turn his arms to the east. Desirous of probing the hidden event of the future, he consulted the Delphic oracle. It is said that the answer was that if he crossed the Halys, he would destroy a mighty empire. Cræsus, at the head of an army which included a force of Ionian Greeks, crossed the fateful Halys and invaded Cappadocia. But the host of Cyrus seems to have been far superior in numbers, and Cræsus retired before him into Lydia. Under the walls of the capital the invader won a decisive victory, and after a short siege Sardis was stormed and plundered. The life of Cræsus was spared.

The overthrow of Crœsus was the most illustrious example that the Greeks had ever witnessed of their favorite doctrine that the gods visit with jealousy men who enjoy too great prosperity. And never more than for the memory of Crœsus did Greece put



CRÆSUS ON THE PYRE (ATTIC VASE)

forth the power which she possessed in such full measure, of weaving round an event of history tales which have a deep and touching import as lessons for the life of men.

Cyrus built a great pyre — so the story is told by Herodotus —

and placed thereon Cræsus bound in chains, with fourteen Lydian boys. And as Cræsus was standing on the pile, in this extreme pass, there came into his mind a word which Solon had said to him, that no man could be called happy so long as he was alive. For the Athenian statesman had visited the court of Sardis in his travels, — the art of the tale-weaver had no precise regard for the facts of time, — and when he had seen the royal treasures and the greatness of the kingdom, Cræsus asked him whom he deemed the happiest of men. Solon named some obscure Greeks who were dead; and when the king, unable to hide his wonder and vexation, exclaimed, “Is our royal fortune so poor, O Athenian stranger, that you set private men before me?” the wise Greek had discoursed on the uncertainty of life and the jealousy of the gods. And so Cræsus, remembering this, groaned aloud and called thrice on the name of Solon. But Cyrus heard him call, and bade the interpreters ask him on whom he was calling. For a while Cræsus would not speak, then he said, “One whom I would that all tyrants might meet and converse with.” Pressed further, he named Solon the Athenian, and repeated the wise man’s words. The pyre was already alight, but when Cyrus heard the answer of his prisoner, he reflected that he too was a man, and commanded that the fire should be quenched and the victims set free. The flames were already blazing so strong and high that the men could not quench them. Then Cræsus cried to Apollo for help, and the god sent clouds into the clear sky, and a tempestuous shower of rain extinguished the fire.

Such is the tale as we read it in the history of Herodotus. The moral of the tale clearly was, Bring gifts to Delphi; and we can hardly doubt that it originated under Delphic influence.

2. **The Persian Conquest of Asiatic Greece, and Egypt.** — When the barrier of Lydia was swept away, a new period opened in Grecian history. The Asiatic Greeks were to exchange subjection to a lord of Sardis for subjection to a potentate who held his court in Susa, a city so distant that the length of the journey


was told by months. The king was obliged to leave his conquests in Asia Minor to the government of his satraps; and the Greeks were unable to exercise any influence upon him, as they might have done if he had ruled from Sardis or some nearer capital. They were an easy prey. Harpagus, the general of Cyrus, reduced them one after another; tribute was imposed upon them and the burden of serving in the Persian armies, when such service was required; but no restrictions were placed upon the freedom of their commerce.

The conqueror of Lydia returned to the east to subdue the mightier power of Babylon. But his conquests lie outside our history. His last enterprise was the subjugation of the Massagetæ, a Scythian folk near the Aral lake, and one story says that he was slain in battle against them, and that the savage queen placed his head in a basin of blood. c. 530 B.C.

While Cyrus far outpassed the utmost limits of Assyria in some directions, he left unconquered the great kingdom of the south, which had once been part of the Assyrian empire. But his son Cambyses repaired the omission. The conquest of Egypt, which became a Persian satrapy, led to the submission of Greek Cyrene.

**3. The First Years of Darius. Conquest of Thrace.** — King Cambyses, returning from Egypt to put down a usurper, “found death by his own hand,” as is related. The next heir to the Persian throne was a certain Hystaspes, who had a son named Darius. Hystaspes made no attempt to secure his right, but Darius had different thoughts from his father; and conspiring with six nobles, he killed the usurper and became king himself. 522 B.C.

Darius divided his whole realm into twenty satrapies. West of the Halys, the old kingdom of Lydia consisted of three provinces, but subject to two satraps: the Ionian and the Lydian under one governor who resided at Sardis; the Phrygian, which included the Greek cities of the Propontis, under a governor whose seat was at Dascylion. These satraps did not interfere in the local affairs of the Greek cities, which were ruled by despots; and the despots



might do much as they pleased, so long as they paid tribute duly and furnished military contingents when required. Commerce was furthered by the monetary reforms of Darius, and the chief piece of Persian gold money was always known in Greece by the name *daric*.

Cyrus had conquered the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean; Cambyses had completed and secured that conquest on the south side by the subjection of Egypt; it remained for Darius to complete and secure his empire on the north side by the reduction of Thrace. The Thracian race was warlike and the country is mountainous, so that the Persian enterprise demanded large forces and careful precautions. A large fleet was furnished by the Greek subjects of Persia, to sail along the Thracian coast of the Black Sea as far as the mouths of the Danube, and to support and coöperate with the army. The contingents of the various Greek cities were commanded by their despots, prominent among whom were Histiaeus of Miletus, and Miltiades of the Thracian Chersonesus. c. 511 B.C.

No details of the warfare in Thrace are preserved. The Greek fleet sailed up the mouth of the Danube, and a bridge of boats was thrown across. Darius and his army marched over into Scythia. But both the king's purpose and what he did, in this remote corner of the world, are hidden in a cloud of legend. It appears that his communications with the fleet which awaited his return were for some time cut off, and the Greek commanders were tempted to sail away and leave him in the lurch. But the fact is that it would have been entirely contrary to their own interests to inflict a blow on the power which maintained despotism in the Greek cities of Asia Minor.

The European expedition of Darius was a distinct success. But it has come down to us in a totally fabulous shape. It is represented by Herodotus as not primarily an expedition against Thrace, but as an attempt to execute the mad project of incorporating the Scythians of the steppes of southern Russia in the Persian empire. Darius, whose purpose is said to have been to



take vengeance on the Scythians for their invasion of Media a hundred years before, intended to break down the bridge when he had passed over the Danube and send the ships home; but by the advice of a prudent Greek, he changed his plan. He took a cord, in which he tied sixty knots, and said to the Greek captains: "Untie one of these knots every day, and remain here and guard the bridge till they are all untied. If I have not returned at the end of that time, sail home." The Ionians waited at the river beyond the ordained time, and presently a band of Scythians arrived, urging them to destroy the bridge, so that they might insure the destruction of Darius and gain their own freedom. Miltiades, the tyrant of the Chersonese, strongly advocated the proposal of the Scythians, but the counter-arguments of Histiaëus of Miletus prevailed, for he pointed out that the power of the despots in the cities depended on the Persian domination. Thus Darius, after an ignominious retreat, was saved by the good offices of Histiaëus; whereas, if the advice of Miltiades had been adopted, the subsequent Persian invasion of Greece might never have taken place.

Thus Greek imagination, inspired by Greek prejudice, changed a reasonable and successful enterprise into an insane and disastrous expedition.

**4. The Ionic Revolt against Persia.** — For twelve years after the return of Darius from Thrace, nothing happened to bring on the struggle between Asia and Europe. Then political strife in the island of Naxos led indirectly to a revolt of the Ionian Greeks from Persia, in which Athens and other cities played a part, and so brought on an expedition against Greece.

Histiaëus, tyrant of Miletus, was detained by Darius at Susa, ostensibly because the king could not do without him — really because he was dangerous. Aristagoras, his son-in-law, governed at Miletus. To the latter came oligarchs from Naxos, exiled by a democratic rising, and asking to be restored. Aristagoras went to Sardis, and suggested to the satrap Artaphernes that, under pretext of restoring these men, first Naxos, and then all the Cy-

clades, might be conquered for Persia. Artaphernes obtained the consent of Darius, and an expedition of two hundred ships was sent out under Aristagoras and the Persian admiral Megabates. The commanders quarreled, Megabates warned Naxos, and the islanders were able to defend themselves. Thus the plan of Aristagoras failed, and finding himself in disfavor with the Persians, he decided to head a rebellion of Ionia. As a revolt could not be led by him as tyrant, for the moving force of rebellion must be the natural Greek hatred of the despotic constitutions which Persia upheld in Ionia as elsewhere, Aristagoras therefore resigned his position as tyrant in Miletus, and in the other cities, also, the tyrants were removed — mostly without bloodshed. 499 B.C.

The next step was to obtain help from Greece against the Persian power. Aristagoras undertook this mission. At Sparta, according to the story, King Cleomenes refused even to consider the question when he found that the capital of the "Great King" was a three months' journey from the coast. But at Athens and Eretria he fared better. Both these cities sent aid; Athens twenty ships — ships, says Herodotus, "which were the beginning of ills between Greeks and barbarians."

The Persians had already laid siege to Miletus, when Aristagoras, with his Athenian and Eretrian allies, marched up to Sardis. His object was to force the enemy to raise the siege of Miletus. The Greeks took Sardis, but they did not take the citadel. While they were there, a fire broke out and the town was burned to the ground. The Greeks left the smoking ruins and marched back to the coast; but near Ephesus they were met by a Persian force and defeated. The Athenians straightway returned home; and with this battle the part played by Athens in the Ionic revolt comes to an end. The burning of Sardis was important only for its consequences. The story is that Darius, being told that Athenians had helped to burn Sardis, asked, "The Athenians — who are they?" He then called for a bow, and shooting an arrow into the air, invoked heaven that it might be 498 B.C.

given to him to punish the Athenians. Moreover, he bade one of his slaves to say to him three times at dinner, "Sire, remember the Athenians."

The revolt extended southward to Caria and to Cyprus, northward to the Propontis. In Cyprus most of the cities threw off the Persian yoke, and a Phœnician fleet was occupied with the recovery of the island. The Hellespontine towns were also subdued. In Caria the insurgents, after suffering two serious defeats, succeeded in destroying a Persian army.

The main and decisive event of the war was the siege of Miletus, on which the Persians at length concentrated all their efforts. The

town was blockaded by the squadron of six hundred ships which had just reduced Cyprus. The Greek fleet was stationed off the island of Lade. It is said to have numbered three hundred and fifty-three ships, but they were ill-organized. In the battle which ensued, the Lesbians and Samians deserted; the men of Chios fought splendidly, but they were too few. Miletus was then taken by storm. The temple of Apollo at Didyma, one of the chief oracular sanctuaries of the Greek world, was burned down.



THE IONIC REVOLT

The tidings of the fall of Miletus produced at Athens a deep feeling, which found expression when Phrynichus, a tragic poet, made the catastrophe of Miletus the theme of a drama. The

Athenians fined him for having recalled to their minds *their own* misfortunes. But in the meantime there had been won for them, from the Persian, what was destined to become afterward a lasting possession. Miltiades, the tyrant of the Chersonese, seized the isles of Lemnos and Imbros. When the revolt failed, feeling himself unsafe in the Chersonese, he fled to Athens, and professed that he had conquered Lemnos and Imbros for her. Though these islands seem to have been occupied by the Persians for a time, they passed back under Athenian dominion.

5. **Second and Third European Expeditions of Darius.** — Having suppressed the rebellion, Darius caused the territories of the Ionian cities to be measured and surveyed, and the tributes regulated accordingly. The revolt had taught Persia that the system of tyrannies did not answer; and it was now resolved to make an experiment of the opposite policy. The despots were abolished, and democratic governments were set up. It was a concession to the spirit of the Greeks which reflects credit on the wisdom of Darius.

The king's son-in-law, Mardonius, was sent to reassert Persian supremacy in Thrace and Macedonia; and through Macedonia he proposed to advance into Greece, in order to punish the two cities which had helped the Ionian rebels. A fleet sailed along the coast and subdued the island of Thasos on its way. Thrace was reduced, and Macedonia, then under King Alexander, submitted. But the Greek expedition could not be carried out, since the fleet was partly wrecked in a storm off the perilous promontory of Athos. 492 B.C.

But Darius was sternly resolved that Athens and Eretria should not escape without chastisement. Their connection with the burning of Sardis had deeply incensed him. Moreover, Hippias, the banished tyrant of Athens, was at the court of Susa, urging an expedition against the city which had cast him out. It was decided that the new expedition should move straight across the Ægean Sea. Heralds were sent to the chief cities of free Greece that were not at war with Persia, requiring the tokens of submission, earth and water. In most cases the tokens were given; and among

490 B.C.

others by Ægina, the enemy of Athens. The command of the army was intrusted to Datis and to Artaphernes, a nephew of Darius; and they were accompanied by the aged tyrant Hippias, who hoped to rule once more over his native country. The armament — six hundred galleys strong, according to Herodotus — having sailed from isle to isle, subduing the Cyclades, went up the channel between Eubœa and Attica, and, reducing Carystus by the way, reached the territory of Eretria. Within seven days the city was delivered over to the invaders by the treachery of some leading citizens. The inhabitants were enslaved. It now remained to deal with the other city which had defied the king. Crossing over the strait, the Persian generals landed their army in the bay of Marathon.

**6. The Battle of Marathon. Miltiades.** — The soul of the resistance which Athens offered to the invader was Miltiades. He had indeed been a tyrant himself, and the successor of tyrants, and had been accused before the Assembly of oppressive rule in the Chersonese. But he had given Lemnos and Imbros to Athens, he was the hereditary foe of the Pisistratids, who had killed his father Cimon, and he probably knew more of the Persians than any man at Athens. He was therefore chosen as the strategos of his tribe. Yet, as Herodotus tells the story, few preparations seem to have been made till the Persians were almost landing. A fast runner was despatched in hot haste to Lacedæmon to bear the news of the fall of Eretria and the jeopardy of Athens. The Lacedæmonians said that they would help Athens, — they were bound to help a member of their league, — but religious scruples forbade them to come at once; they must wait till the full moon had passed. But when the full moon had passed, it was too late.

The whole army of the Athenians may have numbered about nine thousand. The commander-in-chief was Callimachus, the polemarch of the year; and, fortunately for Athens, Callimachus seems to have been willing to hearken to the counsels of Miltiades. The enemy had landed near Marathon and clearly intended to ad-

vance on unwall'd Athens by land and sea. The question was whether the Athenian army should await their approach and give them battle within sight and reach of the Acropolis, or should more boldly go forth to find them. Miltiades proposed in the Assembly to march to Marathon, and meet the Persians there. To have proposed and carried this decree is probably the greatest title of Miltiades to his immortal fame.

The plain of Marathon, stretching along a sickle-shaped line of coast, is surrounded on all other sides by hills, and on both the northern and southern ends bounded by marshes, while through the center a mountain torrent rushes to the bay. Two roads lead from Athens to Marathon. The main road, following the line of the coast, enters the plain from the south; the other, which is somewhat shorter, but more difficult, runs through the hills, and by two paths reaches the plain.



BATTLE OF MARATHON

Callimachus took the northern road, and encamped in a valley not far from the shrine of Heracles. The choice of this admirable position was more than half the victory. The Athenians were themselves unassailable, except at a great disadvantage; and they commanded not only the mountain road by which they had come, but also the main road and the southern gate of the plain; for the Persians in attempting to reach that gate would be exposed to their flank attack. The Persians had encamped on the north side of the torrent-bed, and their ships were riding at anchor beside them.



It was to their interest to bring on a pitched battle in the plain as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Athenians had everything to gain by waiting in their impregnable position; if they waited long enough they might hope for help from Sparta. Help from another quarter had already come. When they reached the sanctuary of Heracles, they were joined by a band of one thousand Plataeans, who, in gratitude for the protection of Athens against the Theban yoke, now came to help her in the hour of jeopardy.

Some days passed, and then, as the Greeks remained immovable, the Persians would wait no longer. Having embarked a part of the army, including the whole body of their cavalry, they made ready to move upon Athens by land and sea. The land force must follow the main road, and was therefore prepared for battle, in case the Greeks should attack them before they defiled from the plain. Another critical moment had come for the Athenians, but the polemarch decided to attack the enemy as they marched southward.

Callimachus showed now a skill in tactics as consummate as the skill in strategy which we have already witnessed. Outnumbered by the foe, if the Athenian line had formed itself in equal depth throughout, it would have swept the Persian center into the sea, but then it would have been caught in a trap, between the sea and ships on one side and the Persian wings, which would have closed in, on the other. Accordingly, Callimachus made his own center long and shallow, so that it would cover the whole Persian center, while his wings of the normal depth would be opposed to the wings of the enemy.

Aug. or Sept.,  
490 B.C.

The long Persian line crossed the bed of the torrent and advanced along the shore. A large portion was detached toward the Greek position, in order either to prevent or to repel a flank attack. With these troops to cover them, the rest of the host might march securely past. The Greek army had perhaps already appeared in the recess of the hills at the mouth of the valley: Callimachus himself led the right wing; the Plataean allies were posted on the

extreme left. When the Greeks drew near to the line of the enemy, they were met by volleys of arrows from the eastern archers, and to escape this danger they advanced at a run into close quarters. All fell out as had been foreseen. The Athenian center was driven back toward the hills by the enemy's center, where the best troops, including the Persians themselves, were stationed; but the Athenian wings completely routed the wings of their foe. Then, closing in, they turned upon the victorious Persians, who were following the retreating Greek center. Here again they were utterly victorious, breaking up the array of the enemy and pursuing them in confusion to the shore, where all who escaped the sword were picked up by the ships. Only a portion of the Persian army had been engaged; the main body doubtless embarked as soon as they saw the first signs of the disruption of the force on which they had relied to cover them from the enemy.

It was not a long battle. The Athenian loss was small — one hundred and ninety-two slain; and the Persian loss was reckoned at about sixty-four hundred. Datis and Artaphernes had still an immense host, which might retrieve the fortune of the campaign; Athens was not yet out of danger. The Persian squadron sailed down the straits and rounded Cape Sunium, while the victorious army, leaving one regiment on the field of their triumph to guard the slain and the spoils, marched back to defend Athens. They halted outside the city on the banks of the Ilissus, and they beheld the fleet of the enemy riding off Phaleron. But it did not put into shore, and presently the whole squadron began to draw out to sea. Datis had abandoned his enterprise. Perhaps when he saw that the army was there, he shrank from another conflict with the hoplites. But a Spartan army had set out on the day after the full moon, and it reached Athens soon after the battle. We may guess that tidings of the approach of the Spartans, if not their actual presence, had something to do with the sudden departure of the invaders, who, though they had received an unlooked-for check, had not endured an overwhelming defeat.

The Spartans arrived too late for the battle. They visited the field, desiring to gaze upon the Persian corpses, and departed home praising the exploit of the Athenians. The scene of the battle is still marked by the mound which the Athenians raised over their own dead; Callimachus was buried there, and Cynegirus (a brother of the poet Æschylus), who was said to have seized a Persian galley and held it until his arm was severed by an axe. Legend grew up quickly round the battle. Gods and heroes fought for Athens, ghostly warriors moved among the ranks. The panic terror of the Persians at the Greek charge was ascribed to Pan, and the worship of this god was revived in a cave consecrated to him under the northwest slope of the Acropolis.

The enormous prestige which Athens won by the single-handed victory over the host of the Great King gave her new self-confidence and ambition; history seemed to have set a splendid seal on her democracy; she felt that she could trust her constitution, and that she might lift her head as high as any state in Hellas. The Athenians always looked back to Marathon as marking an epoch. It was as if on that day the gods had said to them, Go on and prosper.

The great battle immortalized Miltiades; but his latter end was not good. His fellow-citizens granted him, on his own proposal, a commission to attack the island of Paros, which had furnished a trireme to the armament of Datis. Miltiades besieged the city of Paros for twenty-six days, but without success, and then returned home wounded. The failure was imputed to criminal conduct of the general; and he was fined fifty talents, a heavy fine. It is not known what his alleged wrong-doing was; but afterward, when the legend grew, it was foolishly said that he persuaded the Athenians to intrust the fleet to him, promising to take them to a land of gold, and that he deceived them by assailing Paros to gratify a private revenge. He died soon after his condemnation.

7. **Struggle of Athens and Ægina.** — At this time Ægina was

the strongest naval power in the Ægean, and the Athenians had some reason to fear that she would give the Persians not only her good-will, but her active help. Accordingly, the Athenians sought the intervention of Sparta, complaining that Ægina was medizing<sup>1</sup> and betraying Greece out of enmity to Athens. Sparta's prestige had at this time been increased by a victory over her old rival Argos, whom Cleomenes entirely defeated near Tiryns, crippling 494 B.C. the power of Argos for more than twenty years. But Athens appealed to her officially as head of the Peloponnesian League, in which both Athens and Ægina were included. Sparta listened to the complaint, and Cleomenes went to Ægina, seized ten hostages, and left them at Athens. Thus Ægina was prevented from helping the Persians or hindering the Athenians.

After the death of Cleomenes, Ægina demanded the restoration 487 B.C. of her hostages, but the Athenians refused, and hostilities broke out again. The necessity of protecting Attica from Æginetan raids, and the hope of reducing Ægina to subjection or insignificance, helped to convert Athens into a naval power.

**8. Growth of the Athenian Democracy.** — Under the scheme of Cleisthenes great power was left to the archons, whom the people elected for their social position or their ability. But the tendency was to weaken the magistrates and strengthen the Bule; and some years after Marathon, a change was made in the manner of appointment. 487 B.C. Five hundred men were elected by the demes, and out of this body the nine archons were chosen by lot. It was therefore five hundred to one against any prominent citizen becoming chief archon, and obviously the importance of the chief archonship disappears. Obviously, also, a commander-in-chief could not be elected by such means, and the powers of the polemarch were therefore transferred to the ten strategi who had been hitherto elected, each by his own tribe; but a reform was made by which the whole people elected the generals.

A new institution — that of ostracism — transferred the duty

<sup>1</sup> Negotiating with the Medes; *i.e.* Persians.

of protecting the state against the danger of a tyranny from the paternal council of the Areopagus to the sovereign people. The ordinance of the *Ostrakismos* was that in the sixth prytany of each civil year the question should be laid before the Assembly of the people whether they willed that an ostracism should be held or not. If they voted in the affirmative, then an extraordinary Assembly was summoned in the market-place in the eighth prytany. The citizens were grouped in tribes, and each citizen placed in an urn a potsherd (*ostrakon*) inscribed with the name of the person whom he desired to be "ostracized." The voting was not valid unless six thousand votes at least were given, and whoever had most ostraka against him was condemned to leave Attica within ten days and not set foot in it again for ten years. He was allowed, however, to retain his property, and remained an Athenian citizen.

It is said that Cleisthenes devised the ostracism, and devised it specially to banish a Pisistratid, Hipparchus, son of Charmus. And this Hipparchus was the first man ostracized, though not till fifteen years later. In the next year Megacles, an Alcmaeonid who had espoused the Pisistratid cause, suffered the same fate. These decrees were probably brought about by the then leading democratic statesmen, Xanthippus, Aristides, and Themistocles. But when Xanthippus in 484, and Aristides in 482 B.C., were also ostracized, it is clear that the motive was not fear of a tyranny, but to remove the opposition of a statesman to some popular measure — possibly the bold naval policy of Themistocles.

487 B.C.

486 B.C.

An excellent anecdote is told of the ostracism of Aristides "the Just," as he was called. On the day of the voting an illiterate citizen chanced to be close to Aristides who was unknown to him by sight, and requested him to write down the name "Aristides" on the ostrakon. "Why," said Aristides, doing as he was asked, "do you wish to ostracize him?" "Because," said the fellow, "I am tired of hearing him called the Just."

**9. Athens becomes a Sea-Power. Themistocles.** — But the greatest statesman of this critical period in the history of Athens

was Themistocles. It may be said that he contributed more than any other single man to the making of Athens into a great state. In the sixth century the Athenians were a considerable naval power; but the fleet was regarded as subsidiary to the army. The idea of Themistocles was to sacrifice the army to the navy and make Athens a sea-state — the strongest sea-state in Greece. He began the work when he was archon, some two or three years before the battle of Marathon, by carrying a measure through the Assembly for the fortification of the peninsula of Piræus. Hitherto the wide exposed strand of Phaleron was the harbor where the Athenians kept their triremes, hauled up on the beach, unprotected against the surprise of an enemy. It seems strange that they had not before made use of "the Piræus," the large harbor on the west side of the peninsula of Munychia, which could be supplemented by the two smaller harbors on the east side, Munychia and Zea. But the Piræus was somewhat farther from the city, and was not within sight of the Acropolis like Phaleron. So long, therefore, as there was no fortified harbor, Phaleron was safer. The plan of Themistocles was to fortify the whole circuit of the peninsula by a wall, and prepare docks in the three harbors for the reception of the warships. The work was begun, but it was interrupted by the Persian invasion. Then a war with Ægina combined with the fear of another Persian invasion, helped Themistocles to carry to completion another part of his great scheme — the increase of the fleet. A rich bed of silver had been recently discovered in the old mining district of Laurion, and had suddenly brought into the public treasury a large sum, perhaps a hundred talents. It was proposed to distribute this among the citizens, but Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to apply it to the purpose of building new ships. Two years later we find Athens with nearly two hundred triremes at her command. The completion of the Piræus wall was not attempted at this period.



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## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PERILS OF GREECE. THE PERSIAN AND PUNIC INVASIONS

1. **The Preparations and March of Xerxes.** — After the unexpected repulse of his forces at Marathon, Darius had determined to send another expedition. But he died before he could execute his resolve, and Xerxes, his son by Atossa, succeeded to the throne. The question then arose whether the design should be carried out. It is related that Xerxes was himself undecided, but was over-persuaded by the impetuous counsels of his cousin Mardonius. 485 B.C.

It was resolved that the expedition should consist of a joint attack by sea and land. Preparations were begun by the difficult enterprise of digging a canal (about a mile and a half long) across the isthmus of Mount Athos, where a large part of the fleet, under Mardonius, had been wrecked. When it was finished, the workmen proceeded to lay a bridge over the Strymon for the passage of the army, and preparations were made all along the line of route for the feeding of a vast host. It is impossible to suppose that the whole army wintered in Sardis with the king; it is probable that the place of mustering was at the Hellespont, across which two bridges had been constructed by Phœnician and Egyptian engineers. But a tempest destroyed the bridges, and the wrath of Xerxes at this catastrophe was violent. He not only beheaded the engineers, but commanded that three hundred lashes should be inflicted on the waters of the Hellespont. New bridges were constructed, and, from a marble throne erected on the shore, Xerxes is said to have witnessed the passage of his army, which began at the first moment of sunrise. The troops crossed under the lash, and the crossing was accomplished in two days. 483 B.C.

The army was joined by the fleet at Doriscus in Thrace. Fleet and army were henceforward to act together. In the plain of Doriscus, Xerxes reviewed and numbered his forces. "What nation of Asia," asks Herodotus, "did not Xerxes lead against Hellas?" The Persians themselves, who were under the command of Otanes, wore coats of mail and trousers; they had wicker shields, large bows, and short spears. Then there were Assyrians with brazen helmets, linen cuirasses, clubs, lances, and short swords; Bactrians with cane bows; trousered Sacæ with pointed hats, and carrying axes; Indians clad in cotton, Caspians in goat skin; Sarangians wearing dyed garments and high boots; Ethiopians clad in lion-skins or leopard-skins and armed with primitive stone-pointed arrows; Sagartians with dagger and lasso; Thracians with fox-skin caps; Colchians with cow-skin shields. The fleet was furnished by the Phœnicians, Egyptians, Cypriotes, Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Carians, and subject Greeks. It is said to have consisted of 1207 warships, with 3000 smaller vessels. The whole host is said to have reached to upwards of 5,000,000. It is needless to say that these numbers are wholly fabulous. The land forces may have amounted to 300,000 — hardly more.

From Doriscus, Xerxes proceeded to Therma with his fabulous host, drinking rivers dry in their march, and there he was joined by his fleet, which had been separated from him while it sailed round Sithonia and Pallene. Most of the incidents which Herodotus recounts concerning this march of Xerxes are pleasing stories, designed to characterize the barbarian and the despot, and to enhance the danger and the glory of Hellas.

**2. Preparations of Greece.** — In the meantime, Greece was making counter-preparations. Xerxes is said to have despatched from Sardis heralds to all the Greek states, except Athens and Sparta, to demand earth and water. These two cities now joined hands to resist the invasion. They were naturally marked out as the leaders of Greece in Greece's greatest crisis: Sparta by virtue

Aug., 480 B.C.

of her generally acknowledged headship, Athens by the prestige which she had won at Marathon. They jointly convened an Hellenic congress at Corinth on the Isthmus to consult on the measures to be taken for common resistance to the threatened invasion. This is the first instance of anything that can be called a deliberate Panhellenic policy. At this Congress of Corinth over which Sparta presided, thirty-one states bound themselves together in a formal confederation by taking a solemn oath that they

Autumn,  
481 B.C.



THE PERSIAN WARS

would "tithe those who uncompelled submitted" to the barbarian, for the benefit of the Delphic god. This was a way of vowing that they would utterly destroy such traitors. A great many states, the Thessalians, most of the Boeotian cities, besides the smaller peoples of northern Greece,—Locrians, Malians, Achæans, Dolopians, and others— took no part in this congress. These northern states would be first invaded by the Persian, and it was

hopeless for them to think of withstanding him alone. Unless they could absolutely rely on Sparta and her confederates to support them in defending the northern frontier of Thessaly, nothing would be left for them but to submit.

One of the great hindrances to joint action was the existence of domestic disputes. The Congress attempted to reconcile such feuds, and Athens and Ægina laid aside their enmity to fight together for Grecian freedom. Another important question concerned the command of the confederate forces. The claim of Sparta to the leadership of the army was at once admitted. The question as to the fleet was not so clear. Athens, which would furnish more ships than any other state, had a fair claim. But the other cities were jealous of Athens; they declared that they would submit only to a Spartan leader. King Leonidas was leader of the confederate army, and Eurybiadas, a Spartan who did not belong to either of the royal families, was chosen commander of the confederate fleet.

Envoys went forth to enlist new confederates — to win over Argos, which had sent no delegates to the Isthmus; and to obtain promises of assistance from Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse. None of these embassies led to anything. Gelon, the great tyrant of Syracuse, was himself absorbed by the prospect of an attack of the Carthaginians, and, even if he had wished, could have sent no aid to the mother-country.

The Greeks had abundance of time for their preparations. Athens probably threw herself with more energy into the work than any other city. She recalled those distinguished citizens whom the vote of ostracism had driven into banishment during the last ten years. Aristides and Xanthippus returned home; and the city seems to have soon shown its confidence in their patriotism by choosing them as generals.

† 3. **Battle of Artemisium.** — About the time when Xerxes reached the Hellespont, the Thessalians sent a message to the confederacy, suggesting that the pass of Tempe should be defended against the

invading army. Accordingly, ten thousand hoplites were sent. But when they arrived at the spot, they found that there were other passes from Macedonia into Thessaly, by which the Persians would be more likely to come. Hence the defense of Tempe was abandoned, and the troops left Thessaly. This desertion necessarily drove all the northern Greeks to signify their submission to Xerxes by the offering of earth and water.

The next feasible point of defense was Thermopylæ, a narrow pass between the sea and mountain, separating Trachis from Locris. It was the gate to all eastern Greece south of Mount Oeta. At the eastern and at the western end the pass, in those days, was extremely narrow, and in the center the Phocians had constructed a wall as a barrier against Thessalian incursions. It was possible for an active band of men, if they were prevented from proceeding by Thermopylæ, to take a rough and steep way over the mountains and so reach the Locrian road. It was therefore needful for a general who undertook the defense of Thermopylæ to secure this path, lest a detachment should be sent round to surprise him in the rear.

The Greeks determined to defend Thermopylæ, and Leonidas marched thither at the head of his army. He had about 7000 men, including 4000 from Peloponnesus, 1000 Phocians, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, and the Locrians in full force. So far as the Peloponnesians were concerned, this was only a small portion of their forces, and we may suspect that but for Athens they would have abandoned northern Greece entirely and concentrated themselves at once on the defense of the Isthmus. But they were dependent on Athens because her fleet was so strong, and they were therefore obliged to consider her interests. To surrender Thermopylæ and retire to the Isthmus meant the surrender of Attica. But the hearts of the Spartans were really set on the ultimate defense of the Isthmus, and not on the protection of the northern states. They attempted to cover this selfish and short-sighted policy by the plea that they were hindered from marching forth in



full force by the celebration of the Carnean festival; they alleged that the soldiers of Leonidas were only an advance guard — the rest would soon follow.

As the Persian land and sea forces always operated together, it was certain that the Persians would endeavor to sail between Eubœa and the mainland; and therefore, while the Greek hoplites held the pass under Thermopylæ, the Greek fleet took up its station at Artemisium, on the northern point of Eubœa, to dispute the entrance into the Malian Gulf. It numbered three hundred and twenty-four triremes and nine penteconters — the Athenians contributing two hundred. Fifty-three Athenian vessels which did not take part in the first fighting were probably left to guard the southern entrance to the narrows, lest the Persians should send round part of their fleet east of Eubœa, and, coming up the Euripus, thus cut off the Greek retreat.

Toward the end of August the Persian army reached Thermopylæ and the Persian fleet drew up near Cape Sepias on the Magnesian coast. A storm arose, and in that exposed and crowded anchorage, four hundred of the Persian ships were destroyed. Nevertheless the Greeks were inclined to retreat, but the Eubœans, desiring the protection of the fleet, gave Themistocles thirty talents to bribe the commanders into remaining. He distributed eight talents, according to Herodotus, and kept the rest. In spite of their losses the Persians still far outnumbered the Greeks, and were able to detach a squadron of two hundred to sail around Eubœa and attack the Greeks in the rear. When the Greeks learned of this, they determined to sail back to meet these vessels, after delivering an attack on the main body of the Persian fleet. In this attack they were successful and captured thirty vessels, and on the following morning learned that the Persian squadron had been wrecked in its passage around Eubœa. Therefore, since they were in no danger of being cut off, the Greeks remained at Artemisium.

**4. Battle of Thermopylæ.** — Meanwhile, Leonidas had taken up his post at Thermopylæ. The duty of guarding the by-road

over the mountain was assigned to the Phocians; and six thousand determined men prepared to hold the lower pass, behind the old Phocian wall which had been repaired. Xerxes waited four days, in hope that they would retreat; on the fifth he attacked, and the Hellenic spearmen drove back the Asiatic archers. On the next day the result was the same, though Xerxes' own bodyguard, "the Immortals," attempted to storm the pass. Herodotus says that Xerxes



THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM

"sprang thrice from his throne in agony for his army." It was then decided to send the Immortals, under Hydarnes, their commander, to force the mountain road, guided by a Malian Greek named Ephialtes. By a night march they reached the crest of the pass at dawn and surprised the Phocians, who fled up the hills. The Immortals pressed on, but meanwhile Leonidas was informed of the movement. At a council of war it was decided to send the bulk of the little army out of the pass, retaining only the Spartans, Thebans, and Thespians — some fourteen hundred men. The pass runs east and west. Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans undertook to hold the Phocian wall against the main army of Xerxes, while the rest were sent to defend the eastern end against the force that had crossed the mountain.

The action of Leonidas must not be considered as a mere throwing away of life. If the part of his army which he sent back had been able to overpower the Immortals when they came down from the mountain, the negligence of the Phocians might have been retrieved. But it was at best a forlorn hope, and the Immortals were victorious, killing, it is said, four thousand Greeks in all, and forcing their way into the eastern entrance

over the Thebans and Thespians. The Spartans were the last to fall.

They had fought on this day as men desperate. No longer content with repelling assaults, they rushed out on the enemy from behind their wall, charging into the mass with terrible effect. Leonidas fell, and an Homeric battle raged over his body. But at length the defenders were forced back behind the wall. Then, as the Immortals broke in from behind, they drew together on to a hillock, where they made their last stand, to be surrounded and cut down by overwhelming numbers.

The news of Thermopylæ speedily reached the fleet at Artemisium. The Greeks forthwith weighed anchor and sailed through the Euripus to the shores of Attica.

**5. The Persian Advance. The Capture of Athens.** — Having thus succeeded in breaking through the inner gate of Hellas, and having slain the king of the leading state, Xerxes continued his way and passed from Locris into Phocis and thence into Bœotia, meeting with no resistance. The Thebans and most of the other Bœotians now submitted to the Persians.

When the Athenians returned from Artemisium, they found that the main body of the Peloponnesian army was gathered at the Isthmus and engaged in building a wall from sea to sea. Thus Bœotia and Attica were unprotected. Themistocles and his Athenian colleagues decided to evacuate Athens. They made a proclamation that all the citizens should embark in the triremes, and that all who could should convey their families and belongings to places of safety. This was done. The women and children were transported to Trœzen, Ægina, and Salamis. This bold and wise policy of embarkation was dictated by the circumstances, but it was supposed to have been based on an oracle, which foretold that all Attica would be destroyed "save for a wooden wall," which was held to point to the ships. The story went on that certain of the poorer citizens insisted on taking the oracle literally, and remained in the citadel behind a wooden barricade. Probably

the natural strength of the Acropolis led to a hope that it might be held, and the story was invented later.

Meanwhile, the allied fleet had stationed itself in the bay of Salamis, and it was reënforced by new contingents, so that it reached the total strength of three hundred and seventy-eight triremes and seven penteconters.


Xerxes arrived at Athens about the same time that his fleet sailed into the roadstead of Phaleron. He found the town empty, but for the small band which had intrenched itself on the Acropolis. Persian troops occupied the lower height of the Areopagus, which is severed from the Acropolis by a broad saddle, and succeeded in setting the wooden barricade on fire by means of burning arrows. The garrison rolled stones down on them, and such is the natural strength of the Acropolis that the siege lasted two weeks. Then the Persians managed to ascend on the precipitous north side by a secret path. The Greeks were slain, the temples plundered and burned. c. Sept. 9.

**6. The Battle of Salamis.** — After the fall of the Acropolis the Greek admirals held a council of war, and it was carried by the votes of the majority that they should retreat to the Isthmus, since they would there be in close touch with the land forces and have the Peloponnesus as a retreat in case of defeat, whereas at Salamis they would be entirely cut off. This decision meant the abandonment of Ægina, Salamis, and Megara. Themistocles determined to thwart it. He went privately to Eurybiadas and convinced him that it would be much more advantageous to fight in the narrow waters of the Salaminian channel than in the open bay of the Isthmus, where the superior speed and number of the hostile ships would tell. A new council was summoned at which Themistocles, in order to carry his point, had to threaten that the Athenians, who were half the fleet, would cease to coöperate with their allies and seek new homes in some western land, if a retreat to the Isthmus were decided upon.

The southern entrance to the narrow sound between Salamis

and Attica is blocked by the islet of Psyttalea and the long promontory which runs out from Salamis to meet the mainland. The Greek fleet was anchored close to the town of Salamis, north of this promontory. Xerxes moved his armament so as to enclose the ingress of the straits, and at the same time occupied Psyttalea. This movement, carried out in the afternoon, alarmed the Greeks; the Peloponnesian commanders brought pressure to bear on Eury-

c. Sept. 27.



THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS

biadas; another council was called, and Themistocles saw that the hard-won result of his previous exertions would now be overthrown. He therefore determined on a bold stroke. Leaving the council, he despatched a slave to the Persian camp bearing a message from himself, as a well-wisher to Xerxes, that the Greeks purposed to sail away in the night. If they were prevented from doing so, a Persian victory was certain, owing to the disunion which existed in the Hellenic camp. This message was believed, and Xerxes

took his measures at nightfall to hinder the Greek fleet from escaping by the western straits between Salamis and the Megarid. He sent his two hundred Egyptian ships to round the southern promontory of Salamis and place themselves so that they could bar the straits, if necessary.

The Greek generals, meanwhile, were engaged in hot discussion. Suddenly Themistocles was called out from the council. It was his rival Aristides who had sailed across from Ægina and brought the news that the fleet was surrounded by the enemy. Themistocles made Aristides inform the generals of what had happened, and the tidings was presently confirmed by a Tenian ship which deserted from the Persians. Thus Themistocles and the Persians forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis.

At break of day the Greeks began to advance. The Phœnician c. Sept. 20. galleys moved to meet them in column formation while the other two divisions of the Persian fleet probably remained as they were. The fighting began on the Greek left, and it was here, upon the Athenians and Phœnicians, that the main stress of the battle fell. The want of space hindered the Persians from overwhelming their foes with superior numbers; the attempts they made to crowd ships into the strait were disastrous to themselves. Meanwhile, the object of the Greek right was to force a way out of the sound through the enemy's line, in order to attack in the rear. It was the task of the Æginetans to round the point of the jutting promontory of Salamis, and assail the left wing of the enemy stationed about Psyttalea. They succeeded in breaking through, and at a later stage we find them cutting off the retreat of fugitive Persian ships. It is probable that, having discomfited the Ionians, they delivered a flank attack on the Phœnician column; but in any case their success rendered the position of the Phœnicians untenable, and decided the battle.

The Persians, under the eyes of their king, fought with great bravery, but they were badly led and the place of the combat was unfavorable to them. Their numbers were only an encumbrance.



**7. Consequences of Salamis.** — The victory of Salamis was a crushing blow to Persia's naval power, and it was followed by the desertion of the Phœnician contingent. But the Greek story, which represented Xerxes as fleeing back to the Hellespont in wild terror, misrepresents the situation. His land army had met with no reverse and was overwhelmingly superior in numbers: it should still be able to subjugate Greece. What Xerxes had to fear was a rising in Ionia, when the news of the naval defeat reached that province. Accordingly the Persian fleet was sent to the Hellespont to guard the bridge, while Xerxes with sixty thousand men marched back through Thessaly and Macedonia, thus keeping open the line of communications. The land forces were placed under the command of Mardonius, who, as the season was now advanced, determined to postpone further operations till the spring, and to winter in Thessaly.

Meanwhile, the Greeks had failed to follow up their victory. Cleombrotus, the Spartan regent, was about to advance from the Isthmus with the purpose of aiming a blow at the retreating columns of the Persian forces before they reached Bœotia. But as he was sacrificing, before setting out, the sun was totally eclipsed, and this ill omen made him desist from his plan and march back to the Peloponnesus.

Great was the rejoicing in Greece over the brilliant victory which was so little hoped for. The generals met at Isthmus to distribute the booty and adjudge rewards. The Æginetans received the choice lot of the spoil for bravery; the Athenians were adjudged the second place. In adjudging the prizes for wisdom, each captain wrote down two names in order of merit. The story is that each wrote his own name first and that of Themistocles second, and that consequently there was no prize, for a second could not be given, unless a first were also awarded.

**8. Preparations for Another Campaign.** — In the following spring Mardonius was joined by Artabazus and the troops who had conducted Xerxes to the Hellespont. The total number of his

Oct. 2, 480  
B.C., 2 P.M.

479 B.C.

forces is unknown; it is said to have been three hundred thousand. Mardonius, well aware of the fatal division of interests between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, sent an honorable ambassador, King Alexander of Macedon himself, to Athens. He undertook to repair all the injuries suffered by her from the Persian occupation, to help her to gain new territory, and asked only for her alliance as an equal and independent power. The offer was tempting, and the Athenians had good reason to distrust their allies. But



THE INVASION OF XERXES

“Tell Mardonius,” they said to Alexander, “that the Athenians say: so long as the sun moves in his present course, we will never come to terms with Xerxes.”

The embassy of Alexander enabled Athens to exert stronger pressure on the Peloponnesians, with a view to the defense of northern Greece; and the Spartans promised that an army should march into Boeotia. But soon after the embassy of Alexander, they had completed the walling of the Isthmus, and, feeling secure, they took no thought of fulfilling their promise. In the meantime, Mardonius had set his army in motion and advanced into Boeotia, with the purpose of reoccupying Attica. Once more the Athenians had to leave their land and remove their families and property to the refuge of Salamis. Mardonius still hoped to detach the Athenians from the Greek cause. If they would now accept his former offers, he would retreat from their land, leaving it unravaged. But even at this extremity, the Athenians rejected the insidious propositions. Immediately, the three northern states which had not yielded to the Mede — Athens, Megara, and Platæa

— sent ambassadors to Sparta, to insist upon an army marching at once to oppose Mardonius in Attica, with the threat that otherwise there would be nothing for it but to come to terms with the foe. At last the Lacedæmonian government suddenly changed its policy and despatched a force of 5000 Spartans, each attended by some Helots, to northern Greece. Never since, never perhaps before, did so large a body of Spartan citizens take the field at once. They were followed by 5000 pericæci, each attended by one Helot. The command was intrusted to Pausanias, who was acting as regent for his child-cousin Pleistarchus, son of the hero of Thermopylæ. At the Isthmus, the Lacedæmonian army was joined by the troops of the Peloponnesian allies, and by contingents from Eubœa, Ægina, and western Greece; in the Megarid they were reënforced by the Megarians, and at Eleusis by Aristides in command of 8000 Athenians and 600 Plataeans. It was en-

tirely an army of foot soldiers, and the total number, including light-armed troops, may have approached 70,000.

**9. The Battle of Plataea.**—The field on which the fate of Greece was decided is bounded on the north by the river Asopus and on the south by Mount Cithæron. The town of Plataea is in the extreme southwest of this section; and the land between it and the river is cut



BATTLE OF PLATÆA

up by hilly ridges and many streams. On this most difficult field Pausanias attempted to manœuver the allied forces under him. Hesitancy, mistakes, and actual disobedience characterized the movements of the first two days. On the third day, at dawn, seeing the Greeks in confusion, Mardonius, in full force, attacked the Spartans under the walls of Plataea. After some delay, to insure favorable omens, the Spartans charged; and in a hotly fought action killed Mardonius and drove his troops back toward the river. The remainder of the Greek forces then came up and drove the disorganized Persians across the Asopus, and plundered their camp. The slain Greek warriors were buried before the gates of Plataea, and the honor of celebrating their memory by annual sacrifice was assigned to the Plateans. Pausanias called the host together, and in the name of the Spartans and all the confederacy guaranteed to Plataea political independence and the inviolability of her town and territory. The hour of triumph for Plataea was an hour of humiliation for Thebes. Ten days after the battle, the army advanced against the chief Bœotian city and demanded the surrender of the leaders of the party favorable to the Persians. These were given up, by their own wish, for they calculated on escaping punishment by the influence of bribery. But Pausanias caused them to be executed, without trial, at Corinth.

**10. Battle of Mycale and Capture of Sestos.** — The battle of Plataea shares with Salamis the dignity of being decisive battles in the world's history. The poet Pindar links them together as the great triumphs of Sparta and Athens respectively. Notwithstanding the immense disadvantage of want of cavalry, the Lacedæmonians had turned at Plataea a retreat into a victory. The remarkable feature of the battle was that it was decided by a small part of either army. Sparta and Tegea were the actual victors; and on the Persian side forty thousand men had not entered into the action at all. On the death of Mardonius, Artabazus immediately faced about and began without delay the long march back to

the Hellespont. Never again was Persia to make a serious attempt against the liberty of European Greece. For the following century and a half, the dealings between Greece and Persia only affected the western fringe of Asia, and then Alexander of Macedon achieved against the Asiatic monarchy what Xerxes failed to achieve against the free states of Europe.

Aug., 479 B.C. The achievement of the Hellenic army was followed in a few days by an achievement of the Hellenic fleet which delivered the Asiatic Greeks from their master. The Greek fleet, which had gone to Delos, under the Spartan King Leotychidas, moved by a message from the Samians, crossed to Cape Mycale where they landed, attacked, carried, and burned the Persian camp. Mycale followed so close on Plataea, that the belief easily arose that the two victories were won on the same afternoon.

478 B.C. The Athenians and Ionians, led by the Athenian Xanthippus, followed up the great victory by vigorous action in the Hellespont, while the Peloponnesians with Leotychidas, content with what they had achieved, returned home. The difference between the cautious policy of Sparta and the imperial instinct of Athens is here momentarily expressed. The Lacedæmonians were unwilling to concern themselves further with the Greeks of the eastern and northeastern Ægean; the Athenians were both capable of taking a Panhellenic point of view, and were also moved by the impulse to extend their own influence. The strong fortress of Sestos, which stood by the straits of Helle, was beleaguered and taken; and with this event Herodotus closes his history of the Persian wars. The fall of Sestos was the beginning of that Athenian empire, to which Pisistratus and the elder Miltiades had pointed the way.

**11. Gelon, Tyrant of Syracuse.** — While the eastern Greeks were securing their future development against the Persian foe, the western Greeks had been called upon to defend themselves against that Asiatic power with which they had to struggle in the western Mediterranean. Greek offshoots from the Phocæan colony of Mas-



salia (Marseilles) clashed with Phœnician trading ports in Corsica, and even on the coast of Spain. But above all, in Sicily Greek influence threatened the dominion and trade of Carthage; and when Carthage made her great attempt to secure ascendancy in Sicily, she was acting in concert with, though independently of, Xerxes against the common enemy.

Between 490 and 480 B.C., Greek Sicily was dominated by four tyrants; of the four, the greatest was Gelon, who first made himself lord of Gela, and then of Syracuse. He may be called the second founder of Syracuse, which he made by far the greatest Greek city in the west. The island of Ortygia had been joined by a mole to the mainland, so that the city was now on a peninsula. Gelon built a wall, enclosing in one circuit Ortygia and the fortified height of Achradina which looked down upon it. He also constructed docks, for Syracuse was to be a naval power, and he brought in half the citizens of Gela, all from the neighboring city of Camarina, and drew population from other subject towns. He allied himself by marriage to Theron of Agragas.

Theron, supported by Gelon, crossed Sicily to the north and drove Terillus out of Himera. Terillus appealed for help to Carthage, which she was glad to grant. And therefore, when messengers from Greece came to Sicily for aid, before the invasion of Xerxes, they found the power of Gelon and the other Greeks fully occupied. Carthage sent a great fleet and army which landed at Panormus and moved along the coast to besiege Himera, which was defended by Theron. Gelon marched with 50,000 foot and 5000 horse to relieve the town.

A great battle was fought outside the walls: the Greek victory was complete; and Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, himself perished. According to the Carthaginian account he stood all day, while the



COIN OF GELA,  
EARLY (OBSERVE)  
BULL WITH HU-  
MAN HEAD, FORE-  
PART [LEGEND:  
ΓΕΛΑΑΣ]


491 B.C.

480 B.C.



battle raged, offering sacrifice by the altar of Baal, till at last, seeing his host ready to fly, he flung himself as a supreme burnt-offering into the fire. The day was not retrieved; but hereafter Himera paid dear for the death of Hamilcar.

The common significance of the battles of Salamis and Himera, or the repulse of Asia from Europe, was appreciated at the time and naïvely expressed in the fanciful tradition that the two battles were fought on the same day. But Himera, unlike Salamis, was immediately followed by a treaty of peace. Carthage paid the lord of Syracuse two thousand talents as a war indemnity, but this was a small treasure compared with the booty taken in the



COIN OF SYRACUSE, FIFTH CENTURY. OBVERSE: HEAD OF VICTORY, DOLPHINS [LEGEND: ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ]. REVERSE: QUADRIGA CROWNED BY VICTORY; BELOW, A LION

camp. Out of a portion of that spoil a beautiful issue of large silver coins was minted; and some pieces of this memorial of the great deliverance of Sicily are preserved.

**12. Syracuse under Hieron.** — When Gelon died, he left the fruits of his enterprise and statesmanship to his brother Hieron. Hieron completed the victory over Carthage by defeating the other power which threatened western Greece. The Etruscans aimed at the possession of Cyme, northernmost of Greek cities on the Italian coast, and were besieging it, when Hieron's Syracusan fleet sailed to the spot and routed them: and the Tuscan power ceased to be a menace. We possess a bronze helmet from the spoil sent

478 B.C.

474 B.C.





by Hieron to Olympia; and the Pythian ode in which Pindar of Thebes immortalized the victory.

It is perhaps from the hymns of Pindar that we win the most lively impressions of the wealth and culture of the courts of Sicily in the fifth century. Pindar, like other illustrious poets of the day, Simonides and Bacchylides, and Æschylus, visited Sicily, to bask in the smiles, and receive the gifts, of the tyrant. The king of Syracuse sent his race-horses and chariots to contend in the great games



HELMET DEDICATED BY HIERON (IN BRITISH MUSEUM). [INSCRIPTION:  
*Ἱέρων ὁ Δεινόμενος καὶ τοὶ Συρακόσιοι τῷ Διὶ Τυρ(ρ)άν' ἀπὸ Κύμας*]

at Olympia and Delphi, and he employed the most gifted lyric poets to celebrate these victories in lordly odes. Pindar and Bacchylides were sometimes set to celebrate the same victory in rival strains. These poets give us an impression of the luxury and magnificence of the royal courts and the generosity of the royal victors.

Yet though the Syracusan cities might seem fair, the despotisms were oppressive. Hieron was famous for his system of spies.

472 B.C.

471 B.C.

467 B.C.

Theron slaughtered the men of Himera who opposed the rule of his son Thrasydæus. After Theron's death, Thrasydæus quarreled with Hieron, fought, and was defeated. In the hour of his reverse, Himera became independent, and Acragas, his greater city, adopted a free constitution. Hieron, likewise, was succeeded by a less able ruler, Thrasybulus, against whom the citizens rose in mass, and drove him out. The overthrow of tyranny at Syracuse was followed by a civil war between the old citizens and the new, whom Gelon had imported from all quarters. In the end all the strangers were driven out and the democracy of Syracuse was securely established. The next half-century was a period of prosperity for the Sicilian republics, especially for the greatest among them, Syracuse and Acragas, and for Selinus, now freed from the Phœnician yoke.

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(Syllabus, 82-83)

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Bury, 265-269. Holm, II, ch. iv. Harrison, J. A., *Story of Greece*, 335-389, contains a vivid and dramatic narrative of the invasions. The Persian invasions are treated in so great detail in the larger histories that it is difficult to assign topics: it is therefore suggested that the teacher make assignments from some of the sources, particularly from Herodotus.

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2. Platea.

Bury, 289-295. Holm, II, iv.

**Sources.** Herodotus, VIII, 140-144. Portions of the lives of Aristides and Themistocles from Plutarch.

3. The Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily.

Bury, 296-308. Holm, II, 78-89. Abbott, 439-446.

**Source.** Herodotus, VII, 163-167.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE FOUNDATION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

1. **The Position of Sparta and Career of Pausanias.** — For the last forty years Sparta had been the predominant power in continental Greece. Her headship in the common resistance to Persia was recognized without murmur or dispute. A great national enterprise, conducted under her auspices to a splendid conclusion, should have enabled her to convert leadership into dominion. But Lacedæmon had not the spirit to carry out an effective imperial policy. For a state which aspired to a truly imperial position in Greece must inevitably be a sea power. When the world of free Hellenic states once more extended over the *Ægean* to the skirts of Asia and to Thrace, Sparta might retain her continental position, but her prestige must ultimately be eclipsed and her power menaced by any city which won imperial authority over the islands and coasts of the *Ægean*. This was what happened.

The Spartans were a people unable to adapt themselves to new conditions. Reforms were unwelcome; a man of exceptional ability was regarded with suspicion. The formation of a navy would have seemed to them as unpractical an idea as an expedition against the capital of Persia. And if we follow their conduct of the recent war, we see that their policy was petty and provincial. They had generally acted at the last moment; their view was so limited by the smaller interests of the Peloponnesus that again and again they almost betrayed the national cause.

Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, had shown, it must be allowed, remarkable military ability in conducting the campaign of Plataea. But his talents as a politician were not equal to his



talents as a general. Sparta sent him out, in command of a squadron of ships supplied by her allies, to continue the work of emancipating the eastern Greeks. He sailed first to Cyprus and was successful in delivering the greater part of the island from Persian rule. He then proceeded to Byzantium and expelled the Persian garrison. But here he behaved more as a tyrant than as a general. It was said that he adopted the Persian dress, employed an Asiatic bodyguard in his journey through Thrace, and even offered to enslave his own state and all Hellas to Xerxes, and to seal the compact by marrying his daughter. When this was reported at Sparta, he was recalled to answer the charges. The intrigue, however, could not be proved, and he was only punished for some acts of injury he had done to particular persons. Although he was not sent out again officially, he hired a trireme for himself and returned to the Propontus, where he resumed possession of Byzantium, and succeeded in capturing Sestos. This was too much for the Athenians, and they sent a squadron under Cimon, the son of Miltiades, which recovered Sestos and drove Pausanias out of Byzantium.

The Spartan government again summoned Pausanias home. He obeyed the summons, believing he could secure his acquittal by bribes. The ephors threw him into prison; but it was difficult to procure evidence of his guilt. He was released, and challenged inquiry. It was suspected that he had not only negotiated with Persia, but had prepared the way for a revolt of the Helots by promising them emancipation. But there were not clear enough proofs to act upon, until a confidential servant turned informer. But before he could be seized, Pausanias took refuge in the temple of Athena. Unable to arrest him in the sanctuary, the ephors walled up the doors and starved him to death. As he was dying they brought him out, and by the command of the Delphic god he was buried at the entrance of the sacred enclosure. But the starvation within the precincts was an offense against the goddess, and brought a curse upon the Spartans. The career of Pausanias

478 B.C.

477 B.C.

476 B.C.

471 B.C. (?)

is typical of the Spartan abroad; and it has a parallel in the result of Sparta's attempt to extend her power on land. She cast her eyes upon Thessaly, and sent forth an army under King Leotychidas, who landed in the Pagasæan bay. But, like many a Spartan general, he could not resist silver and gold; and the Thessalian princes saved their power by bribing the invader. His guilt was evident, and when he returned home he was condemned to death. He saved himself by fleeing to Athena's sanctuary at Tegea. 476 B.C.

Sparta was soon compelled to fight for her position within the Peloponnesus itself. Argos had now recovered somewhat from the annihilating blow which had been dealt her by King Cleomenes. On the other side, Sparta had to behold the union of the villages of Elis into a city with a democratic constitution. And even in Arcadia she was constrained reluctantly to recognize the new union of the Mantinean villages.

Thus the Persian War left Sparta much where she was before. In the meantime, another city had been advancing with rapid strides along a new path, compassing large enterprises, and establishing a large empire.



472 B.C.

COIN OF ELIS,  
EARLY (RE-  
VERSE). VIC-  
TORY WITH  
WREATH [LE-  
GEND: *FA*(*Αἴων*)]

2. **The Confederacy of Delos.** — The lukewarmness of Sparta, exhibited in her failure to follow up the battle of Mycale, had induced the Ionian and other Asiatic Greeks to place themselves under the leadership of Athens. Thus was formed the voluntary confederation out of which an Athenian empire was to rise. The object was not only to protect the rescued cities from reconquest by the barbarian, but also to plunder the country of the Great King. The treasury of the league was established in the sacred Island of Delos, the ancient center of Ionian worship, and it was hence called the Confederacy of Delos. The recapture of Sestos was its first achievement. 478-477 B.C.

The league included the Ionian and Æolian cities of Asia; the islands adjacent to the coast from Lesbos to Rhodes; a large number of towns on the Propontis, and some in Thrace; most of the Cyclades; and Eubœa except its southern city Carystus. It was a league of sea-states, and therefore the basis of the contract was that each state should furnish ships to the common fleet. But most of the members were small and poor; many could not equip more than one or two ships; many could do no more than contribute a part of the expense to the furnishing of a single galley. To gather together a number of small and scattered contingents at a fixed time and place was always a matter of difficulty: nor was such a miscellaneous armament easily managed. It was therefore arranged that the smaller states, instead of furnishing ships, should pay a yearly sum of money to a common treasury. The valuation of the wealth of the confederate cities and the determination of the "contribution" of each were devolved upon Aristides, whose discretion, and the respect in which he was held, fitted him eminently for the task. His valuation remained in force for more than fifty years. Thus from the very beginning the Confederacy consisted of two kinds of members: those who furnished ships and those who paid an equivalent in money — a *phoros*, as it was called; and the second class was far the larger. For besides those who could only furnish a ship or two, or even part of a ship, many of the larger cities preferred the system of money payments, which did not oblige their citizens to leave home. The tribute was collected by ten Athenian officers, who bore the title of *Hellenotamiae*, "treasurers of the Greeks." The council of the Confederates met at Delos, where the treasury was, and each member had an equal voice. As leader of the Confederacy, Athens had the executive entirely in her hands, and it was of the highest significance that the treasurers were not selected from the whole body of Confederates, but were Athenian citizens. Thus, from the first, Athens held the means of gradually transforming the naval union into a naval empire.

While the name of Aristides is connected most closely with the foundation of the Confederacy, there is no doubt that it was due to his rival Themistocles that Athens took the tide of fortune at the flood. Themistocles had made his city a sea power; and this feat approved him the greatest of all her statesmen. He was a man of genius. The most reserved of all historians, Thucydides, turns aside to praise his unusual natural gifts; his power of divining what was likely to happen, and his capacity for dealing with difficult situations. When Athens undertook the leadership and entered upon the new paths which then opened out before her, she was carrying out a policy of which he had been the clearest and earliest interpreter. And, while the fleet was building an empire in the east, there was work for him to do amid the ruins of Athens.

**3. The Fortification of Athens and the Piræus.** — After Plataea, the Athenians brought back their families and goods to their desolate habitation. Little of the old town wall was still standing, and they proceeded to build a new wall. The work was done in haste; the material of older buildings and even gravestones were used. But this wall of Themistocles — for it was by the advice and under the inspiration of Themistocles that the work was wrought — embraced a larger circuit than the old enclosure. The Lacedæmonians, who looked with jealousy at the rise of the Athenian walls, sent an embassy to urge the Athenians to join Sparta in demolishing all fortifications in Greece, instead of fortifying their own town. But they were not in a position to do more than remonstrate.

The fortification of Piræus was likewise taken in hand. A thick wall was built all round the Munychian peninsula, keeping close to the sea, and was continued along the north side of the harbor, and out to the promontory of Eetionea. The entrances to this chief harbor and to the two small havens of Munychia and Zea on the east side of the peninsula were fortified by moles.

In the course of the next twenty years, the Athenians came to see the disadvantage of the two towns, which ought to have been

458 B.C.

one. It was borne in upon their statesmen that in the case of an enemy invading Attica with a powerful army, the communications between Athens and the Piræus might be completely severed, and the folk of the city be cut off from their ships. In order to meet this danger — which would have been most simply met by deserting Athens — a new device was imagined. It was resolved to transform the two towns into a double town, girt by a continuous line of fortification. Two diverging walls were built to connect Athens with the sea. The northern joined the Piræus wall near the harbor; the southern ran down to the roadstead of Phaleron. By these Long Walls, costly to build and costly to defend, Athens sought to adapt her topography to her rôle of mistress of the sea.

Her naval power was based upon the only sure foundation — a growing naval commerce. This, in its turn, depended upon the increase of Attic industries, which may be estimated by the enormous number of resident aliens or metics, who settled in Athens, or Piræus, for the purpose of manufacture and trade. These metics, who seem to have ultimately approached the number of ten thousand, were liable to the same ordinary burdens as the citizens, and, when a property-tax was imposed in time of war, they were taxed at a higher rate.

Themistocles wished to introduce a system by which a certain number of triremes should be added to the fleet every year; but this idea was not adopted; new ships were built from time to time according as they were needed. But a new system of furnishing them was introduced. The state supplied only the hull and some of the rigging; the duty and expense of fitting the galley, launching it completely, and training the oarsmen, were laid upon the most wealthy citizens, each in his turn. This public burden was called the trierarchy. One hundred and seventy oarsmen composed of hired foreigners and slaves, and partly of the poorest class of the citizens, propelled each galley; there was a crew of twenty men (*hyperetai*), to manage the vessel, including the

*keleustes*, who set the time to the oarsmen; and there were, besides, ten soldiers (*epibatai*). The generals were supreme commanders by land and sea alike.

4. **Ostracism and Death of Themistocles.** — For some years Themistocles divided the guidance of public affairs with Aristides and Xanthippus. But, like most Greek statesmen, he was accessible to bribes, and his vanity betrayed him into committing public indiscretions. He built near his own house a shrine to "Artemis, wisest in Council," on the ground that the counsels which he had offered his country had been wiser than all others. Such things gave opponents a handle for attack. The time and the immediate causes of the banishment of Themistocles are uncertain. He succumbed to a coalition of Aristides and Xanthippus, who appealed to the trial of ostracism. The exiled statesman took up his abode in Argos. When the Persian intrigues of Pausanias were disclosed, the Lacedæmonians discovered that Themistocles was implicated in the scandal. But though Themistocles held communications with Pausanias, it is not in the least likely that he was really guilty of any design to betray Greece to Persia: it is rather to be presumed that those communications were concerned with the schemes of Pausanias against the Spartan constitution. He was accused of high treason against his country; c. 472 B.C. men were sent to arrest him and bring him to trial; and he fled to Corcyra. The Corcyræans refused to keep him, and he crossed over to Epirus, pursued by Lacedæmonian and Athenian officers. He was forced to stop at the house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, though his previous relations with this king had not been friendly. When the king returned, Themistocles implored his protection. Admetus hospitably refused to give him up to the pursuers, and sent the fugitive overland to Pydna in Macedonia. A vessel carried him to the shores of Ionia. When Xerxes died 471 B.C. and Artaxerxes came to the throne, he went up to Susa and intrigued at the Persian court. Thus, circumstances drove him to follow the example of Pausanias; and, by a curious irony, the 464 B.C.



two men who might be regarded as the saviours of Greece, the hero of Salamis and the hero of Plataea, were perverted into framing plans for undoing their own work and enslaving the country which they had delivered. It may well have been, however, that Themistocles merely intended to compass his own advantage at the expense of the Great King, and had no serious thought of carrying out any designs against Greece. He won high honor in Persia, and was given the government of the district of Magnesia, where Magnesia itself furnished his table with bread, Lampsacus with wine, and Myus with meat. Themistocles died in Magnesia, and the Magnesians gave him outside their walls the resting-place which was denied him in his own country.

**5. Successful Campaigns of the Confederacy of Delos.** — The conduct of the war which the Confederacy of Delos was waging against Persia had been intrusted to Cimon, the son of Miltiades. We have seen already how he drove Pausanias out of Sestos and Byzantium. His next exploit was to capture Eion, a town near the mouth of the Strymon, and the most important stronghold of the Persians west of the Hellespont. Then he reduced the rocky island of Scyrus, a stronghold of pirates, which was colonized by Attic settlers. And here was made a famous discovery. There was a Delphic oracle which bade the Athenians take up the bones of Theseus and keep them in an honorable resting-place; and, whether by chance or after a search, there was found in Scyrus a grave containing a warrior's corpse of heroic size. It was taken to be the corpse of Theseus; Cimon brought it back to Athens; and perhaps none of his exploits earned him greater popularity.

A few years later, Xerxes had equipped a great armament — his last resistance to the triumph of Greek arms. Cimon, who had been busy in the northern Ægean, now sailed south. He delivered both the Greek and the native coast towns of Caria from Persian rule, and compelled the Lycian communities to enroll themselves in the Confederacy of Delos. Then at the river

476 B.C.

474 B.C.

468 B.C.





Eurymedon in Pamphylia he found the Persian army and the Persian fleet, and overcame them in a double battle by land and sea, destroying two hundred Phœnician ships. This victory sealed the acquisition of southern Asia Minor, from Caria to Pamphylia, for the Athenian federation, delivered any Ionian cities that still paid tribute to Persia, and freed Greece from all danger on the side of the Persian empire.

**6. The Confederacy of Delos becomes an Athenian Empire.**—The confederate fleet now had other work to do. It had been set to make war upon Greek states, which were unwilling to belong to the league. Carystus, which, unlike the other cities of Eubœa, had held aloof from the Confederacy, was subjugated, and made, in spite of herself, a member of the league. 472 B.C. Naxos 469 B.C. seceded from the league, and the fleet of the allies reduced her by blockade. Each act was defensible, but both acts alike seemed to be acts of tyrannical outrage on the independence of free states, and were an offense to public opinion in Greece. The oppression was all the worse, inasmuch as both Naxos and Carystus were deprived of their autonomy. They became in fact subjects of Athens, who was already forging the fetters with which she would bind her allies.

The victory of the Eurymedon left Athens free to pursue this inevitable policy of transforming the Confederacy into an empire. The most powerful confederate state on the Thracian coast was the island city of Thasos. Athens was making new endeavors to plant a settlement on the Strymon, and her interests collided with those of the Thasians, whose prosperity largely depended upon their trade in Thrace. A dispute arose about a gold mine, and the islanders revolted. The fleet of the Thasians was defeated by Cimon, and after a long blockade they capitulated. 463 B.C. Their walls were pulled down, their ships were handed over to Athens, they gave up all claim to the mine and the mainland, and agreed to pay whatever tribute was demanded.

The instances of these three island cities, Carystus, Naxos,

and Thasos, are typical. There were now three classes of members in the Confederacy of Delos: there were (1) the non-tributary allies which contributed ships; (2) the tributary allies which were independent; and (3) the tributary allies which were subject. It was obviously for the interest of Athens that as many members as possible should contribute money, and as few as possible contribute ships. For the ships which the tribute money furnished out were simply an addition to her own fleet, because they were under her direct control. She consequently aimed at diminishing the members of the first class; and soon it consisted of only the three large and wealthy islands — Lesbos, Chios, and Samos. Again, it was to the interest of Athens to transfer the members of the second class into the third, and win control over the internal affairs of the cities. As a rule, Athens prescribed to her subjects the general form of their constitutions, and it need hardly be said that these constitutions were always democratic.

454 B.C.

As the process of turning the alliance into an empire advanced, Athens found herself able to discontinue the meetings of the confederate assembly in the island of Delos. The formal establishment of her empire may be dated ten years after the war with Thasos, when the treasury of the league was transferred from Delos to Athens. The Confederacy of Delos no longer existed; and, though the term *alliance* was always officially used, men no longer hesitated to use the word *empire* in ordinary speech. The Athenian empire embraced the Ægean Sea with its northern and eastern fringes, from Methone in the northwest to Lycian Phaselis in the southeast. The number of cities which belonged to it at its height was considerably more than two hundred.

The Athenian empire was dissolved half a century after the transference of the treasury from Delos to Athens. We shall see that it began to decline not many years after it had reached the height of its power. The first principles of the political thought and political life of Greece were opposed to such an union. The sovereign city-state was the basis of the civilized Hellenic world,

and no city-state was ready, if it could help it, to surrender any part of its sovereignty. In the face of a common danger, cities might be ready to combine together in a league, each parting with some of her sovereign powers to a common federal council, but preserving the right of secession; and this was the idea of the Confederacy of Delos in its initial form. But when the motives which induced a city to join a federation became less strong and pressing, every member was anxious to regain its complete independence. An empire, however disguised, was always considered an injustice.

**7. Policy and Ostracism of Cimon.** — As the Persian War had brought out more vividly the contrast between Greek and barbarian, so the Confederacy of Delos emphasized a division existing within the Greek race itself, the contrast of Dorian and Ionian. The Dorian federation of the Peloponnesus under the headship of Sparta stood over against the Ionian federation of the Ægean under the headship of Athens.

For some years the antagonism lay dormant. The danger from Persia had not passed away. But the preservation of peace was also due, in some measure, to Aristides and Cimon. The two guiding principles of Cimon's policy were the prosecution of the war against Persia and the maintenance of good relations with the Lacedæmonians. He upheld the doctrine of dual leadership; Athens should be mistress of the seas, but she should recognize Sparta as the mistress on the continent. But after the death of Aristides, younger statesmen arose and formed a party of opposition against Cimon and the oligarchs who rallied around him.



PORTRAIT HEAD, PERHAPS OF  
CIMON, ON A GEM, EN-  
GRAVED BY DEXAMENUS



The two chief politicians of this democratic party were Ephialtes, and Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, who now began to play a prominent part in the Assembly.

464 B.C. Meanwhile, Sparta herself had dealt a blow to Cimon's policy. The Spartan citizens lived over a perpetual danger — the discontent of their Periœci and Helots. An earthquake had laid Sparta in ruins, and the moment was chosen by the Messenian serfs to shake off the yoke. They annihilated in battle a company of three hundred Spartans, but then they were defeated, and sought refuge in the stronghold of Ithome. On that steep hill they held out for a few years. The Spartans were driven to ask the aid of allies.

462 B.C. The democratic politicians at Athens lifted up their voices against the sending of any aid. But the people listened to the counsels of Cimon: "We must not leave Hellas lame; we must not allow Athens to lose her yoke-fellow." Cimon took four thousand hoplites to Messenia, but, though the Athenians had a reputation for skill in besieging fortresses, their endeavors to take Ithome failed. Suspecting treachery, Sparta told the Athenians, alone of all the allies who were encamped around the hill, that she required their help no more.

461 B.C. This incident exposed the futility of making sacrifices to court Sparta's friendship. When Cimon returned with his policy discredited, Ephialtes and his party denounced him as a "Philolaconian," and felt that they could safely attempt to ostracize him. An ostracism was held, and Cimon was banished. Soon afterward a mysterious crime was committed. Cimon's chief antagonist Ephialtes was murdered, and no one ever ascertained with surety who the murderers were.

459 B.C. The Athenians had presently an opportunity of retaliating on Sparta for her contumely. The blockade of Ithome was continued, and the rebels at last capitulated. They were allowed to leave the Peloponnesus unharmed, on the condition that they should never return. The Athenians who had helped to besiege

them now found them a shelter. They settled the Messenians in a new home at Naupactus, on the Corinthian Gulf, a place where Athens had recently established a naval station.

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**Source.** Thucydides, I, 94-95, 128-134.

2. The Fortification of Athens and the Fall of Themistocles.

Holm, II, 89-92, 95-100. Abbott, Greece, II, 267-273, 287-292. Harrison, 362-387.

**Sources.** Thucydides, I, 90-94, 136-139. Plutarch, Themistocles.

3. The Confederacy of Delos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Empire.

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**Sources.** Thucydides, I, 89, 97-100. Plutarch, Aristides.

## CHAPTER X

### THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF PERICLES

#### I. The Completion of the Athenian Democracy. Pericles. —

The democratic principle of the people's sovereignty was still further developed at Athens under the guidance of Pericles, for thirty years the most prominent figure in Greece. His father was Xanthippus, the rival of Themistocles and Aristides; his mother, Agariste, was niece of Cleisthenes. He was trained as a soldier, but carefully educated by the best teachers of the day. His political ideas, however, were his own, as was the lucid and persuasive eloquence by which he achieved his ends. In personal traits he was a striking contrast to Cimon, the loose and genial boon companion. He seldom walked abroad; he was strict in the economy of his household; he avoided convivial parties, and jealously maintained the dignity of his reserve.

(1) *Reform of the Council of the Areopagus.* — The most conservative institution in Athens was the Council of the Areopagus, for it was filled up from the archons, who were taken from the two richest classes in the state. By a measure of Ephialtes the censorial powers which enabled it to inquire into the lives of private citizens had been abolished. Nothing was left to the venerable body but its jurisdiction in homicidal cases. All impeachments for crimes which threatened the public weal were henceforward brought before the Council or the Assembly, and the people tried in their own courts defaulting officials.

(2) *Pay for Public Service.* — About the same time another step was taken on the path of democracy by making the archonship a paid office and open to all classes. The two engines of the

democratic development were lot and pay. The archons and other lesser officers, and the members of the Council, were taken by lot from a select number of candidates; but these candidates were chosen by deliberate election. This preliminary election was done away with; and the Council of Five Hundred, as well as the archons, were appointed by lot from all the eligible citizens. By this means every citizen had an equal chance of holding political office and taking a part in the conduct of public affairs.

It is clear that this system could not work unless the offices were paid; for the poor citizens would have been unable to give up their time to the service of the state. Accordingly, pay was introduced not only for the archonship,

but for the members of the Council. The payment of state offices was the leading feature of the democratic reforms of Pericles;



PERICLES; COPY OF THE PORTRAIT BY CRESILAS

c. 462 B.C.

and at the time of the attack on the Areopagus, Pericles carried a measure that the judges should receive a remuneration of either one or two obols a day. The amount of judicial business was growing so enormously that it would have been impossible to find a sufficient number of judges ready to attend day after day in the courts without any compensation.

It was now to the interest of every Athenian that there should be as few citizens as possible to participate in the new privileges and profits of citizenship. Accordingly, about ten years later, the rolls of the citizens were stringently revised; and a law was passed that the name of no child should be admitted whose father and mother were not Athenian citizens legitimately wedded. This law would have excluded Themistocles and Cleisthenes, the lawgiver, whose mothers were foreigners.

(3) *Liturgies*. — A feature of the Athenian democracy, not to be lost sight of, is that public burdens were laid upon the rich citizens which did not fall upon the poor, and which might fall to a man's lot only once or twice in his life. We have already seen how trierarchs were taken from the richer classes to equip and man triremes, in which they were themselves obliged to sail, and for which they were entirely responsible. Again, when the city sent solemn deputations on some religious errand, a wealthy citizen was chosen to eke out at his cost the money supplied for the purpose by the public treasury, and to conduct the deputation. But none of the liturgies, as these public burdens were called, was more important or more characteristic of Athenian life than that of providing the choruses for the festivals of Dionysus. Every year each tribe named one of its wealthy tribesmen to be a *choregos*, and his duties were to furnish and array a chorus and provide a skilled trainer to teach it the dances and songs of the drama which it was to perform. He whose chorus was victorious in the tragic or the comic competition was crowned, and received a bronze tripod. The state's endowment of religion turned out to be an endowment of brilliant genius; and the rich men who were

called upon to spend their time and money in furnishing the dancers did service to the great masters of tragedy and comedy, and thereby served the whole world.

**2. War of Athens with the Peloponnesians.**—The banishment of Cimon was the signal for a complete change in the foreign policy of Athens. She abandoned the alliance with the Lacedæmonians and formed a new alliance with their enemies, Argos and Thessaly. Her naval empire and rapidly growing trade brought her into deadly rivalry with Sparta's allies—the two great trading cities, Corinth and Ægina. And when an Athenian general took Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians and thus secured a naval station on the Corinthian Gulf, whence Athens could intercept at any time Corinthian fleets sailing for the west, war was certain, and the occasion soon came.

The Megarians, on account of a frontier dispute with Corinth, deserted the Peloponnesian league and placed themselves under Athenian protection. Nothing could be more welcome to Athens than the adhesion of Megara. Holding Megara, she had a strong frontier against the Peloponnesus, commanding the Isthmus from Pagæ on the Corinthian, to Nisæa on the Saronic, Gulf. Without any delays she set about the building of a double line of wall from the hill of Megara down to the haven of Nisæa, which faces Salamis, and she garrisoned these “Long Walls” with her own troops. Thus the eastern coast road was under her control, and Attica had a strong bulwark against invasion by land. 459 B.C.

War soon broke out, but at first Sparta took no active part. But when the Athenians, becoming involved with the Ægina, defeated its fleet and blocked the city, the Spartans were drawn into the conflict. They sent a force of hoplites to help the Æginetans; while the Corinthians advanced into the Megarid, expecting that the Athenians would find it impossible to protect Megara and blockade Ægina at the same time. But the citizens who were below and above the regular military age were formed into an extraordinary army and marched to the Megarid under the strategos 458 B.C.



Myronides. A battle was fought; both sides claimed the victory; but, when the Corinthians withdrew, the Athenians raised a trophy. Urged by the taunts of their fellow-citizens, the Corinthian soldiers returned in twelve days and began to set up a counter-trophy, but as they were at work the Athenians rushed forth from Megara and inflicted a severe defeat.

The siege of Ægina was continued, and, within two years after the battle, the Æginetans capitulated, and agreed to surrender their fleet and pay tribute to Athens. Few successes can have been more welcome or profitable to the Athenians than this. Their rival in commerce, the rich Dorian island which offended their eyes and attracted their desires when they looked forth from their hill across the waters of their bay, was at length powerless in their hands.

**3. War in Egypt.**—The victory over Ægina was won with only a portion of the Athenian fleet. For, in the very hour when she was about to be brought face to face with the armed opposition of rival Greek powers, she had embarked in an expedition to Egypt—one of the most daring ventures she ever undertook.

A fleet of two hundred Athenian and confederate galleys was operating against Persia in Cyprian seas, when it was invited to cross over to Egypt by Inaros, a Libyan potentate, who had stirred up the lands of the lower Nile to revolt against their Persian masters. The invitation was most alluring. It meant that, if Athens delivered Egypt from Persian rule, she would secure the chief control of the foreign trade with the Nile valley and be able to establish a naval station on the coast. The generals of the Ægean fleet accepted the call of the Libyan prince.

The Athenians entered the Nile to find Inaros triumphant, having gained a great victory in the Delta over a Persian army which had been sent to quell him. Sailing up, they won possession of the city of Memphis, except the citadel, the "White Castle," in which the Persian garrison held out. But it was a fatal coincidence that the power of Athens should have been divided

at this moment. With her full forces she might have inflicted a crushing blow on the Peloponnesians; with her full forces she might have prospered in Egypt; but the Persians, supported by a Phœnician fleet, defeated the Greeks, and blockaded them on an island. The Athenians were thus forced to burn their ships, 454 B.C. abandon the enterprise, and to retreat.

4. **War in Bœotia.** — In the meantime, events in another part of Greece had led the Lacedæmonians themselves to take part in the war. The errand which called them out of the Peloponnesus was an errand of piety, to succor their mother-people, the Dorians of the north, one of whose three little towns had been taken by the Phocians. To force the aggressors to restore the place was an easy task for an army which consisted of fifteen hundred Lacedæmonian hoplites and ten thousand troops of the allies. The real work of the expedition lay in Bœotia. It was clearly the policy of Sparta to raise up here a powerful state to hold Athens in check. Accordingly, Sparta now set up the power of Thebes again, and forced the Bœotian cities to join her league. When the army had done its work in Bœotia its return to the Peloponnesus was beset by difficulties. The Athenians guarded the passes in the Megarid, their ships beset the Corinthian Gulf. In this embarrassment the Spartans seem to have resolved to march straight upon Athens, where the people were now engaged in the building of Long Walls from the city to the harbor. The Peloponnesian army advanced to Tanagra, near the Attic frontier; but before they crossed the borders, the Athenians went forth to meet them, fourteen thousand strong, including one thousand Argives and some Thessalian cavalry. The banished statesman Cimon now came to the Athenian camp, pitched on Bœotian soil, and, being refused leave to defend his country, exhorted his parti-



COIN OF THEBES,  
FIFTH CENTURY  
(REVERSE). HE-  
RACLES STRANG-  
LING SNAKES  
[LEGEND: ΘΕ-  
ΒΑΙΩΝ]

sans to fight valiantly. This act of Cimon prepared the way for his recall; in the battle which followed, his friends fought so stubbornly that none of them survived. There was great slaughter on both sides; but the Lacedæmonians gained the victory. But the battle saved Athens, and the victory only enabled the victors to return by the Isthmus.

457 B.C.



CAMPAIGNS IN BŒOTIA

Athens now desired to make a truce with Sparta in order to gain time. No man was more fitted to compass this than the exile Cimon. The people, at the instance of Pericles, passed a decree recalling him; but when Cimon had negotiated the truce, he withdrew from Athens.

Two months after the battle, the Athenians made an expedition into Bœotia under the command of Myronides. A decisive battle was fought at Ænophyta, and the Athenians became masters of the whole Bœotian land. The Bœotian cities were not enrolled in the maritime Confederacy of Delos, but were obliged to furnish

457 B.C.

contingents to the Athenian armies. At the same time the Phocians entered into the alliance of Athens, and the Opuntian Locrians were constrained to acknowledge her supremacy. Such were the consequences of Ctenophyta and Tanagra. Athens could now quietly complete the building of her Long Walls.

**5. The Athenian Empire at its Height.** — Though the Athenians lost ships and treasure in these daring enterprises, their empire was now at the height of its power. They were even able to make the disaster in Egypt a pretext for removing the funds of the league to the Athenian Acropolis, lest the Persian fleet should capture Delos.

The empire of Athens now included a continental as well as a maritime dominion. The two countries which marched with her frontiers, Bœotia and Megara, had become her subjects. Beyond Bœotia, her dominion extended over Phocis and Locris to the pass of Thermopylæ. In Argos her influence was predominant; Ægina had been added to her Ægean empire, the ships of Ægina to her navy. The Saronic bay had almost been converted into an Attic lake.

The great commercial city of the Isthmus was the chief and most dangerous enemy of Athens, and the next object of the policy of Pericles was to convert the Corinthian Gulf into an Attic lake, also, and so hem in Corinth on both her seas. The possession of the Megarid and Bœotia, and especially the station at Naupactus, gave Athens control of the northern shores of the gulf from within the gate up to the Isthmus. But the southern seaboard was still entirely Peloponnesian; and outside the gate, on the Acarnanian coast, there were posts which ought to be secured. The general 455 B.C. Tolmides made a beginning by capturing the Corinthian colony Chalcis, opposite Patræ. Then Pericles himself conducted an expedition to continue the work of Tolmides. Though no mili- 453 B.C. tary success was gained, the expedition seems to have led to the adhesion of the Achæan cities to the Athenian alliance. It is certain, at least, that shortly afterward Achæa was an Athenian

dependency; and for a few years Athenian vessels could sail with a sense of dominion in the Corinthian, as well as in the Saronic, bay.

**6. Conclusion of Peace with Persia.**—The warfare of recent years had been an enormous strain on the resources of Athens. She wanted a relief from the strain, but after the expedition of Pericles three or four years elapsed before peace was concluded. Lacedæmon and Argos first concluded a treaty of peace for thirty years; and then Cimon, who had returned to Athens, negotiated a truce, which was fixed for five years, between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians.

Athens and her allies were now free to resume their warfare against Persia, and Cimon was naturally intrusted with the command. He sailed to Cyprus, where the Phœnician fleet, after putting down rebellion in Egypt, was busy reëstablishing the authority of Artaxerxes. Siege was laid to Cition, and during the blockade Cimon died. But when the siege had to be raised for lack of food, the Greek fleet encountered the Phœnician and Cilician ships off the Cyprian Salamis, and gained a double victory by land and sea.



COIN OF CITION, FIFTH CENTURY (REVERSE).  
SEATED LION; RAM'S  
HEAD [PHœNICIAN  
LEGEND: *l baal melek*]

Yet the victory did not encourage Athens to continue the struggle. War with Persia and war with her enemies in Greece could not be carried on effectually together; and she could only secure peace with the Greeks by surrendering her conquests. Pericles was a strong imperialist, but his aim was to spread the Athenian empire and influence within the borders of Greece, and the death of Cimon had removed the chief advocate of war with Persia. Accordingly, peace was made. The Great King undertook not to send ships of war into the Ægean; Athens gave a pledge securing the coasts of the Persian empire from attack.

452 B.C.

450 B.C.

448 B.C.

The first act in the strife of Greece and Persia thus closed. All the cities of Hellas which had come under barbarian sway, except in Cyprus, had been reunited to the world of free Hellenic states.

**7. Athenian Reverses. The Thirty Years' Peace.** — The peace with Persia, however, was not followed by further Athenian expansion; on the contrary, some of the most recent acquisitions began to fall away. Orchomenus and Chæronea and some other towns in western Bœotia were seized by exiled oligarchs; and it was necessary for Athens to intervene promptly. The general Tolmides went forth with a wholly inadequate number of troops. He took and garrisoned Chæronea, but did not attempt Orchomenus. On his way home he was set upon by the exiles from Orchomenus and some others, in the neighborhood of Coronea, and defeated. He was himself slain; many of the hoplites were taken 447 B.C. prisoners; and the Athenians, in order to obtain their release, resigned Bœotia. Thus the battle of Coronea undid the work of Cœnophyta. The loss of Bœotia was followed by the loss of Phocis and Locris.

Still more serious results ensued. Eubœa and Megara revolted at the same moment; here, too, oligarchical parties were at work. Pericles, who was a general, immediately went to Eubœa with the regiments of seven of the tribes, while those of the remaining three marched into the Megarid. But he had no sooner reached the island than he was overtaken by the news that the garrison in the city of Megara had been massacred and that a Peloponnesian army was threatening Attica. He promptly returned, and with difficulty managed to unite his forces with the troops in the Megarid. The return of Pericles disconcerted King Pleistoanax, who commanded the Lacedæmonians, and he withdrew. Pericles was thus set free to carry out the reduction of Eubœa. Histiaæ, the city in the north of the island, was most hardly dealt with, probably because her resistance was most obstinate; the people were driven out, their territory annexed to Athens. But peace was



446 B.C.

felt to be so indispensable that the Athenians resigned themselves to purchasing a durable treaty by considerable concessions. They had lost Megara, but they still held the two ports, Nisæa and Pagæ. These, as well as Achæa, they agreed to surrender, and on this basis a peace was concluded for thirty years between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. All the allies of both sides were enumerated in the treaty, and it was stipulated that neither Athens nor Lacedæmon was to admit into her alliance an ally of the other, while neutral states might join whichever alliance they chose.

It was a humiliating peace for Athens, and perhaps would not have been concluded but for the alarm which had been caused by the inroad of the Peloponnesians into Attic territory. While the loss of Bœotia and the evacuation of Achæa might be lightly endured, the loss of the Megarid was a serious blow. For, while Athens held the long walls from Nisæa and the passes of Geranea, she had complete immunity from Peloponnesian invasions of her soil. Henceforth Attica was always exposed to such aggressions.

### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 24, 25. Sections 24 *a*, *b*, 26)

#### 1. Changes in Government.

An excellent brief account is in West, *Ancient History*, 165-174. Bury, 346-352. Holm, II, xvi.

**Sources.** Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*, 28, and following.

#### 2. Foreign Policy; War with Egypt, Cyprus, and Persia.

Bury, 354-355, 358-361. Holm, II, 145-146, 175-179.

**Sources.** Thucydides, I, 104, 109, 110 (Egypt); 112 (Cyprus).

#### 3. The Athenian Empire.

Bury, 352-354, 355-357, 358, 363-367. Abbott, *Greece*, II, 328-334, 340-344.

(Longer and more detailed references are to be found in the standard histories, but either the text, or Bury's *History of Greece*, gives all that is necessary.)

**Sources.** Thucydides, I, 105, 109, 113-118. Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE IMPERIALISM OF PERICLES

1. **The Aims of Pericles.** — The cities of the Athenian alliance might have claimed, when the Persian War was ended, that they should resume their original and rightful freedom. The fair answer to this claim would have been, that peace would endure only so long as a power was maintained strong enough to stand up against the might of Persia. But in any case Athens was in the full career of an ambitious "imperialist" state. The tributes which she imposed on her subjects were probably not oppressive, and were constantly revised. But there was much that was galling in her empire, to communities in which the love of freedom was strongly developed.

Pericles had been the guide of the Athenian people in their imperial policy. But that policy had not been unchallenged. There was a strong oligarchical party at Athens which not only disliked the democracy of their city, but arraigned her empire; and there was one man at least who may claim the credit of having honestly espoused the cause of the allied cities against the unscrupulous selfishness of his own city. This was Thucydides, the son of Melesias. He maintained that the tribute should be reserved exclusively for the purpose for which it was levied, the defense of Greece against Persia, and that Athens had no right to spend it on other things. It was an injustice that the allies should have to defray any part of the costs of an Athenian campaign in Bœotia or of a new temple in Athens. This was a just view, but justice is never entirely compatible with the growth

of a country to political greatness, and Pericles was resolved to make his country great at all hazards.

447 B.C.


Among the measures which Pericles initiated to strengthen the empire of his city, none was more important in its results than the system of settling Athenian citizens abroad. The colonies which were thus sent to different parts of the empire served as garrisons in the lands of subject allies, and they also helped to provide for part of the superfluous population of Athens. The first of these Periclean *cleruchies* was established in the Thracian Chersonese, under the personal supervision of Pericles himself. Lands were bought from the allied cities of the peninsula, and a thousand Athenian citizens, chiefly of the poor and unemployed, were allotted farms and assigned to the several cities. The payment for the land was made in the shape of a reduction of the tribute.

The policy was naturally popular at Athens, since it provided for thousands of unemployed who cumbered the streets. But it was a policy which was highly unpopular among the allies, in whose territories the settlements were made.

The imperialism of Pericles was, indeed, of a lofty kind. His aim was to make Athens the queen of Hellas; to spread her sway on the mainland as well as beyond the seas; and to make her political influence felt in those states which it would have been unwise and perhaps impossible to draw within the borders of her empire. Shortly before the loss of Bœotia through the defeat of Coronea, Athens addressed to Greece an open declaration of her Panhellenic ambition. She invited the Greek states to send representatives to an Hellenic congress at Athens, for the purpose of discussing certain matters of common interest. To restore the temples which had been burned by the Persians, to pay the votive offerings which were due to the gods for the great deliverance, and to take common measures for clearing the seas of piracy — this was the programme which Athens proposed to the consideration of Greece. If the congress had taken place, it would have

inaugurated an amphictiony of all Hellas, and Athens would have been the center of this vast religious union. It was a sublime project, but it could not be. It was not to be expected that Sparta would fall in with a project which, however noble and pious it sounded, might tempt or help Athens to strike out new and perilous paths of ambition and aggrandizement. The Athenian envoys were rebuffed in the Peloponnesus, and the plan fell through.

2. **The Restoration of the Temples.** — It remained then for Athens to carry out that part of the programme which concerned 450-430 B.



THE ATHENIAN ACROPOLIS

herself. It devolved upon the city, as a religious duty, to make good the injuries which the barbarian had inflicted upon the habitations of her gods, and fully to pay her debt of gratitude to heaven for the defeat of the Medes. In this, above all, was the greatness of Pericles displayed, that he discerned the importance of performing this duty on a grand scale. He recognized that the city by ennobling the houses of her gods would ennoble herself; and that

she could express her own might and her ideals in no worthier way than by the erection of beautiful temples.

(1) *The Parthenon*. — The rebuilding of the sanctuary of the goddess Athena had already been commenced under Themistocles, but was now resumed on entirely different plans drawn by the architect Ictinus. This temple, known as the Hecatompedos, contained but two rooms, between which there was no communication, and was built of native Attic marble from the quarries of Pentelicus. In the eastern room was a statue of the goddess; a colossal figure, arrayed in a golden robe, a helmet on her head, her right hand holding a golden victory, and her left resting on her shield, while the snake Erichthonius was coiled at her feet. This statue, designed by Pheidias, was of wood covered with gold and ivory — ivory for the exposed flesh and gold for the raiment — and hence called *chryselephantine*.

Pheidias also designed and executed the sculpture which made the great temple complete. The two pediments, or triangular gables over the porches, he adorned with scenes from the life of the goddess; in the eastern one was depicted the story of the birth of Athena, who sprang fully armed from the head of Zeus; while in the western pediment the contest and triumph of Athena over Poseidon was portrayed. In the metopes was shown the battles between the Centaurs and the Giants. But with these Pheidias probably had little to do.

The subject of the wonderful frieze which encircled the temple from end to end was the most solemn of all the ceremonies which the Athenians performed in honor of their queen. At the great Panathenaic festival, every fourth year, they went up in long procession to present her with a new robe. The advance of this procession, starting from the western side, and moving simultaneously along the northern and southern sides, to meet at the eastern entrance, was vividly shown on the frieze of the Parthenon.

(2) *The Athena Promachos*. — Near the west brow of the Acropolis, looking southwestward, a colossal bronze statue of

Athena was constructed. It was about fifty feet high, and the flashes of the sun on the helmet and lance of the goddess were seen by sailors far out at sea.

(3) *The Temple of Athena Nike*.—Still another temple was built for the goddess. On the extreme southwestern summit of the Acropolis, a small but wonderfully perfect temple was erected



ATHENA AND HEPHAESTUS, ON THE FRIEZE OF THE PARTHENON (BRITISH MUSEUM)

to Athena as goddess of victory. In the frieze the motive of the temple was clearly shown, for it depicted the Greeks and Persians in conflict—the battle of Plataea.

(4) *The Propylea*.—The approach to the Parthenon, as devised by the architect Mnesicles, occupied the whole west side of the hill. In the center, on the brow of the hill and facing west-



ward, was to be the entrance with five gates, and on either side two vast columned halls — reaching to the north and south brinks of the hill — in which the Athenians could walk sheltered from sun and rain. Thrown out on the projecting cliffs in front of these halls were to be two spacious wings, flanking the ascent to the central gate. This design was never carried out in full. Though the building was begun and portions of it completed, the jealousy of the priests and the danger of approaching war prevented its completion.

(5) *The Erechtheum*. — The oldest shrine on the citadel was the Erechtheum, which as it appears to-day was probably the work of an age later than that of Pericles, though showing the same spirit. The building is of irregular shape and constructed after the Ionic style. Toward the Parthenon extends a wonderful porch, the roof of which is supported by six female figures instead of columns.

(6) *The Olympian Zeus*. — In the field of art Athens partly fulfilled the ambition of Pericles, who, when he could not make her the queen, desired that she should be the instructress, of Hellas. When Pheidias had completed the great statue of Athena in gold and ivory, and had seen it set up in the new temple, he went forth, invited by the men of Elis, to make the image for the temple of Zeus at Olympia. For five years in his workshop in the Altis the Athenian sculptor wrought at the “great chryselephantine god,” and the colossal image which came from his hands was probably the highest creation ever achieved by the plastic art of Greece. The Panhellenic god, seated on a lofty throne, and clad in a golden robe, held a Victory in his right hand, a scepter in his left. He was bearded, and his hair was wreathed with a branch of olive. Many have borne witness to the impression which the serene aspect of this manifest divinity always produced upon the heart of the beholder. “Let a man sick and weary in his soul, who has passed through many distresses and sorrows, whose pillow is unvisited by kindly sleep, stand in front of this image; he will,

I deem, forget all the terrors and troubles of human life." An Athenian had wrought, for one of the two great centers of Hellenic religion, the most sublime expression of the Greek ideal of god-head.

3. **Literature.**—(1) *The Drama.*—Greek tragedy originated from the choruses and songs that were sung in honor of Dionysus. The first Athenian to create a genuine drama was Phrynichus, who took contemporary events for his themes and who was fined, as has been seen, for his *Capture of Miletus*, which reminded the Athenians of their own misfortunes.

But tragedy was made a genuine work of art by Æschylus, who lived during the era of the Persian Wars. He improved the art of Phrynichus in many ways; he introduced more actors on the stage, provided costumes, and laid greater stress on the dialogue. For his subjects he took, not contemporary events, but myths and legends, and by means of these taught great moral lessons. Some of his most famous tragedies are *The Seven against Thebes*, *Agamemnon*, and *Prometheus*.

Sophocles, however, was the great tragedian of the Periclean age. He is said to have composed more than a hundred dramas, of which seven tragedies have been preserved. Among the most famous of these are *Antigone* and *Œdipus Tyrannus*. In scenic details he did not surpass Æschylus, but he displayed far more dramatic skill, and presented a clearer picture to the spectators. Instead of taking for subjects myths and legends, he chose some great spiritual conflict; as in *Antigone*, between the stubbornness of the king and the self-sacrifice of the princess.

(2) *Philosophy.*—During the sixth century the Ionian cities were the homes of a school of philosophers who sought to solve the problems of the universe. Thales, the astronomer, who was the first to predict an eclipse of the sun, believed he could find the origin of all things in water. His idea, of course, was wrong; but in seeking for one basal element he had given to men the idea of unity. Pythagoras of Samos, who later went to Croton, was

a mathematician; he first recognized the circular form of the earth and knew that the motion of the earth around the sun was only apparent. Heraclitus of Ephesus in many respects foreshadowed the modern doctrine of evolution. He taught that all things were in a state of growth and decay.

But at Athens these doctrines made little headway in this era, and the people still devoutly believed in the old gods and in the old religion.

(3) *History*.—In prose writing the era is famous for the production of the history of Herodotus. Although a native of Halicarnassus, originally a Dorian city, Herodotus was deeply influenced by the Ionic culture. So many of his years were spent in travel that he cannot be claimed by any one city; yet the importance of his work to Athens, his high estimation of Pericles, and the reward which the city voted him, connect him closely with Athena.

His writings cover the era of the Persian Wars, yet in connection with each Persian conquest the conquered country is described, so that an almost universal history of the period is produced. He interweaves description and narrative, combining sober statement of fact with legend and story so that the book becomes one of absorbing interest.

**4. Higher Education. The Sophists.**—Since the days of Nestor and Odysseus, the art of persuasive speech was held in honor by the Greeks. With the rise of the democratic commonwealths, it became more important. If a man was dragged into a law-court by his enemies, and knew not how to speak, he was like an unarmed civilian attacked by soldiers in panoply. The power of clearly expressing ideas in such a way as to persuade an audience was an art to be learned and taught. The demand was met by teachers who traveled about and gave general instruction in the art of speaking and in the art of reasoning, and, out of their encyclopædic knowledge, lectured on all possible subjects. They received fees for their courses, and were called “sophists,” of which


name perhaps our best equivalent is "professors." The name acquired a slightly unfavorable color — partly owing to the distrust felt by the masses toward men who know too much. But this dislike did not imply the idea that the professors were impostors, who deliberately sought to hoodwink the public by arguments in which they did not believe themselves.

The sophists did not confine themselves to teaching. They wrote much; they discussed occasional topics, criticised political affairs, diffused ideas. But the greatest of the professors were much more than either teachers or journalists. They not only diffused but set afloat ideas; they enriched the world with contributions to knowledge. They were all rationalists, spreaders of enlightenment; but they were very various in their views and doctrines. Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Socrates of Athens, each had his own strongly marked individuality.

**5. Opposition to Pericles.** The imperialism of Pericles and the improvements at Athens required a large outlay of money, and thus gave the political opponents of Pericles a welcome handle against him. Thucydides accused Pericles not merely of squandering the resources of the state which ought to be kept as a reserve for war, but of misappropriating the money of the Confederacy for purely Athenian purposes. It is certainly true that some money was taken from the treasury of the Hellenotamizæ for the new buildings, but this was only a very small part of the cost, which was mainly defrayed by the treasury of Athena and by the public treasury of Athens. But Pericles, with bold sophistry, argued that the allies had no reason to complain, so long as Athens defended them efficiently. Three years after the 'Thirty Years' Peace, Thucydides asked the people to decide between them. But the people voted for the ostracism of Thucydides, and hence-  
442 B.C.

**6. The Piræus. Athenian Commercial Policy.** — The Piræus

had grown to be one of the great ports of Greece, and its defenses were improved by the construction of a new long wall, running parallel and close to the northern wall. The southern or Phaleron wall was now allowed to fall into disrepair. Dry docks, new storehouses, and various buildings for the convenience of shipping were constructed round the three harbors. Athens and her harbor increased in population; the total of the inhabitants of Attica seems to have been at this time about two hundred and fifty thousand (twice as large as the Corinthian state). But nearly half of this number were slaves.



ATHENS AND THE PIRÆUS

Attic fame and commerce were spreading in the west. Her standard of coinage was adopted for the currency of Greek cities in Sicily; Rome sent envoys to her to obtain a copy of Solon's code. Yet the more vital interests of Athens were in the east, connected especially with imports of grain from the Euxine. The price of corn fluctuated with every disturbance in these regions, and it was essential to secure this trade route. Her possession of



the Chersonese, which Pericles had strengthened, controlled the Hellespont; Byzantium and Chalcedon, members of her league, held the Bosphorus. And Pericles himself sailed with an imposing squadron into the Pontus to impress the barbarians of those regions with the power of Athens.

The Thracian tribes became united under a powerful king, and Athens needed to keep a watchful eye on this new power. An important port was the Athenian fortress of Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, near a bridge over which ran all the trade between Thrace and Macedonia, and to which came down the produce of the gold mines in the "hinterland." A new city, founded here at the bridge on the Strymon, was called Amphipolis, and became quickly the most important place on the coast. c. 450 B.C.  
436 B.C.

**7. The Revolt of Samos.** — After the ostracism of Thucydides, Pericles for nearly fifteen years ruled as absolutely as a tyrant. But his position was entirely based on his moral influence over the sovereign people. He had the power of persuading them to do whatever he thought good, and every year for fifteen years after his rival's banishment he was elected one of the generals. Although all the ten generals nominally possessed equal powers, yet the man who possessed the supreme political influence was practically chief of the ten, and had the conduct of foreign affairs in his hands. Pericles was not irresponsible; for at the end of any official year the people could decline to reëlect him, and call him to account for his actions. When he had once gained the undisputed mastery, the only forces which he used to maintain it were wisdom and eloquence. The desire of autocratic authority was doubtless part of his nature; but his spirit was fine enough to feel that it was a greater thing to be leader of freemen whom he must convince by speech, than despot of subjects who must obey his nod.

Five years after the Thirty Years' Peace he was called upon to display his generalship. Athens was involved in a war with one of the strongest members of her Confederacy, the island of Samos.



The occasion of this war was a dispute which Samos had with another member, Miletus, about the possession of Priene. Athens decided in favor of Miletus, and Pericles sailed with forty-four triremes to Samos, where he overthrew the aristocracy and established a democratic constitution, leaving a garrison to protect it. But the nobles who had fled to the mainland returned one night and captured the garrison. Athens received another blow at the same time by the revolt of Byzantium. Pericles sailed speedily back to Samos and invested it with a large fleet. At the end of nine months the city surrendered. The Samians undertook to pull down their walls, and to surrender their ships, and pay a war indemnity, which amounted to fifteen hundred talents or thereabouts. Byzantium also came back to the Confederacy.



EARLY COIN OF  
SAMOS (OB-  
VERSE). PART  
OF A BULL

439 B.C.

#### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 85-86)

1. Restoration of the Temples: Sculpture.

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2. Literature.

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**Sources.** Extracts from the poets may be found in Jennings and Johnston, *Half-hours with Greek and Latin Authors*.

3. Education.

West, 188-191. See also Pericles, *Funeral Oration*. Thucydides, II, 34-46.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE WAR OF ATHENS WITH THE PELOPONNESIANS

(431-421 B.C.)

1. **The Prelude of the War.** — The incidents which led up to the "Peloponnesian War" are connected with two Corinthian colonies, Corcyra and Potidæa.

(1) Party struggles had taken place in Epidamnus, a colony of Corcyra. The popular party asked help from their mother-city; but Corcyra refused, and Epidamnus turned to Corinth, which sent a squadron of seventy-five ships with two thousand hoplites against the Corcyræans. The powerful navy of Corcyra, however, won a complete victory over the Corinthians outside the Ambracian Gulf.

Corinth now began to prepare for a greater effort against her powerful and detested colony. The report of the preparations she was making so frightened the Corcyræans that they offered to make an alliance with Athens. Envoys from both Corinth and Corcyra appeared at Athens, and, after two debates, the assembly voted to make a defensive alliance with Corcyra.

Ten ships were sent to Corcyra with orders not to fight unless Corcyra or some of the places belonging to it were attacked. A great and tumultuous naval engagement ensued near the islet of Sybota. A Corcyræan fleet of one hundred and ten ships was ranged against a Corinthian of one hundred and fifty — the outcome of two years of preparation. The right wing of the Corcy-



435 B.C.

COIN OF COR-  
CYRA, FIFTH  
CENTURY  
(OBVERSE).  
HEAD OF  
HERA [LE-  
GEND: KOP]

ræans was worsted, and the ten Athenian ships, which had held aloof at first; interfered to prevent its total discomfiture. In the evening the sudden sight of twenty new Athenian ships on the horizon caused the Corinthians to retreat, and the next day they declined battle.

(2) The breach with Corinth forced Athens to look to the security of her interests in the Chalcidic peninsula. The city of Potidæa, which occupies and guards the Isthmus of Pallene, was a tributary ally of Athens, but received its annual magistrates from its mother-city, Corinth. Immediately after the battle of Sybota, Athens required the Potidæans to raze the city-walls on the south side where they were not needed for protection against Macedonia, and to abandon the system of Corinthian magistrates. The Potidæans refused; they were supported by the promise of Sparta to invade Attica, in case Potidæa were attacked by Athens. But the situation was complicated by the policy of the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, who organized a general revolt of Chalcidice against Athens; and even persuaded the Chalcidians to pull down their cities on the coast and concentrate themselves in the strong inland town of Olynthus. Thus the revolt of Potidæa forms part of a general movement in that quarter against the Athenian dominion.

432 B.C.

The Athenians advanced against Potidæa and gained an advantage over the Corinthian general, Aristeus, who had arrived with some Peloponnesian forces. They then invested the city. So far the Corinthians had acted alone. Now, seeing the danger of Potidæa, they took active steps to incite the Lacedæmonians to declare war against Athens.

432 B.C.

Pericles knew that war was coming, and he promptly struck. Megara had assisted Corinth at the battle of Sybota; the Athenians passed a measure excluding the Megarians from the markets and ports of their empire. The decree spelt economical ruin to Megara, and Megara was an important member of the Peloponnesian league.

2. **Sparta decides upon War.** — The allies appeared at Sparta

and brought formal charges against Athens of having broken the Thirty Years' Peace and committed various acts of injustice. But it was not the Corcyraean incidents, or the siege of Potidæa, or the Megarian decree, that caused the Peloponnesian War, though jointly they hastened its outbreak; it was the fear and jealousy of the Athenian power. The only question was whether it was the right hour to engage in that unavoidable struggle. The Spartan king, Archidamus, advised delay. But the ephors were in favor of war. It was decided that the Athenians were in the wrong, and this decision necessarily led to a declaration of war.

Thucydides makes the Corinthian envoys, at the assembly in Sparta, the spokesmen of a famous comparison. "You have never considered, O Lacedæmonians, what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, while you are conservative. They are bold beyond their strength; whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always abroad, and you are always at home."

On the present occasion, however, the Athenians did not give an example of promptness in action. It was the object of Sparta to gain time; accordingly, she sent embassies to Athens with trivial demands. She required the Athenians to drive out the "curse of the goddess," which rested on the family of the Alcmaeonidæ; the point of this lay in the fact that Pericles, on his mother's side, belonged to the accursed family. Athens replied by equally trivial demands. These amenities were followed by an ultimatum. There was a peace party at Athens, but Pericles carried the day. "We must be aware," he said, "that the war will come; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us."

The peoples of Greece were parted as follows on the sides of the two chief antagonists. *Sparta* commanded the whole Peloponnesus, except her old enemy Argos, and Achæa; she commanded

the Isthmus, for she had both Corinth and Megara; in northern Greece she had Bœotia, Phocis, and Locris; in western Greece, Ambracia, Anactorion, and the island of Leucas. In western Greece, *Athens* commanded the Acarnanians, Corcyra, and Zacynthus, as well as the Messenians of Naupactus; in northern Greece she had Plataea; and these were her only allies beyond her confederacy. Of that confederacy Lesbos and Chios were now the only two independent states. In addition to the navies of Lesbos, Chios, and Corcyra, Athens had three hundred ships of her own.

431 B.C.

**3. The Theban Attack on Plataea.** — The declaration of war between the two great states of Greece let loose smaller enmities. On a dark, moonless night, in the early spring, a band of three hundred Thebans entered Plataea, invited and admitted by a small party in the city. Instead of at once attacking, they took up their post in the agora and made a proclamation, calling upon the Plataeans to join the Bœotian league. The Plataeans were surprised, and acceded to the Theban demand, but in the course of the negotiation discovered how few the enemies were. Breaking down the party-walls between their houses, so as not to attract notice by moving in the streets, they concerted a plan of action. When all was arranged, they attacked the enemy before dawn. The Thebans were soon dispersed. A few escaped. But the greater number rushed through the door of a large building, mistaking it for one of the town-gates, and were thus captured alive by the Plataeans.

The three hundred were only the vanguard of a large Theban force which arrived too late. According to the Theban account, the Plataeans definitely promised to restore the prisoners, if the other troops evacuated their territory. But the Plataeans, as soon as they had conveyed all their property into the city, put their prisoners to death, one hundred and eighty in number. A message had been immediately sent to Athens. The Athenians seized all the Bœotians in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea bidding them not to injure their prisoners; but the herald found the Thebans







dead. The Athenians immediately set Plataea ready for a siege, and sent a garrison of eighty Athenians.

The Theban attack on Plataea was a glaring violation of the Thirty Years' Peace, and it hastened the outbreak of the war.

**4. Spartan Invasions. Athenian Retaliation.** — The key to the war which now began is the fact that it was waged between a state which was mainly continental and one which was mainly maritime. The land power was obliged to direct its attacks chiefly on the continental possessions of the sea power, while the latter had to confine itself to attacking the maritime possessions of the former. The points at which the Peloponnesians could attack Athens with their land forces were Attica itself and Thrace. Accordingly, Attica was invaded almost every year, and there was constant warfare in Thrace. On the other hand, the offensive operations of Athens were mainly in the west of Greece, about the islands of the Ionian Sea and near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. That was the region where they had the best prospect, by their naval superiority, of detaching members from the Peloponnesian alliance. Thrace, Attica, and the seas of western Greece were therefore the chief and constant scenes of the war.

Pericles returned fully to the policy initiated by Themistocles, of concentrating all the energy of Athens on the development of her naval power. "Let us give up lands and houses," he said, "but keep a watch over the city and the sea." The policy of sacrificing Attica was only part of a well-considered system of strategy. Pericles was determined not to court a great battle, for which the land forces of Athens were manifestly insufficient: on land Bœotia alone was a match for her. His object was to wear out the enemy, not to attempt to subjugate or decisively defeat.

When the corn was ripe, in the last days of May, King Archidamus with two-thirds of the Peloponnesian army invaded Attica. 431 B.C. The Athenians brought into the city their families and their goods, while their flocks and herds were removed to the island of Eubœa. The influx of the population in the city caused terrible crowding.

They seized temples and shrines, and even the ancient enclosure of the Pelargicon was occupied, though an oracle forbade its occupation.

Archidamus halted under Mount Parnes, whence he could see in the distance the Acropolis of Athens. The proximity of the invaders caused great excitement in Athens, and roused furious opposition to Pericles, who would not allow the troops to go forth against them — except a few flying columns of horse in the immediate neighborhood of the city. The invader presently advanced northward, between Mounts Parnes and Pentelicus, to Decelea, and proceeded through the territory of Oropus to Bœotia.

The Athenians, meanwhile, had sent 100 ships round the Peloponnesus. The important island of Cephallenia was won over and some towns on the Acarnanian coast were taken. More important was the drastic measure which Athens adopted against her subjects and former rivals, the Dorians of Ægina. She drove out the Æginetans and settled the island with a *cleruchy* of her own citizens. Ægina thus became, like Salamis, annexed to Attica.

When Archidamus left Attica, Pericles organized a reserve. There had been as much as 9700 talents in the treasury, but the expenses of the buildings on the Acropolis and of the war at Potidæa had reduced this to 6000. It was now decreed that 1000 talents of this amount should be reserved, not to be touched unless the enemy were to attack Athens by sea, and that every year 100 triremes should be set apart with the same object.

**5. The Plague. The Death of Pericles.** — Next year the Peloponnesians again invaded Attica. But the Athenians concerned themselves less with this invasion; they had to contend with a more awful enemy within the walls of their city. The plague had broken out. Thucydides, who was stricken down himself, gives a terrible account of its ravages and the demoralization which it produced in Athens. The inexperienced physicians were unable to treat the unknown virulent disease, which was aggravated by the overcrowding, in the heat of summer. The dead lay

unburied, the temples were full of corpses; and the funeral customs were forgotten or violated. The havoc of the pestilence permanently reduced the population. The total number of Athenians (of both sexes and all ages) was about 80,000 in the first quarter of the fifth century. Prosperity had raised it to 100,000 by the beginning of the war; but the plague brought it down below the old level, which it never reached again.

As in the year before, an Athenian fleet attacked the Peloponnesus, but it effected nothing. In Thrace, meanwhile, the siege of Potidæa had been prosecuted throughout the year. The inhabitants had been reduced to such straits that they even tasted human flesh, and in the winter they capitulated. Athens soon afterward colonized the place.

Meanwhile, the Athenians had been cast into such despair by the plague that they made overtures for peace to Sparta. Their overtures were rejected, and they turned the fury of their disappointment upon



ATHENA CONTEMPLATING A STELE (ACROPOLIS MUSEUM, ATHENS)

Pericles. He was suspended from the post of strategos; his accounts were called for and examined by the Council. He was found guilty of "theft" to the trifling amount of five talents; the verdict was a virtual acquittal, though he had to pay a fine of ten times the amount; and he was presently reelected to the post from which he had been suspended. But Athens was not destined to be guided by him much longer. He had lost his two sons in the plague, and he died about a year later. In his last years he had been afflicted by the indirect attacks of his enemies. Pheidias was accused of embezzling part of the public money devoted to the works on the Acropolis, in which he was engaged, and it was implied that Pericles was cognizant of the dishonesty. Pheidias was condemned. Then the philosopher Anaxagoras, was publicly prosecuted for holding and propagating impious doctrines. Pericles defended his friend, but Anaxagoras was sentenced to pay a fine of five talents, and retired to continue his philosophical studies at Lampsacus. A similar attack was made upon his mistress, Aspasia. The pleading of Pericles procured her acquittal, and in the last year of his life the people passed a decree to legitimize her son. The latest words of Pericles express what to the student of the history of civilization is an important feature of his character — his humanity: "No Athenian ever put on black for an act of mine."

**6. The Siege and Capture of Plataea.** — In the next summer Archidamus was induced by the Thebans, instead of invading Attica, to march across Cithæron and lay siege to Plataea. The Plataean land was sacred; and the Spartan king proposed to the Plataeans that they should evacuate their territory until the end of the war; and all should then be restored to them intact. Having consulted Athens, which promised to protect them, the Plataeans refused, and Archidamus began the siege. The Athenians, however, sent no help.

By various means the besiegers attempted to batter down the walls, but were defeated by the ingenuity and resolution of the

besieged. As a last resource they tried to burn out the town. When this device failed, the Peloponnesians saw they would have to blockade Plataea. They built a wall of circumvallation about one hundred yards from the city, and dug two ditches, one inside and one outside this wall. Then Archidamus left part of his army to maintain the blockade during the winter. At the end of another year, the Plataeans saw that they had no longer any hope of help from Athens, and their food was running short. They determined to make an attempt to escape. On a dark night amid rain and storm, about half of the garrison boldly sallied out of the city, while their comrades made a diversion on the opposite side. The fugitives succeeded in crossing the ditches and wall and nearly all of them reached Athens in safety. In the following summer, want of food forced the rest to capitulate at discretion to the Lacedaemonians. Five men were sent from Sparta to decide their fate. But each prisoner was merely asked, "Have you in the present war done any service to the Lacedaemonians or their allies?" and it was in vain that the Plataeans implored the Lacedaemonians to look upon the sepulchres of their own fathers buried in Plataean land and honored every year by Plataea with the customary offerings. They were put to death, two hundred in number, and twenty-five Athenians. The city was razed to the ground.

Dec., 428 B.C.  
427 B.C.

**7. Revolt of Mytilene. New Leaders at Athens.** - Archidamus had invaded Attica for the third time, and had just quitted it, when the news arrived that Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, had revolted. The Lesbians had a large fleet; and the Athenians were feeling so severely the effects of the plague and of the war that the rebellion had a good prospect of success, if it had been energetically supported by the Peloponnesians. Envoys, who were sent to gain their help, pleaded the cause of Lesbos at the Olympic games, which were celebrated this year. Lesbos was admitted into the Peloponnesian league, but no assistance was sent.

428 B.C.

Meanwhile, the Athenians had blockaded the two harbors of



Mytilene, and Paches soon arrived with one thousand hoplites, to complete the investment. Toward the end of the winter, the Spartans sent a general to assure the people of Mytilene that an armament would be despatched to their relief. But the ships never came, and the food ran short. The leaders, in despair, determined to make a sally, and for this purpose armed the mass of the people with shields and spears. But the people, when they got the arms, refused to obey, and demanded that the oligarchs should bring forth the corn, and that all should share it fairly; otherwise, they would surrender the city. This drove the government to capitulate at discretion.

427 B.C.

The ringleaders of the revolt of Mytilene were sent to Athens. The Assembly met to determine the fate of the prisoners, and decided to put to death the whole adult male population, and to enslave the women and children. A trireme was immediately despatched with this terrible command.

The fact that the Athenian Assembly was persuaded to press the cruel rights of war so far as to decree the extinction of a whole population shows how deep was the feeling of wrath that prevailed against Mytilene. The revolt had come at a moment when Athens was in dire straits, between the plague and the war; and it was the revolt, not of a subject, but of a free ally. Athens could more easily forgive the rebellion of a subject state which tried to throw off her yoke, than repudiation of her leadership by a nominally independent confederate. For the action of Mytilene was, in truth, an indictment of the whole fabric of the Athenian empire as unjust and undesirable.

The calm sense of Pericles was no longer there to guide and enlighten the Assembly. We now find democratic statesmen of a completely different stamp coming forward to take his place. The Assembly is swayed by men of the people — tradesmen, like Cleon, the leather-merchant, and Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker. These men had not, like Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, family connections to start and support them; they had no aristocratic tradi-

tions as the background of their democratic policy. They were self-made; they won their influence in the state by the sheer force of cleverness, eloquence, industry, and audacity.

It was under the influence of Cleon that the Assembly vented its indignation against Mytilene by dooming the whole people to slaughter. But when the meeting had dispersed, men began, in a cooler moment, to realize the inhumanity of their action and to question its policy. The envoys of Mytilene, who had been permitted to come to Athens to plead her cause, seeing this change of feeling, induced the generals to summon an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly for the following morning, to reconsider the decree. Thucydides represents Cleon as openly asserting the principle that a tyrannical city must use tyrannical methods, and rule by fear. The chief speaker on the other side was a certain Diodotus, and he handled the question entirely as a matter of policy. The question for Athens to consider, he said, is not what Mytilene deserves, but what it is expedient for Athens to inflict. If the people of Mytilene, who were compelled to join with their oligarchical government in rebelling, are destroyed, the popular party will everywhere be alienated from Athens.

The supporters of Diodotus won their motion by a very small majority, and a trireme was despatched in hot haste to annul the previous savage decree. It arrived barely in time; and the inhabitants were saved. The ringleaders of the revolt, however, were tried and executed at Athens.

Having taken away the Lesbian fleet and razed the walls of Mytilene, the Athenians divided the island, excluding Methymna, into three thousand lots, of which three hundred were consecrated to the gods. The rest they let to Athenian citizens as cleruchs, and the land was cultivated by the Lesbians, who paid an annual rent.

**8. Warfare in Western Greece. Tragic Events in Corcyra.** — While the attention of Greece was directed upon the fortunes of Plataea and Mytilene, in the regions of the west the reputation of

the Athenian navy had, under Phormio, won a brilliant double victory in the Corinthian Gulf, off Naupactus.

429 B.C.

Corcyra presently became the scene of war in consequence of a bloody revolution. The prisoners taken by Corinth in the Epidamnian War were released on a promise to conspire against Athens; and leaguings themselves with the oligarchs, they slew the leaders of the democrats who favored Athens. Street fighting followed. A Peloponnesian fleet which came up was driven off by the approach of a stronger Athenian armament, and the democratic party now slaughtered the oligarchs wholesale. About six hundred escaped, and establishing themselves on Mount Istone in the northeast of the island, harassed their foes thence for two years, till an Athenian fleet brought help to storm the place. The oligarchs then capitulated on the understanding that Athens was to decide their fate; but, by a trick of the democrats, they were induced to attempt to escape, and were caught, and killed in batches. Thucydides comments on the whole story as a symptom of the terrible rancor which party spirit had generated in the Greek city-states.

427 B.C.

425 B.C.

**9. Nicias and Cleon. Politics at Athens.** — At this time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, held the chief place as a military authority at Athens. A wealthy conservative slave-owner, who speculated in the silver mines of Laurion, he was one of the mainstays of that party which was bitterly opposed to the new politicians like Cleon. He would have been an excellent subordinate officer, but he had not the qualities of a leader or a statesman. Yet he possessed a solid and abiding influence at Athens through his impregnable respectability, his superiority to bribes, and his scrupulous superstition, as well as his acquaintance with the details of military affairs. He understood the political value of gratifying in small ways those prejudices of his fellow-citizens which he shared himself; and he spared no expense in the religious service of the state. He had an opportunity of displaying his religious devotion and his liberality on the occasion of the purification of the island of

426 B.C.

Delos, which was probably undertaken to induce Apollo to stay the plague. The dead were removed from all the tombs, and it was ordained that henceforth no one should die or give birth to a child on the sacred island.


An important feature in the political history of Athens in these years was the divorce of the military command from the leadership in the Assembly. The tradesmen who swayed the Assembly had no military training or capacity, and they were always at a disadvantage when opposed by men who spoke with the authority of a strategos on questions of military policy. Until recent years the post of general had been practically confined to men of property and good family. But a change ensued, perhaps soon after the death of Pericles, and men of the people were elected. Cleon was a man of brains and resolution. He was ambitious to rule the state as Pericles had ruled it; and for this purpose he saw clearly that he must gain triumphs in the field as well as in the Assembly. If he was to exercise a permanent influence on the administration, he must be ready, when a good opportunity offered, to undertake the post of strategos; and, supported by the experience of an able colleague, he need not disgrace himself. Such a colleague he might find in Demosthenes, an enterprising commander, who had recently distinguished himself by successful warfare in Ambracia.

**10. The Athenian Capture of Pylos.** — It was doubtless through the influence of Cleon that Demosthenes, though he received no official command, was sent to accompany a fleet of forty ships which was ready to start for the west, under Eurymedon and Sophocles. We have already seen this fleet at Corcyra assisting the people against the oligarchical exiles who had established themselves on Mount Istone. Demosthenes had a plan in his head for establishing a military post in the western Peloponnesus; and, arriving off the coast of Messenia, he asked the commanders to put in at Pylos. But they had heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had already reached Corcyra, and demurred at any delay.

But chance favored the design of Demosthenes. Stress of weather drove them into the harbor of Pylos, and then Demosthenes pressed them to fortify the place. The commanders ridiculed the idea. But the stormy weather detained the ships; the soldiers were idle; and at length, for the sake of something to do, they adopted the project of Demosthenes and fell to the work of fortifying Pylos.

The promontory of Pylos was surrounded on three sides by the sea and protected on the harbor side by steep cliffs; only a low

sand bar connected it with the mainland. The point was easily defensible; and Demosthenes hastened to fortify the unprotected parts with rude walls. When the Spartans heard of this exploit of the Athenians, they sent a detachment of hoplites to check Demosthenes, and hastily summoned their fleet from Corcyra. Their object was to blockade Demosthenes and prevent Athenian reinforcements from landing. To accomplish this they landed a band of four hundred and twenty



SIEGES OF PYLOS AND SPHACTERIA

Spartans, each with his attendant Helot on the island of Sphacteria, which lies south of the promontory; in the meantime, they redoubled their attack upon Demosthenes.

In reply to urgent messages of Demosthenes, an Athenian fleet at last came up; and in a hotly fought action in the harbor defeated the Spartan fleet, and thus transformed the siege of Pylos into the blockade of Sphacteria. The Spartans, fearing that noth-

ing could be done for their countrymen on the island, asked a truce in order to send ambassadors to Athens. The Athenians agreed, but demanded the Spartan ships as a pledge of good faith.

The Assembly at Athens, under the influence of Cleon, made such high demands — the surrender of the harbors of Megara and several other places which they had lost — that the Spartans returned and prepared to renew the action. The Athenians, however, refused to restore the ships, on the pretext of some slight infraction of the truce, and the blockade continued. It proved a more difficult matter than the Athenians had hoped. Sphacteria was an exposed and dangerous coast for the fleet; and the Spartans, stimulating the Helots by offers of freedom, used every means to relieve the garrison.

At home the Athenians grew impatient. They were sorry they had declined the overtures of the Spartans, and there was a reaction against Cleon. That leader adopted a bold policy. He attacked the strategos, Nicias, asserting that he ought to sail and capture the island; and added boastfully, "I would do it myself if I were commander." Nicias took him at his word, and Cleon was forced to make good his boast. Cleon, however, took the precaution to select Demosthenes as his colleague and to take an overwhelming force of hoplites and a large number of light-armed troops. Landing these one night, he succeeded in driving the Spartans to one end of the island, where they were surrounded and forced to surrender to a man.

Cleon had performed his promise; he brought back the captives within twenty days. The success was of political rather than military importance. The Athenians could indeed ravage Lacedæmonian territory from Pylos, but it was a greater thing that they had in the prisoners a security against future invasions of Attica and a means of making an advantageous peace when they chose. It was the most important success gained in the war. In the following year, Nicias captured the island of Cythera, from which he was able to make descents upon Laconia. The loss of



Cythera was in itself more serious for Sparta than the loss of Pylos; but owing to the attendant circumstances, the earlier event made far greater stir.

429 B.C. **II. Athenian Expedition to Bœotia. Delium.** — In each of the first seven years of the war, Attica was invaded, except twice; on one occasion the attack on Plataea had taken the place of the incursion into Attica, and, on another, the Peloponnesian army was hindered by earthquakes from advancing beyond the Isthmus. Every year, by way of reply, the Athenians invaded the Megarid twice, in spring and in autumn. The capture of Pylos induced them to undertake a bolder enterprise against Megara. This enterprise was organized by the generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates. They succeeded in capturing the post of Nisæa, and the Long Walls, and they would have taken Megara itself but for the arrival of the Spartan general, Brasidas, with whom they feared to risk an engagement.

426 B.C.

The recovery of Nisæa, which had been lost by the Thirty Years' Peace, was a solid success, and it seemed to the ambitious hopes of the two generals who had achieved it the first step in the recovery of all the former conquests of their city. Hippocrates and Demosthenes induced Athens to strive to win back Bœotia, which she had lost at Coronea.

A triple attack was planned. On the southwest Demosthenes was to make an inroad from the Corinthian Gulf, while Chæronæa, in the extreme west, was to be seized by domestic conspirators; and on the same day Hippocrates, with an Athenian army, was to enter Bœotia from the northeast, and capture Delium. The design, however, was betrayed, and the Bœotians, checking the landing of Demosthenes, and frustrating the plot at Chæronæa, made a general levy to oppose the army of Hippocrates.

424 B.C. Hippocrates, however, had time to reach and fortify Delium. He had a force of 7000 hoplites and over 20,000 light-armed troops. A trench, with a strong rampart and palisade, was drawn round the temple; and the army then left Delium, to return home.

But about a mile from Delium, they were suddenly attacked by the Bœotarch Pagondas. His army consisted of 7000 hoplites — the same number as that of the enemy — 1000 cavalry, and over 10,000 light-armed men. The Thebans occupied the right wing in the unique formation of a mass twenty-five shields deep; the other contingents varied in depth. The Athenian line was formed with the uniform and regular depth of eight shields. The extreme parts of the wings never met, for watercourses lay between them.



CAMPAIGNS IN BŒOTIA

But the rest pushed shield against shield, and fought fiercely. On the right the Athenians were victorious, but on the left they could not sustain the enormous pressure of the massed Theban force. But even the victory on the right was made of no effect through the sudden appearance of a squadron of cavalry, which Pagondas, seeing the situation, had sent unobserved round the hill. The Athenians thought it was the vanguard of another army, and fled. Hippocrates was slain, and the army completely dispersed.

The battle of Delium confirmed the verdict of Coronea. Athens could not hope to be mistress of Bœotia.

**12. The War in Thrace. Athens loses Amphipolis. Brasidas.** — The defeat of Delium eclipsed the prestige of Athens, but did not seriously impair her strength. Yet it was a fatal year; and a much greater blow was dealt her in her Thracian dominion.

Perdiccas, the shifty king of Macedonia, played a double game between Athens and Sparta. At one time he helped the Chalcidians against Athens; at another he sided with Athens against her revolted allies. He and the Chalcidians (of Olynthus) feared that the success of Pylos might be followed by an increased activity of the Athenians in Thrace, and they sent an embassy to Sparta, requesting help, and expressing a wish that Brasidas might be the commander of whatever auxiliary force should be sent. No Spartans went, but seven hundred Helots were armed as hoplites. Having obtained some Peloponnesian recruits, and having incidentally, as we have already seen, saved Megara, Brasidas marched northward.

Brasidas was a Spartan by mistake. He had nothing in common with his fellows, except personal bravery, which was the least of his virtues. He had a restless energy and spirit of enterprise, which received small encouragement from the slow and hesitating authorities of his country. He had an oratorical ability which distinguished him above the Lacedæmonians, who were notoriously unready of speech. He was free from political prejudices, and always showed himself tolerant, just, and moderate in dealing with political questions. Besides this, he was simple and straightforward; men knew that they could trust his word implicitly. But the quality which most effectually contributed to his brilliant career, and perhaps most strikingly belied his Spartan origin, was his power of winning popularity abroad and making himself personally liked by strangers.

His own tact and rapid movements, as well as the influence of Perdiccas, enabled Brasidas to march through Thessaly, which

was by no means well disposed to the Lacedæmonians. Hurrying through Macedonia he reached the Chalcidice, and having secured Acanthus and the other Greek towns, he made an attempt on Amphipolis, the most important of the Athenian possessions in that region. This city, owing to the neglect of the generals Thucydides and Eucles, surrendered to Brasidas, and the command of the peninsula was lost to the Athenians.

Having secured the Strymon, Brasidas retraced his steps and subdued the small towns on the high eastern tongue of Chalcidice, and gained possession of Torone, the strongest city of Sithonia.

**13. Negotiations for Peace.** — In the meantime, the Athenians had taken no measures to check the victorious winter-campaign of Brasidas. The disaster of Delium had disheartened them, and rendered the citizens unwilling to undertake fresh toil in Thrace; for in Grecian history we must steadfastly keep in view that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers. Further, the peace party, especially represented by the generals Nicias and Laches, took advantage of this depression to work in the direction of peace. The Lacedæmonians, on their part, were more deliberately set on peace than the Athenians. Their anxiety to recover the Sphacterian captives increased, and on the other hand they desired to put an end to the career of Brasidas in Chalcidice. They wished to take advantage of the considerable successes he had already won, to extort favorable conditions from Athens before any defeat should undo or reverse his triumphs. Nor was the news of his exploits received at Sparta with unmixed feelings of pleasure; they were rather regarded with jealousy and distrust. Accordingly, the two states agreed on a truce for a



CAMPAIGNS OF BRASIDAS

March,  
423 B.C.

year, which would give them time to arrange quietly and at leisure the conditions of a permanent peace.

But by the end of the year there was a marked change in public feeling at Athens, and the influence of Cleon was again in the ascendant. He adopted the principle of Pericles that Athens must maintain her empire unimpaired, and he saw that this could not be done without energetic opposition to the progress of Brasidas in Thrace. When the truce expired, Cleon was able to carry a resolution that an expedition should be made to reconquer Amphipolis.

March,  
422 B.C.

**14. Battle of Amphipolis.** — Cleon set sail with thirty ships, bearing twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, and three hundred Athenian cavalry, as well as allies. He gained a considerable success at the outset by taking Torone and capturing the Lacedæmonian governor; Brasidas arrived too late to relieve it. Cleon went on to the mouth of the Strymon and made Eion his headquarters, intending to wait there until he had augmented his army by reënforcements.

Brasidas, meanwhile, was encamped on the other side of the Strymon on a hill above Amphipolis. Cleon, whose men grumbled at inaction, moved on a reconnaissance close to the walls of Amphipolis, and only then detected the fact that Brasidas, at sight of his movement, had slipped into the city and was preparing to attack. A retreat was ordered, but carelessly carried out; and Brasidas, suddenly charging at the head of one hundred and fifty hoplites, threw the whole column into disorder. Cleon fled with his men, and was shot down in flight. But elsewhere there was resistance, and in the confusion Brasidas received his death wound. He only lived long enough to be assured of a victory, which his death had practically converted into a defeat. The people of Amphipolis gave him the honors of a hero. Sacrifices were offered to Brasidas, and yearly games celebrated in his honor.

**15. The Peace of Nicias.** — The death of Brasidas removed the chief obstacle to peace; for no man was competent or disposed to

resume his large designs in Thrace. The defeat and death of Cleon gave a free hand to Nicias and the peace party. Negotiations were protracted during autumn and winter, and the peace was definitely concluded about the end of March. The peace, of which Nicias and the Spartan king Pleistoanax were the chief authors, was fixed for a term of fifty years. Athens undertook to restore all the posts which she had occupied during the war against the Peloponnesians, including Pylos and Cythera. But she insisted upon retaining Sollion and Anactorion, ports on the Acarnanian seaboard commanding the communications with Corcyra, and the port of Nisæa. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis and to relinquish Acanthus and other cities in Thrace. All captives on both sides were to be liberated. 421 B.C.

When the terms were considered at Sparta by a meeting of deputies of the Peloponnesian allies, Corinth was indignant at the surrender of Sollion and Anactorion; Megara was furious that Nisæa should be abandoned to the enemy; and Bœotia was unwilling to hand over Panacton, a fortress in Mount Cithæron which she had recently occupied. Yet Athens could hardly have demanded less. The consequence was that the peace was only partial; those allies which were politically of most consequence refused to accept it, and they were joined by Elis; the diplomacy of Nicias was a complete failure, so far as it aimed at compassing an abiding peace.

#### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 86, Sections 27 *a*, *b*)

(References to more extended histories for the topics treated in this and the next chapter are too long and detailed: it is therefore advised that what supplementary reading be done, be from the sources.)

Harrison, *Greece*, 411-429, gives a spirited account of the period, and Holm, II, 306-349, a moderately detailed one.



**Sources.** Topics from Thucydides. (1) Arguments of Athens and Corinth before the Spartan Assembly, I, 68-78. (2) Funeral Oration of Pericles, II, 34-46. (3) The Plague at Athens, II, 47-54. (4) The Affair at Pylos, IV, 5-41. (5) The Debate concerning Mytilene, III, 37-50.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE DECLINE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

**1. New Political Combinations with Argos.** — The Peace of Nicias was a complete failure. Not only did the Corinthians and the other chief allies refuse to accede to it, but the signatories found themselves unable to carry out the terms they had agreed upon. The Chalcidians refused to surrender Amphipolis, and the Spartans could not compel them. Athens, therefore, justly declined to surrender the Sphacterian prisoners. Sparta, impatient at all costs to recover them, conceived the device of entering into a defensive alliance with their old enemy. This proposal, warmly supported by Nicias, was accepted, and the captives were at length restored, — Athens still retaining Pylos and Cythera. The alliance was a mistake for Athens; she gained nothing by it, and surrendered the best security she had for the fulfillment of the terms of the peace. This agreement between Sparta and Athens led directly to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian league. Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis not only considered themselves deserted by their leader, Sparta, but apprehended that, secured by her alliance with Athens, she would have a free hand in the Peloponnesus and would exercise her power despotically. Accordingly, at the instigation of Corinth, these Peloponnesian states formed an alliance with Argos, who now enters upon the scene. The Chalcidians of Thrace joined; and thus the two great states of Greece stood face to face with a league which refused to recognize the Peace of Nicias.

**2. Renewal of the War. Alcibiades.** — In the following year, 420 B.C. these unstable political combinations were upset by the advent of a new force at Athens. Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, joined the demo-

cratic party, to which, as kinsman of Pericles, he was hereditarily bound. Young and rich, he united extraordinary beauty and talents to a love of ostentation and an insolence which shocked his fellow-citizens. His bravery he had shown, fighting at Delium, where his life was saved by his friend Socrates, the philosopher. This celebrated friendship between men, at every point the opposite of each other, save in talent and courage, was of use to the young statesman as an intellectual training. But Alcibiades was a statesman with no belief in the principles of his party. Only, at present, he saw his way to power through war and conquest, and therefore opposed the peace party.

Meanwhile, an anti-Athenian war-party had grown at Sparta, and was seeking to bring about an alliance with Argos. To counteract this, Alcibiades conceived the idea of a league among the democracies, and negotiated an alliance with Argos and her allies, Elis and Mantinea, to last for a hundred years. In the following summer, this alliance contrived to exclude Lacedæmonians from the Olympian games, on the ground that they had violated the sacred truce by an attack on Lepreon: and Alcibiades won the chariot-race. Thus his power and popularity grew, while Athens and Sparta were estranged, though the Peace of Nicias was not formally broken.

In the following spring, Alcibiades induced the Argives to attack the territory of Epidaurus, but he could not induce the Athenians to support her ally in adequate force. Sparta, in retaliation, sent an army under Agis into Argos. The Argive troops confronted Agis in the plain near Memea, and both generals seem to have been uncertain of the result, for instead of fighting, they made a truce for four months. On both sides there was an outcry, and Alcibiades, arriving at Argos with an army under Laches and Nicostratus, persuaded the allies to disregard the truce.

At length, a great battle was fought near Mantinea. The numbers must have approached ten thousand on each side. The Lacedæmonians were victorious, after a moment of uncertainty,

420 B.C.

419 B.C.

418 B.C.

when one thousand Argives broke through a gap in their line. Both Laches and Nicostratus fell. The victory did much to restore the prestige of Sparta, which had dwindled since the disaster of Sphacteria. It also transformed the situation in the Peloponnesus. The democracy at Argos was replaced by an oligarchy, and the alliance with Athens was abandoned for an alliance with Sparta. Mantinea, Elis, and the Achæan towns also went over to the victor. Athens was again isolated.

**3. First Operations in Sicily.** — During the fifth century the eyes of Athenian statesmen often wandered to western Greece beyond the seas. Alliance was formed with Segesta, and subsequently with Leontini and Rhegium. One general object of Athens was to support the Ionian cities against the Dorian, and especially against Syracuse, the daughter and friend of Corinth. In 427 B.C. Leontini sent an embassy to Athens appearing for help against Syracuse, who threatened her independence. Nearly all the Dorian cities were with Syracuse, while Leontini was supported by Rhegium, Catane, Naxos, and Camarina. An expedition was sent out under Laches, which induced Messana to join the Athenian league, but effected little else. Another fleet, despatched in 425 B.C. under Eurymedon and Sophocles, was detained by the affairs of Pylos and Corcyra so long that Messana revolted before its arrival. Shortly afterward, however, a sedition in Leontini gave an opportunity, and the city was annexed to Syracuse. It became clear that Syracuse merely wanted a free hand for despotism, and Athens was again asked to intervene, but did not move seriously until she had conquered the island of Melos, which was added to her empire in 416.

In that year there arrived at Athens an appeal for help from Segesta, which was at war with Selinus, and from the Leontine exiles. Athens sent envoys to Sicily, for the purpose of reporting on the resources of Segesta, which had undertaken to provide the expenses of the war. The ambassadors returned with glowing stories of the untold wealth of the people of Segesta. Nicias wisely 416 B.C.

opposed the expedition. The people, however, elated by their recent triumph over Melos, were fascinated by the idea of making new conquests in a distant, unfamiliar world. But having committed the imprudence of not listening to Nicias, the people went on to commit the graver blunder of electing him as a commander of the expedition which he disapproved. He was appointed as general along with Alcibiades and Lamachus.



COIN OF SELINUS,  
FIFTH CENTURY  
(OBSERVE). RIVER  
HYPSAS SACRIFICING AT AL-  
TAR; SNAKE  
ROUND THE AL-  
TAR; LAKE BIRD;  
LEAF OF SELI-  
NON [LEGEND :  
HYΨΑΣ]

415 B.C.

**4. The Sicilian Expedition.**—When the expedition was ready to sail, a mysterious event delayed it. One morning in May it was found that the square stone figures which stood at the entrance of temples and private houses in Athens, and were known as Hermæ, had been mutilated. The enemies of Alcibiades seized the occasion and tried to implicate him in the outrage. Alcibiades demanded

the right of clearing himself from the charge, before the fleet started; but his enemies procured the postponement of his trial till his return. The fleet then set sail. Thucydides says that no armament so magnificent had ever before been sent out by a single Greek state. There were 134 triremes, and an immense number of smaller attendant vessels; there were 5100 hoplites; and the total number of combatants was well over 30,000.

A halt was made at Rhegium, where disappointments awaited them. Rhegium adopted a reserved attitude which the Athenians did not expect. In the next place, the Athenians had relied on the wealth of Segesta for supporting their expedition, and they now learned that the Segestæans, collecting all the plate they could get from their own and other cities, had passed the same service from house to house and led the envoys to believe that each of the hosts who sumptuously entertained them possessed a magnificent service of his own.

This discovery was a serious blow, but no one, not even Nicias, seems to have thought of giving up the enterprise. A council of war was held at Rhegium. Nicias proposed to sail about, make some demonstrations, secure anything that could be secured without trouble, and give any help to the Leontines that could be given without danger. Alcibiades proposed that active attempts should be made to win over the Sicilian cities by diplomacy, and that then, having so strengthened their position, they should take steps to force Selinus and Syracuse to do right by Segesta and Leontini. But Lamachus regarded the situation from a soldier's point of view. He advised that Syracuse should be attacked at once, while her citizens were still unprepared. Fortunately for Syracuse, Lamachus had no influence or authority except on the field; and, failing to convince his colleagues, he gave his vote to the plan of Alcibiades.

Naxos and Catane were won over; the Athenian fleet made a demonstration in the Great Harbor of Syracuse and captured a ship. But nothing more had been done, when a mandate arrived from Athens recalling Alcibiades, to stand his trial for impiety. The people of Athens had reverted to their state of religious agony over the mutilation of the Hermæ, and the investigations led to the exposure of other profanations, especially of travesties of the Eleusinian mysteries, in which Alcibiades was involved. The trireme "Salaminia" was sent to summon him to return. He went with the *Salaminia* as far as Thurii, where he made his escape and went into voluntary exile. The Athenians condemned him to death, along with some of his kinsfolk, and confiscated his property.

In Sicily, when Alcibiades had gone, the rest of the year was frittered away in a number of small enterprises, which led to nothing. At length, when winter came, the Syracusan army was lured to Catane for the purpose of making an attack on the Athenian camp, which they were led to believe they would take unawares, while, in the meantime, the Athenian host had gone on board the fleet and

415 B.C.



sailed off to the Great Harbor of Syracuse, where Nicias landed. When the Syracusans returned, a battle was fought, the first battle of war, and the Athenians were victorious. A success had been gained, but on the day ensuing, Nicias ordered the whole army to embark and sail back to Catane. He had numbers of excellent reasons — the winter season, the want of cavalry, of money, of allies; and, in the meantime, Syracuse was left to make her preparations.


**5. Treachery of Alcibiades.**—It seemed, indeed, as if a fatality dogged Athens. Alcibiades and Lamachus, without Nicias, would probably have captured Syracuse. But, not content with the unhappy appointment of Nicias, she must go on to pluck the whole soul out of the enterprise by depriving it of Alcibiades. That active diplomatist now threw as much energy into the work of ruining the expedition as he had given to the work of organizing it. He went to Sparta, and was present at the Assembly which received a Syracusan embassy, begging for Spartan help. There he urged the Spartans to take two measures: to send at once a Spartan general to Sicily to organize the defense, and to fortify Decelea in Attica, a calamity which the Athenians were always dreading. The speech of this powerful advocate turned the balance at a most critical point in the history of Hellas. The Lacedæmonians were decided by his advice, and appointed an officer named Gylippus to take command of the Syracusan forces. Corinth, too, sent ships to the aid of her daughter-city.

**6. The Siege of Syracuse.** — The city of Syracuse extended from the island (Ortygia), which had been joined with the mainland, back to the heights (Epipolæ) on the north. By a sudden and unexpected movement the Athenians succeeded in capturing, almost without a blow, these heights, and thus held a commanding position over the city. It was their plan to run two walls from the Epipolæ; one to the north to the Bay of Thapsos, the other southward to the Great Harbor, and thus having cut off Syracuse from aid by land to bring their fleet into action and close the Great

Harbor. The Syracusans, in vain attempting to check the building of these walls, at length began to build counterwalls. Frequent engagements occurred; and in one of these the Syracusans inflicted an irreparable injury on their opponents by killing Lamachus. But the Athenians were able to push their works steadily southward until Syracuse, despairing of resistance, offered to make terms.

### 7. Spartan Intervention.

— But all thoughts of surrender vanished when it was learned that some Corinthian ships were on their way to aid Syracuse, and with them was coming Gylippus, a Spartan general. Gylippus landed on the northern side of the island, collected a force at Himera, and, through the carelessness of Nicias, entered the city from the north. He now took command and directed the Syracusans to attack the northern Athenian wall, which was as yet unfinished; and to build counterworks to prevent the Athenians from carrying their wall to the sea. In this he was successful, and the Athenians were forced to abandon all hope of investing Syracuse. In the meantime, the Spartans had acted on the advice of Alcibiades, and had seized and fortified Decelea; thus giving them a base from which they could ravage Attica. The plan was successful; Attica could not be cultivated,



THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE

and Athens was forced to depend for her supplies upon her fleet. In spite of their dangerous position, the Assembly listened to the pleas of Nicias and sent a second large expedition to Syracuse under Eurymedon and Demosthenes.

**8. The Defeat of the Athenians.** — When Demosthenes arrived, he saw that his hope lay in capturing the Syracusan wall. In his attempts to do this he was defeated, and advised a retreat. But before this could be accomplished, the Syracusan fleet offered battle in the harbor and won such a decisive victory that they were able to close the harbor mouth. To break their barricade of ships the Athenian fleet and army put forth all their strength. They were unsuccessful; were driven back into the middle of the harbor, and then to the shore. All that remained was to retreat overland, and even this hope was slight, as the Syracusans had fortified the passes. Still the army attempted it, and for over a week the wretched force straggled along. At length, after Demosthenes had been surrounded and forced to surrender, Nicias, to save, if possible, the lives of his once splendid army, surrendered. The prisoners were most harshly treated. After being confined in the stone quarries for seventy days, they were sold as slaves. The expedition had failed; Syracuse had not been conquered. But Athens suffered more than loss of mere prestige, for the lives and the treasure she had vainly expended permanently weakened her in her struggle with her great rival Sparta.

**9. The Revolt of Allies.** — After the Sicilian disaster Athens felt the need of a change in her administration. The Lacedæmonian post at Decelea stopped cultivation, and forced the closing of the silver mines at Laurion, thus cutting off a main source of revenue. It was perceived that a smaller and more permanent body than the Council of Five Hundred was needed, and accordingly the government was intrusted for the time to a board of Ten, named *Probuli*. At the same time the tribute levied from allies was abolished, and replaced by a tax of five per cent on all sea-borne exports and imports at the harbors of the Confederacy,

including Piræus. Thus Athens put herself on a level with her allies in the matter of taxation.

But reforms did not avert danger. All of Greece was eager to spring on Athens, and her subject allies sent to Sparta declaring their willingness to revolt. Thus Sparta was forced into a naval policy, and decided to equip a fleet. Athens also spent the winter in ship-building. At the same time Persia entered again on the stage of Greek history, with the object of regaining the coast cities of Asia Minor, by playing off one Greek power against another. Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, and Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, sent messengers urging Sparta to action and promising alliance, in order to wrest from Athens her Asiatic dominions. The revolt was begun by Chios, when a few Spartan ships appeared; Miletus, Teos, Lebedus, Mytilene, and others 412 B.C. quickly joined.

This successful beginning led to the treaty of Miletus between Sparta and Persia. In the hope of humbling to the dust her detested rival, the city of Leonidas now sold to the barbarian the freedom of her fellow-Greeks of Asia. Sparta recognized the right of the Great King to all the dominion which belonged to him and his forefathers, and he undertook to supply the pay for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet operating on the Asiatic coast, while the war with Athens lasted. The treaty of Miletus opened up a path in Greek politics, which was to lead the Persian king to the position of arbiter of Hellas.

Meanwhile, Athens had sent out a fleet which devastated Chios and won back Lesbos. But Cnidus and Rhodes joined the revolt, and by the beginning of 411 she held on the west coast of Asia little but Lesbos, Samos, Cos, and Halicarnassus. Her empire in Thrace and on the Hellespont was intact, but she was opposed by a strong Peloponnesian fleet with a reënforcement from Sicily



COIN OF CNIDUS  
(OBSERVE). HEAD  
OF APHRODITE

subsidized by Persia. Yet dissension had arisen between Sparta and the Persians. Alcibiades was intriguing — first at Miletus and then at Sardis — with Tissaphernes. King Agis of Sparta was his enemy, his life was unsafe, and his object was to break the alliance between Persia and the enemies of Athens, and so pave the way for his restoration to his own country.

#### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 86, Section 27 *b*, 1)

**I.** The Sicilian Expedition.

Harrison, 444-458. Bury, 466-484. Holm, II, xxvii.

**Sources.** The account in Thucydides is too long to be used in its entirety, but may well be divided and assigned to sections of the class, as suggested in the Syllabus. Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*; *Life of Alcibiades* (first part).

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

**1. The Oligarchic Revolution.** — At Athens in these months there was distress, fear, and discontent. The opportunity for which the oligarchs had waited so long had come at last. There was a fair show of reason for arguing that the foreign policy had been mismanaged by the democracy, and that men of education and knowledge had not a sufficient influence on the conduct of affairs. The chief of those who desired to see the establishment of a moderate policy — neither an extreme democracy nor an oligarchy, but partaking of both — was Theramenes. The extreme oligarchs were ready in the first instance to act in concert with the moderate party for the purpose of upsetting the democracy. The soul of the plot was Antiphon, an eloquent orator. Other active conspirators were Pisander and Phrynichus, who was one of the commanders of the fleet stationed at Samos. The movement was favored by the Probuli and by most of the officers of the fleet. Moreover, Alcibiades had entered into negotiations with the officers at Samos, promising to secure an alliance with Tissaphernes, but representing the abolition of democracy as a necessary condition.

It was voted that Pisander and other envoys should be sent to negotiate a treaty with Tissaphernes and arrange matters with Alcibiades. But it appeared at once that Alcibiades had promised more than he could perform. There had, indeed, been a serious rupture between Tissaphernes and Sparta. But when it came to a question of union with Athens, Tissaphernes proposed impossible conditions to the Athenian envoys, and then made a new treaty with the Spartans. But this failure altered nothing. Men



were convinced that some change in the constitution was inevitable. The news that Abydus and Lampsacus had revolted may have hastened the final act. A decree was passed that the Probuli and twenty others chosen by the people should form a commission of thirty who should jointly devise proposals for the safety of the state, and lay them before the Assembly on a fixed day. When the day came, a radical change was brought forward and carried. The sovereign Assembly was to consist in future, not of the whole people, but of a body of about Five Thousand, those who were strongest physically and financially. Pay for almost all public offices was to be abolished. To these revolutionary measures a saving clause was attached: they were to remain in force "as long as the war lasts."

When the Five Thousand were elected, they chose a commission of one hundred men to draw up a constitution. The commission thus chosen devised a constitution, but they also enacted that the state should be administered by a Council of Four Hundred till the constitution should be established. The Four Hundred were instituted as merely a provisional government, but the entire administration was placed in their hands, the management of the finances, and the appointment of the magistrates. The Five Thousand were to meet only when summoned by the Four Hundred, so that the Assembly ceased to have any significance, and the provisional constitution was an unadulterated oligarchy.

**2. Fall of the Four Hundred. The Democracy Restored.**—For more than three months the Four Hundred governed the city with a high hand, and then they were overthrown. The sailors in the fleet at Samos rose against the oligarchic officers: the chief leaders of this reaction were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Assembly, which had been abolished at Athens, was called into being at Samos, and the army, representing the Athenian people, deposed the generals and elected others. They hoped still to obtain the alliance of Persia, through the good offices of Alcibiades, whose recall and pardon were

formally voted. Thrasybulus fetched Alcibiades to Samos, and he was elected a general, but the hoped-for alliance with Persia was not effected. Negotiations were begun with the oligarchs at Athens, and Alcibiades expressed himself satisfied with the Assembly of Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be abolished. There was a cleavage in the Four Hundred, the extreme oligarchs on one side, led by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the moderate reformers on the other, led by Theramenes. While the moderates accepted gladly the proposals of the army at Samos, the extreme party looked to the enemy for support and sent envoys to Sparta for the purpose of concluding a peace. In the meantime, they fortified Eetionea, the mole which formed the northern side of the entrance to the Great Harbor of Piræus. The object was to command the entrance so as to be able either to admit the Lacedæmonians or to exclude the fleet of Samos.

When the envoys returned from Sparta without having made terms, the movement against the oligarchs took shape. Phrynichus was slain by foreign assassins in the market-place. The soldiers who were employed in building the fort at Eetionea were instigated by Theramenes to declare against the oligarchy, and, after a great tumult at the Piræus, the walls of the fort were pulled down. When the agitation subsided, peaceable negotiations with the Four Hundred ensued. A day was fixed for an Assembly to discuss a settlement. But on the very day, just as the Assembly was about to meet, a Lacedæmonian squadron appeared off the coast of Salamis. Eubœa was threatened, and the Athenians depended entirely on Eubœa, now that they had lost Attica. The Athenians sent thirty-six ships to Eretria, where they were forced to fight at once and were utterly defeated. Eubœa then revolted.

Sept., 411 B.C.

Athens now had no reserve of ships, the army at Samos was hostile; Eubœa, from which she derived her supplies, was lost, and there was feud and sedition in the city. But the Lacedæmonians let the opportunity slip. An Assembly in the Pnyx deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be placed in the

hands of a body consisting of all those who could furnish themselves with arms, which body should be called the Five Thousand. Legislators (*nomothetæ*) were appointed to draw up the details of the constitution. Most of the oligarchs escaped to Decelea, but Antiphon was executed.

**3. The Restored Democracy. Cyzicus.** — The chief promoter of the new constitution was Theramenes, who, from the very beginning, desired to organize a government, with democracy and oligarchy duly mixed. His acquiescence in a temporary oligarchy was a mere matter of necessity; and the nickname of *Cothurnus* — the loose buskin that fits either foot — given to him by the oligarchs was not deserved.

The Peloponnesians were now vigorously assisted by Pharnabazus, who was a far more valuable and trustworthy ally than Tissaphernes. In the spring, Mindarus laid siege to Cyzicus, and the satrap supported him with an army. The Athenian fleet of eighty-six ships succeeded in passing the Hellespont unseen, and in three divisions, under Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasybulus, took Mindarus by surprise. After a hard-fought battle both by land and sea, the Athenians were entirely victorious, Mindarus was slain, and about sixty triremes were taken or sunk. A laconic despatch, announcing the defeat to the Spartan ephors, was intercepted by the Athenians: "Our success is over; Mindarus is slain; the men are starving; we know not what to do." Sparta immediately made proposals of peace to Athens, but the overtures were rejected.

The victory of Cyzicus enabled the democratic party at Athens to upset the organization of Theramenes and restore the old constitution. The years following the victory were marked by operations in the Propontis and its neighborhood. The Athenians, under the able and strenuous leadership of Alcibiades, slowly gained ground, till Athens once more completely commanded the Bosphorus. Nearer home, Athens lost Nisæa to the Megarians; and Pylos was at length recovered by Sparta.

410 B.C.

409 B.C.

**4. Cyrus and Lysander.** — But the affairs of the west had begun to engage the attention of the Great King, Darius, who, aware that the jealousy of the two satraps hindered an effective policy, sent down his younger son Cyrus to take the place of Tissaphernes at Sardis, with jurisdiction over Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Lydia. The government of Tissaphernes was confined to Caria. The arrival of Cyrus on the scene marks a new turning-point in the progress of the war. 407 B.C.

Prince Cyrus was zealous, but his zeal might have been of little use, were it not for the simultaneous appointment of a new Spartan admiral. This was Lysander, who was destined to bring the long war to its close. He gained the confidence of his seamen by his care for their interests, and he won much influence over Cyrus by being absolutely proof against the temptation of bribes, — a quality at which an Oriental greatly marveled. In prosecuting the aims of his ambition Lysander was perfectly unscrupulous, and he was a skillful diplomatist as well as an able general.

**5. Return of Alcibiades. Battles of Notion and the Arginusæ Islands.** — While Cyrus and Lysander were negotiating, Alcibiades, after an exile of eight years, had returned to his native city. He had been elected strategos, and had received an enthusiastic welcome. The citizens trusted in his capacity as a general, and they thought that by his diplomatic skill they might still be able to come to terms with Persia. So a decree was passed, giving him full powers for the conduct of the war, and he was solemnly freed from the curse which rested upon him as profaner of the Eleusinian rites. He had an opportunity of making his peace with the divinities of Eleusis. Ever since the occupation of Decelea, which he had done so much to bring about, the annual procession from Athens along the Sacred Way to the Eleusinian shrine had been suspended. Under the auspices of Alcibiades, who protected the



COIN OF ELEUSIS (REVERSE).  
PIG ON TORCH;  
PIG'S HEAD  
AND IVY LEAF  
BELOW [LE-  
GEND: ΕΑΕΥΣΙ]

407 B.C.

procession by an escort of troops, the solemnity was once more celebrated in the usual way. But a slight incident completely changed the current of feeling in Athens. An Athenian fleet was at Notion, keeping guard on Ephesus, and Lysander succeeded in defeating it and capturing fifteen ships. Though Alcibiades was not present at the battle, he was responsible, and he lost his prestige at Athens. New generals were appointed immediately, and Alcibiades withdrew to a castle on the Hellespont. Conon succeeded him in the chief command of the navy.

406 B.C.

The Peloponnesians during the following winter organized a fleet of greater strength than they had had for many years — 140 ships; but Lysander had to make place for a new admiral, Callicratidas. Conon, who had only 70 ships, was forced into a battle outside Mytilene and lost 30 triremes in the action. The remainder were blockaded in the harbor of Mytilene. The situation was critical, and Athens did not underrate the danger. The gold and silver dedications in the temples of the Acropolis were melted to defray the costs of a new armament; and at the end of a month Athens and her allies sent a fleet of 150 triremes to relieve Mytilene. Callicratidas, who had now 170 ships, left 50 to maintain the blockade and sailed with the rest to meet the foe. A great battle was fought near the islets of the Arginusæ, south of Lesbos, and the Athenians were victorious. Seventy Spartan ships were sunk or taken, and Callicratidas was slain.

The success had not been won without a certain sacrifice; twenty-five ships had been lost with their crews. It was believed that many of the men, floating about on the wreckage, might have been saved. The generals were suspended from their office, and summoned to render an account of their conduct. Probably there had been criminal negligence somewhere, and the natural emotion of indignation which the people felt betrayed them into committing a crime themselves. The question was judged by the Assembly, and not by the ordinary courts. Two sittings were held, and the eight generals who had been present at Arginusæ



were condemned to death and confiscation of property. Six, including Thrasyllus and Pericles, son of the great statesman, were executed; the other two had prudently kept out of the way.

The victory of Arginusæ restored to the Athenians the command of the eastern Ægean, and induced the Lacedæmonians to repeat their propositions of peace. Through the influence of the demagogue Cleophon, who is said to have come into the Assembly drunk, the offer was rejected. Nothing was left for the Spartans but to reorganize their fleet. It was generally felt that if further Persian coöperation was to be secured and the Peloponnesian cause to be restored, the command of the fleet must again be intrusted to Lysander. But there was a law at Sparta that no man could be admiral a second time. On this occasion the law was evaded by sending Lysander out as secretary, but on the understanding that the actual command lay with him and not with the nominal admiral. An unlooked-for event gave him still greater power and prestige. King Darius was very ill, his death was expected, and Cyrus was called to his bedside. During his absence, Cyrus intrusted to his friend Lysander the administration of his satrapy and the tribute. He knew that money was no temptation to this exceptional Spartan, and he feared to trust such power to a Persian noble.

**6. The Battle of Ægosspotami.** — With these resources behind him, Lysander speedily proved his ability. He sailed to the Hellespont and laid siege to Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet of one hundred and eighty ships reunited and followed him thither, and anchored at Ægosspotami, "Goat's River." It was a bad position, as all the provisions had to be fetched from Sestus at a distance of about two miles, while the Peloponnesian fleet was in an excellent harbor with a well-supplied town behind. Sailing across the strait, the Athenians found the enemy drawn up for battle, but under orders not to move until they were attacked, and in such a strong position that an attack would have been unwise. They were obliged to return to Ægosspotami. For four days the

405 B.C., end  
of summer



same thing happened. Each day the Athenian fleet sailed across the strait and endeavored to lure Lysander into an engagement; each day its efforts were fruitless. From his castle in the neighborhood Alcibiades descried the dangerous position of the Athenians, and riding over to Ægospotami earnestly counseled the generals to move to Sestus. His sound advice was received with coldness, perhaps with insult. When the fleet returned from its daily cruise to Lampsacus, the seamen used to disembark and scatter on the shore. On the fifth day Lysander sent scout ships, which, as soon as the Athenian crews had gone ashore for their meal, were to flash a bright shield as a signal. When the signal was given, the whole Peloponnesian squadron, consisting of about two hundred galleys, rowed rapidly across the strait and found the Athenian fleet defenseless. There was no battle, no resistance. Twenty ships, which were in a condition to fight, escaped; the remaining one hundred and sixty were captured at once. It was generally believed that there was treachery among the generals. All the Athenians who were taken, to the number of three or four thousand, were put to death. The chief commander, Conon, who was not among the unready, succeeded in getting away. It would have been madness for the responsible commander to return to Athens with the tidings of such a terrible disaster; and Conon, sending home twelve of the twenty triremes which had escaped, sailed himself with the rest to the protection of Evagoras, the king of Salamis, in Cyprus. Never was a decisive victory gained with such small sacrifice as that which Lysander gained at Ægospotami.

**7. Surrender of Athens.**—The tidings of ruin reached the Piræus at night, and “on that night not a man slept.” They had now to make preparations for sustaining a siege. But the blockade was deferred by the policy of Lysander. He did not intend to attack Athens, but to starve it into surrender. Having completed the subjugation of the Athenian empire in the Hellespont and Thrace, and ordered affairs in those regions, Lysander sailed at

length into the Saronic Gulf with one hundred and fifty ships, occupied Ægina, and blockaded the Piræus. At the same time the Spartan king Pausanias entered Attica, and, joining forces with Agis, encamped in the Academe, west of the city. But the walls were too strong to attack, and at the beginning of winter the army withdrew, while the fleet remained near the Piræus. As provisions began to fail, the Athenians made a proposal of peace, offering to resign their empire and become allies of Lacedæmon. The ephors refused to receive the envoys unless they brought more acceptable terms, including the demolition of the Long Walls for a length of ten stades. It was folly to resist, yet the Athenians resisted. The demagogue Cleophon, who had twice hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honor, now hindered it again. But the situation was hopeless. People were dying of famine, and the reaction of feeling had been marked by the execution of Cleophon. Theramenes was sent to Sparta with full powers. It is interesting to find that during these anxious months a decree was passed recalling to Athens an illustrious citizen — the historian Thucydides.

An assembly of the Peloponnesian allies was called together at Sparta to determine how they should deal with the fallen foe. The general sentiment was that no mercy should be shown; that Athens should be utterly destroyed and the whole people sold into slavery. But Sparta resolutely rejected the barbarous proposal of the confederacy; she would not blot out a Greek city which had done such noble services to Greece against the Persian invader. The terms of the peace were: the Long Walls and fortifications of the Piræus were to be destroyed; the Athenians lost all their foreign possessions, but remained independent, confined to Attica and Salamis; their whole fleet was forfeited; all exiles were allowed to return; Athens became the ally of Sparta, pledged to follow her leadership. When the terms were ratified, Lysander sailed into the Piræus. The demolition of the Long Walls immediately began. The Athenians and their conquerors together pulled them

April, 404 B.C.

down to the music of flute-players; and the jubilant allies thought that freedom had at length dawned for the Greeks.

It is not to be supposed that all Athenians were dejected and wretched at the terrible humiliation which had befallen their native city. There were numerous exiles who owed their return to her calamity; and the extreme oligarchical party rejoiced in the foreign occupation, regarding it as an opportunity for the subversion of the democracy. Theramenes looked forward to making a new attempt to introduce his favorite plan of government. Of the exiles, the most prominent and determined was Critias, a pupil of Gorgias and a companion of Socrates, an orator, a poet, and a philosopher. A combination was formed between the exiles and the home oligarchs; a common plan of action was organized; and the chief democratic leaders were presently seized and imprisoned. The intervention of Lysander was then invoked for the establishing of a new constitution, and, awed by his presence, the Assembly passed a measure that a body of Thirty should be nominated, for the purpose of drawing up laws and managing public affairs until the code should be completed. Critias and Theramenes were among the Thirty who were appointed.

**8. Rule of the Thirty.** — The first measures of the Thirty were to appoint a Council of Five Hundred, consisting of strong supporters of oligarchy, invested with the judicial functions which had before belonged to the people. The chief democrats, who on the fall of Athens had opposed the establishment of an oligarchy, were then seized, tried by the Council, and condemned to death for conspiracy. So far there was unanimity; but Theramenes and his party were opposed to the reign of terror which followed. The Thirty had announced as part of their programme that they would purge the city of wrong-doers. They put to death a number of men of bad character; but they presently proceeded to execute, with or without trial, even men of oligarchical views. The man whom perhaps they had most reason to fear, Alcibiades, had fled

from his Hellespontine castle to the protection of Pharnabazus. The oligarchs passed a decree of banishment against him, and soon afterward he was murdered, by the order of Pharnabazus, who acted at the suggestion of Lysander, and it was said that Lysander was instigated by the tyrants of Athens.

To the motives of fear and revenge was soon added the appetite for plunder; and some men were executed because they were rich. To these judicial murders and this organized system of plundering, Theramenes was unreservedly opposed. The majority of the Council shared his disapprobation; and he would have been able to establish a moderate constitution, but for the ability and strength of Critias. His representations, indeed, induced the Thirty to create a body of three thousand citizens, who had the privilege of bearing arms and the right of being tried by the Council.

In the meantime, the exiles whom the oligarchy had driven from Athens were not idle. They had found refuge in those neighboring states — Corinth, Megara, and Thebes — which had been bitter foes of Athens, but were dissatisfied with the high-handed proceedings of Sparta, who would not give them a share in the spoils of the war. These states were not only ready to grant hospitality to Athenian exiles, but to lend some help toward delivering their city from the oppression of the tyrants. The first step was made from Thebes. Thrasybulus and Anytus, with a band of seventy exiles, seized the Attic fortress of Phyle, in the Parnes range, close to the Bœotian frontier, and put into a state of defense the strong stone walls, whose ruins are still there.

The oligarchs were now in a dangerous position, menaced without by an enemy against whom their attack had failed, menaced within by a strong opposition. They saw that the influence of Theramenes would be thrown into the scale against them, and they resolved to get rid of him. Fearing that he would be acquitted by the Council, Critias struck the name of Theramenes from the list of the Three Thousand, and boldly condemned him to death.

After the death of Theramenes, the Thirty succeeded in dis-

arming, by means of a stratagem, all the citizens who were not enrolled in the list of the Three Thousand, and expelled them from the city. But with a foe on Attic ground, growing in numbers every day, Critias and his fellows felt themselves so insecure, that they took the step of sending an embassy to Sparta, to ask for a Lacedæmonian garrison. The request was granted, and seven hundred men, under Callibius, were introduced into the Acropolis.

**9. Overthrow of the Thirty. Restoration of Democracy. —**

The Thirty had reason to fear that many of their partisans were wavering. Deciding to secure a place of final refuge in case Athens should become untenable, they seized Eleusis. This measure had hardly been carried out when Thrasybulus descended from Phyle and seized the Piræus. He had now about one thousand men, but the Piræus, without fortifications, was not an easy place to defend. He drew up his forces on the hill of Munychia, at the summit of a steep street. Highest of all stood the darters and slingers, ready to shoot over the heads of the hoplites. Thus posted, Thrasybulus awaited the attack of the Thirty. A shower of darts descended on their heads as they mounted the hill, and, while they wavered for a moment under the missiles, the hoplites rushed down on them, led by a prophet, who had foretold his own death in the battle and was the first to perish. Seventy of the enemy were slain; among them Critias himself.

May, 403 B.C.

The oligarchic party now tried a change of constitution, and a meeting of the Three Thousand replaced the Thirty by a new board of Ten, representing the moderate oligarchs. But they could not come to terms with Thrasybulus, who daily gained strength in the Piræus, and were forced to apply to Sparta. Lysander led an army to Eleusis; but he was now distrusted at Sparta, and the command was transferred from him to King Pausanias. Under the auspices of Pausanias, a reconciliation was effected. There was to be a general pardon, from which were excepted only the Thirty and their successors. *Nomothetæ* were appointed to revise the constitution, and these lawgivers restored the old democracy of



Pericles. Eleusis was still held by the oligarchs as an independent city, but after about two years it was attacked and captured, and Attica was again one state. The amnesty was faithfully observed by the democrats, but for more than three generations no oligarchical party had a chance of success in Athens. The city did not forget the doings of the Thirty.

10. **Literature of the Period.** — (1) *History*. — The historian of the Peloponnesian War was Thucydides. It was his aim to show that the war was the greatest in which Greece had ever engaged, and for this purpose he magnified it as much as possible; but aside from this rather narrow point of view, his treatment is admirable. He wrote from such careful personal observation and investigation that modern criticism can find little to correct. Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides avoids anecdote, and his sketches of character are nearly always conveyed in speeches which represent not the words of the speakers but the ideas of the historian. Although closely connected with the oligarchical party, Thucydides gives the best information concerning the misdeeds of that party at Athens.

Xenophon belongs to a later school, influenced and guided by the spirit of Socrates. He was a typical Athenian, keen and alert, interested in politics and philosophy, able to take command of a forlorn hope, as he did in the retreat of the Ten Thousand; and equally able to recount his adventures in the form of an interesting and scholarly history. His chief historical writings are the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*; in addition he wrote the *Memorabilia*, containing a simple account of the method of instruction and the views of his master Socrates.

(2) *Drama*. — The drama was represented in this age by Euripides and Aristophanes. According to tradition, Euripides was born in the year of the battle of Salamis and lived till 406, and wrote over ninety dramas. Differing from both Æschylus and Sophocles, he took his characters from the men of everyday life and sought to convey instruction, not directly but indirectly, by



representing life as it is. Among his great works are the *Orestes* and the *Alcestis*.

Aristophanes was the great writer of comedy, which in Athens filled the place now taken by newspapers and caricatures. He was the spokesman of the dissatisfied, and subjected to ridicule the leaders of the democracy. He was a great poet with wonderful wit and inventive power, but not a reformer nor a man of lofty ideals; his aim was to give amusement and to produce a laugh. The *Clouds*, the *Wasps*, the *Birds*, and the *Frogs* are among his more important works.

#### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 87)

**1. The Story of the War.**

A very brief summary in West, 192-196. Bury, 489-507. Detailed account in Holm, II, 482-508.

**Source.** Plutarch, Alcibiades.

**2. Constitutional Changes; Restoration of the Democracy.**

Bury, 507-514. Holm, III, xxx.

**3. Literature.**

(1) History. Jebb, Primer, 101-109. Holm, II, 435-440; III, 159-162.

(2) Drama. Jebb, 96-101. Holm, 440-452.

**Sources.** Jennings and Johnston, Half-hours with Greek and Latin Authors.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND THE PERSIAN WAR

**1. The Spartan Supremacy.** — For thirty years after Ægospotami, Sparta was engaged in the attempt to maintain and extend her dominion beyond the Peloponnesus. She failed, because neither the Spartan institutions nor the Spartan character were fit to deal with freemen abroad. In each of the cities which had passed from Athenian into Spartan control, a government of ten, called a decarchy, was set up, which derived its authority from a Lacedæmonian *harmost* with a Lacedæmonian garrison. The cities were thus given over to a twofold oppression. The foreign governors were rapacious, and were practically free from home control; the native oligarchies were generally tyrannical, and got rid of their political opponents by judicial murders; and both decarchs and harmost played into each other's hands.

Meanwhile Lysander, who had established the Spartan empire, was too powerful and too ostentatious to be endured at Sparta. He was recalled from Samos, where he held a sort of royal court, and a letter from Pharnabazus which he brought, proved to be not an encomium, but an accusation. He was allowed to escape into banishment under the plea of a pilgrimage to the temple of Zeus 403 B.C. Ammon in Libya. But the same influences which had ruined him were at work to ruin Sparta. The empire paid a tribute of a thousand talents yearly, to maintain the Spartan power, and this influx of money, in defiance of the Lycurgean discipline, brought the corruption which that discipline was designed to avoid.

**2. The Rebellion of Cyrus and the March of the Ten Thousand.**  
— On the death of Darius, his eldest son, Artaxerxes, succeeded to

the throne. When Cyrus, the younger son, returned to his satrapy in Asia Minor, he began to form plans for overthrowing his brother and seizing the throne. He relied largely on an army of Greek mercenaries, which he began to enlist. With this contingent, led by Clearchus, a Spartan, he set forth on his march in the spring of 401.


The real purpose of the march was at first carefully concealed from all except Clearchus, and a pretext for the expedition was found in the continual border wars which the satrap was forced to wage. Among those who were induced, by the prospect of high pay, to join the expedition was Xenophon, an Athenian knight, who was one of the pupils and companions of the philosopher Socrates. His famous history of the *Anabasis*, or the Up-going of the Greeks with Cyrus, and their subsequent retreat, enables us to follow step by step a journey through the inner parts of Asia Minor, into the heart of the Persian empire beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris.

Setting out from Sardis, Cyrus marched southeast through Phrygia; thence, after a detour to the north, southeast again through the Cilician gates, a narrow pass at which his army might have been checked, and so to Tarsus. Here the Greek troops mutinied; but Clearchus regained his control by showing that they must push on, since retreat was impossible. Through the cowardice of the Persian general, the forces of Cyrus were allowed to march through the narrow pass at the Syrian gates, and in twelve days reached Thapsacus and the Euphrates. Crossing the river they continued for thirteen days through the desert, until they reached Cunaxa.

Here they encountered the overwhelming army of the Great King. What might have been a victory for Cyrus was turned into a defeat by his own headlong rashness and the narrow-mindedness of Clearchus. The Greek contingent carried all before it, but everywhere else the rebel army was defeated, and Cyrus himself was slain.

The position of the ten thousand Greeks was most precarious. In the center of the Persian empire, surrounded by the innumer-

able hosts of the Great King, and their patron Cyrus dead, they might well have been daunted. To add to their misfortunes Tissaphernes seized and slew Clearchus and four of their other generals. But the Greeks resolved to fight their way back to the sea, and elected other generals, among them Xenophon, and began their long march. Marching up the valley of the Tigris, over the Carduchian Mountains, harassed continually by the army of Tissaphernes and attacked by the savage natives, at length they



EXPEDITION OF CYRUS AND RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND

reached Armenia. Through the snow, weakened by cold and hunger, the army struggled on until at last the welcome shout of "The Sea, the Sea" heralded the sight of the Pontus, the goal which marked the end of the most dangerous part of their long retreat.

From Trapezus, on the shore of the Pontus, they continued their retreat, partly by land and partly by sea, until they reached Chalcedon. Here, instead of disbanding, the army, holding together

as a unit, was employed first by a Spartan and then by a Thracian general. At length war broke out between Sparta and Persia, and the Lacedæmonians, mindful of the lesson which the march of The



COIN OF TRAPEZUS (OBVERSE), MALE HEAD

Ten Thousand had taught, employed the remaining six thousand to fight against their former enemy.

### 3. War of Sparta with Persia. Agesilaus.—

Cyrus, when bidding for Greek support, had instigated the Ionian cities to revolt from their satrap Tissaphernes. After the defeat of Cyrus at Cunaxa, Tissaphernes returned to the Ægean coast and attempted to recover the Greek cities. The Asiatic Greeks sent to Sparta an appeal for her protection. The relations of Sparta to Persia were no longer friendly, for Sparta had sent seven hundred hoplites to Cyrus. The opportunity of plundering the wealthy satrapies of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes was a bait for Spartan cupidity; the prospect of gaining signal successes against Persia appealed to Spartan ambition. These considerations induced Sparta to send an army to Asia, and this army was increased, as already stated, by the remains of the famous Ten Thousand. Taking advantage of a misunderstanding between the two satraps, the general Dercyllidas succeeded in getting into his hands the Troad,—or Æolis, as it was called,—which served the Spartans against the satrapy of Pharnabazus somewhat as Decelea had served them in Attica; it was a fortified district in the enemy's country.

Dercyllidas was now superseded by a new and leading personage in Greek affairs — King Agesilaus, who had become king of Sparta under exceptional circumstances. When King Agis died, Lysander, who had returned to Sparta with revolutionary schemes, desired a pliant successor. Leotychidas, son of Agis, was reputed to be illegitimate, and by Lysander's influence Agesilaus, the half-brother of Agis, was made king instead. Agesilaus had always shown himself singularly docile and gentle, and had never put himself forward in any way. Though strong and brave, he was lame,

and an oracle bade Sparta "beware of a halt reign." But Lysander explained away the oracle, in his eagerness to see an apt tool on the throne. He was mistaken in his man. Agesilaus, under the mask of Spartan discipline, covered a proud and ambitious character.


It was arranged that Agesilaus should take the place of Dercylidas; that he should take with him a force of two thousand freedmen, and a military council of thirty Spartans, including Lysander. Lysander expected that the real command in the war would devolve upon himself. But Agesilaus had no intention of being merely a nominal chief, and inflicted deliberate humiliations, till Lysander was sent, at his own request, on a separate mission to the Hellespont, where he did useful work for Sparta. Agesilaus himself made a successful inroad into Phrygia, whence he brought much booty to Ephesus. Having organized a force of cavalry during the winter, he took the field in the spring, and gained a victory over Tissaphernes, who was completely discredited. Tithraustes was sent to the coast to succeed him and put him to death. An offer was now made by Tithraustes to Agesilaus, that the Spartans should leave Asia, on condition that the Greek cities should enjoy complete autonomy, paying only their original tribute to Persia. Agesilaus could not agree without consulting his government at home, and an armistice of six months was concluded. 396 B.C.

But, meanwhile, the Athenian Conon, burning to be revenged upon Sparta, had been furnished by Pharnabazus with a fleet of eighty sail, and had induced Rhodes to revolt. In the following summer, he met and defeated the Spartan fleet off Cnidus. The Greek cities at once expelled the Spartan garrisons and acknowledged the overlordship of Persia. The maritime power of Sparta was destroyed, and the unstable foundations of her empire undermined. 394 B.C.

**4. Spartan Aggression. Death of Lysander.** — At the same time Sparta was suffering serious checks nearer home. While



Agesilaus was meditating wonderful schemes against Persia, war had broken out in Greece between Sparta and her allies. After the battle of the Goat's River, Sparta had kept for herself all the fruits of victory. She further exhibited her despotic temper by her proceedings within the Peloponnesus. Elis had given her ground of offense. King Agis invaded and ravaged the country, and imposed severe conditions on the Eleans. The Spartans in-



CAMPAIGNS IN BŒOTIA

dulged another grudge by expelling from Naupactus and Cephalenia the residue of the Messenians, who had settled in those places. In Bœotia, also, Sparta found a pretext for aggression, and a double attack by both Lysander and Pausanias was planned.

Thus threatened, Thebes turned for aid to her old enemy. Athens had been steadily recovering a measure of her prosperity, and men of all parties alike voted to seize the opportunity for attempting to break free from Spartan rule. Conon was sailing the

southeastern seas, Rhodes had revolted, — the moment must not be lost. So alliance was concluded.

Lysander and Pausanias had arranged to meet near Haliartus. Lysander arrived first and attacked the town. From their battlements the men of Haliartus could descry a band of Thebans coming along the road from Thebes, some time before the danger was visible to their assailants; and they suddenly sallied forth from the gates. Taken by surprise and attacked on both sides, Lysander's men were driven back, and Lysander was slain. His death was a loss to Sparta, but no loss to Greece. 395 B.C.

Pausanias soon arrived, and his first object was to recover the corpse of his dead colleague; but an Athenian army came up at the same moment to the assistance of the Thebans, under the leadership of Thrasybulus, and a burial truce was granted only on condition that the Peloponnesian army should leave Bœotia. Pausanias spent the rest of his life as an exile at Tegea.

5. "The Corinthian War." — The result of this double blow to the Spartans was the conclusion of a league, fomented by Persia, against her by the four most important states. Thebes and Athens were now joined by Corinth and Argos. This alliance was soon increased by the adhesion of other minor states. The allies, when spring came, gathered together their forces at the Isthmus, and it was proposed by one bold Corinthian to march straight on Sparta, and "burn out the wasps in their nest." Though the Spartans, by a victory near Corinth, were able to check this proposed invasion, the control of the Isthmus was left in the hands of the confederates, who were now free to resist an attack from the north. 394 B.C.

For Agesilaus was now bearing down upon Bœotia. After the battle of Haliartus, he was recalled by the ephors and forced to give up his plan of Persian conquest. Marching overland through Thrace and Macedonia, he came upon the confederate army at Coronea. On the field where the Bœotians had thrown off Athenian rule half a century before, Athenians and Bœotians now joined

394 B.C.

to throw off the domination of Lacedæmon. A hotly contested battle was fought; and although the Spartans were technically victorious, the real fruits of the victory were with the confederates, for Agesilaus was forced to evacuate Bœotia.

393 B.C.

For the next years the war centered around Corinth. Sparta was fighting for dominion beyond the Isthmus, her enemies to keep her within the Peloponnesus. In this the confederates were aided by Pharnabazus, who had not forgiven the Spartans for the injuries inflicted by Agesilaus. He accompanied the fleet of Conon and ravaged the Spartan territory; and after his return, allowed Conon to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens and to fortify the Piræus. This completely undid the chief result of the Peloponnesian War. The two long, parallel walls connecting Athens with the Piræus were rebuilt; the port was again made defensible; and the Athenians could feel that they were a free people once more.

The war dragged on; the Spartans were continually attempting to gain command of the Isthmus. That the confederates were able to check the Lacedæmonians was largely due to the genius of the Athenian Iphicrates, who with his light-armed mercenaries was able to harry and wear out the heavy-armed hoplites. Thus the most that the Spartans could do was to keep open the gates of the Isthmus.

389 B.C.

**6. The King's Peace.** — We must now turn from the Isthmus of Corinth to the eastern coasts of the Ægean. The most important event of these years was the recovery of Athenian dominion on the Propontis. Thrasybulus, the restorer of the democracy, gained over to the Athenian alliance the islands of Lesbos, Thasos, and Samothrace, the Chersonesus, and the two cities which commanded the Bosphorus, Byzantium and Chalcedon. But to act with effect it was necessary to raise money, and the Athenian fleet coasted round Asia Minor, levying contributions. At Aspendus in Pamphylia, a riot broke out and Thrasybulus was slain. Conon, the other of the two men to whom, since Pericles, Athens had owed most, was also lost to her. Sent as an envoy to Tiribazus, he was detained, and died in Cyprus.

388 B.C.

To counterbalance the advantage which Athens was gaining in the contest, Sparta now leagued herself with the foes of liberty. She obtained a reënforcement of twenty triremes from Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, and she sent the diplomatist Antalcidas to make proposals at the court of Susa. Antalcidas was able to persuade Artaxerxes to enforce a peace upon Hellas, which obliged Athens to give up what Thrasybulus had won back. The representatives of the belligerents were summoned to Sardis, and Tiribazus read aloud the edict of his master, showing them the royal seal. It was to this effect:—

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. Further, that all the other Greek cities, small and great, shall be autonomous; except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus, which shall belong to Athens, as aforetime. If any refuse to accept this peace, I shall make war on them, along with those who are of the same purpose, both by land and sea, with both ships and money.”

The King's peace was inscribed on stone tablets, which were set up in the chief sanctuaries of the Greek states. There was a feeling among many that Greece had suffered a humiliation in having to submit to the arbitration of Persia. Both Spartans and Athenians had alike used Persian help when they could get it, but never before had the domestic conflicts of Hellas been settled by barbarian dictation and under a barbarian sanction. It was Sparta's doing. She constituted herself the minister of the Great King's will in order to save her own position; and the Greeks of Asia were left to endure oriental methods of government.

**7. High-handed Policy of Sparta.**—Sparta, having the Isthmus open to her, and being allied to Persia, was free to exercise her power tyrannically, and she did so in various quarters of Greece.



DARIC (FOURTH CENTURY). OBTVERSE: KNEELING KING WITH BOW AND SPEAR. REVERSE: INCUSE

In the north, a Chalcidian league had been formed about the town of Olynthus, comprising the towns of the Sithonian promontory. The Olynthians now conceived the idea of a confederacy which should embrace the whole Chalcidic peninsula and its neighborhood. They proceeded to coerce those cities which refused to join, and Acanthus and Apollonia, who stood out, sent for help to Sparta.

The expedition against the Chalcidian confederacy led unexpectedly to an important incident elsewhere. Phœbidas had been

ordered to march through Bœotia with troops for Macedonia; and a party in Thebes favorable to Sparta plotted a revolution. The plot succeeded perfectly; the Cadmea — the citadel of Thebes —



COIN OF CHALCIDICE. OBVERSE: HEAD OF LAUREATE APOLLO. REVERSE: LYRE BOUND WITH FILLET [LEGEND: XAAKIAEON]

was occupied without striking a blow; and a government friendly to Sparta was established.

With the fortress of Thebes in her hands, Sparta might regard her supremacy as secured. But her immediate attention was fixed on the necessity of repressing the dangerous league in the north of Greece, and continuing the measures which had been interrupted by the enterprise of Phœbidas in Bœotia. Teleutias, sent to conduct the war, was defeated and slain in front of the walls of Olynthus. Another general, Polybiadas, was more successful. He forced the Olynthians to sue for peace and dissolve their league.

About the same time, the Lacedæmonians were making their heavy hand felt in the Peloponnesus. They ordered Mantinea to pull down her walls; when the citizens refused, Sparta besieged and took the city, and broke it up into five villages, destroying its corporate civic life. At Phlius they ordered the recall of certain



exiles and, when disputes arose, declared war on Phlius, and forced it to receive a Spartan garrison till an oligarchic council, nominated by Agesilaus, should have framed a new constitution.

Thus the Lacedæmonians, in alliance with the tyrant Dionysius and the barbarian Artaxerxes, tyrannized over the Greeks for a space. Even Xenophon, the friend of Sparta's king, the admirer of Sparta's institutions, is roused to regretful indignation at Sparta's conduct, and recognizes her fall at the hand of Thebes as a just retribution.

**8. Alliance of Athens and Thebes.** — The government of Leontidas and his party at Thebes, maintained by fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians in the citadel, was despotic and cruel. Fear made the rulers suspicious and oppressive; for they were afraid of the large number of exiles, who had found a refuge at Athens. That city was now showing the same good-will to the fugitives from Thebes which Thebes, when Athens was in a like plight, had shown to Thrasybulus and his fellows. One of the exiles, named Pelopidas, resolved to take his life in his hands, and found six other associates. There were many in Thebes who were bitter foes of the ruling party, such as Epaminondas, the beloved friend of Pelopidas, but most of them deemed the time unripe. Yet a few were found ready to run the risk; above all, Phyllidas, who was the secretary of the polemarchs, and therefore the most useful of confederates. The day was fixed for the enterprise. On the evening before, Pelopidas and his six comrades crossed Mount Cithæron in the guise of huntsmen, mixed with the peasants who were returning from the fields, and got them safely within the gates. The secretary Phyllidas had made ready a great banquet for the following night, to which he had bidden the polemarchs, tempting them by the promise of introducing them to some high-born and beautiful women. During the carouse, a messenger came with a letter for Archias, and said that it concerned serious affairs. "Business to-morrow," said Archias, placing it under his pillow. On the morrow it was found that this letter disclosed the conspiracy.

Winter, 379-  
378 B.C.



The polemarchs then called for the women, who were waiting in an adjoining room. Phyllidas said that they declined to appear till all the attendants were dismissed. When no one remained in the dining hall but the polemarchs and a few friends, all flushed with wine, the women entered and sat down beside the lords. They were covered with long veils; and even as they were bidden lift them and reveal their charms, they buried daggers in the bodies of the polemarchs. For they were none other than Pelopidas and his fellows in the guise of women. Then they went and slew in their houses the two other chief leaders of the oligarchs, and set free the political prisoners. When all this was done, Epaminondas and the other patriots, who were unwilling to initiate such deeds themselves, accepted the revolution with joy. When day dawned, an assembly of the people was held in the Agora, and the conspirators were crowned with wreaths. Three of them, including Pelopidas, were appointed polemarchs, and a democratic constitution was established.

The rest of the exiles and a body of Athenian volunteers presently arrived, on the news of the success. The Spartan commander of the Cadmea had sent hastily for reinforcements, but those that came were repelled. Then, in the first flush of success, the patriots resolved to storm the Cadmea, strong as the place was. But the Lacedæmonian harmosts decided to capitulate at once. Two of these commanders were put to death on their return to Sparta, and the third was banished. King Cleombrotus was immediately sent with an army to Bœotia, but accomplished nothing.

The presence of his army, however, backed the demand for reparation from Athens. Athens and Sparta were formally at peace. But two Athenian strategæ had accompanied the volunteers to Thebes, regardless of their official position. They were sentenced, one to death, the other to banishment, and justly. But Sparta did not show the same spirit in a similar case. Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespiæ, conceived the plan of seizing Piræus, as Phœbidas had seized Thebes. He marched into Attica with a

force, but the raid was so ill-planned that daylight found him only halfway, and he retreated, plundering as he went. Athens was furious, but Sparta disowned the raid and promised to punish Sphodrias. But Agesilaus intervened to save him, and, as a consequence, Athens allied herself with Thebes and declared war on Sparta. 378 B.C.

**9. Theban Reforms. Epaminondas.** — At Thebes the attention of the government was chiefly bestowed on military affairs. There was formed a new troop of three hundred hoplites, all chosen young men of the noblest families. Each man had his best friend beside him; so that the Sacred Band, as it was called, consisted of one hundred and fifty pairs of friends, prepared to fight and fall together. In battle, it was to stand in front of the other hoplites. Opportunely for Thebes there had arisen, to guide her to success when her chance came, a man of rare ability. This was Epaminondas, the friend of Pelopidas, a modest, unambitious man. But the revolution stimulated his patriotism and lured him into the field of public affairs, where his eminent capacity, gradually revealing itself, made him, before eight years had passed, the most influential man in his city. He had devoted as much time to musical as to gymnastic training; and he had a genuine interest in philosophical speculation. Silent by habit, when the need demanded his eloquence was extremely impressive. Exceptional in his indifference to the prizes of ambition, he was also exceptional in his indifference to money, and he died poor. Not less remarkable was his lack of that party spirit which led to so many crimes in Greece. We have already seen that his repugnance to domestic bloodshed kept him from taking a part in the fortunate conspiracy of Pelopidas.

**10. The Second Athenian League.** — Ever since the battle of Cnidus, Athens had been gradually forming bonds of alliance in Thrace, the Ægean, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The breach with Sparta induced her now to gather together these separate connections into a common league. The league, which was purely de-

fensive, was constituted in two parts — Athens on one side, her allies on the other. The allies had their own syndedrion or congress, which met in Athens, but in which Athens had no part. It was necessary for the members of the league to form a federal fund; their payments were called *syntaxeis* ("contributions"), and the word *phoros* ("tribute"), which had odious memories connected with the Confederacy of Delos, was avoided. But the administration of the federal fund and the leadership of the federal army were in the hands of Athens. Good fortune has preserved to us the original stone, shattered in about twenty pieces, with the decree which founded the confederacy, and we find the purpose of the league definitely declared: "To force the Lacedæmonians to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and independence, with their lands unviolated." The chief cities which first joined the new league were Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, Methymna, and Rhodes; then most of the towns of Eubœa joined, and, what was most important and wonderful, Thebes enrolled her name in the list of the confederates, who amounted to about seventy in all.

**11. The Battle of Naxos and the Peace of Callias.**—Within four years the Bœotian confederacy was extended over all Bœotia, except Chæronea and Orchomenus, the harmosts being expelled. Moreover, Pelopidas and the Sacred Band routed in a narrow pass at Tegyra, between Orchomenus and Locris, a force of Lacedæmonian troops double their own number, and slew both the Spartan generals. This victory over Spartans had, as always, a great moral effect.

In the meantime, Sparta had been defeated by sea. A fleet of sixty galleys, under the Spartan Pollis, hindered the corn ships from bringing grain from the Euxine to Piræus, and threatened Athens with famine. Eighty triremes, under Chabrias, were despatched by the Athenians to regain command of the sea, and to reduce Naxos, which had revolted from the league. Pollis, coming to the rescue, was defeated in the sound between Paros and Naxos, and lost all but eleven ships. Even these would have been disabled, had not Chabrias, remembering

Arginusæ, abandoned the action to pick up men in danger of drowning.

Next year the fleet was sent to sail round the Peloponnesus, under Timotheus, son of Conon—an assertion of naval supremacy. Timotheus won over to the alliance the Molossi, some of the Acarnanians, Cephallenia, and, above all, Corcyra. Negotiations for a peace with Sparta were then concluded, but the peace was at once broken, and Sparta immediately attempted, in vain, to recover Corcyra.

The discouragement of Sparta was increased by a series of earthquakes, and she was anxious for peace. Athens, too, was feeling the war a burden, and growing jealous of Thebes. Thebes had attacked the Phocians, allies of Athens; and, because the recently restored town of Plataea was scheming to be annexed to Attica, a Theban force surprised it, and drove all the Plataeans out. Many of them took refuge at Athens. After this Athens took steps for peace, and sent to the congress of Lacedæmonian allies three envoys, of whom the chief were Callistratus and Callias. Thebes also sent ambassadors, one of whom was Epaminondas. 371 B.C. A general peace, called the Peace of Callias, was concluded, which recognized the autonomy of every Hellenic city. The Athenian and Lacedæmonian confederacies were thus rendered invalid. No compulsion could be exercised on any city to fulfill engagements as members of a league, though cities might coöperate freely as far as they chose.


The question immediately arose whether the Bœotian league was condemned by this doctrine of universal autonomy. Sparta and Athens, of course, intended to condemn it. But it might be contended that Bœotia was a geographical unity, like Attica and Laconia, and had a title to political unity, too. Her representative was Epaminondas, and when Agesilaus asked him curtly: "Will you leave each of the Bœotian towns independent?" he retorted: "Will *you* leave each of the Laconian towns independent?" The name of Thebes was thereupon struck out of the treaty.

So far as Athens and Sparta were concerned, this bargain — which is often called the “Peace of Callias” — put an end to a war which was contrary to the best interests of both. But, although Athens was financially exhausted, the war had made her once more Sparta’s equal. Sparta had lost as much as Athens had gained; the defeat of Naxos, the defeat of Tegyra, the failure at Corcyra, had dimmed her prestige. After the King’s Peace, she had begun her second attempt to dominate Greece; her failure is confessed by the Peace of Callias.

**12. Literature and Art.** — Pericles, in a famous speech, declared that Athens was the school of Greece; yet it was hardly till after Athens lost her empire that she began decisively to influence Greek thought. This influence was due largely to the actual schools of Isocrates and Plato, which attracted men from all quarters to Athens; but also to a change in Athens herself. The city became Hellenic, and almost cosmopolitan, rather than Athenian, as her literature shows. Freedom, combined with the Attic genius, had led to philosophic speculation, and the result had been the growth of what is called “individualism.” By this is meant that the individual citizen no longer looks at the outside world through the medium of his own city. He is a citizen of the world, not a citizen of Athens. He refuses to hold certain beliefs or perform certain acts of worship merely because the state into which he is born enjoins this religion. And, since his own life has thus become for him something independent of the city, his duty to his country may conflict with his duty to himself as a man. Patriotism ceases to be the highest virtue. Again, the question arises whether the state is made for the individual or the individual for the state. When that question is put, greater demands are made by the citizen for his private welfare. A soldier, for example, will seek service where it is most profitable; as Conon, Xenophon, Iphicrates, and others took the pay of foreign powers.

(1) *Socrates*. — Socrates was the first to insist that a man must order his life by the guidance of his own intellect, without any

regard for mandates of external authority or for the impulses of emotion, unless his intellect approves. Socrates was thus a rebel against authority as such; and he shrank from no consequences. He did not hesitate to show his companions that an old man has no title to respect because he is old, unless he is also wise; or that



PORTRAIT HEAD OF SOCRATES

an ignorant parent has no claim to obedience on the mere account of the parental relation. Knowledge and truth were the only masters which he admitted.

But what is knowledge and what is truth? The solution of Socrates is, briefly, this. When we make a judgment, we com-



pare two ideas; and in order to do so correctly, it is obvious that these ideas must be clear and distinct. Definition was thus the essential point in the Socratic method for arriving at truth.

The application of this method to ethics was the chief occupation of Socrates. He was the founder of utilitarianism. He arrived at this doctrine by analyzing the notion of "good"; the result of his analysis was that "the good is the useful." Closely connected was the principle that virtue is happiness, and this was the basis of the famous Socratic paradox that no man willingly does wrong, but only through ignorance, for there is no man who would not will his own happiness.


The sacred name of democracy was not more sheltered than anything else from the criticism of Socrates. He railed, for instance, at the system of choosing magistrates by lot, one of the protections of democracy at Athens. Honest democrats of the type of Thrasylulus and Anytus regarded him as a dangerous freethinker. They might point to the ablest of the young men who had kept company with him, and say: "Look at Alcibiades, his favorite companion, who has done more than any other man to ruin his country. Look at Critias, who inaugurated the reign of terror." However unjust any particular instance might seem, it is easy to understand how considerations of this kind would lead many practical, unspeculative men to look upon Socrates and his ways with little favor. And from their point of view, they were perfectly right. His spirit, and the ideas that he made current, were an insidious menace to the cohesion of the social fabric, in which there was not a stone or a joint that he did not question. In other words, he was the active apostle of individualism, which led in its further development to the subversion of that local patriotism which had inspired the cities of Greece in her days of greatness.

Socrates died five years after the fall of the Athenian empire, and the manner of his death set a seal upon his life. Anytus, the honest democratic politician who had been prominent in the restoration of the democracy, came forward, with some others, as a

champion of the state religion, and accused Socrates of impiety. The accusation ran: "Socrates is guilty of crime, because he does not believe in the gods recognized by the city, but introduces strange supernatural beings; he is also guilty, because he corrupts the youth." The penalty proposed was death; but the accusers had no desire to inflict it; they expected that, when the charge was lodged in the archon's office, Socrates would leave Attica. But Socrates surprised the city by remaining to answer the charge. The trial was heard in a court of five hundred and one judges, the king-archon presiding, and the old philosopher was found guilty by a majority of sixty. According to the practice of Athenian law, it was open to a defendant, when he was condemned, to propose a lighter punishment than that fixed by the accuser, and the judges were required to choose one of the two sentences. Socrates might have saved his life if he had proposed an adequate penalty, but he offered only a small fine, and was consequently condemned, by a much larger majority, to death. He drank the cup of doom a month later, discoursing with his disciples as eagerly as ever till his last hour.

(2) *Isocrates*. — In this period — during the fifty years after the battle of Ægospotami — the art of writing prose was brought to perfection at Athens. It is to the democratic Athenian law-courts that this development was mainly due. The most illustrious instructor in oratory at this period was Isocrates. But the school of Isocrates had a far wider scope and higher aim than to teach the construction of sentences or the arrangement of topics in a speech. It was a general school of culture; — a discipline intended to fit men for public life. Questions of political science were studied, and Isocrates liked to describe his course of studies as "philosophy." But it was to Plato's school in the Academy that the youths of the day went to study "philosophy" in the stricter sense. The discipline of these two rival schools — for there was rivalry between them, though their aims were different — was what corresponded at Athens to our university education. Isocrates

discharged, also, the functions of a journalist of the best kind. Naturally nervous and endowed with a poor voice, he did not speak in the Assembly; but when any great question moved him, he would issue a pamphlet, in the form of a speech, for the purpose of influencing public opinion.



PORTRAIT HEAD OF ISOCRATES

(3) *Praxiteles*. — The form and features of an age are wont to be mirrored in its art; and one effective means of winning a concrete notion of the spirit of the fourth century is to study the works of Praxiteles and compare them with the sculptures which issued from the workshop of Pheidias. In the fifth century, apart from a few colossal statues like those which Pheidias wrought for Athens and Olympia, the finest works of the sculptor's chisel went to decorate frieze or pediment. In the fourth century, the sculptor

developed his art more independently of architecture, and all the great works of Praxiteles were complete in themselves and independent. And, as sculpture was emancipating itself from the old subordination to architecture, so it also emancipated itself from the religious ideal. In the age of Pheidias, the artist who fashioned a god sought to express in human shape the majesty and immutability of a divine being. In the fourth century, the deities lose their majesty and changelessness; they are conceived as physically perfect men and women, with human feelings, though without human sorrows; they are invested with human personalities. Thus, sculpture is marked by "individualism" in a double sense. Each artist is freer to work out an individual path of his own; and the tendency of all artists is to portray the individual man or woman rather than the type, and even the individual phase of emotion rather than the entire character.

**13. Athens under the Restored Democracy.**—The general spirit of the Athenians in their political life corresponds to this change. Men came more and more to regard the state as a means for administering to the needs of the individual. We might almost say that they conceived it as a coöperative society for making profits to be divided among the members. They were consequently more disinclined to enter upon foreign undertakings which were not either necessary for the protection and promotion of their commerce or likely to fill their purses. The fourth century was, therefore, for Athens, an age of less ambition and glory, but of greater happiness and freedom, than the fifth.

For while Athens lost her empire, she did not lose her commerce. The population of Attica had declined; plague and war reduced the number of adult male citizens from at least 35,000 to 21,000. But that was not unfortunate, for there were no longer outsettlements to receive the surplus of the population. In the same period began the system of paying citizens to attend the Assembly. The pay, fixed first at a half a drachma, was raised to a drachma and a half for the regular sessions. The rise

shows the increase in prices and general prosperity. Another notable feature was the distribution of "spectacle-money." The practice of giving the poor Athenian the price of his theater ticket had been introduced earlier, perhaps by Pericles. But in the fourth century, distributions of "theoric" money, to be spent on religious pageants, became frequent and large. This theoric fund absorbed the state's surplus revenue, and became so important that a special minister of finance was named to manage it. Heavier taxation was thus occasioned, and the comfort of the poorer burghers was provided for at the expense of the wealthier. The theoric fund was an outward embodiment of the principle that the purpose of the state is the comfort and pleasure of its individual members.

To conduct her affairs on these lines, Athens needed men of ability. There was no scope for men of genius. None of her statesmen of this period made a mark in history. The art of war became every year more and more an art, and little could be accomplished except by generals who devoted their life to the military profession. Such were Timotheus, Chabrias, and above all Iphicrates. Timotheus was a rich man, and he could afford to serve his country, and his country only. But Chabrias and Iphicrates enriched themselves by taking temporary service under foreign masters; Iphicrates even went so far as to support the Thracian king, whose daughter he had wedded, against Athens. The attitude of the generals to the city became much more independent when the citizens themselves ceased to serve abroad regularly, and hired mercenaries instead. The hiring of the troops and their organization devolved upon the general, and he was often expected to provide the means for paying them, too. Here we touch on a vice in the constitutional machine. No systematic provision was made that, when the people voted that a certain thing should be done, the adequate moneys should be voted at the same time. Any one might propose a decree, without responsibility for its execution; and at the next meeting of the Assembly the people might

refuse to allow the necessary supplies. In the same way, supplies might be cut off in the middle of a campaign. This defect had not made itself seriously felt in the fifth century, when the leading generals were always statesmen, too, with influence in the Assembly; but it became serious when the generals were professional soldiers whom the statesmen employed. During the ten years after the Peace of Callias, Athens was actively engaged in a multitude of enterprises of foreign aggrandizement; but she achieved little, and the reason is that her armaments were hardly ever adequate.

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(Syllabus, 88)

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2. War with Persia.

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**Sources.** Xenophon, *Anabasis*, I, chs. 8-9 (Battle of Cunaxa); IV, ch. 5 (Sufferings of the Greeks). Plutarch, *Agésilas*, *Lysander*.

3. Policy of Sparta in Greece.

(1) "Corinthian War."

Botsford, 263-266. Bury, 539-554. Holm, III, 35-46, 51-60.

(2) High-handed Policy of Sparta.

Holm, III, 63-70. Bury, 555-561.

(3) Revival of Athens.

Bury, 561-574. Holm, III, 84-91.

4. Literature and Art.

(1) Socrates. Jebb, 124-128. Holm, III, 27-30. Curtius, IV, 148-164.

**Source.** Plato, *Apology*. (Jowett's translation.)

(2) Praxiteles. Holm, III, 170-171. Tarbell, *Greek Art*, 214-230.



## CHAPTER XVI

### THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES

**1. Jason of Pheræ and the Battle of Leuctra.**—The balance of power in Greece had been swayed for a hundred years by the two rivals, Sparta and Athens. But now new forces had arisen in the north, and two cities had come into dangerous prominence—Thebes and Pheræ.

The Thessalian cities, which were usually in a state of feud, had been united, and Thessaly had consequently become one of the great powers of Greece. This was the doing of one man. There had arisen at Pheræ a despot whose ambition ranged beyond the domestic politics of Thessaly. Jason had established his dominion by means of a well-trained body of six thousand mercenaries, and also, doubtless, by able diplomacy, and finally had become *leader* of an united Thessaly. The power of the despot extended on one side into Epirus, on the other to Macedonia.

Sparta was still regarded as holding the highest position in Greece; and it was the first object of Jason to weaken her and dethrone her from that place. His second immediate object was to gain control of the key of southern Greece—the pass of Thermopylæ; and as this was commanded by the Spartan fortress of Heraclea, these two objects were intimately connected. His obvious policy was to ally himself with Sparta's enemy, Thebes; and Thebes, in her isolated position, leapt at his alliance. According to the terms of the Peace of Callias, all parties were to recall their armaments from foreign countries and their garrisons from foreign towns. Athens promptly recalled Iphicrates from

Corcyra, but Sparta, on her side, failed to fulfill the contract. King Cleombrotus had, shortly before, led an army to Phocis, and now, instead of disbanding it, he was ordered to march against Thebes and compel that state to set free the Bœotian cities.

Cleombrotus, marching on Thebes itself, found the Theban army in position on the height of Leuctra. The numbers of the two hosts are uncertain; the Lacedæmonians, in any case considerably superior, may have been about eleven, the Thebans about six, thousand strong. But the military genius of Epaminondas made up for the deficiency in strength. Instead of drawing out the usual long and shallow line, he made his left wing deep. This wedge, fifty shields deep, of irresistible weight, with the Sacred Band, under the captaincy of Pelopidas, in front, was opposed to the Spartans, who, with Cleombrotus himself, were drawn up on the right of the hostile army. It was on his left wing that Epaminondas relied for victory; the shock between the Spartans and Thebans would decide the battle.

The battle began with an engagement of the cavalry. In this arm the Lacedæmonians were notoriously weak; and now their horsemen, easily driven back, carried disorder into the line of foot. Cleombrotus, who was confident of victory, then led his right wing down the slopes — the center and left being probably impeded in their advance by the cavalry; and on his side Epami-



THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA

nondas with the Theban left moved down from their hill, deliberately keeping back the rest of the line. The novel tactics of Epaminondas decided the battle. The Spartans, twelve deep, though they fought ever so bravely, could not resist the impact of the Theban wedge led by Pelopidas. King Cleombrotus fell, and after a great carnage on both sides the Thebans drove their enemies up the slopes back to their camp.

A thousand Lacedæmonians had fallen, including four hundred Spartans; and the survivors acknowledged their defeat by demanding the customary truce to take up the dead. But the army remained in its intrenchments on the hill of Leuctra, in the expectation of being reënforced by a new army from Sparta and retrieving the misfortune. The remaining forces of the city were hastily got together, and placed under the command of Archidamus, son of Agesilaus.

Meanwhile, Thebes had sent the news to Thessaly. On receiving it, Jason marched forthwith to the scene of action, at the head of his cavalry and mercenaries, flying so rapidly through Phocis that the Phocians, his irreconcilable enemies, did not realize his presence until he had passed. He could not have reached Leuctra until the sixth or seventh day after the battle. The Thebans thought that with the help of his forces they might storm the Lacedæmonian intrenchments. But for the policy of Jason the annihilation of the enemy or any further enhancement of the Theban success would have been too much. He dissuaded the Thebans from the enterprise, and induced them to grant a truce to the Lacedæmonians, with leave to retire unharmed.

Jason returned to Thessaly, dismantling Heraclea on his way. He set himself to make preparation for a great display of his power at the next Pythian festival, when he proposed to usurp the rights of the Amphictronic board, and preside at the games. But one day as he sat to hear petitions, seven young men approached wrangling, as if to submit their dispute, and stabbed him where he sat. His brothers, who succeeded, were men of no ability. The death

of Jason decided that Bœotia, not Thessaly, should succeed to the supremacy of Sparta.

**2. Policy of Thebes in Southern Greece, Arcadia, and Messenia.**

— The defeat of a Lacedæmonian army in the open field by an enemy inferior in numbers was made more impressive by the death of King Cleombrotus; a Spartan king had never fallen in battle since Leonidas. The news agitated every state in the Peloponnese. The harmosts, whom Sparta had undertaken to withdraw three weeks before, when she signed the Peace, were now expelled from the cities; there was a universal reaction against the local oligarchies. But it was in Arcadia that the most weighty political results followed. The fall of Sparta was the signal for the Mantineans to rebuild their walls, desert their villages, and resume city life.

Mantineia, arisen from her ruins, and the other towns of Arcadia — with the important exceptions of Tegea, Orchomenus, and Heræa — now agreed to form a Pan-Arcadian federal state. Since none of the Arcadian cities was large enough to be a federal capital, and the selection of one would have caused jealousies, it was decided to build a new city, in the western of Arcadia's two large plains, near the sacred mount Lycæon. Its name, Megalopolis, 370 B.C. was justified by the large circuit of its double wall, into which the surrounding village communities were induced to migrate.

To check an attack which Sparta made upon the new confederacy, the Arcadians appealed first to Athens and then to Thebes. Thebes, thinking a united Arcadia would be the best check upon Sparta, sent a force under Epaminondas. When Epaminondas arrived at Arcadia, the Spartans had withdrawn, but he was persuaded to adopt the daring design of making an attack upon Laconia itself.

The invaders advanced in four divisions by four roads, converging on Sellasia, and met no serious attempt to block their way. Sellasia was burnt, and the united army descended into the plain on the left bank of the Eurotas. The river, which separated them from Sparta, was swollen with winter rains, and this probably

saved the city; for the bridge was too strongly guarded to be safely attacked. Epaminondas marched southward a few miles farther, as far as Amyclæ, where he crossed the stream by a ford. But Sparta was now saved. On the first alarm of the coming invasion, messages had flown to the Peloponnesian cities which were



POWER OF SPARTA AND THEBES IN THE PELOPONNESUS

still friendly; and these had promptly sent auxiliary forces. Their coming added such strength to the defense of Sparta that Epaminondas did not attack it, but contented himself with marching up defiantly to its outskirts. It was, indeed, a sufficient revenge. The consternation of the Spartans at a calamity which, owing to

the immunity of ages, they had never even conceived as possible, can hardly be imagined. The women, disciplined though they were in repressing their feelings when sons or husbands perished in battle, now fell into fits of distress and despair; for, unlike the women of so many other Greek cities, they had never looked upon the face of an enemy before.

### 3. The Foundation of Messene. Alliance of Athens and Sparta.

—Having ravaged southern Laconia, the allies returned to Arcadia.

But, though it was mid-winter, their work was not over yet; a far greater blow was still to be inflicted on Sparta. Epaminondas led them now into another part of the Spartan territory, the ancient Messenia. The serfs, who belonged to the old Messenian race,



COIN OF MESSENE. OBTVERSE: HEAD OF DEMETER, CORN-CROWNED. REVERSE: ZEUS WITH THUNDERBOLT AND EAGLE [LEGEND: MESSANION]

arose at their coming; and on the slopes of Mount Ithome the foundations of a new Messene were laid by Epaminondas. The ancient heroes and heroines of the race were invited to return to the restored nation; the ample circuit of the town was marked out, and the first stones placed, to the sound of flutes. Ithome was the citadel, and formed one side of the town, whose walls of well-wrought masonry descended the slopes and met in the plain below. The Messenian exiles who had been wandering over the Greek world had now a home once more. Thus, not only a new stronghold but a new enemy was erected against Sparta in Sparta's own domain. All western Laconia was subtracted from the Spartan dominion; all the perioeci and helots became the freemen of a hostile state.

370-369 B.C

In her distress Sparta had asked aid from Athens. A force was sent under Iphicrates, and an alliance was formed. Shortly after this, Epaminondas made a second invasion to aid the enemies of



Sparta and gained Sicyon and Pellene. He thought it prudent to retire, however, when he heard of the arrival of two thousand mercenaries whom the tyrant of Syracuse had sent to the aid of Sparta.

The confederation, however, had made itself truly Pan-Arcadian by the conquest of all the towns within the borders of Arcadia, and had even gained some of the territory belonging to Elis. Against these aggressions Sparta was practically helpless; but one action in which she succeeded in repulsing the Arcadians with a heavy loss while not a Spartan fell, she dignified by the title of the "tearless battle."

**4. Confusion on the Peloponnesus.** — Attempts were made at the instigation of Persia to bring about a peace, and the Great King sent from Susa a royal order settling the disputes in the main in the favor of Thebes. But Arcadia would not allow this, and formally protested against the leadership of Thebes. In answer to this Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnesus for the third time, and gained the cities of Achæa for Thebes. An oppressive policy, however, was adopted, and the Achæan cities revolted and became partisans of Sparta. In the same year Thebes wrested Oropus from Athens, and thus forced that city to adopt an even more hostile attitude. An alliance was formed between the Arcadian confederacy and Athens against Thebes, and thus the confusion was complete.

**5. Policy of Thebes in Northern Greece.** — In the north the king of Macedonia had forced the cities to recognize his power under the pretense of protecting them against the power of Thessaly. The cities attempted to revolt and appealed to Thebes, while discord in the royal family of Macedonia forced the regent to call on Athens for aid. But Thebes, resolved to oust Athenian influence, despatched Pelopidas to the north, compelled the regent to enter her alliance, and to assure his fidelity by furnishing a number of hostages. Among the young Macedonian nobles who were sent as pledges to Thebes was the boy Philip, who was destined to be the maker of Macedonia.

**6. War between Athens and Thebes.** — Meanwhile, Athens began to act in the eastern Ægean. The opportunity was furnished by the revolt of her friend Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia. A fleet of thirty galleys and eight thousand troops was sent under her experienced general, Timotheus. He laid siege to Samos, on which Persia had laid hands, contrary to the King's Peace, and took it at the end of ten months. At the same time he lent assistance to Ariobarzanes; and as a reward for these services Athens obtained the cession of Sestus. Sestus was of special value, from its position on the Hellespont, securing to Athens control at this point over the ships which supplied her with corn from the Euxine coasts. But more than this, she now regained a foothold in the Thracian Chersonese. Thus Athens began to revive her old empire, but in Samos she revealed her designs even more clearly. This island was not treated as a subject ally, but outsettlers were sent to occupy it, and thus the system of cleruchies, which had been the most unpopular feature of the first confederacy, and had been expressly guarded against at the formation of the second confederacy, was renewed. 366 B.C. 365 B.C.

Timotheus was likewise successful in the north. He compelled Methone and Pydna to join the Athenian confederacy; and in the Chalcidic peninsula he made himself master of Potidæa and Torone.

It was high time for Thebes to interfere. If the successes of Timotheus were allowed to continue, Athens would soon recover Eubœa, and the adhesion of that island was, from its geographical position, of the highest importance to Bœotia. But in order to check the advance of her neighbor, it would be necessary for Thebes to grapple with her on her own element. By the advice of Epaminondas, it was resolved to create a navy and enter upon the career of a sea power. A hundred triremes were built and manned and sent to the Propontis under the Bœotarch, Epaminondas. The sailing of this fleet was a blow to Athens, from the support and encouragement which it gave to those members of the confederacy which were eager to break their bonds. Byzantium openly re- 364-362 B.C. 364 B.C.

belled; Rhodes and Chios negotiated with Epaminondas; and even Ceos, close to Attica itself, defied Athens, but was reduced by Chabrias.

364 B.C.

Meanwhile, a Theban army had marched against the ally of Athens, Alexander of Pheræ, whose hand, strengthened by a mercenary force, had been heavy against the Thessalians. Once more, but for the last time, Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and advanced against Pheræ itself. Alexander came forth to meet him with a large force, and it was a matter of great importance, for the purpose of barring the Theban advance, to occupy the heights known as Cynoscephalæ, or the Dog's Heads, on the road from Pharsalus to Pheræ. The armies reached the critical spot nearly at the same time, and there was a rush for the crests. Pelopidas, by a combined assault of horse and foot, at length won the summit and forced the enemy to give way. But in the moment of victory the impetuous general espied the hated despot in whose dungeon he had languished, and yielding to a fit of passion, he forgot the duties of a general and rushed against his enemy. Alexander withdrew into the midst of his guards, and Pelopidas, plunging desperately after him, was overwhelmed by numbers. The death of Pelopidas was not fatal to his followers, who routed the enemy with heavy loss; but it was a sore blow both to his own Thebes and to Thessaly. In the following year, an army was sent against Pheræ, and avenged his death. Alexander was obliged to relinquish all his possessions except his own city and submit to the headship of Thebes.

**7. War on the Peloponnesus. Battle of Olympia.** — The Arcadian confederacy was threatened with dissolution. Elis, seeking to recover her territory, allied herself with Sparta. Arcadia, in revenge, determined that the next Olympic games should not be held under the time-honored presidency of Elis, but revived the ancient claim of Pisa. To support this move, they sent a force which occupied and fortified the Hill of Cronus above Olympia, and when the games came round, the whole army of the con-

federacy, with contingents from Athens and from Argos, arrived to protect the celebration. The horse-race had been run, and the pentathlon, or contest of five-feats — running, wrestling, hurling the javelin, throwing the disc, and leaping — was in progress, when the men of Elis marched up and attacked. A battle ensued and they were driven back, but all Greece was outraged by the violence done at the holy time. Sympathy was on the side of Elis from the first, and far more so when the Arcadians began to use the sacred treasures of Olympia to pay their army.



364 B.C.

COIN OF ELIS (OBVERSE). HEAD OF FERA [LEGEND: FA]

Jealousies were already rife in the federation, and Mantinea seized the excuse of this scandal to secede. In the league itself there arose a party which favored alliance with Sparta rather than to endure to be dependent on Thebes. The Bœotians, to maintain their power in the Peloponnesus, sent a fourth invading army under Epaminondas. He advanced to Tegea while his enemies were gathering at Mantinea, Tegea's rival. 362 B.C.

**8. Battle of Mantinea. The Death of Epaminondas.** — Agesilaus led his forces to protect Mantinea, thus leaving Sparta open to attack. Learning this, Epaminondas determined to strike another blow at the now unprotected city and with this in view made a night march from Tegea to Sparta. His plans, however, were betrayed to Agesilaus, who hurried back to defend his capital, and Epaminondas was thwarted a second time. But by this movement Agesilaus had left Mantinea unguarded and Epaminondas sent his cavalry to surprise that city. This surprise also was foiled by the unexpected appearance of some Athenian troops who drove back the Theban force.

Thus foiled in his two projects of surprise, Epaminondas was forced to attack the united enemy at Mantinea. He adopted the same tactics by which he had won at Leuctra. On the

left he placed the Bœotian hoplites, under his own immediate command, in a deep column, destined to break through the right wing of the enemy before the rest of the armies could come to blows. All fell out as he designed. His cavalry routed their cavalry, and the force of his wedge of hoplites, led by himself, broke through the opposing array and put the Lacedæmonians to flight. The men of Achæa and Elis and the rest, when they saw the flight of the Spartans, wavered before they came into collision with their own opponents.

It was a great Theban victory, and yet a chance determined that this victory should be the death-blow to the supremacy of Thebes. As he pursued the retreating foe, at the head of his Thebans, Epaminondas received a mortal thrust from a spear. When the news spread through the field, the pursuit was stayed and the effect of the victory was undone; the troops fell back like beaten men. There was no one to take his place. In his dying moments, before the point of the fatal spear was extracted, Epaminondas asked for Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he destined as his successors. He was told that they were slain. "Then," he said, "make peace with the enemy." Peace was made on condition that things should remain as they were; Megalopolis and Messenia were recognized — the abiding results of Theban policy.

Great as were the genius, character, and achievements of Epaminondas, he did not build to last. He did not create what Bœotia needed — an efficient machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs. He did not seriously grapple with the question whether or no Bœotia should attempt to become a maritime power. Above all he did not succeed in welding Bœotia into a real national unity. His work died with him. Epaminondas was a great general — not a great statesman.

## REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 89)

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Holm, III, 93-103. Bury, 591-598. Curtius, IV, 410-420.
2. Policy of Epaminondas in the Peloponnesus.  
Holm, III, 105-115. Bury, 596-612.
3. End of Theban Leadership; Mantinea.  
Holm, III, 118-128. Bury, 619-626. Curtius, IV, 503-510.



## CHAPTER XVII

### THE SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE

**1. Carthaginian Destruction of Selinus and Himera.** — The victories of Salamis and Himera were practically simultaneous. In the west as in the east, Greece repulsed the barbarian. But when Persia and Carthage, after long quiescence, saw the greatest city of eastern Greece in deadly conflict with the greatest city of western Greece, Carthage, like Persia, again encroached upon the Greek.



COIN OF SYRACUSE, ENGRAVED BY CIMON (OBVERSE). HEAD OF ARETHUSA [LEGEND: ΑΡΕΘΟΥΣΑ; SIGNATURE OF ΚΙΜΩΝ ON HEADBAND]



COIN OF ACRAGAS (OBVERSE). EAGLE TEARING HARE; SHELL AS SYMBOL OF THE SEASHORE [LEGEND: ΑΚΡΑΓΑΝΤΙΝΩΝ]

At Syracuse, as at Athens, victory over the invader was followed by a democratic movement. Hermocrates, the leading citizen, was indeed an oligarch, but during his absence with the fleet sent to help Sparta in the Ægean, he was banished on the motion of his opponent Diocles. At this juncture a new feud between Segesta and Selinus was the pretext for a new invasion. Segesta appealed to Carthage, where one of the two shophets or judges was

410 B.C.

Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who was slain at Himera. At his instance a great expedition was sent against Selinus, which was inadequately fortified; the place was sacked and the people slaughtered. Hannibal now proceeded to his real purpose, vengeance on Himera. The city had time to prepare, and help came from Syracuse under Diocles. But the Carthaginians, by a stratagem, drew off Diocles with his fleet for three days, and the town was carried by a desperate assault when the returning ships were actually in sight. Hannibal slaughtered three thousand prisoners to appease the shade of his grandfather, and utterly demolished the town.

2. **Rise of Dionysius.** — Carthage, determined to subdue all Greek Sicily, made ready another great expedition and attacked Acragas, then at the height of its prosperity. The defense was conducted by the Spartan Dexippus, and soon after the beginning of the siege the invaders, under Hannibal and Himilco, were defeated outside the walls by a relieving army from Syracuse. The Punic army, short of supplies, was threatened with disaster; but Hannibal intercepted provision ships coming to the town, and reversed the situation. The mercenary troops deserted the defenders, and the citizens abandoned their city by night. Acragas became a Carthaginian town. At Syracuse men felt the great jeopardy in which Sicily now stood; and there was one man who saw in this jeopardy the opportunity of his own ambition, — Dionysius, — a man of obscure birth, who had been a clerk in a public office. He had marked himself out by his energy and bravery before the walls of Acragas. He saw the incompetence of the democratic government of his city, and he determined to overthrow it. An assembly was held to consider the situation. Dionysius arose, and in a violent harangue accused the generals of treachery. The generals were deposed, and a new board was appointed, of which Dionysius was one. This was only the first step on the road which was to lead to the *tyrannis*. He soon began to discredit his colleagues; and spread reports that they were disloyal to Syracuse.

Presently he openly accused them, and the people elected him sole general with sovereign powers to meet the instant danger. The next step was to procure a bodyguard. The assembly at Syracuse would certainly not have granted such an instrument of tyranny. But Dionysius ordered the Syracusan army to march to Leontini, which was now a Syracusan dependency. He encamped near the town, and during the night a rumor was spread about that the general's life had been attempted. An assembly was held next day, which, when Dionysius laid bare the designs of his enemies, voted him a bodyguard of six hundred; and he had won over the mercenaries to his cause.

**3. Tyranny of Dionysius.** — These were the three steps in the "despot's progress." The democracy, of course, was not formally overthrown; Dionysius held no office that upset the constitution. Things went on as at Athens under Pisistratus; the assembly met and passed decrees and elected magistrates.

405 B.C.

The justification of the power of Dionysius lay in the need of a champion against Carthage. He set out with a great fleet and army to relieve Gela, which was already beleaguered. But a plan of attack failed, by reason of his half-heartedness, and he ordered the people to evacuate the town. On his way back he also ordered the abandonment of Camarina. Syracuse in disgust rose against him, but he forced his way in. A treaty, probably arranged beforehand, was then concluded with Carthage, confirming Carthage in her conquests, but recognizing Dionysius as ruler of Syracuse. He thus secured Punic aid to build up the town, which he would one day use against Carthage. Under Dionysius Syracuse became the leading European power on the Mediterranean.

His tyranny lasted thirty-eight years, till the end of his life. The forms of the constitution were maintained, and he was nominally elected; but his foreign bodyguard was the prop of his power. Yet he owed his long success, also, to a wise principle of tyranny. He was cruel and oppressive only for political ends, not for personal desires.

His first concern was to establish himself in a stronghold. He made the island a fortress barred off by a wall from the mainland, and entered only by passing under five successive gates. The Lesser Harbor, which became the chief naval arsenal, was included in these fortifications: its mouth was closed by a mole with a gate through which only one galley passed at a time. Further, he made friends for himself by rewarding adherents and by enfranchising slaves with confiscations from his opponents. Then he proceeded to a career of conquest. The Ionian cities of Naxos and Catane were taken by treachery, their inhabitants were sold, and Naxos destroyed. Leontini submitted, and its inhabitants were transferred to Syracuse. This was an offense to Carthage, and Dionysius provided against the struggle by fortifying his city on a huge scale. The heights of Epipolæ were included in the walls, and a great castle was built at the important point of Euryalos, whose ruins still are a monument of Greek Syracuse at the height of her power.

His military preparations were not less notable and original. He first thought out and taught how the heterogeneous parts of a military armament — the army and the navy, the cavalry and the infantry, the heavy and the light troops — might be closely and systematically coördinated so as to act as if they were a single organic body. He introduced the catapult, invented by his engineers, which revolutionized siege-warfare, and brought a new element into military operations. An engine which hurled a stone of two or three hundredweight for a distance of two or three hundred yards was extremely formidable.

**4. Punic Wars of Dionysius.** — When his preparations were complete, Dionysius went forth to do what no Greek leader in Sicily had ever done before. He went forth not merely to deliver Greek cities from Phœnician rule, but to conquer Phœnician Sicily itself. At the head of eighty thousand foot and three thousand horse, he laid siege to Motya. This city was an island town connected by a causeway with the land, and the inhabitants broke down the

398-397 B.C.

causeway. Dionysius set to building a much greater mole from which to work his engines. Towers of six stories high were brought up to the walls, and the battle was waged in mid-air. The town was defended from street to street, till at last a night assault finished the business.


Carthage now bestirred herself. Himilco gained Eryx by treachery, and recovered Motya. He then turned upon Messena, and razed the place, though the inhabitants escaped into the neighboring hills. The Syracusan fleet, under the brother of Dionysius, came against the Carthaginians, but was routed at Catane; and soon Himilco with his victorious fleet sailed into the Great Harbor at Syracuse, while the army encamped along the banks of the Anapus. But the siege was protracted, and the Carthaginian camp, pitched in a swamp in the burning heat, was ravaged by pestilence; and suddenly Dionysius made a joint attack on the fleet and camp. It was wholly successful: the fleet was destroyed; the forts which protected the camp were taken. The whole armament might have been annihilated like that of Athens, had not Dionysius accepted three hundred talents from Himilco to connive at the escape of all Carthaginian citizens. The tyrant felt that if the Carthaginians vanished from Sicily, his autocracy would be endangered; and he made no effort to drive them from their old station in the western corner of the island. Another Punic War broke out five years later, in which Dionysius won possession of Solus, the most easterly Carthaginian city. The peace which concluded it placed all the Greek cities in Sicily, and also the Sicels, under the power of Syracuse.

**5. The Empire of Dionysius. His Death.** — Having made himself master of all Greek Sicily, the lord of Syracuse began to plan the conquest of Greek Italy. Here, as in other things, Dionysius was an innovator; he set the example of enterprises of conquest beyond the sea.

He had rebuilt and resettled Messena, and now he attacked Rhegium, opposite it on the strait. But the confederate cities of

397 B.C.

392 B.C.





the Italian coast came to the rescue, and defeated Dionysius, who declared war on the federation. He besieged Caulonia, and the federal army came out from Croton to oppose him. Dionysius was victorious, and ten thousand fugitives cut off on a high hill without water were forced to surrender at discretion, and Dionysius told them off with a wand as they passed him, each man expecting bondage, if not death. They were let go without even a ransom. This act of mercy produced a great sensation, and its wisdom was soon approved. The communities to which the captives belonged voted him golden crowns and made separate treaties with him. Only Rhegium, Caulonia, and Hipponion stood out; the two smaller towns were taken, and their people transplanted to Syracuse. Rhegium stood a siege of ten months, but was at last reduced, and all its inhabitants who could not find ransoms were sold into slavery. He was now master of both sides of the strait, and held the fortress which was the bulwark of Greek Italy. Eight years later he captured Croton, and his power in Italy reached its greatest height.

In the meantime, Dionysius was pushing even farther afield, and planting colonies on both shores of the Adriatic. The Syracusan empire now included the greater portion of Sicily and the southern peninsula of Italy. It had remoter dependencies, allies rather than subjects, in Thurii and other Italian cities north of the Crathis; in Iapygia, on the heel of Italy; in the kingdom of Molossia, on the Epirot coast, and in some seaboard parts of Illyria. But the maintenance of this empire forced Dionysius to lay upon the Syracusans a most burdensome taxation. It is little wonder that the tyrant had an evil repute in the mother-country.

It was only for a moment that the dominion of the Syracusan despot reached its extreme limits. He had hardly won the city and lands of Croton, when his borders fell back in the west of his own island. A new war with Carthage had broken out, and a battle was fought at Cronion, near Panormus, and Dionysius was defeated with terrible loss, and compelled to make a disadvan-

389 B.C.

383 B.C.

tageous peace. The boundary of Greek against Punic Sicily was withdrawn from the river Mazarus to the river Halycus. This 378 B.C. means that the deliverer of Selinus and Thermæ gave back those cities to the mercies of the barbarian.

Ten years later Dionysius made war once more upon Carthage, and for the second time he invaded Punic Sicily. He delivered Selinus, and captured Eryx along with its haven Drepanon. But he failed in an attempt upon Lilybæum, which the Carthaginians had founded to take the place of Motya, and he lost a large part of his fleet. This was the last undertaking of the great "ruler of Sicily." He died before peace was concluded, of a strange cause. He was a dramatic poet, and had frequently competed with his tragedies at Athens, but had never won first prize. Now, to console him for his failures, came the news that his *Ransom of Hector* had gained first place at the Lenæan festival. In his joy he drank indiscreetly, fever followed, and a narcotic administered to him 367 B.C. brought on the sleep of death.

**6. Dionysius the Younger and Dion.** — The empire of Dionysius descended to his son, Dionysius, a youth not without amiable qualities, but of the nature that is easily swayed to good or evil. At first he was under the influence of Dion, who had been the most trusted minister of the elder Dionysius in the latter part of his reign, and who might easily have made himself tyrant. But Dion desired to get rid of tyranny. He was the friend of Plato, and his hope was to establish at Syracuse an ideal constitution, such as Plato had sketched.

No welcome could have been more honorable and flattering than that which Plato received. He engaged the respect and admiration of Dionysius, and the young tyrant was easily brought to regard tyranny as a vile thing and to cherish the plan of building up a new constitution. But Plato insisted on imparting to his pupil a systematic course of philosophical training, and began with the science of geometry. The tyrant took up the study with eagerness; his court was absorbed in geometry; but he presently wearied

of it. And then influences which were opposed to the scheme of Dion and Plato began to tell.

Those who were entirely adverse to the proposed reforms insinuated that the true object of Dion was to secure the tyranny for one of his own nephews, and at last an indiscreet letter of Dion gave them the means of success. Syracuse and Carthage were negotiating peace, and Dion wrote to the Carthaginian judges not to act without first consulting him. The letter was intercepted and was interpreted as treason. Dion was banished from Sicily.

57 B.C.

Dion betook himself to Old Greece and made Athens his headquarters. At length Dion, deeming that the time for action had come, landed in southwestern Sicily with a small force. Dionysius had departed for Italy with eighty ships. Learning this, Dion marched to Syracuse, picking up reënforcements, both Greek and Sicel, on his way, and entered Syracuse amid general rejoicings. The assembly placed the government in the hands of twenty generals, Dion among them.

Dion was not a man who could hold the affections of the people, for he repelled men by his exceeding haughtiness; a rival appeared on the scene who possessed more popular manners. This was a certain Heraclides with whom he was forced to share the power. In the meantime, Dionysius, whose forces held the island, after making assaults with varying success, resolved to surrender to Dion and withdraw to Locri; thus leaving Dion in a position to become master of Syracuse.

Dion professed to have come to give Syracuse freedom. The Syracusan citizens wanted the restoration of their democracy but he desired to establish an aristocracy, with some democratic limitations, and with a king, or kings, as in Sparta. The Syracusans longed to see the fortress of the tyrant demolished; Dion allowed it to remain, and its existence seemed a standing invitation to tyranny. His authority was only limited by the joint command of Heraclides, and at last he was brought to consent that his rival should be secretly assassinated. After this he was to all

purposes tyrant, though he might repudiate tyranny with his lips. Finally he was murdered; and in the next eight years no less than four different tyrants held Syracuse. Then Dionysius regained Ortygia. 354 B.C. 346 B.C.

7. **Timoleon.**—The Sicilian Greeks, bent with a plague of tyrannies, and threatened with a new Carthaginian armament, appealed to Corinth. Corinth sent them Timoleon, a man who had first saved his brother's life in battle and then slain that brother for plotting a tyranny. Timoleon arrived with ten ships, and established himself at the Sicel town of Hadranum. City after city joined him, and presently Dionysius proposed to surrender Ortygia and retire with his private property to Corinth. This was agreed to, and the tyrant ended his life at Corinth in obscurity. The rest of Syracuse was held by Hiketas, tyrant of Leontini, and to help Hiketas came a Punic fleet under Mago. But Mago, suspecting treachery among his Greek mercenaries, withdrew, Hiketas was driven out, and Syracuse was free. The fortress of Dionysius was pulled down, and proclamation made recalling banished citizens and inviting settlers. Timoleon went on to do the same work in other Sicilian towns. 344 B.C.

But Carthage was preparing a great effort. An armament landed at Lilybæum, having in the host the "Sacred Band" of 2500 Carthaginian citizens. They decided to march across Sicily, and Timoleon went to meet them with an army of 9000 in all. The armies met at the Crimisus, the Greeks being on a hill above the river. The Punic war-chariots crossed first, and after them the Sacred Band. Timoleon attacked, while the host was divided by the river; his cavalry was driven back by the chariots, but the infantry reached the Sacred Band, and failing to break the shield wall with spears, took to their swords, when skill and quickness told. The Sacred Band was routed; and in the face of the rest of the host came down a tempest of wind-driven rain and hail. In the muddy ground the lighter-armed Greeks had an advantage, and the storm swelled the Crimisus to a furious torrent behind the 339 B.C.

beaten army. Fifteen thousand prisoners were secured; ten thousand killed in the fight; rich spoils of gold and silver taken. Timoleon had gained a victory which may be set beside Gelon's at Himera.

Having now delivered Sicily both from despots and from foreign powers, Timoleon, a man unique in Greek history, laid down the power intrusted to him. The Syracusans gave him a property near Syracuse, and there he dwelt till his death, two years after his crowning victory. Occasionally he visited the city when the folk wished to ask for his counsel, but he had become blind, and these visits were rare. He was lamented by all Greek Sicily, and at Syracuse his memory was preserved by a group of public buildings called after him.

#### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 89)

1. Dionysius I.

Botsford, 239-245. Holm, III, 130-142. Bury, 639-669.

2. Timoleon.

Botsford, 245-249. Holm, III, 401-409. Bury, 673-679.

Sources. Plutarch, Timoleon.



ALLIANCE COIN (HEMIDRACHM, ENLARGED) OF LEONTINI AND CATANE. OBVERSE: HEAD OF APOLLO WREATHED WITH BAY; BAY LEAF AND BERRY [LEGEND: AEON (τινων)]. REVERSE: BULL (RIVER SIMÆTHOS); FISH BELOW [LEGEND: KATANAIΩN]

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE RISE OF MACEDONIA

**1. Macedonia.** — The death of Epaminondas and collapse of Thebes left Athens the leading state in Greece, and she would doubtless have formed a new empire but for the growth of two out-lying semi-Hellenic powers, Macedon and Caria. She recovered the Chersonese with the command of the Propontis, and won back Eubœa to her league; it seemed even likely that she would regain Amphipolis, but this project, bringing her into collision with Macedon, opened a new chapter in Greek history.

In their fortress of Ægæ the Macedonian kings had ruled for ages with absolute sway over the lands on the northern and north-western coasts of the Thermaic Gulf, which formed Macedonia in the strictest sense. The Macedonian people and their kings were of Greek stock, as their traditions and the scanty remains of their language combine to testify. They were a military people, and they extended their power westward and northward over the peoples of the hills, so that Macedonia in the wide sense of the name reached to the borders of the Illyrians in the west and of the Pæonians in the north. In fact, the Macedonian kingdom consisted of two heterogeneous parts, and the Macedonian kings had two different characters. Over the Greek Macedonians of the coast the king ruled immediately; they were his own people, his own "Companions." Over the Illyric folks of the hills he was only overlord; they were each subject to their own chieftain, and the chieftains were his unruly vassals. Macedonia could never become a great power until these vassal peoples had been brought



under the direct rule of the kings, and until the Illyrian and Pæonian neighbors had been taught a severe lesson.

The kings had made some efforts to introduce Greek civilization into their land. Archelaus had succeeded in making his court at Pella a center for famous artists and poets, such as Zeuxis, the painter, and Euripides. But no law bound the Macedonian monarch; his subjects had only one solitary right against him. In the case of a capital charge, the king could not put a Macedonian to death without the authority of a general assembly. Fighting and hunting were the chief occupations of this vigorous people. A Macedonian who had not killed his man wore a cord round his waist; and until he had slain a wild boar he could not sit at table with the men.



COIN OF ARCHELAUS  
I. (OBSERVE).  
HORSEMAN WITH  
TWO SPEARS

2. **Early Conquests of Philip II. of Macedonia.**—The usurping regent Ptolemy had been slain by his ward, the young King Perdiccas. Six years later the Illyrians swooped down upon Macedonia, and Perdiccas was slain in battle. It was a critical moment for the kingdom; the Pæonians menaced it in the north, and from the east a Thracian



COIN OF PHILIP II. OBTVERSE: HEAD OF LAUREATE ZEUS. REVERSE: HORSE AND JOCKEY; THUNDERBOLT BELOW [LEGEND: ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΥ]

army was advancing to set a pretender on the throne. The rightful heir, Amyntas, the son of the slain king, was a child. But there was one man in the land who was equal to the situation — this child's uncle, Philip; and he took the government and the guardianship of the boy into his own hands. Philip, as one of the hostages carried off to Thebes, had lived there for a few

years, and had drunk in the military and political wisdom of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. He was now twenty-four years old. His first step was to buy off the Pæonians by a large sum of money, his next to get rid of the pretenders. One of these, Argæus, was assisted by a strong fleet. Philip defeated him, and did all in his power to come to terms with Athens. He released without ransom the Athenians whom he had made prisoners in the battle; and he renounced all claim to the possession of Amphipolis.

He then turned his forces against the Pæonians and Illyrians, whom he defeated in two decisive battles. With his territory now cleared of invaders, he began to push eastward to gain possession of the rich gold mines in Thrace. But in order to control these he must become master of Amphipolis, which commanded the Strymon. To disarm the suspicions of the Athenians, he promised to turn over Amphipolis to them in exchange for the free town of Pydna. He broke his word, and they cried out; but their own part of the agreement was a shameful act of treachery to Pydna, their ally. When Philip had taken Am-



GOLD COIN OF PHILIPPI. OBVERSE: HEAD OF HERACLES. REVERSE: TRIPOD; PALM ABOVE; PHRYGIAN CAP [LEGEND: ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΥ]

phipolis, he converted the Thasian settlement of Crenides into a great fortress, which he called after his own name, Philippi. The yield of the gold mines amounted at least to one thousand talents a year. No Greek state was so rich. The old capital, Ægæ, was now definitely abandoned, and the seat of government was established at Pella.

Not long afterward Philip captured Pydna. He then took Potidæa, but instead of keeping it for himself, handed it over to the Olynthians. Thus he dexterously propitiated the Olynthians 356 B.C. — intending to devour them on some future day. With the exception of Methone, the Athenians had no foothold now on the coasts of the Thermaic Gulf.

3. **The Organization of the Macedonian Army.** — Having established his mining town, Philip assumed the royal title, setting his nephew aside, and devoted himself during the next few years to the consolidation of his kingdom, and the creation of a national army. It was in these years that he made Macedonia.



THE GROWTH OF THE POWER OF MACEDONIA

His task was to unite the hill tribes, along with his own Macedonians of the coast, into one nation. The means by which he accomplished this was by military organization. He made the highlanders into professional soldiers, and kept them always under arms. Both infantry and cavalry were indeed organized in territorial regiments; but common interests tended to obliterate these distinctions, and they were done away with under Philip's son. The heavy cavalry were called "Companions" of the king. Among the infantry there was one body of "Royal" guards, the silver-shielded *Hypaspistæ*.

The famous Macedonian phalanx, which Philip drilled, was merely a modified form of the usual battle-line of Greek spearmen. The men in the phalanx stood freer, in a more open array, and used a longer spear; so that the whole line was more easily wielded, and the effect was produced, not merely by sheer pressure, but by the skillful manipulation of weapons. Nor was the phalanx intended to decide a battle, like the deep columns of Epaminondas; its function was to keep the front of the foe in play, while the cavalry, in wedge-like squadrons, rode into the flanks.

But Greece paid little heed to the things which Philip was doing. When Philip married Olympias, the daughter of an Epirot prince, the event could cause no sensation; the birth of Alexander a year later stirred no man's heart in Greece; for who, in his wildest dreams, could have foreseen in the Macedonian infant the greatest conqueror who had yet been born into the world? If it had been revealed to men that a new power had started up, they would have turned their eyes, not to Pella, but to Halicarnassus.

**4. Mausolus of Caria.** — Caria, like Macedonia, was peopled by a double race, the native Carians and the Greek settlers on the coast. The native Carians were farther removed than the Illyrians from the Greeks. Yet the Carians were in closer touch with Greece than the Greeks of Macedonia. The Carian cities, to all appearance Greek towns, had nominally free assemblies, like Athens under Pisistratus; but they were all subject to one ruler, the "dynast," who was officially recognized as satrap of Persia. Mausolus, second of these native

satraps, annexed Lycia, and, aiming at a naval power, changed his capital from inland Mylasa to Halicarnassus on the sea. His special object was to win the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, discontented members of the Athenian league; and at his instigation they revolted jointly, and were joined by Byzantium.

c. Oct.,  
356 B.C.



COIN OF MAUSOLUS (REVERSE). ZEUS LABRANDEUS WITH TWY-AXE; WREATH [LEGEND: ΜΑΥΣΕΩΑΑΟ]

54 B.C.

Athens immediately sent naval forces to Chios, but failed to regain the island. Soon afterward negotiations were opened with the revolted allies, and a peace was made. Athens recognized the independence of the three islands, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and of the city of Byzantium. It was not long before Lesbos also severed itself from the Athenian alliance, which thus lost all its important members in the eastern Ægean; and in the west Corcyra fell away about the same time.

53 B.C.

All happened as Mausolus foresaw. He helped the oligarchies to overthrow the popular governments, and then gave them the protection of Carian garrisons. But soon after the success of his policy against Athens, he died, leaving his power to his widow, Artemisia. The expansion of the Carian power, which seemed probable under the active administration of Mausolus, was never fulfilled. A statue of the prince, now in the British Museum, stood, along with that of Artemisia, within the tomb which he probably began, and which she certainly completed. It rose above the harbor at Halicarnassus, adorned with friezes wrought by four of the most illustrious sculptors of the day, of whom Scopas himself was one. From it is derived the word Mausoleum.

**5. Phocis and the Sacred War.** — In the meantime, another of the states of northern Greece seemed likely to win the position of supremacy. Phocis came forward in her turn. Thebes, however, decided to check her rival through the old Amphictionic league in which Epaminondas had won her an influence; at an Amphictionic assembly, a number of rich and prominent Phocians were condemned to pay large fines for some act of sacrilege. When these sums were not paid within the prescribed time, the Amphictions decreed that the lands of the defaulters should be taken from them and consecrated to the Delphian god.

The accused determined to resist. Their leader, Philomelus, discerned clearly that mercenaries would be required to defend Phocis against her enemies, — Bœotians, Locrians,



and Thessalians, — and boldly seized the treasure at Delphi, which enabled him to hire troops. The next object of 356 B.C.



BOEOTIA

Philomelus was to enlist Hellenic opinion in his favor. He sent envoys to Sparta, to Athens, to Thebes itself, to say that in seizing Delphi the Phocians were simply resuming their rights over the temple, and to declare that they were ready to allow all the treasures to be weighed and numbered, and to be responsible to Greece for their safety. In consequence of these embassies, Sparta allied herself with Phocis, while Athens and some smaller states promised their support.



COIN OF DELPHIC AMPHICTIONY (FOURTH CENTURY). OBERSE: DEMETER, WITH VEIL AND CROWN OF CORN. REVERSE: APOLLO, SITTING ON OMPHALOS, LEANING ON LYRE [LEGEND: AMΦΙΚΤΙΟΝ]



The Amphictionic assembly met at Thermopylæ, and it was decided that an Amphictionic army should rescue Delphi. But by offering large pay, Philomelus assembled an army of ten thousand men, who cared little whence the money came. An indecisive war followed, till at length the Phocians underwent a severe defeat on the north side of Mount Parnassus, and Philomelus perished.

354 B.C.

**6. Intervention of Philip of Macedonia.**—His successor Onomarchus reorganized the troops, and entered upon a short career of signal successes. He reduced Doris, gained Thermopylæ, and made an alliance with the tyrants of Phæræ. This induced Philip to intervene, and marks a new stage in the course of the Sacred War. But Onomarchus defeated the Macedonian army in two battles with serious loss, and Philip was compelled to withdraw into Macedonia.

353 B.C.

At this moment, the power of the Phocians was at its height. Their supremacy reached from the shores of the Corinthian Gulf to the slopes of Olympus. They were masters of the pass of Thermopylæ, and they had two important posts in western Bœotia. But Philip of Macedon speedily retrieved the humiliation which he had suffered at the hands of his Phocian foes. In the following year he descended again into Thessaly, and in a decisive battle defeated the Phocian army, and thus became master of Thessaly. He now prepared to march southward for the purpose of delivering the shrine of Apollo from the possession of the Phocians, whom he professed to regard as sacrilegious usurpers.

Phocis was now in great need, and her allies — Sparta, Achæa, and Athens — at length determined to give her active help. The Macedonian must not be permitted to pass Thermopylæ. The statesman Eubulus, now predominant at Athens, acted promptly on this occasion, and sent a large force to defend the pass. Philip at once recognized that it would be extremely hazardous to attempt to force the position, and he retired. Thus Phocis was rescued for the time.

352 B.C.

7. **Aims of Philip.** — No sooner had Philip returned from Thessaly than he moved against Thrace, and forced the king, Cersobleptes, to submit. His movements were so rapid that Athens had no time to come to the rescue. When the news arrived, there was a panic, and an armament was voted to save the Chersonese. But a new message came that Philip had fallen ill; then he was reported dead; and the sending of the armament was postponed. Philip's illness was a fact; it compelled him to desist from further operations, and the Chersonesus was saved.

Eight years had not elapsed since Philip had mounted the throne of Macedon; and he had altered the whole prospect of the Greek world. He had created an army, and a thoroughly adequate revenue; he had made himself lord of almost the whole seaboard of the northern Ægean from the defile of Thermopylæ to the shores of the Propontis. The only lands which were still excepted from his direct or indirect sway were the Chersonesus and the territory of the Chalcidian league. He was ambitious to secure a recognized hegemony in Greece; to form, in fact, a confederation of allies, which should hold some such dependent relation toward him as the confederates of Delos had held toward Athens. Rumors were already floating about that his ultimate design was to lead a Panhellenic expedition against the Persian king. Though the Greek states regarded Philip as in a certain sense an outsider, it must never be forgotten that Philip desired to identify Macedonia with Greece, and to bring his own country up to the level of the kindred peoples which had so far outstripped it in civilization. Throughout his whole career he regarded Athens with respect, and would have given much for her friendship. He was himself imbued with Greek culture; and if the robust Macedonian enjoyed the society of the somewhat rude boon companions of his own land with whom he could drink deep, he knew how to make himself agreeable to Attic men of letters. He chose Aristotle of Stagira, who had been educated at Athens, to be the instructor of his son Alexander.


8. **Demosthenes.**—In these years Athens was under the guidance of a cautious statesman, Eubulus. He pursued a peace policy; yet it was he who struck the one effective blow that Athens ever struck at Philip, when she hindered him from passing Thermopylæ. The news of Philip's campaign in Thrace may have temporarily weakened his influence; and his opponents had a fair opportunity to inveigh against an inactive policy. The most prominent among these opponents was Demosthenes. His father was an Athenian manufacturer, who died when Demosthenes was still a child; his guardians dealt fraudulently with the considerable fortune left him; and when he came of age he resolved to recover it. For this purpose he sat at the feet of the orator Isæus, and was trained in law and rhetoric. Demosthenes used himself to tell how he struggled to overcome his natural defects of speech and manner until he became the most applauded orator in Athens.

351 B.C.

The advance of Philip to the Propontis now gave him occasion for that political harangue, known as the First Philippic, one of his most brilliant and effective speeches, calling upon the Athenians to brace themselves vigorously to oppose Philip, "our enemy." He draws a lively picture of the indifference of his countrymen and contrasts it with the energy of Philip, "who is not the man to rest content with what he has subdued, but is always adding to his conquests, and casts his snare around us while we sit at home postponing."

Demosthenes proposed a scheme for increasing the military forces of the city; and the most essential part of the scheme was that a force should be sent to Thrace, of which a quarter should consist of citizens, and the officers should be citizens. The orator was applauded, but nothing was done. His ideal was the Athens of Pericles; but he lived in the Athens of Eubulus. The Athenians were quite capable of holding their own among their old friends and enemies, the Spartans and Thebans and the islanders of the Ægean; with paid soldiers and generals like Iphicrates and Chares

they could maintain their position as a first-rate power. Athens was still the great sea power of the Ægean, well able to protect her commerce. But against a large, vigorous land power, with a formidable army, her chances were hopeless; for, since the fall of



PORTRAIT HEAD OF DEMOSTHENES

their empire, the whole spirit of the people had tended to peace and not to war.

9. **The Advance of Macedonia. Fall of Olynthus.** — The next stage in the development of Macedonia was the incorporation of

Chalcidice. Philip sent a requisition to the Olynthians, demanding the surrender of his half-brother, a pretender to the Macedonian throne, to whom they had given shelter. The demand was refused, and Philip marched against Chalcidice. One after another the cities of the Olynthian confederacy opened their gates to him; or if they refused, they were captured.

349 B.C.

In her jeopardy Olynthus sought an alliance with Athens, and it was during the debates on this question that Demosthenes pronounced his Olynthiac orations, which were, in fact, Philippics. At this juncture the Athenians seem to have been awakened to the necessity of action sufficiently to embolden Demosthenes to throw out the unpopular suggestion that the Theoric Fund should be devoted to military purposes; and he repeated his old plea for citizen-soldiers. An alliance was concluded, and mercenaries were despatched to the Chalcidian peninsula. Philip might have been placed in some embarrassment, especially as Cersobleptes, king of Thrace, had rebelled; but he diverted the concern of Athens in another direction. He had long been engaged in intrigues in Eubœa, and now Eubœa revolted. The division of forces was fatal. Phocion was sent to Eubœa and won a battle, but returned to Athens without having recovered any of the rebellious cities. The enemy had taken a number of prisoners, for whose ransom Athens had to pay fifty talents; and the independence of Eubœa was acknowledged.

348 B.C.

Meanwhile, Philip was pressing Olynthus hard, and urgent appeals were sent to Athens. This time Demosthenes had his way, and two thousand citizen-soldiers sailed for the north. But Olynthus was captured before they reached it. The place was destroyed and the inhabitants scattered in various parts of Macedonia. The other cities of the confederacy were practically incorporated in Macedonia.

**10. The Peace of Philocrates.** — These military efforts had left Athens without money to pay the judges their daily wage. Peace was a necessity; but the fall of Olynthus, where many Athenians

had been captured, stung Athens, and an embassy was despatched to the Peloponnesus to organize a national resistance of the Greeks to the destroyer of Olynthus. The emissary chosen was the orator Æschines, famous as the antagonist of Demosthenes. He had been first a teacher in a school kept by his father, then a tragic actor, and finally a public clerk.

Philip, on his part, desired two things — to make peace with Athens and to become a member of the Amphictionic Council. Thebes now invoked his aid to crush the Phocians; and the Phocians, hearing this, sent to Athens and Sparta for help to keep Philip out of Greece. It was granted. But the Phocian commander refused to admit either Spartans or Athenians to Thermopylæ; and as it was feared that he might surrender it to Philip, the necessity for making peace with Philip grew more imperative. Ten Athenian envoys, and one representative of the Athenian allies, were sent to Pella to negotiate terms of peace with the Macedonian king. Among the envoys were Æschines and Demosthenes. The terms to which Philip agreed were that Athens and Macedon should each retain the territories of which they were actually in possession at the time the peace was concluded, and that the peace would be concluded when both sides had sworn to it. Both the allies of Macedonia and those of Athens were to be included, except the Phocians. By these terms, which were perfectly explicit, Athens would surrender her old claim to Amphipolis, and on the other hand, Philip would recognize Athens as mistress of the Chersonese. The exception which Philip made was inevitable; it was an essential part of the Macedonian policy to proceed against Phocis.

There were a few Thracian forts which Philip was anxious to capture before the peace was made; and while the Athenians debated and finally accepted the proposals, Philip captured the fortresses in Thrace and reduced its king to a vassal. When he returned to Pella, so far as the formal conclusion of the peace went there was no difficulty, but the Athenian ambassadors had received general powers to negotiate further with Philip on the



settlement of the Phocian question and northern Greece. If Philip could have had his way, the alliance would have become a bond of close friendship and coöperation. Athens might have taken her position now as joint arbitrator with Philip in the settlement of the Amphictionic question. But Demosthenes opposed such a plan; and desired an alliance with Thebes, so that both Athens and Thebes might oppose the Macedonian advance.

**11. Philip in Greece.**— Philip, in the meantime, advanced southward. The pass of Thermopylæ was opened to him; but before he reached Thermopylæ, he addressed two friendly letters to Athens, inviting her to send an army to arrange the affairs of Phocis and Bœotia. But the Athenians listened to the suggestions of Demosthenes that Philip would detain their army as hostages. Accordingly, they contented themselves with sending an embassy to convey to Philip an announcement of the decree which they had passed, calling upon the Phocians to surrender Delphi.

As it was clear that Philip could not trust Athens, owing to the attitude of Demosthenes, he was constrained to act in conjunction with her enemy, Thebes. The doom of the Phocians was decided by the Amphictionic Council, which was now convoked. The Phocians were deprived of their place in the Amphictionic body; and all their cities (with the exception of Abæ) were broken up into villages, so that they might not again be a danger to Delphi. They were obliged to undertake to pay back, by installments of sixty talents a year, the value of the treasures which they had taken from the sanctuary. The place which Phocis vacated in the Council was transferred to Macedonia, in recognition of Philip's services.

An occasion offered itself to Philip almost immediately to display publicly to the assembled Greek world the position of leadership which he had thus won. It so happened that the celebration of the Pythian games fell in the year of the peace. Athens sulked;

he sent no deputy to the Amphictionic meeting which elected Philip president for the festival, no delegates to the festival itself. A great tide of anti-Macedonian feeling had set in, which made Demosthenes henceforward her most influential counselor. Yet neither Demosthenes nor Eubulus knew the needs of Athens or of Greece. The only man of the day who really grasped the situation was the nonagenarian Isocrates. He explained in an open letter to Philip the futility of perpetuating a number of small sovereign states. The time had come to unite Greece, and to dispose of the superfluous population who went about as roving mercenaries by a great act of colonization. And he called upon Philip to lead forth the hosts of Hellas against the barbarian and win a new world.

## 12. Interval of Peace and Preparations for War (346-341 B.C.).

— Having gained for Macedonia the coveted place in the religious league of Greece, Philip spent the next year or two in improving his small navy, in settling the administration of Thessaly, and in acquiring influence in the Peloponnesus. The Thessalian cities elected the Macedonian king as their *archon*, and he set four governors over the four great divisions of the country. South of the Corinthian Isthmus, his negotiations gained him the adhesion of Messenia and Megalopolis, Elis, and Argos. Nor did Philip yet despair of achieving his chief aim, the conciliation of Athens. The veteran Eubulus was in favor of friendly relations; so were Æschines and Philocrates; and so was the incorruptible soldier Phocion. This notable person was marked among his contemporaries as an honest man, superior to all temptations of money; and, since the Athenians always prized this superhuman integrity which few of them attempted to practise, they elected him forty-five times as strategos, though in military capacity he was no more than a respectable sergeant. But his strong common-sense, which was impervious to oratory, and his exceptional probity, made him a useful member of his party.

There was one man in Athens who was firmly resolved that the

peace should be a mere interval preparatory to war. Demosthenes spent the time in inflaming the wrath of his countrymen against Philip, and in seeking to ruin his political antagonists. He went on a mission to the Peloponnesian cities, and his oratory occasioned an embassy from Pella to remonstrate. In reply to this embassy, the Second Philippic was delivered, inculcating the baseless view that Philip desired and purposed to destroy Athens.

344 B.C.

342-341 B.C.

Philip now decided to turn to one of the greatest tasks which was imposed upon the expander of Macedonia — the subjugation of Thrace. His campaign lasted ten months, and he spent a winter in the field in that wintry land, suffering from sickness as well as from the cold; for in war Philip never spared himself either hardship or danger. The Thracian king was dethroned, and his kingdom became a tributary province. This conquest threatened nearly and seriously the position of Athens at the gates of the Black Sea. Demosthenes induced Athens to attack an ally of Philip, and delivered a loud call to war — the harangue known as the Third Philippic.

341 B.C.

Envoys were sent here and there to raise the alarm. Demosthenes himself proceeded to the Propontis and succeeded in detaching Byzantium and Perinthus from the Macedonian alliance. At the same time Athenian troops were sent into Eubœa; the governments in Oreus and Eretria, which were under the influence of Philip, were overthrown, and these cities joined an independent Eubœic league. All these acts of hostility were committed without an overt breach of the peace between Athens and Philip. But the secession of Perinthus and Byzantium was a blow which Philip was not prepared to take with equanimity. When he had settled his Thracian province, he began the siege of Perinthus by land and sea. Athens remained inactive, till the king suddenly raised the siege of Perinthus and marched against Byzantium, hoping to capture it by the unexpectedness of his attack. Now Athens could no longer hold aloof when the key of the Bosphorus was in peril. A squadron under Chares was sent to help Byzantium, and

Phocion presently followed with a second fleet. Other help had come from Rhodes and Chios, and Philip was compelled to withdraw into Thrace. Demosthenes received a public vote of thanks from the Athenian people. 340 B.C.

**13. March of Philip. Alliance of Athens and Thebes.**—Philip had now no choice. The irreconcilable Demosthenes, who before the siege of Byzantium was merely an agitator, now directed affairs at Athens, and with amazing vigor. War was inevitable; and the whole hope of Demosthenes lay in alliance with Thebes. Athenian and Theban troops together might successfully resist a Macedonian invasion.

The invasion soon came, and through a curious occasion. A Sacred War was declared on some slight pretext against Amphissa; and since both Athens and Thebes stood aloof, the Amphictions called upon Philip to be their leader in this religious quarrel. Philip did not delay a moment. Advancing through the defile of Thermopylæ into northern Phocis, he seized and refortified the dismantled city of Elatea. The purpose of this action was to protect himself in the rear against Bœotia, and preserve his communications with Thermopylæ while he was operating against Amphissa. But while he halted at Elatea, he sent ambassadors to discover the intentions of Thebes. He declared that he intended to invade Attica, and called upon the Thebans to join him in the invasion, or, if they would not do this, to give his army a free passage through Bœotia.

In Athens, when the news came that the Macedonian army was at Elatea, the city was filled with consternation for a night and a day, and these anxious hours have become famous in history through the genius of the orator Demosthenes, who in later years recalled to the people the scene and their own emotions by a picturesque description which no orator has surpassed. On the advice of Demosthenes, the Athenians despatched ten envoys to Thebes; everything depended on detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance. The envoys, of whom Demosthenes was

one, were instructed to make concessions and exact none. The Athenians were ready to pay two-thirds of the expenses of the war; they abandoned their claim to Oropus, and they recognized the Bœotian dominion of Thebes. By these concessions they secured the alliance of Thebes, and Demosthenes achieved the consummation to which his policy had been directed for many years.

**14. Battle of Chæronea.**—Philip captured Amphissa and Naupactus. Then he turned back to carry the war into Bœotia, and when he entered the great western gate of that country close to Chæronea, he found the army of the allies guarding the way to Thebes and prepared to give him battle. He had 30,000 foot soldiers and 2000 horse, perhaps slightly outnumbering his foes.

Aug., 338 B.C. Their line extended over about three and a half miles, the left wing resting on Chæronea and the right on the river Cephissus. The Theban hoplites, with the Sacred Band in front, were assigned the right, which was esteemed the post of honor. In the center were ranged the troops of the lesser allies — Achæans, Corinthians, Phocians, and others. On the left stood the Athenians under three generals — Chares, Lysicles, and Stratocles, of whom Chares was a respectable soldier with considerable experience and no talent, while the other two were incompetent. Demosthenes himself was serving as a hoplite in the ranks.

We can form a general notion of the tactics of Philip. The most formidable part of the adverse array was the Theban infantry; and accordingly he posted on his own left wing the phalanx, with its more open order and long pikes. On the flank of this wing he placed his heavy cavalry, to ride down upon the Thebans when the phalanx had worn them out. The cavalry was commanded by Alexander, now a lad of eighteen. The right wing was comparatively weak, and Philip planned that it should gradually give way before the attack of the Athenians, and draw them on, so as to divide them from their allies. This plan of holding back the right wing reminds us of the tactics of Epaminondas; but the use of

cavalry to decide the combat is the characteristic feature of Philip's battles.

The Athenians pressed forward, fondly fancying that they were pressing to victory, and Stratocles in the flush of success cried, "On to Macedonia!" But, in the meantime, the Thebans had been broken by Alexander's horsemen: their leader had fallen, and the comrades of the Sacred Band were making a last hopeless stand. Philip could now spare some of his Macedonian footmen, and he moved them so as to take the Athenians in flank and rear. Against the assaults of these trained troops, the Athenians were helpless. One thousand were slain, two thousand captured, and the rest ran, Demosthenes running with the fleetest. But the Sacred Band did not flee. They fought till they fell, and it is their heroism which has won for the battle of Chæronea its glory as a struggle for liberty.

The statement that Greek liberty perished on the plain of Chæronea is misleading. Whenever a Greek state became supreme, that supremacy entailed the depression of some states and the dependency or subjection of others. But Macedon was regarded in Hellas as an outsider. This was a feeling which the southern Greeks entertained even in regard to Thessaly; and Macedonia, politically and historically as well as geographically, was some steps farther away than Thessaly. And, in the second place, Macedonian supremacy was the triumph of an absolute monarchy over free commonwealths, so that the submission of the Greek states to Macedon's king might be rhetorically branded as an enslavement to a tyrant. For these reasons the tidings of Chæronea sent a new kind of thrill through Greece.

**15. The Congress of the Greeks.** — Philip treated Thebes harshly. He punished by death or confiscation his leading opponents; he established a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and broke up the Bœotian league, giving all the cities their independence, and restoring the dismantled towns of Orchomenus and Plataea. But his dealing with Athens was usually lenient. The



truth was that Athens did not lie defenseless at his feet. The sea power of Athens saved her, and not less, perhaps, the respect which Philip always felt for her intellectual eminence. Now, at last, by unexpected leniency, he might win what he had always striven for, the moral and material support of Athens. And in Athens the policy of Demosthenes had failed, and all desired to recover the two thousand captives and avert an invasion of Attic soil. Philip offered to restore all the prisoners without ransom and not to march into Attica. The Athenians on their side were to dissolve what remained of their confederacy, and join the new Hellenic union which Philip proposed to organize. In regard to territory, Oropus was to be given to Athens, but the Chersonesus was to be surrendered to Macedonia. On these terms peace was concluded.

It was now necessary for Macedonia to win the recognition of her supremacy from the Peloponnesian states. Philip marched himself into Peloponnesus, and met with no resistance. Sparta alone refused to submit, and suffered at the hands of Philip what she had before suffered at the hands of Epaminondas — the devastation of Laconia and the diminution of her territory. Having thus displayed his arms and power in the south, the Macedonian king invited all the Greek states within Thermopylæ to send delegates to a congress at Corinth; and, with the sole exception of Sparta, all the states obeyed.

It was a federal congress: the first assembly of an Hellenic confederacy, of which the place of meeting was to be Corinth and Macedonia the head. The aim of the confederacy was understood from the first; but it would seem that it was not till the second meeting, a year later, that Philip announced his resolve to make war upon Persia, in behalf of Greece and her gods, to liberate the Greek cities of Asia, and to punish the barbarians for the acts of sacrilege which their forefathers had wrought in the days of Xerxes. It was the formal announcement that a new act in the eternal struggle between Europe and Asia was about to

begin. The federal gathering voted for the war, and elected Philip general with supreme powers. It was arranged what contingents in men or ships each city should contribute to the Panhellenic army; the Athenians undertook to send a considerable fleet.

But the new league did not unite the Greeks in the sense in which Isocrates hoped for their union. There was no zeal for the aims of the northern power, no faith in her as the guide and leader of Greece. The interests of the Greek communities remained as isolated and particular as ever. The peace which the league stipulated could not be maintained without some military stations in the midst of the country; and Philip established three Macedonian garrisons at important points: at Ambracia to watch the west, at Corinth to hold the Peloponnesus in check, and at Chalcis to control northeastern Greece.

**16. Death of Philip.** — In the spring, after the congress, his preparations for war were nearly complete, and he sent forward an advance force under Parmenio and other generals to secure the passage of the Hellespont and win a footing in the Troad and Bithynia. The rest of the army was soon to follow under his own command. But Olympias, his wife, offended at his too open infidelities, sought to avenge herself, and a tool was easily found. A certain Pausanias, an obscure man of no merit, was madly incensed against the king, who refused to do him justice. One day as Philip in solemn procession entered the theater a little in advance of his guards, Pausanias rushed forward with a dagger and laid him a corpse at the gate. The assassin was caught and killed, but the true assassin was Olympias. 336 B.C.

To none of the world's great rulers has history done less justice than to Philip. The overwhelming greatness of a son greater than himself has overshadowed him and drawn men's eyes to achievements which could never have been wrought but for Philip's lifetime of toil. In the second place, we depend for our knowledge of Philip's work almost entirely on the Athenian orators, and

especially on Demosthenes, whose main object was to misrepresent the king. Thus through chance, through the malignant eloquence of his opponent, who has held the ears of posterity, and through the very results of his own deeds, the maker and expander of Macedonia, the conqueror of Thrace and Greece, has hardly held his due place in the history of the world. The work of Alexander is the most authentic testimony to the work of Philip.

It is part of the injustice to Philip that the history of Greece during his reign has so often been treated as little more than a biography of Demosthenes. Only his political opponents would deny that Demosthenes was the most eloquent of orators and the most patriotic of citizens. But that oratory in which he excelled was one of the curses of Greek politics. The art of persuasive speech is indispensable in a free commonwealth, and, when it is wielded by a statesman or a general, — a Pericles, a Cleon, or a Xenophon, — is a noble as well as useful instrument. But once it ceases to be a merely auxiliary art, it becomes dangerous and hurtful. This is what happened at Athens. Orators took the place of statesmen, and Demosthenes was the most eminent of the class. They could all formulate striking phrases of profound political wisdom; but their school-taught lore did not carry them far against the craft of the Macedonian statesman. The men of mighty words were as children in the hands of the man of mighty deeds.

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## CHAPTER XIX

### THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA

Summer,  
336 B.C.

**1. Alexander in Greece and Thrace.** — On his accession to the throne of Macedon, Alexander found himself menaced by enemies on all sides. The members of the confederacy of Corinth, the tributary peoples of the province of Thrace, the inveterately hostile Illyrians, all saw in the death of Philip an opportunity, not to be missed, for undoing his work; and in Asia, Attalus, the father of Cleopatra, espoused the claim of Cleopatra's infant son. Alexander encountered these perils one after another, and overcame them all.

First of all, he turned to Greece, where Athens had hailed the news of Philip's death with undisguised joy, and at the instance of Demosthenes had passed a decree in honor of his murderer's memory. Ambracia expelled her Macedonian garrison, and Thebes attempted to expel hers. Of far greater importance was the insurrection of Thessaly, for the Thessalian cavalry was an invaluable adjunct to the Macedonian army.

Alexander advanced to the defile of Tempe, but found it strongly held by the Thessalians. Cutting steps up the steep side of Ossa, he made a new path for himself over the mountain and descended into the plain of the Peneus behind his enemy. Not a drop of blood was shed. A Thessalian assembly elected Alexander to the archonship, and he guaranteed to the communities of the land the same rights and privileges which they had enjoyed under his father. At Thermopylæ the young king was recognized by the amphictiony, and as he marched southward not a hand was raised against him; he had swooped down so quickly that nothing was

ready to resist. The Athenians sent a repentant embassy; and the congress of the confederacy met at Corinth to elect Alexander 336 B.C. general in his father's place.

Alexander was chosen supreme general of the Greeks for the invasion of Asia; and it was as head of Hellas, descendant and successor of Achilles, rather than as Macedonian king, that he desired to go forth against Persia. The contingents which the Greek states



ALEXANDER THE GREAT (BRITISH MUSEUM)

furnished as members of the league were small, yet the vote, however perfunctory, which elected him leader of the Greeks, was the fitting prelude to the expansion of Hellas and the diffusion of Hellenic civilization, which destiny had chosen him to accomplish. He was thus formally recognized as what he in fullest verity was, the representative of Greece.



There were symptoms of disquietude in Thrace; there were signs of a storm brewing in the Illyrian quarter; and it would have been impossible for the young king to invade Asia, with Thrace ready to revolt in his rear, and Macedonia exposed to attack from the west. Accordingly, he spent the spring of the following year in subduing unruly tribes in northern Thrace. As he marched homeward news reached him that the Illyrians were on the frontier, and by a swift march he met and defeated them near Pelion.

335 B.C.

Even as the tidings of the Illyrian danger had reached him before he left Thrace, so now, while he was still in the heart of Illyria, the news came that Thebes had rebelled.

As the patriots had often prayed for the death of Philip, so now they longed for the death of his youthful son. Rumors soon spread that the wish was fulfilled. Alexander was reported to have been slain in Thrace; and the Theban fugitives in Athens hastened to return to their native city and incite it to shake off the Macedonian yoke. Two captains of the garrison were caught outside the Cadmea and murdered, and the Thebans then proceeded to blockade the citadel. Greece responded to the Theban leading. The hopes of the patriots ran high; the fall of the Cadmea seemed inevitable.

Suddenly a report was whispered in Thebes that a Macedonian army was encamped a few miles away at Onchestus. As Alexander was dead, it could only be Antipater — so the Theban leaders assured the alarmed people. But it was, indeed, the king Alexander. In less than two weeks he had marched from Pelion to Onchestus, and on the next day he stood before the walls of Thebes. Alexander waited to give the Thebans time to make submission, but they attacked first. Next day, a skirmish led to a general assault. The city was taken and a merciless butchery began. Six thousand lives were taken before Alexander stayed the slaughter. On the next day, he summoned the confederates of Corinth to decide the fate of the rebellious city. The sentence was that the city should be leveled with the dust and her land divided among the confederates; that the inhabitants should be sold into bondage;

Sept.,  
335 B.C.

and that the Cadmean citadel should be occupied by a garrison. The severe doom was carried out; and among the ruined habitations only one solitary house stood, the house of Pindar, which Alexander expressly spared.

The Bœotian cities were at length delivered from the yoke of their imperious mistress; and the fall of Thebes promptly checked all other movements in Greece. When the news reached Athens, which a few days before had voted aid to Thebes, the festival of the Mysteries was interrupted, and in a hurried meeting of the Assembly it was resolved, on the proposal of Demades, to send an embassy to congratulate Alexander. Alexander demanded — and it was a fair demand — that Demosthenes and Lycurgus and the other anti-Macedonian agitators should be delivered to him. But it was decided that Demades should accompany another embassy and beg that the offenders might be left to the justice of the Athenian people. Alexander, still anxious to show every consideration to Athens, withdrew his demand, insisting only on the banishment of the adventurer Charidemus.

With the fall of Thebes Alexander's campaigns in Europe came to an end. The rest of his life was spent in Asia. The European campaigns, though they filled little more than a year, and though they seem of small account by the side of his triumphs in the east, were brilliant and important enough to have won historical fame for any general.

**2. Preparations for Alexander's Persian Expedition. Condition of Persia.** — Having spent the winter in making his military preparations and setting in order the affairs of his kingdom for a long absence, Alexander set forth in spring for the conquest of Persia. His purpose was to conquer the Persian kingdom, to 334 B.C.  
dethrone the Great King and take his place. To carry out this design, the first thing needful was to secure Thrace in the rear, and that had been done already. In the conquest itself there were three stages. The first step was the conquest of Asia Minor; the second was the conquest of Syria and Egypt; and these two

conquests, preliminary to the advance on Babylon and Susa, would mean not merely acquisitions of territory, but strategic bases for further conquest.

To secure Macedonia during his absence, Alexander was obliged to leave a large portion of his army behind him. The government was intrusted to his father's minister, Antipater. It is said that the king before his departure divided all his royal domains and forests and revenues among his friends; and, when Perdiccas asked what was left for himself, he replied, Hope. Then Perdiccas, rejecting his own portion, exclaimed, "We who go forth to fight with you need share only in your hope."

338 B.C.

The Persian empire was weak and loosely knit, and it was governed now by a feeble monarch. Artaxerxes Ochus, who had displayed more strength than his predecessors, was assassinated; and after two or three years of confusion the throne passed to a distant member of the Achæmenid house, Darius Codomannus. If Darius had been able and experienced in war, he would have had some enormous advantages. In the first place, he had the advantage in the sheer weight of human bodies. In the second place, the Great King commanded untold wealth. In the third place, he had a navy which controlled the seaboard of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. And fourthly, although there was no centralization or unity in the vast empire, there was, for that very reason, little or no national discontent in the provinces. But multitudes were useless without a leader, and money could not create brains. Moreover, Persia was behind the age in the art of warfare. The only lesson which the day of Cunaxa had taught her was to hire mercenary Greeks.

The strength of the army which Alexander led forth against Persia is said to have been thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, thus preserving the large proportion of cavalry to infantry, which was one of the chief novelties of Philip's military establishment. We have seen how Philip organized the national army of Macedonia, in the chief divisions of the phalanx, the light infantry

or hypaspists, and the heavy cavalry. Alexander led to Asia six regiments of the phalanx, and in the great engagements which decided the fate of Persia, these formed the center of his array. They were supported by Greek hoplites, both mercenary and confederate. The hypaspists, led by Nicanor, son of Parmenio, had their station on the right wing. Philotas, another son of Parmenio, was commander of the heavy cavalry, in eight squadrons. This Macedonian cavalry was always placed on the right, while on the left rode the splendid Thessalian cavalry. Both the right and the left wings were strengthened by light troops, horse and foot, accoutered according to their national habit, from Thrace, Pæonia, and other countries of the Illyrian peninsula.

3. **Conquest of Asia Minor.** — The fleet transported the army from Sestos to Abydos, while Alexander himself sailed across to the "Harbor of the Achæans." The first to leap upon the Mysian strand, he crossed the plain of Troy and went up to the hill of Ilion. It is said that he dedicated his own panoply in the shrine, and took down from the wall some ancient armor, preserved there as a relic of the Trojan War. He sacrificed to Priam to avert his anger from one of the race of Neoptolemus; he crowned the tomb of Achilles, his ancestor; and his bosom-friend Hephæstion cast a garland upon the grave of Patroclus, the beloved of Achilles. These solemnities on the hill of Troy are significant as revealing the spirit which the young king carried into his enterprise.

Meanwhile, the satraps of the Great King had formed an army of about forty thousand men to defend Asia Minor. Darius committed the characteristic blunder of a Persian monarch, and consigned the army to the joint command of a number of generals, including Memnon, the Rhodian, and several of the western satraps. The Persian commanders were jealous of the Greek, and against his advice they decided to risk a battle at once. Accordingly, they advanced to the plain of Adrastea, through which the river Granicus flows into the Propontis, and posted themselves on the steep left bank of the stream, so as to hinder the enemy from crossing.


They had made the curious disposition of placing their cavalry along the river bank and the Greek hoplites on the slopes behind. As cavalry in attack has a great advantage over cavalry in defense, Alexander saw that the victory could best be won by throwing his own squadrons against the hostile line. Drawing up his army in the usual way, with the six regiments of the phalanx in the center, intrusting the left wing to Parmenio and commanding the right himself, he first sent across the river his light cavalry to keep the extreme left of the enemy engaged, and then led his heavy Macedonian cavalry against the Persian center. Alexander himself was in the thickest of the fight, dealing wounds and receiving blows. After a sharp engagement on the steep banks, the Persian cavalry was broken and put to flight. The phalanx then advanced across the river against the Greek hoplites in the background, while the victorious cavalry cut them up on the flanks.

May-June,  
334 B.C.

This victory was very far from laying Asia Minor at the conqueror's feet. There were strong places, which must be taken one by one — strong places on the coast, which could be supported by the powerful Persian fleet. Of all things, the aid of the Athenian navy would have best helped Alexander now, and he did not yet despair. After the skirmish of the Granicus, when he divided the spoil, he sent three hundred Persian panoplies to Athens, as an offering to Athena on the Acropolis, with this dedication: "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedæmonians), from the barbarians of Asia." But Athens had no zeal for the cause of the Greeks and Alexander against the barbarians.

The victor marched southward to occupy Lydia and Sardis. The citadel was strong, but it now passed with its treasures unresistingly into the hands of the Greek conqueror. For this prompt submission the Lydians received their freedom. Parmenio's brother, Asander, was appointed satrap of Lydia, and Alexander turned to deal with the Ionian cities. Here the democrats welcomed the Greek deliverer; but the oligarchs supported the Persian cause, and wherever they were in power, admitted Per-







sian garrisons. In Ephesus, on the approach of Alexander's army, the people began to massacre the oligarchs. Alexander pacified these troubles and established a democratic constitution. The next stage in his advance was Miletus, and here for the first time he encountered resistance. As soon as he captured it, he disbanded his fleet, and proceeded to blockade the sea by seizing all the strong places on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. The execution of this design occupied him for the next two years, but it brought with it the conquest of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt.

As for Asia Minor, the next and the hardest task was the reduction of Caria and the capture of Halicarnassus. The remnant of the host which fled from the Granicus, and the Rhodian Memnon himself, had rallied here. The Great King had now intrusted to Memnon the general command of the fleet and the coasts, and Memnon had dug a deep ditch round Halicarnassus and furnished the place with food for a long siege. Alexander filled up the moat and brought his towers and engines against the walls. A breach was made on the northeast side, but Alexander, who hoped to induce the town to surrender, forbore to order an attack, and more than once called back his men from storming. At length Memnon saw that the prospect of holding out longer was hopeless, and he determined to withdraw the garrison to the royal fortress on the island in the harbor. He fired the city at night before he withdrew, and the place was in flames when the Macedonians entered.

The cold season was approaching, and Alexander divided his army into two bodies, one of which he sent under Parmenio to winter in Lydia, while he advanced himself with the other into Lycia. He gave leave to a few young officers who had been recently wedded to return home, charging them with the duty of bringing reënforcements. Alexander met with no resistance from the cities of the Lycian league, and he left the constitution of the confederacy intact. He advanced along the coast of Pamphylia, and turning inland from Perge, fought his way through the Pisidian

hills. He descended to Celænæ, the strong and lofty citadel of the Phrygian satrapy, and leaving a garrison there, he marched on to Gordion on the Sangarius, the capital of the ancient kingdom of Phrygia.

At Gordion, the appointed mustering-place, Alexander's army reunited, and new troops arrived from Macedonia to replace those who had been left to garrison the subjugated countries and cities. On the citadel of Gordion stood the remains of the royal palaces of Gordius and Midas, and Alexander went up the hill to see the chariot of Gordius and the famous knot which fastened the yoke. Cord of the bark of a cornel tree was tied in a knot which artfully concealed the ends, and there was an oracle that he who should loose it would rule over Asia. Alexander vainly attempted to untie it, and then drawing his sword cut the knot and so fulfilled the oracle. From Gordion Alexander marched by Ancyra into Cappadocia, and thence southward to Tyana and the Cilician gates, which he seized by surprise, and moved so rapidly on Tarsus that the satrap Arsames fled without striking a blow.

Here a misadventure happened which well-nigh changed the course of history. After a long ride under a burning sun, the king, bathing in the cool waters of the Cydnus, caught a chill which resulted in violent fever, and his physicians despaired of his life. But Philip of Acarnania recommended a certain purgative. As he was preparing the draught in the king's tent, a letter was placed in Alexander's hands, alleging that Darius had bribed Philip to poison his master. Alexander, taking the cup, gave Philip the letter to read, and, while Philip

Spring,  
333 B.C.



SILVER COIN OF TARSUS. OBTVERSE: EN-  
THRONED ZEUS [ARAMAIC LEGEND: BAAL  
TARS]. REVERSE: LION [OBSCURE LE-  
GEND]

read, Alexander swallowed the medicine. His confidence was justified, and under the treatment he soon recovered.


4. **Battle of Issus.** — The Great King had already crossed the Euphrates at the head of a vast host. Alexander did not hurry to the encounter, but sending forward Parmenio with part of the army to secure the passes from Cilicia into Syria, he himself turned to subdue the hillfolk of western Cilicia. He then returned eastward, and advanced to Issus under Mount Amanus. Darius was on the other side of the mountains, on ground which was highly favorable for deploying his host. There were two roads from Issus into Syria. One led directly over difficult mountain-passes, while the other wound along the coast to Myriandros and then crossed Mount Amanus. The second road, along which Cyrus and Xenophon had marched, was now chosen by Alexander. Leaving his sick at Issus, he marched forward to Myriandros, but was detained there by a violent storm. The Great King expected every day to see Alexander descending from the mountains; and when he came not, owing to the delays in Cilicia, it was thought that he did not venture to desert the coast. Accordingly, Darius and his nobles decided to seek Alexander. The Persian army crossed the northern passes of Amanus, thus coming between Alexander and his base. Reaching Issus, they tortured and put to death the sick who had been left behind. Alexander cannot be blamed for this disaster, for he could not foresee that his enemies would abandon the open position in which their numerical superiority would tell for a confined place where the movements of a multitude would be cramped. To Alexander the tidings that Darius was at Issus were too good to be true, and he sent a boat to reconnoiter. When he was assured that the enemy had thus played into his hands, he marched back from Myriandros through the sea-gates into the little plain of Issus.

Oct., 333 B.C. The plain of Issus is cut in two by the stream of the Pinarus. Here, as at the Granicus, it fell to Alexander to attack the Persians, who had themselves no plan of attack; and here, as there, the Per-

sians were defended by the natural intrenchment of a steep-banked river. The Macedonian columns defiled into the plain at dawn, and when Darius learned that they were approaching, he threw across the river squadrons of cavalry and light troops to cover the rest of the army while it arrayed itself for battle. The whole front was composed of hoplites, including thirty thousand Greek mercenaries; the left wing touched the lower slopes of the mountains and curved round, following the line of the hill, so as to face the flank of the enemy's right wing. When the array was formed, the cavalry was recalled to the north of the river, and posted on the right wing, near the sea, where the ground was best adapted for cavalry movements.

Alexander advanced, his army drawn up on the usual plan, the phalanx in the center, the hypaspists on the right. In order to meet the danger which threatened the flank and rear of his right wing from the Persian forces on the slope of the mountain, he placed a column of light troops on the extreme right, to form a second front. As in the engagement on the Granicus, the attack was to be made by the heavy cavalry on the left center of the enemy's line. But it was a far more serious and formidable venture, since Darius had thirty thousand Greek mercenaries who knew how to stand and to fight. And if Alexander was defeated, his retreat was cut off.

The Persian left did not sustain Alexander's onset at the head of his cavalry. The phalanx followed more slowly, and in crossing



BATTLE OF ISSUS

the stream and climbing the steep bank the line became broken, especially at one spot, and the Greek hoplites pressed them hard on the river-brink. If the phalanx had been driven back, Alexander's victorious right wing would have been exposed on the flank and the battle lost; but the phalangites stood their ground obstinately, until the hypaspists were free to come to their help by taking their adversaries in the flank. Meanwhile, Alexander's attack had been directed upon the spot where the Great King himself stood in his war-chariot, surrounded by a guard of Persian nobles. There was a furious struggle, in which Alexander was wounded in the leg. Then Darius turned his chariot and fled, and this was the signal for an universal flight on the left. On the sea side the Persian cavalry crossed the river and carried all before them; but in the midst of their success the cry that the king was fleeing made them waver, and they were soon riding wildly back, pursued by the Thessalians. The whole Persian host was now rushing northward toward the passes of Amanus, and thousands fell beneath the swords of their pursuers. Darius did not tarry; he forgot even his mother and his wife, who were in the camp at Issus; and when he reached the mountain he left his chariot, his shield, and his royal cloak behind him, and mounting a swift mare rode for dear life.

Having pursued the Great King till nightfall, Alexander returned to the Persian camp. He supped in the tent of Darius, and, hearing the wailing of women from a tent hard by, he learned that it was the mother and wife and children of the fugitive king. They had been told that Alexander had returned with the shield and cloak of Darius, and supposing that their lord was dead, had broken out into lamentation. Alexander sent one of his companions to comfort them with the assurance that Darius lived, and that they would receive all the respect due to royal ladies; for Alexander had no personal enmity against Darius. No act of Alexander, perhaps, astonished his contemporaries more than this generous treatment of the family of his royal rival.

A city, which still retains the name of Alexander, was built in



commemoration of the battle, at the northern end of the sea-gates. The road was now open into Syria. Just as the small fight on the Granicus had cleared the way for the acquisition of Asia Minor, so the fight on the Pinaros cleared the way for the conquest of Syria and Egypt. The rest of the work would consist in tedious sieges. But the victory of Issus had, beyond its immediate results, immense importance through the prestige which it conferred on the victor. He had defeated an army ten times as great as his own, led by the Great King in person; he had captured the mother of the Great King, and his wife and his children. Darius himself made the first overtures to the conqueror. He wrote a letter, in which he complained that Alexander was an unprovoked aggressor, begged that he would send back the royal captives, and professed willingness to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance. Such a condescending appeal required a stern reply. "I have overcome in battle," wrote Alexander, "first thy generals and satraps, and now thyself and thine host, and possess thy land, through the grace of the gods. I am lord of all Asia, and therefore do thou come to me. If thou art afraid of being evilly entreated, send some of thy friends to receive sufficient guarantees. Thou hast only to come to me to ask and receive thy mother and wife and children, and whatever else thou mayest desire. And for the future, whenever thou sendest, send to me as to the Great King of Asia, and do not write as to an equal, but tell me whatever thy need be, as to one who is lord of all that is thine. But if thou disputest the kingdom, then wait and fight for it again, and do not flee; for I will march against thee wherever thou mayest be."

**5. Conquest of Syria.** — After Issus, Alexander might have pursued Darius into the heart of Persia, and crushed him before he could collect another army. He showed his greatness by proceeding in a more systematic manner. As Asia Minor had to be subdued before Syria and Egypt could be won, so Syria and Egypt had to be subjugated before he attempted to conquer Mesopotamia. And in Syria his most important objective was the Phœnician towns.



These cities — Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus — had never stood together, and Sidon, having revolted, was burned by Artaxerxes Ochus. Now Aradus and Byblus, which replaced Sidon, submitted at once to Alexander, while Tyre held out.



SILVER COIN OF SIDON (? 374-62 B.C.). OBVERSE: GALLEY IN FRONT OF CITY-WALL; BELOW TWO LIONS. REVERSE: KING AND CHARIOTEER IN CHARIOT; BELOW GOAT (INCUSE)

Alexander advanced southward toward Tyre. But the men of Tyre felt secure on their island rock, which was protected by eighty ships, apart from a squadron which was absent in the Ægean,

and they refused to "receive either Persian or Macedonian into the city." To subdue Tyre was an absolute necessity, as Alexander explained to a council. It was not safe to advance to Egypt, or to pursue Darius, while the Persians were lords of the sea; and the only way of wresting their sea power from them was to capture Tyre, the most important naval station on the coast; once Tyre fell, the Phœnician fleet, which was the most numerous and strongest part of the Persian navy, would come over to Macedon, for the rowers would not row or the men fight when they had no habitations to row or fight for. The reduction of Cyprus and Egypt would then follow without trouble. Alexander grasped and never let go the fact that Tyre was the key to the whole situation.

But the siege of Tyre was perhaps the hardest military task that Alexander's genius ever encountered. The city, girt by huge walls, stood on an island across a sound of more than half a mile in width. On the side which faced the mainland were the two harbors: the northern or Sidonian harbor with a narrow mouth,

and the southern or Egyptian. For an enemy, vastly inferior at sea, there was only one way to set about the siege. Those thousand yards of water must be bridged over and the isle annexed to the mainland. Without hesitation Alexander began the building of the causeway. The first part of the work was easy, for the water was shallow; but when the mole approached the island, the strait deepened, and the difficulties of the task began. Triremes issued from the havens to shoot missiles at the workers. To protect them, Alexander erected two towers on the causeway, and mounted engines on the towers to reply to the missiles from the galleys. He attached to these wooden towers curtains of leather to screen both towers and workmen from the projectiles which were hurled from the city-walls. But the men of Tyre were ingenious. They constructed a fire-ship filled with dry wood and inflammables, and, choosing a day on which a favorable wind blew, they towed it close

to the dam and set it on fire. The device succeeded; the burning vessel soon wrapt the towers and all the engines in flames. Alexander then widened the causeway throughout its whole length, so that it could accommodate more towers and engines, before he attempted to complete it. He saw that it would be needful to support his operations from the causeway by operations from ship-board; and he went to Sidon to bring up a few galleys which were stationed there. But at this moment the squadrons of Aradus and Byblus, which were acting in the Ægean, learning that their cities



SIEGE OF TYRE

had submitted to Alexander, left the fleet and sailed to Sidon. The kings of Cyprus also joined Alexander, and reënforced the fleet at Sidon by one hundred and twenty ships. With a fleet of about two hundred and fifty triremes at his command, Alexander was now far stronger at sea than the merchants of Tyre.

During the siege Alexander received an embassy from the Great King, offering an immense ransom for the captives of the royal



SILVER COIN OF TYRE (331 B.C.). OBVERSE: MELKART WITH BOW ON SEA-HORSE; WAVES; DOLPHIN. REVERSE: OWL WITH CROOK AND FLAIL (EGYPTIAN EMBLEMS OF ROYALTY)

house, and the surrender of all the lands west of the Euphrates; proposing also that Alexander should marry the daughter of Darius and become his ally. The message

was discussed in a council, and Parmenio said that if he were Alexander, he would accept the terms. "And I," said the king, "would accept them if I were Parmenio."

From Sidon Alexander bore down upon Tyre with his whole fleet, hoping to entice the Tyrians into an engagement. When the fleet hove in sight, the men of Tyre, seeing that they had no chance against so many, drew up their triremes in close array to block the mouths of their harbors. Alexander set the Cyprian vessels on the north side of the mole to blockade the Sidonian harbor, and the Phœnician on the south side to blockade the Egyptian harbor. It was opposite this harbor, on the mainland, that his own pavilion was placed.

The mole had now been carried up to the island, and all was ready for a grand attack on the eastern wall. Some of the engines were placed on the mole, others on transport ships or superannuated galleys. But little impression was made on the wall, which on this side was one hundred and fifty feet high and enormously thick;

and the besieged replied to the attack with volleys of fiery missiles from powerful engines, which were mounted on their lofty battlements. All attacks on this wall failed; but in a sally made to surprise the Cyprian squadron, the Tyrians after a moment of success had their fleet completely put out of further action. Finally the efforts of the besiegers were united upon the south side near the Egyptian harbor. Here, at length, a bit of the wall was torn down, and though the Tyrians easily repelled the attack, it showed Alexander the weak spot, and two days later he prepared a grand and supreme assault.

The vessels with the siege-engines were set to work at the southern wall, while two triremes waited hard by, one filled with hypaspists under Admetus, the other with a phalanx regiment, ready as soon as the wall yielded to hurl their crews into the breach. Ships were stationed in front of the two havens, to force their way in at a favorable moment, and the rest of the fleet, manned with light troops and furnished with engines, were disposed at various points round the island, to embarrass and bewilder the besieged and hinder them from concentrating at the main point of attack. A wide breach was made, the two triremes were rowed up to the spot, the bridges were lowered, and the hypaspists, Admetus at their head, first mounted the wall. Admetus was pierced with a lance, but Alexander took his place, and drove back the Tyrians from the breach. Tower after tower was captured; soon all the southern wall was in the hands of the Macedonians. But the city had already been entered from other points. The chains of both the Sidonian and the Egyptian harbors had been burst by the Cyprian and Phœnician squadrons; the Tyrian ships had been disabled; and the troops had pressed into the town. Eight thousand inhabitants are said to have been slain, and the rest, about thirty thousand, were sold into slavery, with the exception of the king, Azemilco.

The fall of Tyre gave Alexander Syria and Egypt and the naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. The communities of

Syria and Palestine, that had not submitted, like Damascus, after the victory of Issus, submitted now after the capture of Tyre, and he encountered no resistance in his southern march to Egypt, until he came to the great frontier stronghold, Gaza, the city of the Philistines.

Gaza had been committed by Darius to the care of Batis, a trusty eunuch, and had been well furnished with provisions for a long siege. Batis refused to surrender, trusting in the strength of the fortifications, but Alexander could not leave such an important post on the line from Damascus to Egypt in the hands of the enemy, and after a siege of several weeks, during which he was wounded in the shoulder by a dart from a catapult, the place was taken and became a Macedonian fortress.

**6. Conquest of Egypt.** — Egypt was now absolutely cut off from Persia; Alexander had only to march in. The Persian satrap thought only of making his submission and winning the conqueror's grace. In Memphis, the capital of the Pharaohs, where he was probably proclaimed king, Alexander sacrificed to Apis and the other native gods, and thereby won the good-will of the people.

From Memphis he sailed down the river to Canopus, and took a step which, alone, would have made his name memorable forever. He chose the ground, east of Rhacotis, between Lake Mareotis and the sea, as the site of a new city, over against the island of Pharos, famous in Homeric song, and soon to become more famous still as the place of the first lighthouse, one of the seven wonders of the world. The king is said to have himself traced out the ground-plan of *Alexandria*. He joined the mainland with the island by a causeway seven stades (nearly a mile) in length, and thus formed two harbors. The subsequent history of Alexandria, which has held its position as a port for more than two thousand years, proves that its founder had a true eye in choosing the site of the most famous of his new cities. Alexandria was intended to take the place of Tyre as the commercial center of western Asia and the

Oct.—Nov.,  
332 B.C.

(?) Jan.,  
331 B.C.

eastern Mediterranean, throwing the trade of the world into a port where Greeks would encounter no Phœnician rivalry.

In the official style of the Egyptian monarchy the Pharaohs were sons of Ammon, and as the successor of the Pharaohs Alexander assumed the same title. It was therefore necessary in order to regulate his position that an official assurance should be given by Ammon himself that Alexander was his son. To obtain this Alexander undertook a journey to the oracular sanctuary of Ammon in the oasis of Siwah. And this motive is alone sufficient to explain the expedition. But it may well be that in Alexander's mind there was a vague notion that there was something divine about his own origin. Proceeding along the coast to Parætonion, he was there met by envoys who conveyed the submission of Cyrene. By this acquisition the western frontier of the Macedonian empire extended to the border of the Carthaginian sphere of rule. Alexander then struck across the desert to visit that Egyptian temple which was most famous in the Greek world, the temple, as it was always called, of Zeus Ammon. It is said that Alexander told no man what he asked the god or what the god replied, save only that the answer pleased him.



COIN OF CYRENE (OBVERSE). HEAD OF ZEUS AMMON; OLIVE SPRAY

**7. Battle of Gaugamela, and Conquest of Babylonia.** — The new lord of Egypt and Syria returned with the spring to Tyre. The whole coastland was now in his possession, and he controlled the sea; the time had come to advance into the heart of the Persian empire. Having spent some months in the Phœnician city, he set forth at the head of 40,000 infantry and 7000 horse, and reached Thapsacus on the Euphrates at the beginning of August. The objective of Alexander was Babylon. He chose the road across the north of Mesopotamia and down the Tigris on its eastern bank. From some Persian scouts who were captured, it was ascertained



that Darius, with a yet larger multitude than that which had succumbed at Issus, was on the other side of the river, determined to contest the passage. Alexander crossed the Tigris, not at Nineveh, the usual place of crossing, but higher up at Bezabde. On the same night the moon went into eclipse, and men anxiously sought in the phenomenon a portent.

Sept. 20,  
331 B.C.

Marching southward for some days, Alexander found Darius encamped in a plain near Gaugamela on the river Bumōdus. The numbers of the army were reported at 1,000,000 foot and 40,000 horse. Before the battle the night was spent by the Persians under arms, for their camp was unfortified, and they feared a night attack. And a night attack was recommended by Parmenio, but Alexander preferred to trust the issue to his own generalship and the superior discipline of his troops. He said to Parmenio, "I do not steal victory," and under the gallantry of this reply he concealed, in his usual manner, the prudence and policy of his resolve. A victory over the Persian host, won in the open field in the light of day, would have a far greater effect in establishing his prestige in Asia.

The Great King, according to wont, was in the *center* of the Persian array, surrounded by his kinsfolk and his Persian body-guard. On either side of them were Greek mercenaries, Indian auxiliaries with a few elephants, and Carians whose ancestors had been settled in upper Asia. The center was strengthened and deepened by a second line. On the *left* were men from Susa, from the Caspian, from Arachosia and Bactria, covered by one hundred scythe-armed chariots and Bactrian and Scythian cavalry. On the *right* were Hyrcanians and Parthians, the Medes and dwellers in Mesopotamia, with other Caucasian folks.

Against this host, of which the cavalry alone is said to have been as numerous as all the infantry of the enemy, Alexander descended the hill in the morning. On his *left* wing — commanded as usual by Parmenio — were the cavalry of the Thessalian and confederate Greeks; in the *center* the six regiments of the phalanx;

and on the *right*, the hypaspists, and the eight squadrons of the Companions, the royal squadron of Clitus being at the extreme right. Covering the right wing were some light troops, spear-throwers and archers. The line was far outflanked on both sides by the enemy, and the danger which Alexander had most to fear, as at the battle of Issus, was that of being attacked in rear or flank; only that here both wings were in peril. He sought to meet these contingencies by forming behind each wing a second line, which, by facing round a quarter or half circle, could meet an attack on flank or rear.

As he advanced, Alexander and his right wing were opposite the center of the enemy's line, and he was outflanked by the whole length of the enemy's left. He therefore bore obliquely to the right, and, even when the Scythian horsemen, riding forward, came into contact with his own light troops, he continued to move his squadrons of heavy cavalry in the same direction. The Macedonians were thus moving off the ground, which had been leveled for the scythe chariots, and Darius ordered a flank charge to check them. Alexander's Greek mercenaries with difficulty held off the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, and, meanwhile, the scythed cars were loosed upon the Macedonian ranks. But the archers shot down horses and drivers, and the hypaspists, opening their order, let the chariots rattle harmlessly by.

The whole Persian line was now advancing to attack, and Alexander was waiting for the moment to deliver his cavalry charge. He had to send his mounted pikemen to the help of the light cavalry, who were being hard pressed on the right by the Scythians and Bactrians; and as a counter-check to this reënforcement, squadrons of Persian cavalry were despatched to the assistance of their fellows. By the withdrawal of these squadrons a gap was caused in the left Persian wing, and into this gap Alexander plunged at the head of his cavalry column and split the line in two. Thus the left side of the enemy's center was exposed, and turning obliquely Alexander charged into its ranks. Meanwhile,

the bristling phalanx was moving forward and was soon engaged in close combat with another part of the Persian center. The storm of battle burst with wildest fury round the spot where the Persian king was trembling, and what befell at Issus befell again at Gaugamela. The Great King turned his chariot and fled. His Persians fled with him, and swept along in their flight the troops who had been posted in the rear.

Meanwhile, Parmenio was hard pressed. The troops of the extreme Persian right had attacked his cavalry in the flank or rear. Parmenio sent a messenger entreating aid, and Alexander desisted from the pursuit of his fleeing rival. Riding back with his Companions, he encountered a large body of cavalry, Persians, Parthians, and Indians, in full retreat, but in orderly array. A desperate conflict ensued — perhaps the most fearful in the whole battle. Sixty of the Companions fell, but Alexander was again victorious and rode on to the help of Parmenio. But Parmenio no longer needed his help. Not the least achievement of this day of great deeds was the brilliant fighting of the Thessalian cavalry, who not only sustained the battle against the odds which had wrung from Parmenio the cry for aid, but in the end routed their foemen before Alexander could reach the spot. The battle was won, and the fate of the Persian empire was decided.

Alexander lost not a moment in resuming the chase which he had abandoned, and, riding eastward throughout the night on the tracks of the Persian king, he reached Arbela on the morrow. But he did not take the king. Darius fled into the highlands of Media, and Ariobarzanes with a host of the routed army hastened southward to Persia. Alexander pursued his way to Babylon.

Alexander seems to have expected that the men of Babylon, trusting in their mighty walls, would have offered resistance. He was disappointed. When he approached the city, with his army arrayed for action, the gates opened and the Babylonians streamed out, led by their priests and their chief men. The satrap Mazæus, who had fought bravely in the recent battle, surrendered the city

and citadel. In Babylonia, Alexander followed the same policy which he had already followed in Egypt. He appeared as the protector of the national religions which had been depressed and slighted by the Persian fire-worshippers. He rebuilt the Babylonian temples which had been destroyed, and above all he commanded the restoration of the marvelous temple of Bel, standing on its eight towers, on which the rage of Xerxes had vented itself when he returned from the rout of Salamis. The Persian Mazæus was retained in his post as satrap of Babylonia.

**8. Conquest of Susiana and Persis.** — Having rested his army, the conqueror advanced southeastward to Susa, the summer residence of the Persian court. In the citadel he found enormous treasures of gold and silver and purple. Among other precious things at Susa was the sculptured group of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogiton, which Xerxes had carried off from Athens; and Alexander had the pleasure of sending back to its home this historical monument, now more precious than ever.

Dec.,  
331 B.C.

Though it was midwinter, Alexander soon left Susa. There were immense treasures still in the palaces of Cyrus and Darius in the heart of the Persian highlands, and these were guarded not only by the difficulties of the mountainous approaches, but by the army which Ariobarzanes had rescued from the overthrow of Gaugamela. It was no easy task. The storming of the "Persian Gates," defended by Ariobarzanes, was one of the most arduous tasks that Alexander ever accomplished, yet the pass was carried by a surprise march through snow-clad mountains.

The royal palaces of Persia, to which Alexander now hurried with the utmost speed, stood in the valley of Mervdasht, fertile then, but desolate at the present day, and close to the city of Istachr, which the Persians deemed the oldest city in the world. This cradle of the Persian kingdom, to which, city and palace together, the Greeks gave the name of *Persepolis*, was "the richest of all the cities under the sun." It is said that one hundred and twenty

thousand talents were found in the treasury; an army of mules and camels were required to remove the spoils.


330 B.C.

But the most famous incident connected with the four months' sojourn at Persepolis is the conflagration of the palace of Xerxes. The story is that one night when Alexander and his companions had drunk deep at a royal festival, Thais, an Attic courtesan, flung out among the tipsy carousers the idea of burning down the house of the malignant foe who had burned the temples of Greece. The mad words of the woman inspired a wild frenzy, and whirled the revelers forth, armed with torches. Alexander hurled the first brand, and the cedar woodwork of the palace was soon in flames. But before the fire had done its work, the king's head was cool, and he commanded the fire to be quenched.

**9. Death of Darius.** — In the meantime, King Darius remained in Ecbatana, surrounded by the adherents who were faithful to him. Media was defensible; he had a large army from the northern satrapies; and he had Bactria as a retreat, if retreat he must. The spring was advanced when Alexander left Persis for Ecbatana. He made all speed, when the news reached him by the way, that Darius was at Ecbatana with a large army, prepared to fight. But when he drew nigh to the city, he found that Darius had flown eastward. At Ecbatana Alexander paid off the Thesalian troops and the other Greek confederates; but any who chose to enroll themselves anew might stay, and not a few stayed.

With the main part of the army Alexander hurried on, merciless to men and steeds, bent on the capture of Darius. But, meanwhile, doom was stealing upon the Persian monarch by another way. His followers were beginning to suspect that ill luck dogged him, and when he proposed to stay and risk another battle instead of continuing his retreat to Bactria, none were willing except the remnant of Greek mercenaries. Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, was a kinsman of the king, and it was felt by many that he might be able to raise up again the Achæmenian house, which Darius had been unable to sustain. Darius was seized in the





PROPYLÆA OF XERXES, AT PERSEPOLIS



night, and hurried on as a prisoner along the road to Bactria. This event disbanded his army. The Greek mercenaries went off northward into the Caspian Mountains, and many of the Persians turned back to find pardon and grace with Alexander. When he learned that his old rival was a prisoner and that Bessus was now his antagonist, Alexander resolved on a swift and hot pursuit. Leaving the main body of the army to come slowly after, he set forth at once with his cavalry and some light foot, and sped the whole night through, not resting till next day at noon, and then another evening and night at the same breathless speed. Sunrise saw him at Thara, where the Great King had been put in chains. It was ascertained that Bessus and his fellows intended to surrender Darius if the pursuit were pressed. The pursuers rode on throughout another night; men and horses were dropping with fatigue. At noon they came to a village where the pursued had halted the day before, and Alexander learned that they intended to force a march in the night. He asked the people if there was no short way, and was told that there was a short way, but it was waterless. Alexander instantly dismounted five hundred of his horsemen and gave their steeds to the officers and the strongest men of the infantry who were with him. With these he started in the evening, and having ridden about forty-five miles came up with the enemy at break of day. Bessus and his fellow-conspirators bade their prisoner mount a horse; and when Darius refused, they stabbed him and left him in his litter. The litter-mules strayed about half a mile from the road down a side valley, where they were found at a spring by a Macedonian who had come to slake his thirst. The Great King was near his last gasp. He had the solace of a cup of water in his supreme moments, and thanked the Macedonian soldier by a sign. Alexander viewed the body, and is related to have thrown his own cloak over it in pity. It was part of his fair luck that he found Darius dead; for if he had taken him alive, he would not have put him to death, and such a captive would have been a perpetual embarrassment. He

sent the corpse with all honor to the queen-mother, and the last of the Achæmenian kings was buried with his forefathers at Persepolis. July, 330 B.C.

10. **Spirit of Alexander's Policy as Lord of Asia.** — From the very beginning Alexander had shown to the conquered provinces a tolerance which was not only prompted by generosity, but based on political wisdom. He had permitted each country to retain its national institutions, insisting only on the division of power. Under the Persian kingdom the satrap was usually sole governor, controlling not only the civil administration, but the treasury and the troops. Alexander, in most cases, committed only the internal administration to the governor, and appointed besides him, and independent of his authority, a financial officer and a military commander. This division of authority was a security against rebellion.

But the Macedonian king had set forth as a champion of Greeks against mere barbarians, as a leader of Europeans against effeminate Asiatics. All the Greeks and Macedonians who followed him regarded the east as a world to be plundered, and the orientals as inferiors meant by nature to be their own slaves. But, as Alexander advanced, his view expanded, and he began to transcend the familiar distinction of Greek and barbarian. He formed the notion of an empire, both European and Asiatic, in which the Asiatics should not be dominated by the European invaders, but Europeans and Asiatics alike should be ruled on an equality by a monarch, indifferent to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, and looked upon as their own king by Persians as well as by Macedonians. The idea begins to show itself after the battle of Gaugamela. Some of the eastern provinces are intrusted to Persian satraps; for example, Babylonia to Mazæus, and the court of Alexander ceases to be purely European. With oriental courtiers the forms of an oriental court are also gradually introduced; the Asiatics prostrated themselves before the lord of Asia; and presently

Alexander adopted the dress of a Persian king at court ceremonies, in order to appear less a foreigner in the eyes of his eastern subjects.

#### REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY READING

(Syllabus, 91-92)

These last chapters are so detailed that there is little necessity of supplementary reading. Should a more extended account be desired, Bury, chs. 17-18, or Wheeler, *Alexander*, will furnish material. In addition, Grote, XII, 49-66, and Dodge, *Alexander*, 134-171, have good descriptions of the military system of Alexander.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST

1. **Hyrkania, Areia, Bactria, Sogdiana.** — The murderers of Darius fled — Bessus to Bactria, Nabarzanes to Hyrcania. Alexander could not pursue Bessus while Nabarzanes was behind him in the Caspian region, and therefore his first movement was to cross the Elburz chain of mountains, which separate the south Caspian shores from Parthia, and subdue the lands of the Tapuri and Mardi. The Persian officers who had retreated into these regions submitted, and were received with favor; the life of Nabarzanes was spared. The Greek mercenaries who had found refuge in the Tapurian Mountains capitulated. All who had entered the Persian service, before the Congress of Corinth had pledged Greece to the cause of Macedon, were released; the rest were compelled to serve in the Macedonian army. Alexander sent orders to Parmenio to go forth from Ecbatana and take possession of the Cadusian territory on the southwestern side of the Caspian. He himself, having rested a fortnight at Zadracarta and held athletic games, marched eastward to Susia, a town in the north of Areia, and was met there by Satibarzanes, governor of Areia, who was confirmed in his satrapy. Here the news arrived that Bessus had assumed the style of Great King with the name of Artaxerxes, and was wearing his turban "erect." Alexander started at once on the road to Bactria. But he had not gone far when he was overtaken by the news that Satibarzanes had revolted behind him. Hurrying back in forced marches with a part of his army, Alexander appeared before Artocoana, the capital of Areia, in two days. There was little resistance, and the conqueror marched



southward to Drangiana. His road can hardly be doubtful — the road which leads by Herat into Seistan. And it is probable that Herat is the site of the city which Alexander founded to be the capital and stronghold of the new province, Alexandria of the Areians. The submission of Drangiana was made without a blow.

At Prophthasia, the capital of the Drangian land, it came to Alexander's ears that Philotas, the son of Parmenio, was conspiring against his life. The king called an assembly of the Macedonians and stated the charges against the general. Philotas admitted that he had known of a plot to murder Alexander and said nothing about it; but this was only one of the charges against him. The Macedonians found Philotas guilty, and he was pierced by their javelins. The son dead, it seemed dangerous to let the father live, whether he was involved or not in the treasonable designs of Philotas. A messenger was despatched with all speed to Media, bearing commands to some of the captains of Parmenio's army to put the old general to death. It was an arbitrary act of precaution against merely suspected disloyalty; there seem to have been no proofs against Parmenio, and there was certainly no trial.

In the meantime, Alexander, instead of retracing his steps and following the route to Bactria, resolved to fetch a circle. Marching through Afghanistan, subduing it as he went, he would cross the Hindu-Kush Mountains and descend on the plain of the Oxus from the east. First he advanced southward to secure Seistan and the northwestern regions of Baluchistan, then known as Gedrosia, wintering among the Ariaspæ, a peaceful and friendly people whom the Greeks called "Benefactors." A Gedrosian satrapy was constituted with its capital at Pura. When spring came, Alexander pushed northeastward up the valley of the Halmand. 329 B.C. The chief city which he founded in Arachosia was probably on the site of Candahar, which seems to be a corruption of its name, Alexandria. The way led on over the mountains, past Ghazni, into the valley of the upper waters of the Cabul River, and Alexander came to the foot of the high range of the Hindu-Kush. The



whole massive complex of mountains which diverge from the roof of the world, dividing southern from central, eastern from western, Asia — the Pamirs, the Hindu-Kush, and the Himalayas — were grouped by the Greeks under the general name of Caucasus. But the Hindu-Kush was distinguished by the special name of Paropanisus, while the Himalayas were called the Imaus. At the foot of the Hindu-Kush he spent the winter, and founded another Alexandria to secure this region, somewhere to the north of Cabul; it was distinguished as Alexandria of the Caucasus. The crossing of the Caucasus, undertaken in the early spring, was an achievement which seems to have fallen little short of Hannibal's passage of the Alps. The soldiers had to content themselves with raw meat and the herb of silphion as a substitute for bread. At length they reached Drapsaca, high up on the northern slope — the frontier fortress of Bactria. Having rested his way-worn army, Alexander went down by the stronghold of Aornus into the plain and marched to Bactra, now Balkh.

The pretender, Bessus Artaxerxes, had stripped and wasted eastern Bactria up to the foot of the mountains, for the purpose of checking the progress of the invading army; but he fled across the Oxus when Alexander drew near. Another province was added without a blow to the Macedonian empire. Alexander lost no time in pursuing the fugitive into Sogdiana. This is the country which lies between the streams of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. It was called Sogdiana from the river Sogd, which loses itself in the sands of the desert before it approaches the waters of the Oxus. Bessus had burned his boats, and when Alexander, after a weary march of two or three days through the hot desert, arrived at the banks of the Oxus, he was forced to transport his army by the primitive vehicle of skins, which the natives of central Asia still use. Alexander's soldiers, however, instead of inflating the sheepskins with air, stuffed them with rushes. They crossed the river at Kilif and advanced to Maracanda, easily recognized as Samarcand.

The Sogdian allies of Bessus, thinking to save their country, sent a message offering to surrender the usurper. The king sent Ptolemy, son of Lagus, with six thousand men to secure Bessus. By Alexander's orders he was placed, naked and fettered, on the right side of the road by which the army was marching. He was then scourged and sent to Bactra to await his doom.

But Alexander did not arrest his march; he had made up his mind to annex Sogdiana. Not the Oxus, but the Jaxartes, was to be the northern limit of his empire. Having seized and garrisoned Samarcand, the army pushed on northeastward by the unalterable road which nature has marked out. The road reaches the Jaxartes where that river issues from the chilly vale of Fergana, and deflects its course to flow through the steppes. It was a point of the highest importance; for Fergana forms the vestibule of the great gate of communication between southwestern Asia and China — the pass over the Tian-shan Mountains, which descends on the other side into the land of Kashgar. Here Alexander, with strategic insight, resolved to fix the limit of his empire, and on the banks of the river he founded a new city, which was known as 328 B.C. Alexandria Eschaté (the Ultimate), which is now Khodjend.

The conqueror, judging from the ease with which he had come and conquered Arachosia and Bactria, seems not to have conceived that it might be otherwise beyond the Oxus. But as he was designing his new city, Alexander received the news that the Sogdians were up in arms behind him, and the garrison of Samarcand was besieged in the citadel. A message had gone forth into the western wastes, and the Massagetæ and other Scythian tribes were flocking to drive out the intruder. It was a dangerous moment for Alexander. He first turned to recover the Sogdian fortresses, and in two days he had taken and burned five of them; the others capitulated, and the dwellers of all these places were led in chains to take part in peopling the new Alexandria.

The next task should have been the relief of Samarcand, but Alexander found himself confronted by a new danger. The

Scythians were pouring down to the banks of the Jaxartes, ready to cross the stream and harass the Macedonians in the rear. It was impossible to move until they had been repelled and the passage of the river secured. The walls of Alexandria Eschaté were hastily constructed of unburnt clay and the place made fit for habitation in the short space of twenty days. Meanwhile, the northern bank was lined by the noisy and jeering hordes of the barbarians, and Alexander determined to cross the river. Bringing up his missile-engines to the shore, he dismayed the shepherds, who, when stones and darts began to fall among them from such a distance and unhorsed one of their champions, retreated some distance from the bank. The army seized the moment to cross; the Scythians were routed, and Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, pursued them far into the steppes. Then, relieving Samarcand by a forced desert march, the king swept on to Sogdiana, ravaging the land; then marching southwestward to the Oxus, he crossed into western Bactria and spent the winter at Zariaspa.

327 B.C.

At Zariaspa, Bessus was formally tried for the murder of Darius, and was condemned to have his nose and ears cut off and be taken to Ecbatana to die on the cross. The Greeks, like ourselves, regarded mutilation as a barbarous punishment, but Alexander saw that he must meet the orientals on their own ground; he must become their king in their own way. The surest means of planting Hellenism in their midst was to begin by taking account sympathetically of their prejudices. Alexander, therefore, assumed the state of Great King, surrounded himself with eastern forms and pomp, exacted self-abasement in his presence from oriental subjects, and adopted the maxim that the king's person was divine. He was the successor of Darius, and it was therefore an act of deliberate policy that he punished the king-slayer in eastern fashion.

The misfortune was that Alexander's assumption of oriental state and the favor which he showed to the Persians were highly unpopular with the Macedonians. Though they were attached to their king, and proud of the conquests which they had helped him

to achieve, they felt that he was no longer the same to them as when he had led them to victory at the Granicus. His exaltation over obeisant orientals had changed him, and the execution of his trusted general Parmenio was felt to be significant of the change.

These feelings of discontent accidentally found a mouthpiece about this time. Rebellious movements in Sogdiana brought Alexander over the Oxus again before the winter was over, and he spent some time at Samarcand. One of the most unfortunate consequences of the long-protracted sojourn in the regions of the Oxus was the increase of drunkenness in the army. The excessively dry atmosphere in summer produces an intolerable and frequent thirst; and it was inevitable that the Macedonians should slake it by wine, if they would not sicken themselves by the bad water of the country. Alexander's potations became deep and habitual from this time forth. One night in the fortress of Samarcand the carouse lasted far into the night. Greek men of letters, who accompanied the army, sang the praises of Alexander, exalting him above the Dioscuri, whose feast he was celebrating on this day. Clitus, his foster-brother, flushed with wine, suddenly sprang up to denounce the blasphemy, and, once he had begun, the current of his feelings swept him on. It was to the Macedonians, he said—to men like Parmenio and Philotas—that Alexander owed his victories; he himself had saved Alexander's life at the Granicus. Alexander started to his feet and called in Macedonian for his hypaspists; none obeyed his drunken orders; Ptolemy and other banqueters forced Clitus out of the hall, while others tried to restrain the king. But presently Clitus made his way back and shouted from the doorway some insulting verses of Euripides, signifying that the army does the work and the general reaps the glory. The king leapt up, snatched a spear from the hand of a guardsman, and transfixing his foster-brother. An agony of remorse followed. For three days the murderer lay in his tent, without sleep or food, cursing himself as the assassin of his friends.

327 B.C.

There were more hostilities in western Bactria and western Sogdiana, until at last, overawed by Alexander's success, the Scythians, in order to win his favor, slew Spitamenes, their chief leader. It only remained to reduce the rugged southeastern regions of Sogdiana. The Sogdian Rock, which commands the pass into these regions, was occupied by Oxyartes, and a band of Macedonian soldiers captured it by an arduous night-climb.

Among the captives was Roxane, the daughter of Oxyartes; and the love of Alexander was attracted by the beauty and manners of the Sogdian maiden. Notwithstanding the adverse comment which such a condescension would excite among the proud Macedonians, he resolved to make her his wife, and, on his return to Bactria, he celebrated the nuptials — a union of Asia and Europe.

About this time an attempt seems to have been made to render uniform the court ceremonial, and enforce upon the Macedonians the obeisances demanded from Persian nobles. Callisthenes, nephew of Aristotle, who was composing a history of Alexander's campaigns, was prominent in opposing the change, and fell into disfavor. One of his duties was to educate the pages, the noble Macedonian youths who attended on the king's person; and over some of these Callisthenes had great influence. One day at a boar-hunt a page named Hermolaus committed the indiscretion of forestalling the king in slaying the beast; and for this breach of etiquette he was flogged and deprived of his horse. Smarting under the dishonor, Hermolaus plotted with some of his comrades to slay Alexander in his sleep. But the plot was betrayed. The conspirators were arrested, and put to death by the sentence of the whole army. Callisthenes was hanged on the charge of being an accomplice.

Before the end of summer, Alexander bade farewell to Bactria and set forth to the conquest of India. In three years since the death of Darius, the western conqueror had subdued Afghanistan, and cast his yoke over the herdsmen of the north as far as the river Jaxartes. He was the first European invader and conqueror

of the regions beyond the Oxus, anticipating by more than two thousand years Russia's recent conquests. His next enterprise forestalled the English conquest of northwestern India.

**2. The Conquest of India.** — In returning to Afghanistan, Alexander seems to have followed the main road from Balkh to Cabul, which, if he had not refounded, he had at all events renamed, Nicæa. Here he stayed till the middle of November, preparing for further advance. He had left a large detachment of his army in Bactria, but he had enrolled a still larger force — thirty thousand — of the Asiatics of those regions. The host with which he was now to descend upon India must have been at least twice as numerous as the army with which he had crossed the Hellespont seven years before.

During these years Alexander's camp was his court and capital, the political center of his empire — a vast city rolling along over mountain and river through central Asia. Men of all trades and callings were there: craftsmen of every kind, engineers, physicians, and seers; peddlers and money-changers; literary men, poets, musicians, athletes, jesters; secretaries, clerks, court attendants; a host of women and slaves. A court diary was regularly kept — in imitation of the court journal of Persia — by Eumenes of Cardia, who conducted the king's political correspondence.

Alexander had no idea of the shape or extent of the Indian peninsula, and his notion of the Indian conquest was probably confined to the basins of the Cophen and the Indus. The stories that were told about the wonders of India excited the curiosity of the Greek invaders. It was a land of righteous folks, of strange beasts and plants, of surpassing wealth in gold and gems. It was supposed to be the ultimate country on the eastern side of the world, bounded by Ocean's stream.

At this time northwestern India was occupied by a number of small principalities. The northern districts of the land between the Indus and the Hydaspes were ruled by Omphis, whose capital was at Taxila near the Indus. His brother Abisares was the ruler


327 B.C.



of Hazara and the adjacent parts of Cashmir. Beyond the Hydaspes was the powerful kingdom of Porus, who held sway as far as the Acesines, which we know as the Chenab, the next of the "Five Rivers." East of the Chenab, in the lands of the Ravee and the Bēas, were other small principalities, and also free "kingless" peoples, who owned no master. These states had no tendency to unity or combination. An invader, therefore, had no common resistance to fear; and he could be assured that many would welcome him out of hatred for their neighbors. The prince of Taxila paid homage to Alexander at Nicæa, and promised his aid in subduing India.

Alexander's direct road from the high plain of Cabul into the Punjab lay along the right bank of the Cophen or Cabul River, through the great gate of the Khyber Pass. But it was impossible to advance to the Indus without securing his communications, and for this purpose it was needful to subjugate the river-valleys to the left of the Cabul, among the huge western spurs of the Himalaya Mountains.

For the purposes of this campaign Alexander divided his army. Hephæstion advanced by the Khyber Pass, with orders to construct a bridge across the Indus. The king, with the rest of the army, including the light troops, plunged into the difficult country north of the river; and the winter was spent in warfare with the hardy hill-folks in the district of the Kunar, in remote Chitral, and in the Panjkar and Swat valleys. After this severe winter campaign, the army rested on the west bank of the Indus until spring had begun, and then, with the solemnity of games and sacrifices, crossed the river to Taxila, whose prince and other lesser princes met Alexander with obsequious pomp. A new satrapy, embracing the lands west of the Indus, was now established and intrusted to Philip, son of Machatas; Macedonian garrisons were placed in Taxila and some other places east of the Indus, and Philip was charged with the general command of these troops. This shows the drift of Alexander's policy. The Indus was to be the eastern



boundary of his direct sway; beyond the Indus, he purposed to create no new provinces, but only to form a system of protected states.

326 B.C.

Alexander then marched to the Hydaspes. Prince Porus, having gathered an army from thirty to forty thousand strong, was encamped on the left bank of the river, to contest the crossing. After a march, which was made slow and toilsome by the heavy tropical rain, the invaders encamped on the right bank of the river, and saw the lines of Porus on the opposite shore, protected by a multitude of elephants. It was useless to think of crossing in the face of this host; for the horses, which could not endure the smell and noise of the elephants, would certainly have been drowned; and the men would have found it almost impossible to land, amid showers of darts, on the slimy, treacherous edge of the stream. All the fords in the neighborhood were watched. Alexander adopted measures to deceive and puzzle the enemy. Each night the Macedonian camp was in motion as if for crossing; each night the Indians stood long hours in the wind and rain. Alexander, meanwhile, was maturing a plan which he was able to carry out when he had put Porus off his guard.

About sixteen miles upward from the camp, the Hydaspes made a bend westward, and opposite the jutting angle a thickly wooded island rose amid the stream, while a dense wood covered the right shore. Here Alexander determined to cross. He caused the boats to be conveyed thither in pieces and remade in the shelter of the wood; he had prepared skins stuffed with straw. When the time came, he led a portion of his troops to the wooded promontory, marching at a considerable distance from the river in order to avoid the observation of the enemy. A sufficient force was left to guard the camp under the command of Craterus. The king arrived at the appointed spot later in the evening, and throughout the wet, stormy night he directed the preparations for passing the swollen stream. Before dawn the passage began. Alexander led the way in a boat of thirty oars, and the island was safely passed;

but land was hardly reached before they were descried by Indian scouts. At last the whole force was safely landed on the bank, and Alexander ordered his men for the coming battle — the third of the three great battles of his life. It was to be won without any heavy infantry; he had with him only 6000 hypaspists, about 4000 light foot, 5000 cavalry, including 1000 Scythian archers. Taking all the cavalry with him, he rode rapidly forward toward the camp of Porus.

But Porus was advancing with his main army, having left a small force to guard the river-bank against Craterus. When he reached sandy ground, suitable for the movements of his cavalry and war-chariots, he drew up his line of battle. In front of all he arranged 200 elephants at intervals of 100 feet, and at some distance behind them his infantry, who numbered 20,000, if not more. On the wings he placed his cavalry — perhaps 4000. Alexander waited for the hypaspists to come up, and drew them up opposite to the elephants. It was impossible to attack in front, for neither horse nor foot could venture in between these beasts, which stood like towers of defense, the true strength of the Indian army. The only method was to begin by a cavalry attack on the flank; and Seleucus and the other captains of the infantry were bidden not to advance until they saw that both the horse and the foot of the foe were tumbled into confusion by the flank assault. Alexander determined to concentrate his attack on the left wing; perhaps because it was on the river side, and he would be within easier reach of his troops on the other bank. Accordingly, he kept all his cavalry on his right wing. One body was intrusted to Cœnus, who bore well to the right, and was ready to strike in the rear, and to deal with the body of horse stationed upon the enemy's right wing, in case they should come round to assist their comrades on the left. The mounted Scythian archers rode straight against the front of the enemy's cavalry — which was still in column formation, not having had time to open out — and harassed it with showers of arrows; while Alexander himself, with the rest of the heavy

cavalry, led the charge upon the flank. Porus — who had committed the fatal mistake of allowing the enemy to take the offensive — brought up his remaining squadrons from the right wing as fast as he could. Then Cœnus, who had ridden round close to the river-bank, fell upon them in the rear. The Indians had now to form a double front against the double foe. Alexander seized the moment to press hard upon the adverse squadrons; they swayed backward and sought shelter behind the elephants. Then those elephant riders who were on this side of the army drove the beasts against the Macedonian horses; and at the same time the Macedonian footmen rushed forward and attacked the animals which were now turned sideways toward them. But the other elephants of the line were driven into the ranks of the hypaspists, and dealt destruction, trampling down and striking furiously. Heartened by the success of the elephants, the Indian cavalry rallied and charged, but beaten back by the Macedonian horse, who were now formed in a serried mass, they again sought shelter behind the elephantine wall. But many of the beasts were now furious with wounds and beyond control; some had lost their riders; and in the confusion they trampled on friends and foes alike. The Indians suffered most, for they were surrounded and confined to the space in which the animals raged; while the Macedonians could attack the animals on side or rear, and then retreat into the open when they turned to charge. At length, when the elephants grew weary and their charges were feebler, Alexander closed in. He gave the order for the hypaspists to advance in close array, shield to shield, while he, reforming his squadrons, dashed in from the side. The enemy's cavalry, already weakened and disordered, could not withstand the double shock and was cut to pieces. The hypaspists rolled in upon the enemy's infantry, who soon broke and fled. Meanwhile, the generals on the other side of the river, Craterus and the rest, discovering that fortune was declaring for Alexander, crossed the river without resistance. Porus, who had shown himself a mediocre general,

but a most valiant soldier, when he saw most of his forces scattered, his elephants lying dead or straying riderless, did not flee, — as Darius had twice fled, — but remained fighting, seated on an elephant of commanding height, until he was wounded in the right shoulder, the only part of his body unprotected by mail. Then he turned round and rode away. Alexander, struck with admiration at his prowess, sent messengers who overtook him and induced him to return. The victor, riding out to meet the old prince, was impressed by his stature and beauty, and asked him how he would fain be treated. “Treat me like a king,” said Porus. “For my own sake,” said Alexander, “I will do that; ask a boon for thy sake.” “That,” replied Porus, “containeth all.”

And Alexander treated his captive royally. He not only gave him back his kingdom, but largely increased its borders. This royal treatment was inspired by deep policy. He could rest the security of his rule beyond the Indus on no better base than the mutual jealousy of two moderately powerful princes. He had made the lord of Taxila as powerful as was safe; the reinstatement of his rival Porus would be the best guarantee for his loyalty. But on either side the Hydaspes, close to the scene of the battle, two cities were founded, which would serve as garrisons in the subject land. On the right hand, the city of Bucephala, named after Alexander’s steed, which died here; on the left, Nicæa, the city of victory.

Leaving Craterus to build the cities, Alexander crossed the Acesines, more than a mile and a half broad, into the territory of a namesake and nephew of Porus, who fled eastward. Alexander left Hephæstion to march southward and subdue the land of the younger Porus, as well as the free communities between the two rivers. The news that the Cathæans, a free and warlike people, were determined to give him battle, diverted Alexander from the pursuit. He stormed their chief town Sangala, and all their land was likewise placed under the lordship of Porus. Thus, of the



four river-bounded tracts which compose the Punjab, the largest, between Indus and Jehlum, belonged to Omphis of Taxila, while the three others, between Jehlum and Bēas, were assigned to Porus.

Alexander now advanced to the Hyphasis, or Bēas, and reached it higher up than the point where it joins the Sutlej. It was destined to be the landmark of his utmost march. He wished to go farther and explore the lands of the Ganges, but an unlooked-for obstacle occurred. The Macedonians were worn out with years of hard campaigning, and weary of this endless rolling on into the unknown. Their numbers had dwindled; the remnant of them were battered and grown old before their time. All yearned to go back to their homeland in the west. On the banks of the Hyphasis the crisis came; the men resolved to go no farther. At a meeting of the officers which Alexander summoned, Cœnus was the spokesman of the general feeling. The king retired to his tent and for two days refused to see any of his Companions, hoping that their hearts would be softened. But the Macedonians did not relent or go back from their purpose. On the third day, Alexander offered sacrifices preliminary to crossing the river, declaring that he would advance himself; but the victims gave unfavorable signs. Then the king yielded. When his will was made known, the way-worn veterans burst into wild joy; the more part of them shed tears. They crowded round the royal tent, blessing the unconquered king, that he had permitted himself to be conquered for once, by his Macedonians. On the banks of the Hyphasis, Alexander erected twelve towering altars to the twelve great gods of Olympus, as a thank-offering for having led him safely within reach of the world's end. For in Alexander's conception the Ganges discharged its waters into the ocean which bounded the earth on the east, as the Atlantic bounded it on the west of the world.

Alexander is often represented as a madman, impelled by an insatiable lust of conquest for conquest's sake. But if the form

and feature of the earth were what he pictured it to be, twenty years would have sufficed to make his empire conterminous with its limits. He might have ruled from the eastern to the western ocean, from the ultimate bounds of Scythia to the shores of Libya; he might have brought to pass in the three continents an universal peace, and dotted the habitable globe with his Greek cities. The advance to the Indus was no mere wanton aggression, but was necessary to establish secure routes for trade with India, which was at the mercy of the wild hill-tribes; and the subjugation of the Punjab was a necessity for securing the Indus frontier. The solid interests of commerce underlay the ambitions of the Macedonian conqueror.

Alexander retraced his steps to the Hydaspes, on his way picking up Hephæstion, who had founded a new city on the banks of the Acesines. On the Hydaspes, Craterus had not only built the two cities at the scene of the great battle, but had also prepared a large fleet of transports, which was to carry part of the army down the river to reach the Indus and the ocean. The fleet was placed under the command of Nearchus; the rest of the army, divided into two parts, marched along either bank, under Hephæstion and Craterus.

As they advanced, the only formidable resistance that they encountered was from the free and warlike tribe of the Malli. Having routed a large host of these natives, Alexander pursued them to their chief city, which is possibly to be sought near the site of the modern Multan. Here he met with a grave adventure. The city had been easily taken, and the natives had retreated into the citadel. Two ladders were brought to scale the earthen wall, but it was found hard to place them beneath the shower of missiles from above. Impatient at the delay, Alexander seized a ladder and climbed up under the cover of a shield. Peucestas, who bore the sacred buckler from the temple of Ilion, and Leonnatus followed, and Abreas ascended the other ladder. When the king reached the battlement, he hurled down or slew the Indians who

were posted at that spot. The hypaspists, when they saw their king standing upon the wall, a mark for the whole garrison of the fortress, made a rush for the ladders, and both ladders broke under the weight of the crowd. Only those three — Peucestas, Leonnatus, and Abreas — reached the wall before the ladders broke. His friends implored Alexander to leap down; he answered their cries by leaping down among the enemy. He alighted on his feet. With his back to the wall he stood alone against the throng of foes, who recognized the Great King. With his sword he cut down their leader and some others who ventured to rush at him; he felled two more with stones; and the rest, not daring to approach, pelted him with missiles. Meanwhile, his three companions had cleared the wall of its defenders and leapt down to help their king. Abreas fell slain by a dart. Then Alexander himself received a wound in the breast. For a space he stood and fought, but at last sank on his shield fainting through loss of blood. Peucestas stood over him with the holy shield of Troy, Leonnatus guarded him on the other side, until rescue came. Having no ladders, the Macedonians had driven pegs into the wall, and a few had clambered up as best they could and flung themselves down into the fray. Some of these succeeded in opening one of the gates, and then the fort was taken. No man, woman, or child in the place was spared by the infuriated soldiers, who thought that their king was dead. But, though the wound was grave, Alexander recovered. The rumor of his death reached the camp where the main army was waiting at the junction of the Ravee with the Chenab, and it produced deep consternation and despair. Reassuring letters were not believed; so Alexander caused himself to be carried to the banks of the Ravee, and conveyed by water down to the camp. When he drew near, the canopy which sheltered his bed in the stern of the vessel was removed. The soldiers, still doubting, thought it was his corpse they saw, until the bark drew close to the bank and he waved his hand. Then the host shouted for joy. When he was carried ashore, he was lifted for a moment

on horseback, that he might be the better seen of all; and then he walked a few steps for their greater reassurance.

This adventure is an extreme case of Alexander's besetting weakness, which has been illustrated in many other of his actions. In the excitement of battle, amid the ring of arms, he was apt to forget his duties as a leader. To have endangered his own safety was a crime against the whole army.

The Malli made a complete submission; and when Alexander had recovered from his wound the fleet sailed downward, and the Indian tribes submitted, presenting to the conqueror the characteristic products of India — gems, fine draperies, tame lions, and tigers. At the place where the united stream of the four lesser rivers joins the mighty flow of the Indus, the foundations were laid of a new Alexandria. The next stage of the southward advance was the capital town of the Sogdi, which lay upon the river. Alexander refounded it as a Greek colony, and built wharfs; it was known as the Sogdian Alexandria, and was destined to be the residence of a southern satrapy which was to extend to the sea-coast. It is impossible to identify the sites of these cities, because the face of the Punjab has completely changed, through the alteration of the courses of its rivers, since the days of Alexander.

The principalities of the rich and populous land of Sind were distinguished from the states of the north by the great political power enjoyed by the Brahmans. Under the influence of this caste, the princes either defied Alexander or, if they submitted at first, speedily rebelled. Thus it was nearly midsummer when the king reached Patala, near the Indian Ocean. On the tidings of an insurrection in Arachosia, he had despatched Craterus with a considerable portion of the army to march through the Bolan Pass into southern Afghanistan and put down the revolt. Alexander himself designed to march through Baluchistan, and Craterus was ordered to meet him in Kirman, near the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Another division of the host was to go by sea to the mouth of the Tigris. The king fixed upon Patala to be for the

Indian empire what the most famous of his Alexandrias was for Egypt. He charged Hephæstion with the task of fortifying the citadel and building an ample harbor. Then he sailed southward himself to visit the southern ocean. He sacrificed to Poseidon; he poured drink-offerings from a golden cup to the Nereids and Dioscuri, and to Thetis, the mother of his ancestor Achilles, and then hurled the cup into the waves. This ceremony inaugurated his plan of opening a seaway for commerce between the west and the far east. The enterprise of discovering this seaway was intrusted to Nearchus. Alexander started on his land-march in the early autumn, but Nearchus and the fleet were to wait till October, in order to be helped forward by the eastern monsoons.

**3. Alexander's Return to Babylon.**—No enterprise of Alexander was so useless, and none so fatal, as the journey through the desert

of Gedrosia, the land which is now known as the Mekran. His guiding motive in choosing this route was to make provisions for the safety of the fleet, to dig wells and store food at certain places along the coast.



COIN OF ALEXANDER. OBTVERSE: HEAD OF HERACLES, IN LION'S SKIN. REVERSE: EAGLE-BEARING ZEUS, AND PROW OF GALLEY IN FIELD [LEGEND: ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ]

The march through the Mekran and the voyage of Nearchus were interdependent parts of the same adventure; and so timid were the mariners of those days that the voyage into unknown waters seemed far more formidable than the journey through the waste.

With perhaps thirty thousand men, Alexander passed the mountain wall which protects the Indus delta, and reduced the Oritæ to subjection before he descended into the waste of Gedrosia. The army moved painfully through the desert, where it was often almost impossible to step through the deep sinking sand.

Aug.-Oct.,  
325 B.C.



Alexander himself is said to have trudged on foot and shared all the hardships of the way. At length the waste was crossed; the losses of that terrible Gedrosian journey exceeded the losses of all Alexander's campaigns.

Having rested at Pura, the king proceeded to Kirman, where he was joined by Craterus, who had suppressed the revolt in Arachosia. Presently news arrived that the fleet had reached the Kirman coast, and soon Nearchus arrived at the camp and relieved Alexander's anxiety. They had been weather-bound and had lost three ships; but the king was overjoyed that they had arrived at all. Nearchus was dismissed to complete the voyage by sailing up the Persian Gulf and the Pasitigris River to Susa; Hephæstion was sent to make his way thither along the coast; while Alexander himself marched through the hills by Persepolis and Pasargadæ.

It was high time for Alexander to return. There was hardly a satrap, Persian or Macedonian, in any land, who had not oppressed his province by violence and rapacity. Many satraps were deposed or put to death; and one guilty minister fled at Alexander's approach. This was the treasurer Harpalus, who had squandered his master's money in riotous living at Babylon, and deemed it prudent to move westward. Taking a large sum of money, he went to Cilicia, and hiring a bodyguard of six thousand mercenaries, he lived in royal state at Tarsus. On Alexander's return he fled to Greece, where we shall meet him presently.

Having punished with a stern hand the misrule of his satraps, Macedonian and Persian alike, Alexander began to carry out schemes which he had formed. He had unbarred and unveiled the orient to the knowledge and commerce of the Mediterranean peoples, but his aim was to do much more than this; it was no less than to fuse Asia and Europe into a homogeneous unity. He devised various means for compassing this object. He proposed to transplant Greeks and Macedonians into Asia, and Asiatics into Europe, as permanent settlers. This plan had indeed been partly realized by the foundation of his numerous mixed cities in the far



east. The second means was the promotion of intermarriages between Persians and Macedonians, and this policy was inaugurated in magnificent fashion at Susa. The king himself espoused Statira, the daughter of Darius; his friend Hephæstion took her sister; and a large number of Macedonian officers wedded the daughters of Persian grandees. Of the general mass of the Macedonians ten thousand are said to have followed the example of their officers and taken Asiatic wives; all those were liberally rewarded by Alexander. It is to be noticed that Alexander, already wedded to the princess of Sogdiana, adopted the polygamous custom of Persia; and he even married another royal lady, Parysatis, daughter of Ochus. These marriages were purely dictated by policy; for Alexander never came under the influence of women.

But the most effective means for bringing the two races together was the institution of military service on a perfect equality. With this purpose in view, Alexander, not long after the death of Darius, had arranged that in all the eastern provinces the native youth should be drilled and disciplined in Macedonian fashion and taught to use the Macedonian weapons. In fact, Hellenic military schools were established in every province, and at the end of five years an army of thirty thousand Hellenized barbarians was at the Great King's disposition. At his summons this army gathered at Susa, and its arrival created a natural, though unreasonable, feeling of discontent among the Macedonians, who divined that Alexander aimed at making himself independent of their services. His schemes of transforming the character of his army were also indicated by the enlistment of Persians and other orientals in the Macedonian cavalry regiments.

324 B.C.

Alexander left Susa for Ecbatana in spring. He sailed down the river Pasitigris to the Persian Gulf, surveyed part of the coast, and sailed up the Tigris, removing the weirs which the Persians had constructed to hinder navigation. The army joined him on the way, and he halted at Opis. Here he held an assembly of the Macedonians, and formally discharged all those — about ten

thousand in number — whom old age or wounds had rendered unfit for warfare, promising to make them comfortable for life. The smouldering discontent found a voice now. The cry was raised, "Discharge us all." Alexander leapt down from the platform into the shouting throng; he pointed out thirteen of the most forward rioters, and bade his hypaspists seize them and put them to death. The rest were cowed. Amid a deep silence the king remounted the platform, and in a bitter speech he discharged the whole army. Then he retired into his palace, and on the third day summoned the Persian and Median nobles and appointed them to posts of honor and trust which had hitherto been filled by Macedonians. The names of the Macedonian regiments were transferred to the new barbarian army. When they heard this, the Macedonians, who still lingered in their quarters, miserable and uncertain whether to go or stay, appeared before the gates of the palace. They laid down their arms submissively and implored admission to the king's presence. Alexander came out, and there was a tearful reconciliation, which was sealed by sacrifices and feasts.

The summer and early winter were spent at the Median capital. Here a sorrow, the greatest that could befall him, befell Alexander. Hephæstion fell ill, languished for seven days, and died. Alexander fasted three days, and the whole empire went into mourning.

Alexander set out for Babylon toward the end of the year, and on his way ambassadors from far lands came to his camp. The Bruttians, Lucanians, and Etruscans, the Carthaginians and the Phœnician colonies of Spain, Celts, Scythians of the Black Sea, Libyans, and Ethiopians had all sent envoys to court the friendship of the monarch who seemed already to be lord of half the earth.

**4. Preparations for an Arabian Expedition. Alexander's Death.** — Ever since the successful voyage of Nearchus, Alexander was bent on the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. His eastern empire was not complete so long as this peninsula lay outside it. The possession of this country of sand, however, was only an incident in the grand range of his plans. His visit to In-

dia and the voyage of Nearchus had given him new ideas; he had risen to the conception of making the southern ocean another great commercial sea like the Mediterranean. He hoped to establish a regular trade-route from the Indus to the Tigris and Euphrates, and thence to the canals which connected the Nile with the Red Sea. Alexander destined Babylon to be the capital of his empire, and doubtless it was a wise choice. But its character was now to be transformed. It was to become a naval station and a center of maritime commerce. Alexander set about the digging of a great harbor, with room for a thousand keels.

All was in readiness, at length, for the expedition to the south. On a day in early June, a royal banquet was given in honor of Nearchus and his seamen, shortly about to start on their oceanic voyage. Two nights of carousal ended in a fever which held him for six days, while the expedition's departure was postponed for another and yet another day. Then his condition grew worse, and he was carried back to the palace, where he won a little sleep, but the fever did not abate. When his officers came to him, they found him speechless; the disease became more violent, and a rumor spread among the Macedonian soldiers that Alexander was dead. They rushed clamoring to the door of the palace, and the bodyguards were forced to admit them. One by one they filed past the bed of their young king, but he could not speak to them; he could only greet each by slightly raising his head and signing with his eyes. Peucestas and some others of the Companions passed the night in the temple of Serapis and asked the god whether they should convey the sick man into the temple, if haply he might be cured there by divine help. A voice warned them not to bring him, but to let him remain where he lay. He died on a June evening, before the thirty-third year of his age was fully told.

323 B.C.

His sudden death was no freak of fate or fortune; it was a natural consequence of his character and his deeds. Into thirteen years he had compressed the energies of many lifetimes. Sparing

of himself neither in battle nor at the feast, he was doomed to die young.

5. **Greece under Macedonia.** — The tide of the world's history swept us away from the shores of Greece; we could not pause to see what was happening in the little states which were looking with mixed emotions at the spectacle of their own civilization making its way over the earth. Alexander's victory at the gates of Issus and his ensuing supremacy by sea had taught many of the Greeks the lesson of caution; the Confederacy of the Isthmus had sent congratulations and a golden crown to the conqueror; and when, a twelvemonth later, the Spartan king Agis renewed the war against Macedonia, he got no help or countenance outside the Peloponnesus. Agis induced the Arcadians, except Megalopolis, 331 B.C. the Achæans, and the Eleians, to join him; and the chief object of the allies was to capture Megalopolis. Antipater, as soon as the situation in Thrace set him free, marched southward to the relief of Megalopolis, and easily crushed the allies in a battle fought hard by. Agis fell fighting, and there was no further resistance.

So long as Darius lived, many of the Greeks cherished secret hopes that fortune might yet turn. But on the news of his death such hopes expired, and it was not till Alexander's return from India that anything happened to trouble the peace.

For Athens the twelve years between the fall of Thebes and the death of Alexander were an interval of singular well-being. The conduct of public affairs was in the hands of the two most honorable statesmen of the day, Phocion and Lycurgus; and Demosthenes was sufficiently clear-sighted not to embarrass, but, when needful, to support, the policy of peace. Phocion probably did not grudge him the signal triumph which he won over his old rival, Æschines; for this triumph had only a personal, and not a political, significance. Ctesiphon had proposed to honor Demosthenes, both for his general services to the state and especially for his liberality in contributing from his private purse toward the repair of the city-walls, by crowning him publicly in the theater

with a crown of gold. The Council passed a resolution to this effect; but Æschines lodged an accusation against the proposer, on the ground that the motion violated the *Graphé Paranomôn*. In a speech of the highest ability, Æschines reviewed the public career of Demosthenes, to prove that he was a traitor and responsible for all the disasters of Athens. The reply of Demosthenes, a masterpiece of splendid oratory, captivated the judges; and Æschines, not winning one-fifth part of their votes, left Athens and disappeared from politics.

The Macedonian empire had not yet lasted long enough to turn the traffic of the Mediterranean into new channels, and Athens still enjoyed great commercial prosperity. Although peace was her professed policy, she did not neglect to make provision, in case opportunity should come round, for regaining her sovereignty on sea. Money was spent on the navy, which is said to have been increased to well-nigh four hundred galleys, and on new ship-sheds. The man who was mainly responsible for this naval expenditure was Lycurgus. In recent years considerable changes had been made in the constitution of the financial offices. Eubulus had administered as the president of the Theoric Fund. But now we find the control of the expenditure in the hands of a minister of the public revenue, who was elected by the people and held office for four years, from one Panathenaic festival to another. Lycurgus held this post. The post practically included the functions of a minister of public works, and the ministry of Lycurgus was distinguished by building enterprises. He constructed the Panathenaic stadion on the southern bank of the Ilissus. He rebuilt the Lycean gymnasium, where in these years the philosopher Aristotle used to take his morning and evening "walks," teaching his "peripatetic" disciples. But the most memorable work of Lycurgus was the reconstruction of the theater of Dionysus. It was he who built the rows of marble benches, climbing up the steep side of the Acropolis, as we see them to-day.

Thus Athens discreetly attended to her material well-being, and



courted the favor of the gods, and the only distress which befell her was a dearth of corn. But on the return of Alexander to Susa, two things happened which imperiled the tranquillity of Greece. Alexander promised the Greek exiles — there were more than twenty thousand of them — to procure their return to their native cities. He sent Nicanor to the great congregation of Hellas at the Olympian festival, to order the states to receive back their banished citizens. Only two states objected — Athens and Ætolia; and they objected because, if the edict were enforced, they would be robbed of ill-gotten gains. The Ætolians had possessed themselves of Cēniadæ and driven out its Acarnanian owners. The position of Athens in Samos was similar; the Samians would now be restored to their own lands, and the Athenian settlers would have to go. Both Athens and Ætolia were prepared to resist. 324 B.C.

**6. The Episode of Harpalus and the Greek Revolt.** — Meanwhile, an incident had happened which might induce some of the patriots to hope that Alexander's empire rested on slippery foundations. Harpalus had arrived off the coast of Attica with five thousand talents, a body of mercenaries, and thirty ships. He had come to excite a revolt against his master. Refused admission with his force, he came alone to Athens with a sum of about seven hundred talents. After a while messages arrived both from Macedonia and from Philoxenus, Alexander's financial minister in western Asia, demanding his surrender. The Athenians, on the proposal of Demosthenes, adopted a clever device. They arrested Harpalus, seizing his treasure, and said that they would surrender him to officers expressly sent by Alexander, but declined to give him up to Philoxenus or Antipater. Harpalus escaped, and was shortly afterward murdered by one of his fellow-adventurers.

The stolen money was deposited in the Acropolis, under the charge of specially appointed commissioners, of whom Demosthenes was one. Suddenly it was discovered that only three hundred and fifty talents were actually in the Acropolis. Charges immediately circulated against the influential politicians, that the



other three hundred and fifty talents had been received in bribes by them before the money was deposited in the citadel. The court of Areopagus satisfied themselves that a number of leading statesmen had received considerable sums. Demosthenes appeared in their report as the recipient of twenty talents. He confessed the misdemeanor himself, and sought to excuse it by the subterfuge that he had taken it to repay himself for twenty talents which he had advanced to the Theoric Fund. But why should he repay himself, without any authorization, out of Alexander's money, for a debt owed him by the Athenian state? The charges against Demosthenes were twofold: he had taken money, and he had culpably omitted to report the amount of the deposit and the neglect of those who were set to guard it. He was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents. Unable to pay it, he was imprisoned, but presently effected his escape.

If Alexander had lived, the Athenians might have persuaded him to let them remain in occupation of Samos; for he was always disposed to be lenient to Athens. When the tidings of his death came, men almost refused to credit it; the orator Demades forcibly said, "If he were indeed dead, the whole world would have smelt of his corpse." It did not seem rash to strike for freedom in the unsettled condition of things after his death. Athens revolted from Macedonia; she was joined by Ætolia and many states in northern Greece, and she secured the services of a band of eight thousand discharged mercenaries who had just returned from Alexander's army. One of their captains, the Athenian Leosthenes, occupied Thermopylæ, and near that pass the united Greeks gained a slight advantage over Antipater, who had marched southward as soon as he could gather his troops together. No state in north Greece except Bœotia remained true to Macedonia. The regent shut himself in the strong hill-city of Lamia, which stands over against the pass of Thermopylæ under a spur of Othrys; and here he was besieged during the winter by Leosthenes. These successes had gained some adherents to the cause in the

Peloponnesus; and, if the Greeks had been stronger at sea, that cause might have triumphed, at least for a while. In spring the arrival of Leonnatus, governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, at the head of an army, raised the siege of Lamia. The Greeks marched into Thessaly to meet the new army before it united with Antipater; a battle was fought, in which Leonnatus was wounded to death. Antipater arrived the next day, and, joining forces with the defeated army, withdrew into Macedonia, to await Craterus, who was approaching from the east. When Craterus arrived, they entered Thessaly together, and in an engagement at Crannon, in 322 B.C. which the losses on both sides were light, the Macedonians had a slight advantage. This battle apparently decided the war, but the true cause which hindered the Greeks from continuing the struggle was not the insignificant defeat at Crannon, but the want of unity among themselves, the want of a leader whom they entirely trusted. They were forced to make terms singly, each state on its own behalf.

Athens submitted when Antipater advanced into Bœotia and prepared to invade Attica. She paid dearly for her attempt to win back her power. Antipater, unlike Alexander, had no soft place in his heart for the memories and traditions of Athens. He saw only that, unless strong and stern measures were taken, Macedonia would not be safe against a repetition of the rising which he had suppressed. He therefore imposed three conditions which Phocion and Demades were obliged to accept: that the democratic constitution should be modified by a property qualification; that a Macedonian garrison should be lodged in Munychia; and that the agitators, Demosthenes, Hypereides, and their friends, should be surrendered.

Demosthenes had exerted eloquence in gaining support for the cause of the allies in the Peloponnesus, and his efforts had been rewarded by his recall to Athens. As soon as the city had submitted, he and the other orators fled. Hypereides with two companions sought refuge in the temple of Æacus at Ægina, whence

they were taken to Antipater and put to death. Demosthenes fled to the temple of Poseidon in the island of Calaurea. When the messengers of Antipater appeared and summoned him forth, he swallowed poison, which he had concealed; according to one story, in a pen, and was thus delivered from falling into the hands of the executioner.

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